Resumo em Inglês:

Abstract In the practice and teaching of logic, incomplete systems are typically not regarded as proper logical systems. Their study is marginal if not absent in most courses. There seems to be a tyranny of completeness. I find this problematic as many systems are being left behind. This article aims to challenge such tyranny, which I find to be a consequence of a traditional view of logic as a discipline that studies content-independent truths. I begin by showing how this view is inherited from Hilbert’s foundational program. As an alternative, I take a pragmatist view of logic from Frege, Brandom, and Frápolli. I then argue that this view implies a Principle of Expressive Power Priority (PEP) for picking out logical systems, and I show that the tyranny is simply a generalization of a singular case of application of PEP that is correct when we are interested in systems to be run exclusively by computers. But I argue that if the systems are to be employed by knowledgeable human beings, incomplete systems are still interesting. Thus, from this pragmatist view of logic we can overcome the tyranny and rekindle interest in incomplete systems without losing sight on the import of completeness.

Resumo em Inglês:

Abstract Several epistemologists reject Conciliationism on the basis that it self-undermines. They maintain that self-undermining positions are untenable. We argue that these attacks fail to show that there is something fundamentally wrong with Conciliationism. To this end, we examine carefully what the problem can be. First, we discard three inadequate diagnoses - we argue that being self-undermining neither shows that the view is false, nor that it defeats warrant in its favour, nor that it gives incoherent or inviable advice. Second, we develop our own diagnosis, according to which the problem is that the very belief in Conciliationism constitutes a (potentially temporary) rational obstacle for endorsement of the view, which means that subjects are unable to exploit their warrant in favour of the view. Unlike extant positions, on our construal of the problem, conciliationists should not be seriously worried by it, for it is not a serious threat for the plausibility of the view.

Resumo em Inglês:

Abstract Some speakers have their linguistic agency unfairly restricted. Here I explore one way in which silencing can be countered. Instead of individual speakers, I focus on group political action, a strategy successfully employed by feminist movements. I argue that protests have the power to update our normative landscape and, in particular, to amend silencing linguistic practices. To this aim, I apply the presupposition framework introduced by Langton and West, as well as Langton’s view on blocking and counterspeech, to the analysis of feminist movements. In this framework, silencing is the result of the presence of silencing presuppositions. I then argue that some feminist slogans can be understood as blocking silencing presuppositions and therefore promoting more just linguistic practices. Importantly, collective speakers can avoid some of the problems that individual speakers face in their attempts to undo silencing.