Hume's philosophy present relevant differences between the work of his young years and the one produced in his maturity. However, the Treatise of Human Nature does not justify referring to a young Hume the same way Hegel, Marx or Kant have sometimes been considered. Hume's work is rather an intermediate case. The author allegedly develops his philosophical thought publishing new versions of its mains subjects, while criticizing the Treatise for its negligence and imprecision. The changes require an attentive examination of each text essaying different reading procedures in order to do justice to the genial imperfections of the Treatise as well as to the more consistent arguments presented in the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding. The result of a careful reading of the first Enquiry may shed light upon the absence of any involvement of association of ideas in causal reasoning. One can also find no compatibility of Hume's epistemology either with common empiricism or any kind of pyrrhonism. Such findings may offer strong support to the conclusion that Hume's mature epistemology operated relevant changes not only in the manner but also in the matter of his earlier work that should be acknowledged as final versions of the author's theoretical positions.
humean epistemology; causation; associationism; empiricism; pyrrhonism