Abstract
This text develops a critique of State capture inevitability, as proposed by public choice theory in general, and by the logic of the collective action of Mancur Olson in particular. For this, the methodological deficiencies about its predictions, the evidence it uses, and its unsatisfactory explanation of strategic behavior of groups are explained. Then, from administrative procedural theory of S. P. Croley, a legal critique is made to public choice theory, demonstrating that it negligently deals with administrative procedures. Then, the fallibility of the logic of collective action is tested using two cases of environmental assessment occurred in Chile, namely the case “El Morro” and the case “HidroAysén”. As a conclusion, the capture in environmental impact assessment, in the terms exposed by the logic of the collective action, is likely to fail in its predictions for not considering enough evidence on administrative procedures.
Keywords
Environmental law; environmental assessment; public choice; logic of collective action; administrative process