Composition of the board of directors and the probability of disclosure of social responsibility reports

Abstract

Purpose

To identify the relationship between characteristics of the board of directors and the probability of dissemination of social responsibility reports.

Theoretical framework

Considering the central role of the board of directors in mitigating conflicts of interest, the study is based on the stakeholder-agency theory.

Design/methodology/approach

The sample included 250 companies listed on the Brazilian Stock Exchange (B3). The data used were collected in the “Relate or Explain” Report, Economática®, and CVM Reference Form, and then operationalized using a binary logistic regression model.

Findings

The results suggest that the probability of dissemination of social responsibility reports is 1.52% higher for companies with more concentrated shares, 101.10% higher for larger companies, and 59.2% lower for companies with dual positions.

Practical & social implications of research

The findings may be useful for (i) guiding organizational strategies for board composition that improve the dissemination of social responsibility reporting, (ii) fostering discussions about changes in the classification of levels of corporate governance in the B3, and (iii) multi-stakeholder decision making.

Originality/value

For the accounting academia, the study promotes an additional debate on the role of the board of directors in dealing with the agency problem. The study is innovative in showing how the characteristics of the board of directors can change the potential for dissemination of social responsibility reports.

Keywords:
Stakeholder‐agency theory; corporate social responsibility; corporate governance