This article analyzes the theoretical propositions of Raymond Boudon's methodological individualism, which seeks to disassociate itself from perspectives that emphasize the notion of instrumental rationality such as understandings of rational choice. Differences between instrumental conduct and the idea of cognitive rationality proposed by this sociologist hark back to central themes of contemporary social reflection, most specifically the possibly problematic ties between the sociological tradition and a certain economic ontology. To reveal the particularities of Boudon's methodological individualism as well as his notion of cognitive rationality, I first expound on his major critiques of the instrumental paradigm. I then go on to debate the alternatives he suggests, particularly the notion that agents incorporate beliefs or theories simply because they have "good reasons" to do so, as well as his notion of "diffuse rationalization". Finally I seek to analyze the way in which this French author's theory points to flaws in the economistic view of rationality, although presenting some propositions that are lacking in precision. Thus, while he signals the important lack of connection between individual agency and social context that inheres within rational choice theory, Boudon elaborates a universalist conception of rationality that seems to overlook the circumstantial and defined bases of social reality.
Social Theory; methodological individualism; rationality; instrumental action