BOARD ATTRIBUTES AND ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE: WHAT IS THE NEXUS IN LIBERAL ECONOMIES?

Pinheiro, Alan Bandeira; Oliveira, Marcelle Colares; Freitas, George Alberto de; García, María Belén Lozano

doi:10.1590/S0034-759020230402

Alan Bandeira Pinheiro ^**Corresponding author

Conceptualization

data curation

formal analysis

Investigation

Methodology

Visualization

Writing - original draft

Writing - proofreading and editing

Universidade Federal do Paraná, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Administração, Curitiba, PR, Brazil

Neoma Business School, Doctoral School, Rouen, France

https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6326-575X

Marcelle Colares Oliveira

Acquisition of financing

Investigation

Methodology

Project administration

Resources

Software

Supervision

Universidade Federal do Ceará, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Administração e Controladoria, Fortaleza, CE, Brazil

https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3751-8340

George Alberto de Freitas

Data Curation

Formal Analysis

Validation

Visualization

Writing - original draft

Writing - proofreading and editing

Universidade Federal do Ceará, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Administração e Controladoria, Fortaleza, CE, Brazil

https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7087-422X

María Belén Lozano García

Acquisition of financing

Project administration

Resources

Software

Supervision

Validation

Visualization

Universidad de Salamanca, Instituto Multidisciplinar de Empresa, Salamanca, Spain

https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8514-3737

*Corresponding author

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The authors have no conflicts of interest to declare.

Economic sector name/ Country	AUS	CAN	IRE	NZE	UK	USA	Number of firms
Communication	4	8	0	2	13	29	56
Consumer discretionary	18	13	5	1	40	100	177
Consumer staples	6	10	4	0	21	41	82
Energy	3	22	1	0	7	22	55
Financial	13	24	3	0	30	60	130
Health care	6	2	4	1	6	54	73
Industrials	10	18	3	0	54	92	177
Materials	18	37	5	0	23	43	126
Real Estate	0	0	0	0	3	7	10
Technology	1	7	3	0	10	84	105
Utilities	5	8	0	2	6	25	46
Total	84	149	28	6	213	557	1037

Pillars of environmental disclosure	Description
Recycled	Waste Recycled Total
	Waste Recycled to Total Waste Score
Energy consumption	Energy Efficiency Initiatives
	Energy Use Total
	Renewable Energy Use
Biodiversity	Biodiversity Impact Reduction
	Biodiversity Restoration Protection
Emissions	CO2 Equivalents Emission Total
	NOx Emissions
	SOx Emissions
	Ozone-Depleting Substances
Effluents and Water	Water Discharged
	Water Pollutant Emissions
	Water Recycled
	Water Withdrawal Total
	Water Technologies
Waste	Waste Total
	Non-Hazardous Waste
	Hazardous Waste Reduction
Spills	Recent Spills and Pollution Controversies
	Accidental Spills
Environmental Impacts	Environmental Resource Impact Controversies
	Land Environmental Impact Reduction
	Toxic Chemicals or Substances Reduction
	Environmental Products

Variable	Description	Previous studies
ENVINDEX	Environmental Disclosure: This variable ranges from 0 (less environmental disclosure by the company) to 25 (greater disclosure of environmental issues by the company).	This index was created based on Gamerschlag et al. (2011)Gamerschlag, R., Möller, K., & Verbeeten, F. (2011). Determinants of voluntary CSR disclosure: Empirical evidence from Germany. Review of Managerial Science, 5(2), 233-262. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11846-010-0052-3 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11846-010-0052-... .
BMEET	Board meetings: Number of meetings held by the board per year.	Birindelli et al. (2018)Birindelli, G., Dell’Atti, S., Iannuzzi, A. P., & Savioli, M. (2018). Composition and activity of the board of directors: Impact on ESG performance in the banking system. Sustainability (Switzerland), 10(12), 1-20. https://doi.org/10.3390/su10124699 https://doi.org/10.3390/su10124699... ; Ji et al., (2020)Ji, J., Talavera, O., & Yin, S. (2020). Frequencies of board meetings on various topics and corporate governance: Evidence from China. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 54(1), 69-110. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-018-00784-2 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-018-00784... ; Yusoff et al. (2019)Yusoff, H., Ahman, Z., & Darus, F. (2019). The influence of corporate governance on corporate social responsibility disclosure: A focus on accountability. Academy of Accounting and Financial Studies Journal, 23(1), 1-16. https://search.proquest.com/docview/2238483401?accountid=142908 https://search.proquest.com/docview/2238...
BINDP	Board Independence: Percentage of independent auditors on the board of directors	Endo (2020)Endo, K. (2020). Corporate governance beyond the shareholder-stakeholder dichotomy: Lessons from Japanese corporations’ environmental performance. Business Strategy and the Environment, 29(4), 1625-1633. https://doi.org/10.1002/bse.2457 https://doi.org/10.1002/bse.2457... ; Fallah and Mojarrad (2019)Fallah, M. A., & Mojarrad, F. (2019). Corporate governance effects on corporate social responsibility disclosure: Empirical evidence from heavy-pollution industries in Iran. Social Responsibility Journal, 15(2), 208-225. https://doi.org/10.1108/SRJ-04-2017-0072 https://doi.org/10.1108/SRJ-04-2017-0072... ; Hussain et al. (2018)Hussain, N., Rigoni, U., & Orij, R. P. (2018). Corporate Governance and sustainability performance: Analysis of triple bottom line performance. Journal of Business Ethics, 149(2), 411-432. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-016-3099-5 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-016-3099-...
BSIZE	Board size: Total number of directors on the board of directors.	Bae et al. (2018)Bae, S. M., Masud, M. A. K., & Kim, J. D. (2018). A cross-country investigation of corporate governance and corporate sustainability disclosure: A signaling theory perspective. Sustainability (Switzerland), 10(8), 1-16. https://doi.org/10.3390/su10082611 https://doi.org/10.3390/su10082611... ; Husted and Sousa-Filho (2019)Husted, B. W., & Sousa-Filho, J. M. de. (2019). Board structure and environmental, social, and governance disclosure in Latin America. Journal of Business Research, 102, 220-227. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2018.01.017 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2018.0... ; Olthuis and Oever (2020)
SUSCM	Sustainability Committee: Presence of a sustainability committee (1), absence of a sustainability committee (0).	Adel et al. (2019)Adel, C., Hussain, M. M., Mohamed, E. K. A., & Basuony, M. A. K. (2019). Is corporate governance relevant to the quality of corporate social responsibility disclosure in large European companies? International Journal of Accounting and Information Management, 27(2), 301-332. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJAIM-10-2017-0118 https://doi.org/10.1108/IJAIM-10-2017-01... ; Burke et al. (2019); Orazalin (2020)Orazalin, N. (2020). Do board sustainability committees contribute to corporate environmental and social performance? The mediating role of corporate social responsibility strategy. Business Strategy and the Environment, 29(1), 140-153. https://doi.org/10.1002/bse.2354 https://doi.org/10.1002/bse.2354...
GENDI	Gender diversity: Percentage of women on the board over the total number of members on the board of directors	Furlotti et al. (2019)Furlotti, K., Mazza, T., Tibiletti, V., & Triani, S. (2019). Women in top positions on boards of directors: Gender policies disclosed in Italian sustainability reporting. Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, 26(1), 57-70. https://doi.org/10.1002/csr.1657 https://doi.org/10.1002/csr.1657... ; Jizi (2017)Jizi, M. (2017). The Influence of board composition on sustainable development disclosure. Business Strategy and the Environment, 26(5), 640-655. https://doi.org/10.1002/bse.1943 https://doi.org/10.1002/bse.1943... ; Nadeem et al. (2020)Nadeem, M., Gyapong, E., & Ahmed, A. (2020). Board gender diversity and environmental, social, and economic value creation: Does family ownership matter? Business Strategy and the Environment, 29(3), 1268-1284. https://doi.org/10.1002/bse.2432 https://doi.org/10.1002/bse.2432...
GRI	Adoption of GRI guidelines: it takes the value 1 if the company publishes a CSR report following the GRI guidelines and 0, otherwise.	Fuente et al. (2017); Kuzey and Uyar (2017); Torelli et al. (2020)
ROA	Return on Assets: Net Income / Total Assets	Bae et al. (2018)Bae, S. M., Masud, M. A. K., & Kim, J. D. (2018). A cross-country investigation of corporate governance and corporate sustainability disclosure: A signaling theory perspective. Sustainability (Switzerland), 10(8), 1-16. https://doi.org/10.3390/su10082611 https://doi.org/10.3390/su10082611... ; Frías-Aceituno et al. (2013); Husted and Sousa-Filho (2019)Husted, B. W., & Sousa-Filho, J. M. de. (2019). Board structure and environmental, social, and governance disclosure in Latin America. Journal of Business Research, 102, 220-227. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2018.01.017 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2018.0...
FIRMSIZE	Firm Size: This variable is measured by: number of employees/10000.	Adel et al. (2019)Adel, C., Hussain, M. M., Mohamed, E. K. A., & Basuony, M. A. K. (2019). Is corporate governance relevant to the quality of corporate social responsibility disclosure in large European companies? International Journal of Accounting and Information Management, 27(2), 301-332. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJAIM-10-2017-0118 https://doi.org/10.1108/IJAIM-10-2017-01... ; Huang (2013)
SECTOR	High Impact Sector: it takes the value 1 if the company operates in an industry with strong and direct environmental impact and 0, otherwise.	Gallego-Álvarez and Pucheta-Martínez (2020); Odoemelam and Okafor (2018)Odoemelam, N., & Okafor, R. (2018). The influence of corporate governance on environmental disclosure of listed non-financial firms in Nigeria. Indonesian Journal of Sustainability Accounting and Management, 2(1), 25-49. https://doi.org/10.28992/ijsam.v2i1.47 https://doi.org/10.28992/ijsam.v2i1.47... ; Torelli et al. (2020)
AUSTRALIA	Dummy variable: 1 = if the firm is in Australia; 0 = Otherwise.	---
CANADA	Dummy variable: 1 = if the firm is in Canada; 0 = Otherwise.	---
IRELAND	Dummy variable: 1 = if the firm is in Ireland; 0 = Otherwise.	---
NEWZEALAND	Dummy variable: 1 = if the firm is in New Zealand; 0 = Otherwise.	---
UK	Dummy variable: 1 = if the firm is in the United Kingdom; 0 = Otherwise.	---
USA	Dummy variable: 1 = if the firm is in the United States; 0 = Otherwise.	---

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Shapiro-Francia W test
ENVINDEX	3966	12.88	2.78	10	24	0.92
BMEET	3966	8.77	3.77	1	48	0.87
BINDP	3966	98.88	6.77	0	100	0.92
BSIZE	3966	10.14	2.65	1	22	0.99
SUSCM	3966	0.59	0.49	0	1	1.00
GENDI	3966	13.57	9.87	0	60	0.99
GRI	3966	0.28	0.45	0	1	1.00
ROA	3087	0.07	0.06	-0.5	0.41	0.90
FIRMSIZE	3966	3.87	9.53	0.09	220	0.31
SECTOR	3966	0.21	0.41	0	1	1.00
AUSTRALIA	3966	0.07	0.26	0	1	1.00
CANADA	3966	0.14	0.34	0	1	1.00
IRELAND	3966	0.02	0.15	0	1	1.00
NEWZEALAND	3966	0.00	0.07	0	1	1.00
UK	3966	0.20	0.40	0	1	1.00
USA	3966	0.54	0.49	0	1	1.00

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
(1) ENVINDEX	1.00
(2) BMEET	0.05^* ***** p<0.01.	1.00
(3) BINDP	0.05^* ***** p<0.01.	-0.05^* ***** p<0.01.	1.00
(4) BSIZE	0.20^* ***** p<0.01.	-0.05	0.09^* ***** p<0.01.	1.00
(5) SUSCM	0.42^* ***** p<0.01.	0.12^* ***** p<0.01.	0.03^* ***** p<0.01.	0.21^* ***** p<0.01.	1.00
(6) GENDI	0.13^* ***** p<0.01.	0.04^* ***** p<0.01.	0.09^* ***** p<0.01.	0.25^* ***** p<0.01.	0.21^* ***** p<0.01.	1.00
(7) GRI	0.63^* ***** p<0.01.	0.06^* ***** p<0.01.	0.05^* ***** p<0.01.	0.25^* ***** p<0.01.	0.43^* ***** p<0.01.	0.20^* ***** p<0.01.	1.00
(8) ROA	0.02	-0.20^* ***** p<0.01.	-0.01	-0.15^* ***** p<0.01.	-0.08^* ***** p<0.01.	-0.02	-0.02	1.00
(9) FIRMSIZE	0.06^* ***** p<0.01.	-0.03^ p<0.05.	0.03	0.20^* ***** p<0.01.	0.12^* ***** p<0.01.	0.14^* ***** p<0.01.	0.16^* ***** p<0.01.	0.01	1.00
(10) SECTOR	0.27^* ***** p<0.01.	0.03^* * p<0.10.	-0.02	-0.05^* ***** p<0.01.	0.15^* ***** p<0.01.	-0.11^* ***** p<0.01.	0.18^* ***** p<0.01.	-0.09^* ***** p<0.01.	-0.12^* ***** p<0.01.	1.00
(11) AUSTRALIA	0.01	0.22^* ***** p<0.01.	-0.31^* ***** p<0.01.	-0.23^* ***** p<0.01.	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.06^* ***** p<0.01.	0.06^* ***** p<0.01.	1.00
(12) CANADA	-0.01	0.08^* ***** p<0.01.	0.05^* ***** p<0.01.	0.07^* ***** p<0.01.	0.09^* ***** p<0.01.	-0.08^* ***** p<0.01.	0.01	-0.09^* ***** p<0.01.	-0.08^* ***** p<0.01.	0.22^* ***** p<0.01.	-0.11^* ***** p<0.01.	1.00
(13) IRELAND	0.01	0.02	-0.01	0.01	-0.03^* * p<0.10.	-0.03^* ***** p<0.01.	0.02	0.03^* * p<0.10.	0.01	-0.00	-0.04^* ***** p<0.01.	-0.06^* ***** p<0.01.	1.00
(14) NEWZEALAND	-0.03	0.05^* ***** p<0.01.	-0.11^* ***** p<0.01.	-0.07^* ***** p<0.01.	0.01	0.03^* ***** p<0.01.	-0.01	-0.00	-0.02^* * p<0.10.	0.02	-0.02	-0.02^* * p<0.10.	-0.01	1.00
(15) UK	0.09^* ***** p<0.01.	0.05^* ***** p<0.01.	-0.01	-0.15^* ***** p<0.01.	0.17^* ***** p<0.01.	-0.09^* ***** p<0.01.	-0.03^ p<0.05.	0.02	-0.04^* ***** p<0.01.	-0.06^* ***** p<0.01.	-0.14^* ***** p<0.01.	-0.20^* ***** p<0.01.	-0.08^* ***** p<0.01.	-0.03^* ***** p<0.01.	1.00
(16) USA	-0.07^* ***** p<0.01.	-0.23^* ***** p<0.01.	0.16^* ***** p<0.01.	0.20^* ***** p<0.01.	-0.19^* ***** p<0.01.	0.14^* ***** p<0.01.	0.00	0.02	0.12^* ***** p<0.01.	-0.14^* ***** p<0.01.	-0.31^* ***** p<0.01.	-0.44^* ***** p<0.01.	-0.17^* ***** p<0.01.	-0.08^* ***** p<0.01.	-0.55^* ***** p<0.01.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
	D.V.: Recycled	D.V.: Energy Consumption	D.V.: Emissions	D.V.: Effluents and Water	D.V.: Waste	D.V.: Spills	D.V.: Environmental Impacts	D.V.: Environmental Index
Variable	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.
BMEET	0.000	0.006	-0.002	0.000	0.002	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001
BINDP	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.003^ p<0.05.	0.003^* * p<0.10.	0.000	0.011^* * p<0.10.
BSIZE	0.009^* * p<0.10.	0.001	0.007^* ***** p<0.01.	0.025^* ***** p<0.01.	0.010^ p<0.05.	0.007^* * p<0.10.	0.007^* ***** p<0.01.	0.063^* ***** p<0.01.
SUSCM	0.410^* ***** p<0.01.	0.259^* ***** p<0.01.	0.019^* * p<0.10.	0.063^ p<0.05.	0.376^* ***** p<0.01.	0.090^* ***** p<0.01.	0.008	1.013^* ***** p<0.01.
GENDI	0.001	0.000	0.009^* * p<0.10.	0.000	-0.000	-0.001	-0.000	0.000
GRI	0.640^* ***** p<0.01.	0.415^* ***** p<0.01.	0.215^* ***** p<0.01.	0.668^* ***** p<0.01.	0.826^* ***** p<0.01.	0.641^* ***** p<0.01.	0.075^* ***** p<0.01.	3.189^* ***** p<0.01.
ROA	0.315	0.126	0.231^* ***** p<0.01.	1.487^* ***** p<0.01.	0.566^* ***** p<0.01.	0.929^* ***** p<0.01.	0.132^* ***** p<0.01.	3.504^* ***** p<0.01.
FIRMSIZE	-0.005^* ***** p<0.01.	-0.000	-0.000^ p<0.05.	-0.002^* ***** p<0.01.	-0.004^* ***** p<0.01.	-0.001	-0.000^* * p<0.10.	-0.013^* ***** p<0.01.
SECTOR	-0.221^* ***** p<0.01.	-0.003	0.291^* ***** p<0.01.	0.637^* ***** p<0.01.	0.040	0.171^* ***** p<0.01.	0.106^* ***** p<0.01.	1.138^* ***** p<0.01.
Obs.	3085	3085	3085	3085	3085	3085	3085	3085
Effect	Random	Random	Random	Random	Random	Random	Random	Random
R²overall:	0.2530	0.3211	0.2888	0.3200	0.3606	0.2391	0.1193	0.4563
R² between	0.8153	0.7026	0.3557	0.7405	0.8256	0.7031	0.5275	0.8244
VIF	1.16	1.16	1.16	1.16	1.16	1.16	1.16	1.16
Breusch-Pagan test	463.38^* ***** p<0.01.	55.61^* ***** p<0.01.	1605.65^* ***** p<0.01.	1973.08^* ***** p<0.01.	248.79^* ***** p<0.01.	1088.61^* ***** p<0.01.	3818.12^* ***** p<0.01.	762.31^* ***** p<0.01.
Durbin-Watson test	No endogenous	No endogenous	No endogenous	No endogenous	No endogenous	No endogenous	No endogenous	No endogenous
Wald x² test	1041.67^* ***** p<0.01.	1454.40^* ***** p<0.01.	1248.54^* ***** p<0.01.	1447.03^* ***** p<0.01.	1734.02^* ***** p<0.01.	966.38^* ***** p<0.01.	416.64^* ***** p<0.01.	2580.93^* ***** p<0.01.
Year effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Hausman test	Prob>chi2 =0.999	Prob>chi2 =0.984	Prob>chi2 =0.997	Prob>chi2 =0.998	Prob>chi2 =0.996	Prob>chi2 =0.999	Prob>chi2 =0.883	Prob>chi2 =0.992

	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14
Variable	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.
AUSTRALIA	0.228
CANADA		-0.747^* ***** p<0.01.
IRELAND			0.398
NEWZEALAND				-1.067^ p<0.05.
UK					0.844^* ***** p<0.01.
USA						-0.320^* ***** p<0.01.
BMEET	-0.005	0.002	-0.002	-0.000	-0.001	-0.010
BINDP	0.014^ p<0.05.	0.013^ p<0.05.	0.011^* * p<0.10.	0.009^* * p<0.10.	0.010^* * p<0.10.	0.015^* ***** p<0.01.
BSIZE	0.069^* ***** p<0.01.	0.073^* ***** p<0.01.	0.062^* ***** p<0.01.	0.060^* ***** p<0.01.	0.077^* ***** p<0.01.	0.073^* ***** p<0.01.
SUSCM	1.017^* ***** p<0.01.	1.058^* ***** p<0.01.	1.017^* ***** p<0.01.	1.017^* ***** p<0.01.	0.818^* ***** p<0.01.	0.927^* ***** p<0.01.
GENDI	0.000	-0.001	0.000	0.001	0.003	0.002
GRI	3.180^* ***** p<0.01.	3.165^* ***** p<0.01.	3.185^* ***** p<0.01.	3.185^* ***** p<0.01.	3.228^* ***** p<0.01.	3.200^* ***** p<0.01.
ROA	3.482^* ***** p<0.01.	3.356^* ***** p<0.01.	3.471^* ***** p<0.01.	3.498^* ***** p<0.01.	3.380^* ***** p<0.01.	3.464^* ***** p<0.01.
FIRMSIZE	-0.013^* ***** p<0.01.	-0.014^* ***** p<0.01.	-0.013^* ***** p<0.01.	-0.013^* ***** p<0.01.	-0.012^* ***** p<0.01.	-0.012^* ***** p<0.01.
SECTOR	1.134^* ***** p<0.01.	1.245^* ***** p<0.01.	1.142^* ***** p<0.01.	1.144^* ***** p<0.01.	1.196^* ***** p<0.01.	1.110^* ***** p<0.01.
Obs.	3085	3085	3085	3085	3085	3085
Effect	Random	Random	Random	Random	Random	Random
R² overall:	0.4567	0.4624	0.4567	0.4572	0.4679	0.4587
R² between	0.8242	0.8057	0.8290	0.8278	0.8327	0.8368
VIF	1.21	1.16	1.15	1.15	1.17	1.19
Breusch-Pagan test	755.62^* ***** p<0.01.	785.09^* ***** p<0.01.	755.76^* ***** p<0.01.	753.89^* ***** p<0.01.	763.20^* ***** p<0.01.	749.88^* ***** p<0.01.
Durbin-Watson test	No endogenous	No endogenous	No endogenous	No endogenous	No endogenous	No endogenous
Wald x² test	2584.42^* ***** p<0.01.	2644.16^* ***** p<0.01.	2584.18^* ***** p<0.01.	2589.38^* ***** p<0.01.	2702.60^* ***** p<0.01.	2605.08^* ***** p<0.01.
Year effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Hausman test	Prob>chi2=0.996	Prob>chi2=0.996	Prob>chi2=0.996	Prob>chi2=0.997	Prob>chi2=0.999	Prob>chi2=0.998

\begin{matrix} {Disclosure}_{i t} = β_{0} + β_{1} {BMEET}_{i t} + β_{2} {BINDP}_{i t} + β_{3} {BSIZE}_{i t} + β_{4} {SUSCM}_{i t} + β_{5} {GENDI}_{t} + β_{6} {GRI}_{i t} + \\ β_{7} {ROA}_{i t} + β_{8} {FirmSize}_{i t} + β_{9} {Sector}_{i t} + β_{9} {Australia}_{i t} + β_{10} {Canada}_{i t} + β_{11} {Ireland}_{i t} + \\ β_{12} {NewZealand}_{i t} + β_{13} {UK}_{i t} + β_{14} {USA}_{i t} + μ_{i} + ε_{i t} \end{matrix}

[1] *Corresponding author

Brasil

Brasil

BOARD ATTRIBUTES AND ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE: WHAT IS THE NEXUS IN LIBERAL ECONOMIES?

Atributos de la junta y divulgación ambiental: ¿Cuál es el nexo en las economías liberales?

ABSTRACT