HOW STATE-OWNED SHAREHOLDERS UNDER GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION AFFECT THE RE-INNOVATION DECISION OF ENTERPRISES AFTER TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION FAILURE?

	Benchmark regression model				Endogeneity test(2SLS regression model)
	ADDITIONAL	ADDITIONAL	NEW	NEW	ADDITIONAL	ADDITIONAL	NEW	NEW
SOH1	-1.186		0.238^**		-0.976		0.315^***
	(1.295)		(0.092)		(1.482)		(0.12)
SOH2		-6.283		1.008^***		-7.762		1.23^***
		(4.387)		(0.31)		(4.158)		(0.355)
SIZE	1.691^***	1.984^***	1.005^***	0.96^***	1.804^***	2.078^***	0.962^***	0.932^***
	(0.626)	(0.664)	(0.045)	(0.047)	(0.578)	(0.574)	(0.037)	(0.039)
DLDS	13.924	16.705	-2.482^***	-2.865^***	12.45	17.328^*	-2.285^**	-2.909^***
	(11.707)	(11.936)	(0.834)	(0.844)	(9.578)	(9.577)	(1.023)	(0.979)
GROWTH	1.544	1.315	0.095	0.13	1.46	1.27	.156	0.171
	(2.568)	(2.565)	(0.183)	(0.181)	(2.745)	(2.845)	(.198)	(0.171)
ROE	-7.228	-9.171	2.105^***	2.398^***	-8.007	-9.891	2.413^***	2.59^***
	(8.090)	(8.221)	(0.576)	(0.582)	(7.609)	(7.83)	(.637)	(0.675)
TECH	68.307^***	62.554^***	14.975^***	15.882^***	69.359^***	60.192^***	14.101^***	15.666^***
	(23.046)	(23.362)	(1.642)	(1.653)	(20.311)	(21.453)	(1.996)	(2.19)
INNOVAFAIL	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
YEAR	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
_cons	-33.892	-40.516^***	-4.094^***	-3.064^***	-35.8^***	-42.661^***	-3.345^***	-2.51^***
	(13.393)	(14.299)	(0.954)	(1.011)	(13.062)	(13.022)	(0.826)	(0.87)
R-squared	0.103	0.109	0.792	0.796	0.097	0.104	0.779	0.792

	ADDITIONAL	ADDITIONAL	NEW	NEW
SOH1	-0.958		0.157^***
	(1.191)		(0.086)
SOH2		-6.348		1.055^***
		(4.221)		(0.301)
SIZE	1.803^***	2.013^***	0.975^***	0.94^***
	(0.576)	(0.597)	(0.042)	(0.043)
DLDS	12.434	16.275	-2.139^***	-2.779^***
	(11.185)	(11.521)	(0.811)	(0.821)
GROWTH	1.461	1.321	0.142	0.165
	(2.475)	(2.467)	(0.18)	(0.176)
ROE	-7.994	-9.412	2.293^***	2.531^***
	(7.731)	(7.778)	(0.561)	(0.554)
TECH	69.347^***	61.737^***	14.212^***	15.475^***
	(21.895)	(22.271)	(1.588)	(1.586)
INNOVAFAIL	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
YEAR	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
_cons	-35.773^***	-41.13^***	-3.593^***	-2.699^***
	(12.675)	(13.292)	(0.919)	(0.979)
Chi-squared	20.545	22.326	691.004	731.711

	ADDITIONAL	ADDITIONAL	NEW	NEW
SOH1	-0.955		0.216^**
	(1.304)		(0.089)
SOH2		-6.120		0.945^***
		(4.386)		(0.296)
SIZE	1.769^***	2.057^***	0.976^***	0.934^***
	(0.633)	(0.669)	(0.043)	(0.045)
DLDS	7.527	10.229	-1.768^**	-2.068^**
	(12.462)	(12.602)	(0.846)	(0.850)
GROWTH	1.964	1.752	0.043	0.072
	(2.580)	(2.576)	(0.175)	(0.174)
ROE	-7.793	-9.881	1.955^***	2.255^***
	(8.162)	(8.300)	(0.554)	(0.559)
TECH	54.528^**	48.825^*	17.989^***	18.893^***
	(25.209)	(25.400)	(1.712)	(1.712)
MANAGER	2.195	2.227	-0.412^***	-0.425^***
	(1.510)	(1.498)	(0.103)	(0.101)
POWER	2.909	3.727	1.388^**	1.233^**
	(8.627)	(8.582)	(0.586)	(0.579)
INNOVAFAIL	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
YEAR	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
_cons	-33.538^**	-39.938^***	-3.670^***	-2.735^***
	(13.564)	(14.412)	(0.921)	(0.972)
R-squared	0.115	0.122	0.813	0.817

	ADDITIONAL	ADDITIONAL	NEW	NEW
SOH1	15.213^**		1.046^**
	(6.247)		(0.422)
GOVER	-1.961^***	-2.724^***	0.332^***	0.241^***
	(0.645)	(0.532)	(0.044)	(0.036)
SOH1^*GOVER	-2.22^**		-0.12^**
	(0.862)		(0.058)
SOH2		48.293^*		-1.472
		(25.362)		(1.73)
SOH2^*GOVER		-6.228^*		0.249
		(3.299)		(0.225)
SIZE	2.357^***	1.986^***	0.981^***	0.957^***
	(0.559)	(0.591)	(0.038)	(0.04)
DLDS	7.647	8.333	-2.05^***	-2.121^***
	(10.298)	(10.725)	(0.696)	(0.732)
GROWTH	4.006^*	4.321^*	-0.122	-0.107
	(2.28)	(2.316)	(0.154)	(0.158)
ROE	0.996	3.239	1.292^***	1.417^***
	(7.216)	(7.505)	(0.488)	(0.512)
TECH	68.336^***	66.313^***	14.569^***	15.322^***
	(20.241)	(21.043)	(1.368)	(1.436)
INNOVAFAIL	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
YEAR	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
_cons	-32.872^**	-20.333	-5.983^***	-4.797^***
	(12.932)	(13.166)	(0.874)	(0.898)
R-squared	0.318	0.306	0.858	0.852

\begin{aligned} {ADDITIONAL}_{(i, t + 1)} = α + β_{1} {SOH 1}_{(i, t)} + β_{2} {SIZE}_{(i, t)} + β_{3} {DLDS}_{(i, t)} + β_{4} GROWTH_{(i, t)} + β_{5} R O E_{(i, t)} + β_{6} {TECH}_{(i, t)} + β_{7} {INNOVFAIL}_{(i, t)} + + μ_{(i, t)} \end{aligned}

\begin{aligned} {NEW}_{(i, t + 1)} = α + β_{1} {SOH 1}_{(i, t)} + β_{2} {SIZE}_{(i, t)} + β_{3} {DLDS}_{(i, t)} + β_{4} GROWTH_{(i, t)} + β_{5} R O E_{(i, t)} + β_{6} {TECH}_{(i, t)} + β_{7} {INNOVFAIL}_{(i, t)} + + μ_{(i, t)} \end{aligned}

\begin{aligned} {ADDITIONAL}_{(i, t + 1)} = α + β_{1} {SOH 2}_{(i, t)} + β_{2} {SIZE}_{(i, t)} + β_{3} {DLDS}_{(i, t)} + β_{4} GROWTH_{(i, t)} + β_{5} R O E_{(i, t)} + β_{6} {TECH}_{(i, t)} + β_{7} {INNOVFAIL}_{(i, t)} + + μ_{(i, t)} \end{aligned}

\begin{aligned} {NEW}_{(i, t + 1)} = α + β_{1} {SOH 2}_{(i, t)} + β_{2} {SIZE}_{(i, t)} + β_{3} {DLDS}_{(i, t)} + β_{4} GROWTH_{(i, t)} + β_{5} R O E_{(i, t)} + β_{6} {TECH}_{(i, t)} + β_{7} {INNOVFAIL}_{(i, t)} + + μ_{(i, t)} \end{aligned}

\begin{aligned} {ADDITIONAL}_{(i, t + 1)} \\ = α + β_{1} {SOH 1}_{(i, t)} + β_{2} {GOVER}_{(i, t)} + β_{3} SOH 1 * {GOVER}_{(i, t)} \\ + β_{4} SIZE_{(i, t)} + β_{5} D L D S_{(i, t)} \\ + β_{6} {GROWTH}_{(i, t)} + β_{7} {ROE}_{(i, t)} + β_{8} {TECH}_{(i, t)} + β_{g} {INNOVFAIL}_{(i, t)} + μ_{(i, t)} \end{aligned}

\begin{aligned} {NEW}_{(i, t + 1)} \\ = α + β_{1} {SOH 1}_{(i, t)} + β_{2} {GOVER}_{(i, t)} + β_{3} SOH 1 * {GOVER}_{(i, t)} \\ + β_{4} SIZE_{(i, t)} + β_{5} D L D S_{(i, t)} \\ + β_{6} {GROWTH}_{(i, t)} + β_{7} {ROE}_{(i, t)} + β_{8} {TECH}_{(i, t)} + β_{g} {INNOVFAIL}_{(i, t)} + μ_{(i, t)} \end{aligned}

\begin{aligned} {ADDITIONAL}_{(i, t + 1)} \\ = α + β_{1} {SOH 2}_{(i, t)} + β_{2} {GOVER}_{(i, t)} + β_{3} SOH 1 * {GOVER}_{(i, t)} \\ + β_{4} SIZE_{(i, t)} + β_{5} D L D S_{(i, t)} \\ + β_{6} {GROWTH}_{(i, t)} + β_{7} {ROE}_{(i, t)} + β_{8} {TECH}_{(i, t)} + β_{g} {INNOVFAIL}_{(i, t)} + μ_{(i, t)} \end{aligned}

\begin{aligned} {NEW}_{(i, t + 1)} \\ = α + β_{1} {SOH 2}_{(i, t)} + β_{2} {GOVER}_{(i, t)} + β_{3} SOH 1 * {GOVER}_{(i, t)} \\ + β_{4} SIZE_{(i, t)} + β_{5} D L D S_{(i, t)} \\ + β_{6} {GROWTH}_{(i, t)} + β_{7} {ROE}_{(i, t)} + β_{8} {TECH}_{(i, t)} + β_{g} {INNOVFAIL}_{(i, t)} + μ_{(i, t)} \end{aligned}

¿Cómo los accionistas estatales bajo intervención gubernamental afectan la decisión de reinnovación de las empresas después del fracaso de la innovación tecnológica?