What we know about party federations in Brazil: electoral reform, political context, formation, and outcomes

Abstract:

Law No. 14.208/2021 introduced party federations into the Brazilian political system. Since its enactment, three federations have been formed: PCdoB-PT-PV, Cidadania-PSDB, and Rede-PSOL. This article examines the political and institutional context that led to the creation of party federations, the process involved in their formation and internal governance, and their performance in the 2022 and 2024 elections. The research draws on party documents that detail intra-party negotiations and strategies during the federation-building process, as well as press coverage that sheds light on behind-the-scene dynamics. To analyze internal governance, the statutes registered with the Superior Electoral Court (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral - TSE) were also reviewed. Our findings suggest that party federations offer more advantages than drawbacks for the political system. However, from the perspective of individual parties, while federations help parties clear the performance threshold clause, they do not necessarily ensure the long-term resilience of legislative caucuses.

Keywords:
electoral reform; political parties; party federations; political reform

Resumo:

Após a Lei 14.208/2021, o sistema político brasileiro passou a contar com o mecanismo das federações partidárias. A partir de então, três federações partidárias foram formadas: PCdoB, PT e PV; Cidadania e PSDB; e Rede e PSOL. O presente artigo investiga o contexto que levou ao surgimento das federações partidárias, os processos de formação e governança das três federações e os resultados obtidos nas eleições de 2022 e 2024. Para a realização da pesquisa, foram analisados documentos partidários que registram as oscilações e negociações entre as legendas no processo de construção das federações, além de matérias jornalísticas que contextualizam os bastidores dessas articulações. Com o intuito de compreender a governança interna das federações, foram examinados os estatutos registrados no Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE). O artigo conclui que a federação partidária traz mais benefícios do que desvantagens para o sistema político. Já do ponto de vista particular dos partidos, os dados indicam que a federação é útil para garantir a superação da cláusula de desempenho, mas não é necessariamente um instrumento para resiliência de bancadas.

Palavras-chave:
reforma eleitoral; partidos políticos; federações partidárias; reforma política

Introduction

On September 28, 2021, President Jair Bolsonaro signed Law No. 14.208/2021 (Brasil, 2021a), introducing party federations into Brazil’s political system. This institutional innovation applied to the 2022 and 2024 elections, during which three federations were formed: PCdoB-PT-PV, Cidadania-PSDB, and Rede-PSOL.

Party federations emerged as a strategy for smaller parties to mitigate the constraints imposed by the 2017 electoral reform, which established an electoral performance threshold and abolished proportional coalitions. The reform aimed to reduce the fragmentation of Brazil’s party system, disproportionately affecting smaller parties.

Although new in Brazil, party federations are not unprecedented in Latin America. Similar institutional arrangements exist under other names in countries such as Chile and Uruguay (Gresta; Carvalho, 2022).

This article examines the political and institutional context that led to the creation of party federations in Brazil, the formation and internal governance of the three federations created before the 2022 elections, and their electoral performance in 2022 and 2024. The study aimed to understand how this new institutional innovation shapes party organization, identify the results achieved and their significance, and discuss the advantages and disadvantages of federations for Brazil’s political system.

The research draws on party documents detailing intra-party negotiations during federation formation, as well as media reports that shed light on behind-the-scene dynamics. To assess internal governance, the statutes filed with the Superior Electoral Court (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral - TSE) were examined. Electoral results from the TSE database were also systematized and analyzed, with special emphasis on differences between the 2020 and 2024 municipal elections and the 2018 and 2022 Chamber of Deputies (lower house) elections.

The federal legislative elections are particularly significant for federations, since it is in the race for the Chamber of Deputies that parties must clear the performance threshold, a major motivation for adopting the mechanism. Nevertheless, municipal election results were also examined due to their potential influence on subsequent proportional elections through the reverse coattail effect (Ames, 1994; Avelino, Biderman; Barone, 2012; Eduardo; Russo, 2022; Schaefer; Krause; Mancuso, 2024; Ventura, 2021).

This article is divided into five sections. The first reviews the political context of the 2021 electoral reform that created party federations in Brazil. The second section examines the political negotiations that led to the creation of the three federations in 2022, while the third analyzes their governance structures based on TSE-registered statutes, and the fourth assesses their electoral performance in 2022 and 2024. The final section discusses the advantages and disadvantages of party federations for Brazil’s political system.

Overall, the analysis suggests that party federations offer more benefits than drawbacks at the system levels. However, for small parties, while federations have proved useful in terms of clearing the performance threshold, they do not necessarily ensure long-term caucus strength. In other words, although party federations have helped guarantee short-term party survival, they appear less capable of sustaining it over the medium and long term.

Political context: the performance threshold and the end of coalitions

To understand the adoption of Law No. 14.208/2021 (Brasil, 2021a), which introduced party Federations to Brazil’s political system, it is important to revisit 2017, a notable political moment in Brazil when the party system experienced a legitimacy crisis under intense scrutiny from mainstream media and the judiciary, particularly through Operation Car Wash (Santos, 2017; Souza, 2016). For instance, a 2013 Transparency International survey found that 81% of Brazilians viewed political parties as “corrupt or very corrupt” (Bruno, 2013, translated by the author). In response, political elites sought to demonstrate accountability to public opinion, culminating Constitutional Amendment No. 97/2017 (Brasil, 2017).

This amendment represented a major electoral reform. It eliminated coalitions in proportional elections beginning in 2020 and introduced a performance threshold that parties had to meet to access public funding and broadcast time from 2018 onward. Both measures aimed to reduce the number of political parties.

Two primary motivations drove these reforms. For political elites, the goal was to enhance executive governability, while from society’s perspective the aim was to improve the quality of representation (Gomes; Lacerda, 2023).

As noted by Testa, Mesquita and Bolognesi (2024, p. 14, translated by the author), “these changes indicate a growing concern with legislative fragmentation among political elites beginning in 2015, who sought mechanisms to minimize the role of small parties”. Larger parties also had an implicit interest in absorbing smaller ones within their orbit.

The second motivation stemmed from the widespread belief that excessive party fragmentation undermined the legitimacy of the system. According to Meneguello and Amaral (2022, p. 63, translated by the author), “the strong fragmentation of the party system is one of the main explanations for citizens’ detachment from parties because it hampers the development of representative and identity-based ties”. Nicolau (2017, p. 92, translated by the author) adds that “the proliferation of parties in Brazil does not reflect ideological diversity or social cleavages, but rather institutional factors”, especially permissive coalition rules in proportional elections and easy access to public funds and media time for small parties. Thus, ending proportional coalitions and tightening access to public funds appeared to be the most effective tools to reduce fragmentation.

However, these measures have been criticized for their potential antidemocratic implications. Political theorist Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos repeatedly voiced strong objections. Writing in the 1990s, he stated:

In political philosophy, it is extremely difficult to justify any legislation that extinguishes parties or imposes barriers to representation. The cornerstone of the representative system stipulates that voters cannot transfer to their representatives any powers they themselves do not possess. This does not include the power to eliminate other parties or to force candidates elected by one party to migrate to another. If failure to reach a certain vote threshold is offered as a pretext for this coercion, then this coercion has a name: tyranny of the majority in the first case, and electoral fraud in the second. [...] Democratically, no citizen has the right to authorize their representatives to strip others of rights while theirs remain intact. Even if the chamber unanimously legislated to the contrary and the electorate unanimously ratified this legislation, it would still be undemocratic. Fundamental political rights transcend majorities and unanimities, and the right to representation, according to each person’s choice, is a fundamental right (Santos, 1994, p. 14, translated by the author).

A decade later, Santos (2007, p. 109, translated by the author) reiterated that “performance thresholds do not merely curb excessive fragmentation; they reduce political competition and representation”. His central argument is that in liberal democracies, more competition means more democracy. However, by limiting the rights of small parties relative to those of their medium-sized and large counterparts, thresholds constitute an anticompetitive and ultimately antidemocratic constraint.

Despite ongoing debates in political theory, Constitutional Amendment No. 97/2017 ultimately prevailed, abolishing electoral coalitions and establishing a performance threshold. This means that the party system was not reduced organically, but by institutional force. Evidence of this shift appeared immediately after the 2018 elections, which produced “an alarming increase in party fragmentation in the Brazilian legislature, reaching an unprecedented level in the country’s democratic period” (Krause; Schaefer; Mancuso, 2023, p. 111, translated by the author). Thirty parties secured seats in the Chamber of Deputies, the highest number in Brazil’s history. Among the 35 existing parties, 14 fell below the performance threshold: Patriota, PHS, PCdoB, PRP, Rede, PRTB, PMN, PTC, PPL, DC, PMB, PCB, PSTU, and PCO.

To avoid sanctions under the threshold, parties began restructuring through incorporations. Article 2 of Brazilian Party Law allows “the creation, merger, incorporation, and abolition of political parties whose programs respect national sovereignty, the democratic regime, multi-party pluralism, and people’s fundamental rights” (Brasil, 1995, translated by the author). This enables smaller parties to combine in order to clear the threshold.

In 2019, PRP was absorbed by Patriota, PPL joined PCdoB, and PHS merged with Podemos, reducing the number of registered parties from 35 in 2018 to 32 by the end of 2019. This consolidation continued: in 2022, DEM and PSL merged to create União Brasil, and in 2023, PSC joined Podemos, PROS joined Solidariedade, and PTB merged with Patriota to form PRD. The only entirely new party registered during this period was Unidade Popular in 2019. By the end of 2024, Brazil had 29 registered political parties.

This system-wide contraction was mirrored at the municipal and state level. In the 2020 municipal elections, the first under the new rules, the number of parties fielding candidates and electing city council members declined (Aikawa; Machado, 2023). In state legislatures, Krause, Schaefer and Mancuso (2023, p. 133, translated by the author) observed “a generalized decline in the ENP [Effective Number of Parties] between 2018 and 2022, reversing previous fragmentation trends and demonstrating that the reform achieved its primary goals”. As noted by Bolognesi (2023), the reforms reshaped strategic behavior among parties and voters.

Electoral reform and the emergence of party federations

Facing the risk of disappearance unless they merged, smaller parties began advocating in Congress for a different institutional solution: Party federations (Vasquez; Sandes-Freitas; Santana, 2024).

This concept is not new, but rather dates back to at least 1999, when PCdoB representative Haroldo Lima introduced Bill No. 1.203 of June 16, 1999, proposing a so-called “Front of Parties” (Frente de Partidos) (Brasil, 1999). According to Lima (2000, p. 36), the initiative sought to offer another mechanism for political coordination while preserving the autonomy of each member party. Over time, the idea of a party front evolved into the institutional model now known as the party federation.

Just over two months after Haroldo Lima introduced his bill in the Chamber of Deputies, the Senate took up the issue. In the Constitution, Justice, and Citizenship Committee (Comissão de Constituição, Justiça e Cidadania - CCJ), lawmakers debated a proposal from Senator José Agripino (PFL) to limit access to radio and television time for parties that failed to win at least 5% of the national vote and at least 2% in one-third of the states. The CCJ, however, approved a substitute proposed by Senator Edison Lobão (PFL), incorporating an amendment by Senator Antônio Carlos Valadares (PSB) that would allow parties falling below those thresholds to join in federations. The substitute, including Valadares’ amendment, was approved by the Senate on October 21, 1999. This marked the first time the federation mechanism had been approved by either chamber of Brazil’s National Congress, although the Chamber of Deputies did not immediately act on it.

In 2003, the Chamber created a Special Committee on Political Reform, which drafted Bill No. 2.679/2003. It stipulated that:

Two or more political parties may form a federation that, once constituted and registered with the Superior Electoral Court, shall operate as a single party organization, including in candidate nomination and parliamentary functioning, while preserving the identity and autonomy of its member parties (Brasil, 2003, art. 3, translated by the author).

The bill required “member parties to remain in the federation for at least three years” (Brasil, 2003, art. 3, translated by the author). According to Fleischer (2006, p. 146, translated by the author), “it is akin to a three-year civil union”. The intent was to replace ad-hoc electoral coalitions with more programmatic, durable alliances, encouraging federations of ideologically aligned parties. According to Vasquez, Sandes-Freitas and Santana (2024, p. 6, translated by the author), “the mandatory duration induces ideological compatibility among partners, weakening purely pragmatic alliances and strengthening programmatic ones”. The bill also proposed another significant institutional change in the form of closed, pre-ordered party lists for proportional elections, stating in paragraph 5: “The statute referred to in item II of paragraph 4 shall establish rules for compiling the pre-ordered party lists for proportional elections” (Brasil, 2003, translated by the author). However, the proposal stalled and was never voted on, reportedly due to opposition from three medium-sized parties - PP, PTB, and PL (Fleischer, 2006, p. 146).

A similar proposal resurfaced four years later with Bill No. 1.210/2007, which addressed multiple issues, including closed-list voting, campaign finance, media regulation, coalitions, and federations. The federation language was identical to the 2003 bill, and again, the proposal never advanced.

Substantive progress only occurred in 2015, when the Senate approved Bill No. 477/2015, drafted by its Political Reform Committee. Like the earlier proposals, it allowed parties to form federations that would operate as single organizations once registered with the TSE (Brasil, 2015). It required a four-year minimum duration, one year longer than the 2003 version, and again incorporated the closed-list proposal. Once approved by the Senate, it was forwarded to the Chamber of Deputies, where it was renumbered as Bill No. 2.522/2015 and languished without movement until 2021.

Concerned about the effects of the 2017 electoral reform and the fast-approaching 2022 elections, smaller parties saw the long-dormant Bill No. 2.522/2015 as a political lifeline (Fisch; Mesquita, 2022). They worked with then Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, Arthur Lira (PP), to secure its passage in 2021. The timetable was tight, however, because to take effect for the October 2022 elections, the law had to be enacted by September 2021. The urgency stemmed from the so-called principal of electoral annuality, which stipulates that any law altering the electoral process applies only to elections held at least one year after its enactment (Brasil, 1988, article 16). To meet this deadline, the Chamber had to approve the Senate’s version without modifications, since any change would have required the bill to return to the Senate, making approval in time impossible. Accordingly, on August 12, 2021, the Chamber passed Bill No. 2.522/2015 unchanged, maintaining the full text approved by the Senate.

The bill was poised for presidential sanction, but to the dismay of smaller parties, President Jair Bolsonaro vetoed it on September 8, 2021. In his veto message he argued that allowing federations would contradict the intent of the 2017 reform:

The prohibition of coalitions in proportional elections, introduced by Constitutional Amendment No. 97 of October 4, 2017, together with the performance rules for access to public funding and free radio and television airtime, sought to strengthen the representative system by reducing fragmentation and making it easier for voters to identify with a given party. Allowing party federations would move in the opposite direction, contrary to the public interest (Brasil, 2021b, translated by the author).

Less than three weeks later, on September 27, 2021, Congress overturned the presidential veto. During the vote, Senator Flávio Bolsonaro, the president’s son, voiced his disapproval, declaring: “The federations are nothing more than an attempt to give a lifeline to parties such as PCdoB and PCO, which defend regimes already tested and rejected worldwide, since communism has never worked anywhere” (Brasil, 2021c, translated by the author). With the veto overridden, President Jair Bolsonaro had no choice but to sign the measure into law on September 28, 2021, enacting Law No. 14.208/2021 (Brasil, 2021a). From then on, party federations were officially authorized to participate in the 2022 elections.

As mentioned earlier, the bill approved by the Senate introduced a significant innovation in the form of a pre-ordered list for proportional elections, in other words, a closed-list system. It was also noted that the Chamber passed the Senate text unchanged to ensure enactment before the electoral deadline. However, the legislative process deviated from this account. During the final vote, the Chamber made an unconstitutional adjustment that went largely unnoticed by the media. Lawmakers removed the word “pre-ordered” from the clause referring to the federation list, claiming it was a mere stylistic revision. The final version of Law No. 14.208/2021 stated only that “the statute referred to in item II of paragraph 6 shall define the rules for composing the federation’s list for proportional election” (Brasil, 2021a, translated by the author). The removal of the word “pre-ordered” was far from editorial; it altered the substance of the bill, eliminating the explicit adoption of the closed-list system initially approved by the Senate.³ Under article 65 of the Federal Constitution, any substantive change made by one chamber requires the bill to return to the other. However, given the urgent need to approve the bill before October 2021, the Chamber classified the change as a simple editorial adjustment to avoid resubmission to the Senate.⁴ This constitutionally questionable maneuver went unchallenged by political parties, scholars, and the press alike.

Political reform in Brazil has often been advanced through so-called judicialization - the use of courts to settle political disputes (Araújo; Rodrigues, 2023; Marchetti; Cortez, 2009; Marchetti, 2015; Rodrigues, 2019). In this case, however, judicialization was used in an attempt to block the new mechanism. In November 2021, shortly after the law’s enactment, the PTB filed Direct Action of Unconstitutionality (ADI) No. 7021 before the Federal Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal - STF). The STF, however, upheld the law’s constitutionality.⁵

Formation of the federations

A flurry of political negotiations followed, lasting almost until the legal deadline. By late 2021, conversations regarding federations were already underway, PCdoB being the first party to formally position itself. In a political resolution adopted on October 17 at its 15^th Congress, the party declared: “With the democratic victory of party federations, PCdoB has forged a new path for its electoral affirmation, as part of the broader effort to defeat Bolsonaro and change the country’s course” (PCdoB, 2021, translated by the author). A November 26 statement from its National Political Committee reiterated this statement, affirming that the party would “swiftly continue dialogue and negotiations with parties in the popular, democratic, and patriotic camp” (Cintra, 2021, translated by the author).

On December 10, PSOL’s National Executive authorized formal talks with Rede and PCdoB to explore forming a federation. “Nothing has been decided. A future federation depends on political, ideological, and programmatic affinity among the parties, as well as electoral considerations”, explained Juliano Medeiros, PSOL’s national president at the time (PSOL, 2021, translated by the author).

On December 16, the National Directorate voted 72-10 to authorize negotiations toward a federation with PSB, PCdoB, PSOL, and PV. On December 21, PV approved joining PSB, PCdoB, and PT. Thus, PCdoB could have joined either configuration, with PSOL and Rede or with PT, PSB, and PV, ultimately opting for the latter.

Talks with PSB broke down in early 2022. A final meeting on March 9 confirmed the split, with the official statement noting: “In response to the current political scenario, PT, PCdoB, and PV will form a federation and continue discussion with PSB and other allied parties” (Spechoto, 2022, translated by the author).

On April 18, 2022, party presidents Gleisi Hoffmann (PT), Luciana Santos (PCdoB), and José Luís Penna (PV) formally announced the registration of the Federação Brasil da Esperança at the TSE. The announcement went beyond administrative formality; it articulated a democratic and progressive political identity, opposed to the far-right Bolsonaro government and aligned with the presidential candidacy of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. As the statement declared:

April 18 marks a historic moment in Brazilian political life. Federação Brasil da Esperança (FE Brasil) has been founded as an expression of the need and desire for unity among popular, democratic, and progressive forces, as part of a broad coalition to restore democracy, rebuild and transform Brazil, and ensure dignity for the Brazilian people. [...] FE Brasil has taken on a major responsibility: to serve as a decisive force in freeing our country from the disastrous far-right government. To rise to this challenge, the Federation must rally broad political, social, economic, and cultural forces around the leadership forces of former president Lula so that the people and democracy prevail in the October elections (Bittencourt, 2022, translated by the author).

On March 12, PSOL and REDE had already announced their agreement. In a statement released on social media by Senator Randolfe Rodrigues: “It is with great joy that I share that Rede Sustentabilidade has unanimously decided to form a federation with the Partido Socialismo e Liberdade (PSOL)” (Eleições 2022…, 2022, translated by the author).

While developments were unfolding on the left, PSDB and Cidadania also moved to form a federation, filing their registration request on April 1, 2022. Cidadania president Roberto Freire described the initiative as a centrist project: “There was anticipation among political and social actors regarding this arrangement, which, once formalized, would boost the confidence of those preparing for the October election, helping to build a democratic centrist alternative - a ‘third-way’ alternative between Lula and Bolsonaro” (Porto, 2022, translated by the author). PSDB was not Cidadania’s only option; the party also considered partnerships with Podemos and PDT. Nevertheless, on February 19, 2022, the National Directorate overwhelmingly approved joining PSDB.

On May 24, 2022, the TSE approved the first party federation in Brazilian history: the Federação Brasil da Esperança (FE Brasil), composed of PT, PCdoB, and PV. Two days later, on May 26, the Court approved two additional federations, PSDB-Cidadania and PSOL-REDE. All three met the May 31 deadline set by the Federal Supreme Court (STF).

The literature identifies two types of federations: symmetric and asymmetric. Symmetric federations bring together parties of similar size and political weight, whereas “asymmetric federations include both small and large parties, revealing an imbalance of power” (Agra; Lucena, 2022, p. 185, translated by the author). From this standpoint, FE Brasil and PSDB-Cidadania can be classified as asymmetric, while PSOL-REDE more closely resembles a symmetric arrangement.

Internal governance structures

Each federation was required to register its statute with the TSE, outlining its decision-making processes and leadership selection rules.

Federação Brasil da Esperança is structured around the following bodies: the General Assembly, National Executive Committee, State or District Provisional Committees, and Municipal Provisional Committees. Article 10 of the statute specifies how seats in the General Assembly are allocated:

Article 10. The General Assembly, the federation’s highest decision-making body, consists of 60 representatives appointed by the national leadership of each member party. Of these, 9 seats are evenly distributed among the parties, and 51 are allotted proportionally based on valid votes received in the 2018 Chamber of Deputies election (Federação Brasil da Esperança, 2023, translated by the author).

The National Executive Committee comprises 18 members: three party presidents and 15 additional representatives allocated using the same proportional formula as the General Assembly.

The PSOL-Rede Federation adopts a similar structure. Its statute establishes the following bodies: General Assembly, National Directorate, State/District and Municipal Directorates, and Fiscal Council. Composed of 27 members, the General Assembly is the highest decision-making authority, with seats allocated proportionally to valid votes earned in the Chamber of Deputies. The National Directorate, which governs between Assembly meetings, must include between 9 and 13 voting members, also selected proportionally (Federação PSOL Rede, 2022).

By contrast, the PSDB-Cidadania Federation adopts a slightly different structure. Its governing bodies consist of a Collegiate Board and Electoral Convention. The Collegiate Board has 19 full members and 7 alternates, “allocated proportionally to each party’s total vote share for the Chamber of Deputies in the most recent election, with a minimum of 30% representation for gender (at least 30% women)” (Federação PSDB Cidadania, 2022, art. 16, translated by the author).

Brazilian law guarantees that parties within a federation retain their identity and autonomy. In practice, this means that a member party cannot be forced to adopt a position solely because the federation decides so. Notably, all three federations’ statutes include nearly identical provisions affirming this autonomy:

1. Federação PSDB Cidadania (PSDB Cidadania Federation) - “Article 3. The political parties that make up the federation shall preserve their respective legal personalities, leadership bodies, and internal and programmatic autonomy” (Federação PSDB Cidadania, 2022, translated by the author);

2. Federação Brasil da Esperança (Brasil da Esperança Federation) - “Article 3. The political parties that compose Federação Brasil da Esperança maintain their respective legal personalities, TSE registration, and their ideological, programmatic-political, and organizational identities and autonomies” (Federação Brasil da Esperança, 2023, translated by the author).

3. Federação PSOL REDE (PSOL REDE Federation) - “Article 1. Each of the political parties that make up the PSOL-REDE Federation maintains its respective legal personality, TSE registration, and its ideological, political-programmatic, and organizational identities and autonomies” (Federação PSOL REDE, 2022, translated by the author).

The PSOL-REDE Federation statute (Federação PSOL REDE, 2022, translated by the author) goes further on this point, stating in Article 1, paragraph 1 that each member party retains autonomy, and that “this autonomy extends to each party’s parliamentary caucus, and to its decisions regarding participation in federal, state/district, and municipal governments.” Yet even as it emphasizes autonomy, the statute repeatedly underscores that progressive consensus-building should be the federation’s preferred approach to decision making. In a similar vein, Federação PSDB-Cidadania (2022, art. 3, translated by the author) declares it will “prioritize negotiation, coordination, and consensus-seeking through dialogue among its member parties”. Likewise, Federação Brasil da Esperança (2023, art. 2, translated by the author) affirms that “dialogue, mediation, and the search for consensus among member parties must guide the implementation of the Federation’s goals”. Thus, all three federations, at least formally, emphasize consensus-based decision making while simultaneously establishing procedures for decisions taken without consensus.

Electoral performance of the federations in 2022 and 2024

As noted earlier, the federations faced their first electoral test in October 2022. In the presidential race, both left-wing federations endorsed Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, while PSDB-Cidadania backed the center-right candidate, Senator Simone Tebet (MDB), in the first round. In the runoff between Lula and Jair Bolsonaro, the PSDB-Cidadania alliance experienced internal division: Cidadania endorsed Lula, whereas PSDB opted for neutrality. With no consensus possible, the federation released its members to support whichever candidate they preferred.

For the federations, the Chamber of Deputies election is the most consequential, since it determines whether parties clear the electoral performance threshold, the primary motivation behind the creation of federations. In this respect, all three federations successfully cleared the threshold, and PCdoB, Rede, PV, and Cidadania would have failed to do so had they run independently.

However, a comparison between seats won in 2022 and 2018 reveals mixed performance. As shown in Table 1, PSOL-Rede expanded its representation, while PSDB-Cidadania lost seats. In Federação Brasil da Esperança, PT and PV increased their seats, whereas PCdoB lost ground.

Table 1.
Federal deputies elected by party in Brazil (2018-2022)

Party/ Year	2018	2022	Change
PT	56	68	12
PCdoB	9	6	-3
PV	4	6	2
PSDB	29	13	-16
PPS/ Cidadania	8	5	-3
PSOL	10	12	2
REDE	1	2	1

• Source: compiled by the authors based on TSE data.

All three federations remained united through the 2024 municipal elections. Tables 2 and 3 report the results for mayoral and city council races among the parties in the three federations. Unlike 2022, there was no performance threshold at stake. The focus here is simply whether each party increased or decreased its presence in mayoralties and municipal legislatures. As Table 2 shows, with the exception of PT, every party saw a decline in the number of mayors following federation formation. Table 3 indicates a similar pattern for city council seats. The main exception is PV, which, like PT, increased its number of municipal councilors.

Table 2.
Mayors elected by party in Brazil (2020-2024)

Party/ Year	2020	2024	Change
PT	184	252	68
PCdoB	46	19	-27
PV	45	14	-31
PSDB	535	276	-259
Cidadania	142	33	-109
PSOL	5	0	-5
REDE	6	4	-2

• Source: compiled by the authors based on TSE data.

Table 3.
City councilors elected by party in Brazil (2020-2024)

Party/ Year	2020	2024	Change
PT	2672	3116	444
PCdoB	704	345	-359
PV	811	481	-330
PSDB	4402	2982	-1420
Cidadania	1584	435	-1149
PSOL	93	80	-13
REDE	149	171	22

• Source: compiled by the authors based on TSE data.

In short, the evidence suggests that while federations are highly effective in helping parties clear the performance threshold, they do not necessarily ensure the long-term resilience of legislative caucuses.

Advantages and disadvantages of party federations in Brazil

Given the discussion thus far, one key question remains: what are the advantages and disadvantages of party federations for Brazil’s political system? Federations appear to offer four systemic benefits: (1) greater programmatic coherence in party alliances; (2) greater alliance stability; (3) improved governability under coalition presidentialism; and (4) strengthened electoral and party competition. A potential drawback is also evident: governance asymmetry and potential party autonomy constraints. Each point is discussed below.

Advantage 1: Greater programmatic coherence

A central benefit is the increase in programmatic coherence within alliances. The literature has long shown that earlier electoral coalitions often lacked ideological consistency (Nicolau, 2017). It was not uncommon for a left-leaning party to form a short-term coalition with a right-leaning party in a specific state solely for strategic reasons, allowing voters who intended to support a left-wing candidate to inadvertently contribute to electing a right-wing one. Federations eliminate this risk by requiring member parties to adopt a joint program and statute. Indeed, the 2022 federations were composed of parties with clear programmatic affinities (Mesquita; Roeder, 2023, p. 65). Lopes and Greco (2022, p. 268, translated by the author) go so far as to argue that federations “will undermine the very logic of ‘rental parties,’ which by nature arise, develop, and dissolve for opportunistic and narrow purposes, draining democratic intent and focusing solely on electoral returns”. Even if one adopts a more cautious view, federations clearly enhance programmatic coherence relative to the old coalition model.

Advantage 2: Greater alliance stability

Federations also generate greater stability. Traditional coalitions were fleeting arrangements that dissolved immediately after elections, allowing parties to take divergent and even contradictory paths. Under federations, parties must remain united throughout the four-year legislative term. This stability improves voter understanding of political alliances and pushes parties toward more ideologically consistent partnerships, given that they will campaign and govern together across two electoral cycles.

Advantage 3: Improved governability under coalition presidentialism

This stability, in turn, has potential benefits for Brazil’s model of coalition presidentialism. In principle, it is easier for the Executive to negotiate with three federations rather than ten separate parties. In other words, federations can streamline political coordination and dialogue. As noted by Guimarães (2022, p. 229, translated by the author), “federations may indeed represent a political-institutional advance for achieving governability within coalition presidentialism”. Of course, this remains conditional on federations joining the governing coalition, a contextual rather than automatic institutional outcome. Under these conditions, Maldonado and Pereira (2022, p. 251, translated by the author) argue that federations help form the majorities required for coalition governance, “increasing the likelihood that this occurs based on ideological affinity as opposed to clientelist demands”, thereby strengthening governability.

Advantage 4: Increased electoral and party competition

A fourth advantage concerns the expansion of electoral and party competition. In his influential critique of Brazil’s oligarchic liberalism, Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos advanced a clear argument against efforts to shrink the party system by force: “the more democratic system is that which offers greater electoral and party competition; conversely, proposals that result in subtracting degrees of freedom from voters in their choice of parties and candidates are oligarchic” (Santos, 1994, p. 41, translated by the author). We share Santos’ view that, in a liberal democracy, greater competition among parties and candidates is desirable. The abolition of electoral coalitions and the introduction of the performance threshold limited parties’ strategic tools for competing. By contrast, federations broaden the available mechanisms for competition.

Disadvantage 1: Governance asymmetry and potential autonomy constraints.

Critics argue that federations, especially asymmetric alliance, may weaken the autonomy of smaller member parties (Gomes; Lacerda, 2023). Larger parties could, in principle, impose decisions within the federation, compelling smaller partners to adopt positions they would not otherwise take. While this is a plausible concern, it does not constitute an actual loss of autonomy in the strict sense. Entry into a federation is voluntary, and parties may reasonably conclude that accepting occasional unfavorable outcomes is worthwhile if the federation offers compensating advantages, such as clearing the performance threshold.

Autonomy may indeed be relatively constrained during the federation’s operation, particularly in asymmetric arrangements where larger parties exert more influence. However, this reduction is relative, since decision-making rules are established jointly and voluntarily by the parties themselves. For example, federation statutes can require unanimous decisions on key matters or adopt more balanced internal representation rules to reduce disproportionate influence.

Additionally, parties are not legally obligated to vote together in Congress or issue unified public positions. They also retain their own leadership structures, party foundations, and budgets. In this sense, the autonomy “loss” is better understood as conditional coordination rather than coercion, making this disadvantage largely overstated. Agra and Lucena (2022, p. 185) argue that asymmetry may ultimately lead to the incorporation of smaller parties by larger ones, which they consider beneficial, since it would reduce party fragmentation organically rather than administratively. From this perspective, this supposed disadvantage may in fact represent a broader systemic advantage.

Final considerations

This article traced the development of party federations in Brazil, from their initial legislative proposals in the late 1990s to their final approval in 2021 and the subsequent creation of three federations in 2022 It also examined the electoral outcomes of the 2022 and 2024 elections.

There is little doubt that party federations represented a significant institutional victory for smaller parties threatened by the 2017 electoral reform, particularly the performance threshold and the elimination of proportional coalitions. The adoption of federations allowed PV, PSOL, PCdoB, REDE, Cidadania, and PSDB to preserve access to key resources such as public party funding and free broadcast time.

However, the electoral data suggest that these parties’ capacity for parliamentary representation is either stagnating or declining. Accordingly, while federations served as a short-term lifeline, they may prove insufficient to sustain or strengthen these parties over the medium and long term.

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• ³
  For an account of the strong support for closed-list proportional representation among Brazilian political scientists, see Rodrigues (2022).
• ⁴
  Under the Internal Rules of the Chamber of Deputies, Article 118, Paragraph 8, “An editing amendment seeks to remedy a language flaw, technical drafting error, or an evident lapse” (Brasil, 1989, translated by the author). Because such amendments do not alter substance, they are understood not to require the bill to return to the other chamber.
• ⁵
  In ruling on ADI 7021, the Federal Supreme Court made only a minor adjustment to the deadlines for registering federations (Brasil, 2021d).
• Data availability
  The entire dataset from this study was published in the article.
• Declaration on the Use of Generative Artificial Intelligence
  The authors declare that they did not use generative artificial intelligence tools in the preparation of this manuscript, assuming full responsibility for its content.

• Editors
  Debora Rezende de Almeida
  Rebecca Neaera Abers

Data availability

The entire dataset from this study was published in the article.

Publication Dates

• Publication in this collection
  29 June 2026
• Date of issue
  2026

History

• Received
  07 Feb 2025
• Accepted
  15 Oct 2025