

THE FEMININE AND THE END OF ANALYSIS: VICISSITUDES OF THE EGO-IDEAL IN THE WORK OF ANALYSIS

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ABSTRACT: Departing from two different views – the theme of *joissance* and the final of analysis and liquidation of transference – we intend to approach them through the notion of subjective destitution, resulting from the end of treatment and implied in the idea of absence of a signifier that names the feminine. The concepts of unitary trace and of ego-ideal connect the two mentioned concept objectives, allowing to approach the unfolding of transference in analysis and the one which is not-all in the sexuation. It is concluded that the subjective destitution that is produced by the analyst in the end of analysis, is similar to the feminine position: without the phallus as an identification to the Other and without the name/trace that would count the subject and groups him in a collective. It is the signifier of the lack of the Other [S(A)] that will allow to the analyst, having concluded his analysis, quitting his condition of subject in directing a cure.

Keywords: feminine; end of analysis; transference; subject destitution; psychoanalysis.

Resumo: O feminino e o final de análise: vicissitudes do ideal do eu no trabalho de uma análise. Partindo de duas vertentes diversas o tema do gozo e da sexuação e o final da análise e liquidação da transferência – pretendemos aproximá-las através da noção de destituição subjetiva, decorrente do fim do tratamento e subentendida na aceção de ausência de um significante que nomeie o feminino. Os conceitos de traço unário e de ideal do eu ligam os dois escopos conceituais citados, permitindo abordar os desdobramentos da transferência em análise e aquilo que é *não-todo* na sexuação. Conclui-se que a destituição subjetiva, que produz um analista ao final da análise, assemelha-se à posição feminina: sem o falo como resposta identificatória ao Outro e sem o nome/traço que faria contar o sujeito e agrupá-lo em um coletivo. É o significante da falta do Outro [S(A)] que permitirá ao analista, tendo concluído sua análise, abrir mão de sua condição de sujeito ao dirigir uma cura.

Palavras-chave: feminino; fim de análise; transferência; destituição subjetiva; psicanálise.

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INTRODUCTION

In this article, we intend to approach the theme of the end of analysis and its relation with what Lacan designates as the side the woman in the formulae of sexualization. Though they belong to different conceptual objectives – the theme of *jouissance* and sexualization, on one side, and end of analysis and liquidation of transference on the approach the subjective destitution resulting from the end of treatment and the absence of a signifier that names the feminine. This approximation will bring, as we will show, some elucidations for both conceptual poles.

In order to work these questions, it is fundamental to have in view the unfolding of transference along the treatment, since the establishment of the love link and supposition of knowing from the beginning until the resolution/destitution of the end. The notion of ego-ideal follows this unfolding, and its vicissitudes in the treatment allow his association to the inexistence of the signifier relative to feminine. We will approach such destiny of ideal through the reading proposed by Lacan of the unitary link, that founds the ego-ideal and constitutes the primordial bonds with the signifier network, having specifications when approach by the bias of what the psychoanalyst designates as feminine.

The identification to the trait inscribes the name – both the first name as the possibility of nominating – now the identification to the phallus refers the masculine sexualized identification, as an effect of the “choice” in the face of the father carrier of the phallus. Identifying with him is also to certify the ego ideal included in the identification with the paternal insignia. On the other side, in the feminine the trait and the phallus are not-all, remaining a part with no name and identification, as it in the subjective destitution relative to the end of analysis.

Ego-ideal and transference

The subject supposed to know relative to the analyst, Lacan says it in the Seminar about *The four fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis* (LACAN, 1964/1985) links with the ego-ideal, the one that has its germ in the unitary trait, and that remains, in a second time, as heir of the Oedipus complex. These two times refer to the signifier inscription, in the first, as original writing, the one that erases the materiality of the object until it remains only a trait, “mark” of its absence. Thus, “the function of unitary trait (...) is the origin of the signifier (...) [and] it is in the unitary trait that originates everything that interests us, the analysts, as to know” (LACAN, 1969-1970/1992, p. 44). In the second moment, the signifier inscription occurs as mark of the father that combines to know (about the desire of the mother, limiting it) and love, because he is the savior of the deadly *jouissance*. In the two times, the identification is the consequence: identification with the father, as Freud (1921/1976) postulates and as Lacan (1961-1962/ 2003) repeats, being the “father” the synonym of the signifier inscription and of the identificatory effects that are originated by it.

The work of analysis proposes a non-identification in relation with these primordial signifiers. The concept of the ego-ideal is, therefore, fundamental for the unfolding of the analytical process, both by the way of crossing of the fantasy and by the fall of the love of transference with the separation between the Ideal and the object a, as requires the end of analysis.

Let's consider briefly the work of Freud about the instances of the ideal. In *Introduction to narcissism* (FREUD, 1914/1974), he proposes the ideal ego as endowed by old omnipotence of the child ego, and the ideal of the ego as a model that intervenes in the function of judgment. The child narcissism makes the ego as his own ideal and that which injures his notion of perfection, causing narcissistic wound, it is the ego-ideal that searches, according to him, the reestablishment of the completeness. Still, in the text, Freud links narcissism and love, proposing two types of choice of object: one narcissistic and the other of linkage. In the first, we would love what we are, or what we were or what would like to be, or someone who was part of himself. In the second type, we would love a representative of the “woman that nourishes or of the man who protects” (p.107). These two ways of loving permit to clarify the difference between the types of ideal: in the narcissist, love is the reference to himself from the ideal ego, and in the other the parental instances are present, representing the ego-ideal. Freud, thus, leaves indicated two faces of love: a narcissist, which has the own ego has a reference, and the other that passes by the link to another to establish, represented by the nourishing mother and the protecting father.

So, in the *Introductory Conferences* (FREUD, 1916-1917 [1915-1917]/1976), the emphasis falls on the vigilant aspect of the ego-ideal, that is, it appears as an instance in charge of the moral conscience, evaluator of the relations of ego with its ideal. Four years later, in *Group psychology and ego analysis* (FREUD, 1921/1976), the ego-ideal is presented as separated from the ego, and is capable of conflicting with it. Its functions are self-observation, the onirical censorship, the moral conscience and the participation in the process of repression. The observation of the ego-ideal in relation to the ego makes keeping away the impulses that contradict the narcissism. Freud demonstrates that group (mass) behavior is characterized by the dissolution of identity of

each subject, due to the horizontal identification among its participants, as well as a vertical identification with the leader, whose image is introjected, occupying the place of the ego-ideal of each one of the belonging of the group. The mass, thus, acts like a vital unit, following the leader docilely, this being representative of the idealized fatherly image.

In *The ego and the id* (FREUD, 1923/1976), ego-ideal and superego appear almost identified. In the origin of ego-ideal would be the identifications with the parents and their substitutes, comprising functions of prohibition and idealization, as well as ethical and cultural notions, stressing the bond of ego-ideal and the inscription of what come from the other. In *New introductory conferences about psychoanalysis* (FREUD, 1933 [1932]/1976), the ego-ideal is called as precipitated of parental representations and of the superego function, departing from which the ego evaluates and judges himself. The ego-ideal, therefore, passes to represent that what the subject must be to answer the demanding of the superego. The ego-ideal, thus, will form the bases of all ethical, esthetic and religious ideal. The ego-ideal corresponds, from the other side, to what each one expects from himself, in order to respond favorably to the demands of an infantile illusion of omnipotence.

Lacan, by his turn, stresses and clarifies the differences between ideal ego and ego-ideal, keeping aside to the first the relation of the relation to the imaginary register and the image of himself; and to the second the bond with the symbolic register, trait that affirms or denies the image. The ego-ideal will be the one which will command, according to Lacan (1964/1985), the establishment of the transference, through which “the subject makes himself a lovable object. Referring to the one who must love him, he tries to introduce the Other in a relationship of mirage in which he persuades him of being lovable” (FREUD, 1964/1985, p. 253). To Lacan, therefore, the ego-ideal will attend the analysis through the love of transference, effect of the subject’s suppose to know, and that demonstrates well the love illusion, centering the question on the darkening of the lack which love promotes: “In persuading the other that he has what can complete us, we guarantee the power of continuing to ignore precisely the thing that lack us [which] makes the dimension of love” (LACAN, 1964/1985, p. 128). So, it is worthwhile to stress, transference, referring to the ego-ideal, says the symbolic register, of bond love, the one that intends from the Other a trait on meaning that says of the subject lovable as ideal, because it carries the paternal emblems. With that, Lacan highlights that the constitution of transference follows the supposition that analyst knows about/detain the trait that nominate the subject, traits that would permit to count one, as well as the paternal traits that allows him to situate in front of the ideal, including sexuation.

The establishment of transference and its liquidation accompanies the passage, along the direction of cure, of the love cheating to the inexistent encounter with the object, or with a worn out signification. The unitary trait, when funding the ego-ideal, occurs upon it, assembling the position from where the subject seeks to be looked as lovable, as well as alludes to the to know implicated in the One signification (LACAN, 1972-1973/2010), as if this could sew up the lack that puts the being into effect.

The point of the ego-ideal is from where the subject will see himself, as it is said, as seen by the other (...). Love has the essence of cheating. It is situated in the field instituted at level of the pleasure reference, of this unique signifier, necessary in order to introduce a perspective centered in the ideal point, I in capital letter, put in some place of the Other, from where the Other sees me, in the way that pleases me to be seen. (LACAN, 1964/1985, p. 253).

Lacan, in this passage of the Seminar, examines the premises in order to affirm, among other aspects, what he calls “the fundamental motive of the analytical operation [which is] the maintenance of the distance between the I and the a.” (p. 258). The I of the ego-ideal, he continues, refer to the unitary trait – the *einzigiger Zug* proposed by Freud in the *Group Psychology and ego analysis* (1921/1976), in which “very interesting indeed, [...] he takes the father’s model previous to the libidinous investment – mythical time, surely” (LACAN, 1964/1985, p. 242), or, still, that is the “birth of the possibility, and you will have the unitary trait which, by filling the invisible mark that the subject receives from the signifier, alienates this subject in the first identification that forms the ego-ideal” (LACAN, 1960/1998, p. 822). In another moment, he adds:

It is the field of the Other that determinates the function of the unitary trait, in which it is inaugurated a larger time of the identification in the topic then developed by Freud – that is, the idealization, the ego-ideal. From this first signifier, I showed you the traits in the primitive bone that a hunter marks and counts the number of times the makes a score. (LACAN, 1964/1985, p. 242).¹

¹ Lacan alludes to the bone seen by him in a collection of pre-historical objects and that had a series of carved traits, probably marking the number of hunted animals.

It is worthwhile stressing that, through Lacan takes from Freud the reference to the unitary trait and to ego-ideal, what each one these authors highlights is different. What interested to Freud was the mechanism of the mass formation (group) and, departing from the notion of libido, to locate two effects: the existence of the leader and linkage of some individuals with others. To Lacan, differently, interests the counting of a subject among others, as part of an all, and its reference to the phallus and its insignia.

The feminine and the phallic function

In the Seminar *Encore* (1972-1973/2010), Lacan resumes the notion of unitary trait to emphasize as partly absent in the feminine not-all. He conceives in there the feminine side (on the right of the sexuation table, below). There is no one that escapes from the castration ($\exists x \overline{\Phi x}$), what leads – in the absence of an exception – that they be not-all in the phallic function ($\forall x \Phi x$).




Figure 1 – Sexuation table

Source: Lacan (1972-73/1985, p. 105)

The formula indicates that being not-all in the phallic function, there is no one in the feminine who escapes it: there is no founder exception, therefore the feminine group not constitutes a class, even though would be constituted by singular and countable elements. If there is no common trait (unique, unitary) that specifies them, the first consequence is that there is not “the feminine” as a closed category. As the article cannot be applied, Lacan writes \bar{A} woman. This leaves \bar{A} women with no class to belong, with no distinctive trait that would guarantee a feminine identity.

The subject, in the half that is determined by the quantifiers denied, resulting that nothing existing constitutes a limit of the function, that cannot certify of anything that is a universe. Thus, because they are based in this half, they are not-all, which has, as consequence, and for the same reason, that neither one of them is all. (LACAN, 1972/2003, p. 466)

With the feminine, as there is no all, only the one and one – the signifier inscription is specific, remaining a part not circumscribed by the symbolic. And, as there is no exception; the women are not-all submitted to the phallic function, being left a more beyond the phallus, which is also beyond of the unitary trait.

On the masculine side, Lacan wrote: “every $x \Phi$ de x ”, that is, it is applied the function Φx to every element of this group, or said otherwise: every element of masculine group is concerned by the phallic function. Above, on the left, there is the “exists a x not Φ de x ”, that is, there is at least one element of this group to which this function is not applied: there is at least one that escapes to the phallic function. That is, on the side of masculine sexuation, the *at-least-one* that escapes to the castration defines the exception which makes the rule exist, that every x is function of x , that is, that masculine is all in the phallic function. He says: “there is no universal that should not be contained by and existence that denies it” (LACAN, 1972/2003, p. 450).

Therefore, $\forall x \Phi x$ indicates that it is through the phallic function that the man makes his inscription, except that this function meets its limit in the existence of an x through which the function Φ is denied. Marc Darmon (1994) clarifies that the castration is the universal law: $\forall x \Phi x$ (to every x , x is castrated) and that at least one x exists escaping from it, precisely the one which applies it to all: the symbolic Father.

On other side, this father of the exception of the exception does not inscribe in the feminine sexuation. The feminine does not identify herself with such a father, and her choice is the one of love for him. Thus, the

father instance does not inscribe himself in the feminine by identification, not being incorporated, neither as sexual identity, nor subjective.

The masculine nomination is the same inscribed in the phallic *jouissance*, the one of the language, in which the name is inscribed and demands to honor such inscription. In the feminine, the not-all *jouissance* supposes a negative name, designating an out of the language, beyond the phallic: either language, or not-nomination, since “The woman is ‘not-all’, there is always something in her that escapes to the discourse” (LACAN, 1972-1973/2010, p. 99).

The *sexuation table* allows, therefore, two kinds of relation with the phallic function, as it is relative to the castration, because of the language. Thus, it is not for being a man that he is in phallic function but differently from it, as clarifies Soler (2005), it is for the reason of an indeterminate x situating entirely in the phallic function that we can call him a man. The feminine, on her turn, registers in consequence of her not-all linkage with the phallic function. It deals with a logical position that will carry out – a posteriori – a given sexuated position, independent of the biological sex.

In the lower part of the *sexuation table*, on the left side, masculine, we see an barred subject, because he is marked by the castration, as well as the phallic signifier, Φ , inscribed as a function, that is, the access to the phallic signifier needs the symbolic castration in order to inscribe it under the form of the function Φx (DARMON, 1994). In the feminine field, we see the object a , cause of the desire; the signifier of the lack of the Other $S(\bar{A})$ and $L\bar{a}$, A , the barred woman, indicated her duplicity in relation to the *jouissance* – phallic *jouissance*, on a side, but also the Other *jouissance*, beyond the phallus. The $L\bar{a}$, otherwise, says A woman does not exist, for the feminine signifier does not exist: “this A of A woman (La femme), in the moment in which it is enunciated by a ‘not-all’, it cannot be written, for it only exists here barred: \bar{A} woman ($L\bar{a}$ femme)” (LACAN, 1972-1973/2010, p. 170).

As Lacan (1975-1976/2007) stressed, the dimension of the lack in the language and the lack which inscribes the castration do not mix. $S(\bar{A})$ indicates that there is a signifier that lacks in the Other, for the language is indelibly marked by a primordial lack; while the phallus Φ designates the specific lack, that one that concerns to the castration.

It is here in $S(\bar{A})$, and one has to read it: signifier of a lack in the Other, inherent to its own function of being the treasure of the signifier. This, as the Other is asked (*che vuoi*) to respond to the value of this treasure (...) in terms of drive. The lack that is here dealt is, in effect, the one that we already formulate, that there is no Other of the Other. (LACAN, 1960/1998, p. 833)

Therefore, the positions of the all phallic and not-all phallic *jouissance* are defined departing from the phallic function in consequence of the castration. Thus, $S(\bar{A})$ does not establish a sexuation, it is not another referent (as it is the phallus), which, if making it, it would be the “other half” of the masculine, erasing the “woman inexistence” and its similar: “the sexual relation does not exist”. So, both the masculine and the feminine are referred to the phallus, though being here as not-all, remaining something of not written also in its *jouissance*, represented in the *sexuation table* by $S(\bar{A})$.

The non-existence of the A woman and of the sexual relation are assembled in beyond the phallus, one “the sexual relation only occurs in the human beings departing from the phallus, which establishes its limits. But, at the same time, this reference institutes the Real as impossible, or the thing that does not exist (‘there is no sexual relation’)” (PRATES, 2001, p. 98). The signifier of the lack of the Other is, in view of this, absence of nomination, referring to what it is silence in the feminine and that leads to the Other *jouissance*, besides the phallic. Or still, as says Lacan (1972-1973/2010) “there is no Other of the Other. It is the reason why this signifier, with this open parenthesis, marks this Other as barred $S(\bar{A})$ ” (LACAN, 1972-73/2010, p.170). The aphorism about the inexistence of the Other of the Other and its signifier lack flows to the same point: there is no language that adds up what can be said, always lack some signifier that would give consistence to all the others. $S(\bar{A})$, therefore, it is defined as hole, restraining an impossible, which, departing from the seminar *Encore* is articulated to feminine. $S(\bar{A})$ is not confounded with the object a , for they mark different fields of the lack.

$S(\bar{A})$ designates, though, something of the subject, precisely his “unthinkable”, that is, what escapes to the representation of this subject. This designation deserves to be delimited, once the object (a) writing tends to designate something that lacks of the signifier. There is here a difference that is worthwhile to stress: it implicates, in first place, that $S(\bar{A})$ is not the signifier of the object (a). $S(\bar{A})$ indicates the lack of signifier. In this quality, it supplies formal support to the lacanian formulae of the type: “there is no...” [...], while the object (a) crystallizes in a letter, to designate what, from the *jouissance*, escapes to the signifier inscription. (KAUFMANN, 1996, p. 311).

In common between the $S(\bar{A})$ and the a there is only the register of partiality referred in the not-all: part

not inscribed in the phallic function, as consequent absence of something of the representation (impossible to represent the lack of lack of language), as well as the presence of a *jouissance* that is Other in relation to the phallic.

The feminine and the ego-ideal

In what refers to the feminine and the ego-ideal, affirms Millot (1998) that: “the difficulty of resolution, characteristic of the feminine Oedipus, results (...) from the difficulty of formation of an ideal of the feminine ideal, contradictory in its terms, the ideal implicating the phallic insignia” (MILLOT, 1998, p.43), thus explaining the linkage of the inexistence of the signifier that designates the feminine to the absence of a distinctive/unique/unitary.

The ego-ideal is supported by a trait – *einziger zug* - unitary trait, which is the insignia order, intermediate between the sign and the signifier. It commands the subject position, thus being in relation with the specular register. It represents that, thanks to what the subject restores the lost narcissistic satisfaction, that is, it bears an ideal of omnipotence. (MILLOT, 1998, p. 30).

Lacan (1953-1954/1986), as we already have approached, differently from declaring the ideal imaginary, describes that it is the symbolic position that determines the locus while viewer, situating in there the ego-ideal, with effects upon the ideal ego, being this of the order of imaginary. Therefore, differently from the mentioned author and instead of situation only the specular register – the imaginary – we propose that is necessary to consider a first “binding” between them. This is because the ego-ideal, as we already said, refers the symbolic point, of the anchorage to the narcissitic/specular image, reuniting the register trait, departing from which a subject will be counted, and the corresponding image. Because, as Lacan says: “We can distinguish radically the ego-ideal from the ideal ego. The first is symbolic introjections, while the second is source of an imaginary projection. [This] depends on the possibility of reference to this primordial symbolic term that can be monoformal, monosemantic, *ein einziger Zug*” (LACAN, 1960-1961/1992, p. 344).

Lacan (1962-1963/2005) still refers to this point to the image in the Seminar about the anxiety, in describing the baby search for the Other look that confirms the image, as if announcing “you are this”. Because, as Lacan (1949/1998) had already affirmed before, “it is enough to understand the mirror phase as an identification, in the full meaning that the analysis confers to this term, that is, the transformation produced in the subject when he assumes an image” (LACAN, 1949/1998, p. 97). Lacan, therefore, identifies the ratification to the image as ego-ideal, and the image produced as an effect to this as ideal ego. With this, embraces the two registers, the symbolic of the ego-ideal and the imaginary of the ideal ego. As well as the ego-ideal is symbolic, love keeps elements of the same register, with imaginary effects, however not restraining to it. Love has consequences in the image of itself that alludes to the narcissistic omnipotence, yet connects to the elements of the ideal trait of the Other, registered in the subject by identification.

Love, under analysis, effect of the transference, returning to it, is relative to the ego-ideal, effects of the unitary trait, resulting from which the subject is counted. The search of love and to know directs itself, in analysis, to the instance, that acknowledges the subject to an image that corresponds to him. Departing from the link with such symbolic instance that the subject could see himself “with good eyes”, allusion to the love ideal longed for. If the Other carries the traits that evidence/testify the subject, and, therefore, is connected to the suppose to know about him, love occurs, both directed to the one that gives the reference, and to the own ego, now looked from the look of the Other. Nevertheless, something stays out of these registers, which Lacan (1962-1963/2005) clarifies by saying that the a object is not susceptible to mirror. The more he gains an imaginary and symbolic version, if suspended, remains the a object whilst pure lack, unveiling the absence of object and any name. Without the clothing, given to the a object, the subject appears divided, without consistence. This is another way of considering the passage of the Ideal to the a object in question in the end of analysis: if the ego-ideal inscribes itself in the symbolic and has effects on the imaginary, in the end it will be the real of the a object that will appear, out of the words or the image.

About the feminine and the trait, it will be in the retreat of the second phase of the inscription of the ego-ideal that he will seem to lack to her. It will be in the *a posteriori* of the lack of the feminine signifier, that the inscription of the unitary trait will also situate as lacking, as well as her image and her body will suggest to be lacking. Because, in what concerns to the sexuation, it is a second time of the identification and of the ego-ideal that she is placed: the one that, departing from the second phase of the Oedipus complex, calls upon the subject to situate while masculine or feminine, or, said in another way, situate before the father while ruled by the phallus, or not-all in the phallic function. The one of the unitary is registered therefore, while phallic logic, uniting – *a posteriori* – the trait and the phallus. In this point, it is situated the ideal in the sense

also proposed by Freud, that of Oedipus heir: “Freud explored and articulated as being the Oedipus exit, from which, after the Oedipal desire repression, the subject comes out renewed, and provided of what? The answer is: of an ego-ideal” (LACAN, 1957-1958/1999, p. 300). The love to the father savior/acknowledged of the Other constitutes as an answer to this Oedipal time, with effects of sexual identification relative to each sexuation. The masculine choosing to situate as identified with the phallic function, and the not-all feminine related to it. It is by retroaction since this second time that the first, united to the unitary trait, inscribes while not saying about the feminine. The previous time is here reinterpreted up to the point of registering that something is not told in the feminine. Something of the identificatory trait that it announces is registered as “no” to the identified all to the father trait.

Both the ideal ego and the ego-ideal create a cover to the “beginning”, giving a name and an image to the real. In the second time of the ego-ideal inscription remains a name and image now associated to the sexuation: the masculine name and body while whole phallic; or feminine, nominated not-all, with the body sheltering a lack in the signifier field. The unitary trait in the femininity, thus, does not lead to conclude about the one inscribed in a class, as it is done with the masculine. For this, the unitary trait – a posteriori – will inscribe the identification that will also be sexuated, up to the point of being masculine correspond to every identity.

As we referred before, the signifier writing connects the subject to the phallus, with different consequences to the masculine and the feminine. For the masculine, the inscription is completely commanded by the phallic function, what leads to the identification with this logic, the One logic, of the One (unitary, unique) and the phallus as the central signifier – unique, in this sense – in the constitution of masculine sexuation and of the phallic *jouissance*. With the feminine, differently, neither the unitary trait nor the symbolic phallus is exclusive (unique) in her sexuation and *jouissance*.

The more beyond the One delimits what it is not written of trait and the father. There is an Other position, consequently, belonging to the identification. The feminine position, thus, alludes to a “subjective destitution” inherent to herself.

The subjective destitution of the end of analysis supposes a fall of the name and the image close to the feminine position. The signifiers that write the bond with the name are registered in a not-all way, because, at the same time, refer to a more beyond, not inscribed, not susceptible of identification.

The subjective destitution

The subjective destitution, therefore, is similar to what the feminine position demarcates in the sexuation table: without the phallus as identificatory response to the Other and without the name/trait that would count the subject and groups it in a collective. The signifier of the lack of the Other [S(A)] of the feminine, thus, is similar to what counts in the subjective destitution. The absence of the trait of the feminine position and the nor-all inscription in the phallic function associate to the *desêtre* (fr.) of the end of analysis. Without the identification that would promote a class, the indelible singular is placed. Like it is with the psychoanalyst, alone in the condition of sheltering the transference of each case and undressed of the identificatory references when he listens and intervenes with each analysand.

The symbolic references of the trait, of the phallus and the ego-ideal affects themselves until opening the real which delimits the sexual relationship impossible (LACAN, 1972-1973/2010) and of the all represent. Another logic is inscribed with it: the not-all logic. In it, the real presides a part of it while field not inscribed by the trait/name, nor by the phallus as the lack designator. The real register, differently from announcing a lethal *jouissance*, participates of the analytic trait while more beyond the language, even though it had by reference. So, the real logic, we suggest, explains what the analytic act demonstrate: language act which, in transposing the saying, opens the dimension of the more beyond. It deals with the register of the real which arises by surpassing, having been valid to the symbolic, or the father, provided that it has served him. Like Lacan says: “Psychoanalysis, when well-succeeded, proves we can dispense with the Name-of-the-father. We can do without the condition of serving ourselves from him” (LACAN, 1975-1976/2007, p. 132).

Retaking, some essential elements complete what is being considered, according to Lacan (1967/2003), in the end of analysis: they are the transference dissolution, the subject destitution and the fantasy crossing. Being elements between themselves, they connect the fall of the subject supposed to know of the transference with the fall of the ideal signifier that represented the subject, deposing them. Together with it, the crossing of the inscription/*fantasy* scene risks the places of the subject and of the object [S(a)], that supported the relations with the Other until there.

If, in the beginning of analysis, the transference love and the search for meaning are the main motives of it, in the treatment unfolding, the signifier is present whilst not guaranteeing a last signification, forwarding the subject to his *lack-to-being* (LACAN, 1958/1998). Therefore, love, to know and being are enlaced in the

transferential composition, as explains Maurano (2006) when considering that the bet on which the transference is based is of a to know that meets the hole present in the relation of the subject with the Other, because: "In transference, we have, on a side, an *appeal to the to know* that comes from the relation with the language and, on the other, a *appeal to the being*, that is outlined a love demand. Demand that results in finding consistency, in the meaning of its being, through the way of love" (MAURANO, 2006, p. 28).

The development of the analysis leads to the disconnection of the signifiers and of the meanings captured in the identification, in relation of which the subject is bound, in the double sense of constituted and arrested. In the end of analysis, with the resulting subjective destitution, it is produced the effect of assumption of an indelibly marked by the signifier lack. The meaning, that aimed to make believe in the potency of the signifier, when emptied, leads to the unveiling of the gaps not filled by it. The Other, then, does not inscribe itself as instance that would respond about the subject, not even as instance trying to complete or cause *jouissance*. The fantasy that acted up this attempt is empty from the need of each time offer the object that supposedly would complete the Other and the subject.

The supposition to know to the analyst, with his fall/dissolution, produces the inscription of a lack that cannot be appeased, not with the meaning, nor with the signifier, nor with love, to know or *jouissance*.

The structure, thus abbreviated, permits to have an idea of what happens to the end of the transferential relation, that is, when, having resolved the desire sustained in his operation the psychoanalyzed, he is not willing, in the end, to raise his option, that is, of remaining with the rest that, as determinant of his division, makes him decay from his fantasy and destitute him as subject (LACAN, 1967/2003, p. 257).

The fall of the subject's supposed to know coincides with the subjective destitution, according to as mentioned above in *October nine Proposition*. For, the subjective destitution corresponds to the fall of the signifiers that represented the subject and is correlated to the vanishing of the Other, with the unveil of his lack and his inconsistency. Together with it, the fantasy crossing associates itself to the subjective destitution, as the subject's position in the fantasy is defined by the signifier that represents him.

The end of psychoanalysis is exactly the one which it happens as constituted by this division (...) in which any signifier (...) contains the possibility of its inefficiency, precisely in operating this representation, of its position played in false as representative. There is no psychoanalyzed, there is "having been a psychoanalysis" from where results a warned subject of what this that he couldn't think is constituting of any action of his (LACAN, 1967-1968/2001, p. 225).

At the end of analysis the subject will come across the division that constitutes him, and, as "advised subject", it will not be the fantasy that he fears and desires an Other idealized and under *jouissance*. About it, Soler (1995) affirms, from the experience of his division, each subject experiences the presence of "the not know and of the not-wanted" (SOLER, 1995, p.16), facing the impossibility of making One.

The subject, in the end of analysis, says yet the authoress, meets the limit of his ontological attributes, "the static limit of 'you are this', this being now not-identified by the signifier, a not representable being that will reach what in the subject is not a symbolic register, but real register" (SOLER, 1995, p. 75)

The "being this" provided by the identifications, by falling and resulting the *desêtre* (fr.), leads to include the register of the real that takes out the reference to One, by all or whole. We stress, thus, that these points connected to the end of analysis are associated with those writings in the feminine side of the sexuation table, that is: the object a, the $S(\bar{A})$. The $S(\bar{A})$ is related with the subjects not representable, with the not-all. As to the object a, it announces itself in the subject division and gains the function of cause, and not more one of the fantasy object that wished to appease what lacks.

End of analysis

Having said this, the ego-ideal participates in the establishment of transference, and also in its dissolution, having the subjective destitution as a consequence. In the destitution of the end of analysis, therefore, the ego-ideal, for commanding the transference, fails to sustain the fall of the supposed to know, unveiling the lack-of-being from the subject. The Other trait reveals itself, consequently, as insufficient to tell about the subject. The direction of the cure intervenes, thus, on the lack-of-being, isolating the ideals, the identifications, the signifier condensed of meaning, revealing the lack implicated in the desire cause. So, the fall of the supposed to know coincides with the fall of I of the ego-ideal generated by the one of the unitary trait, with effects upon the subject image (how he wished to be seen through the ideal), his identifications (to the trait coming from the Other), upon the link with the paternal instance and upon the object, effect of the passage from I to a.

And these effects connect themselves, as we have been proposing, to the belonging of the feminine position formulated by Lacan in the *Seminar Encore* (1972-1973/2010).

The subjective destitution is, therefore, what will allow to the analyst, having concluded his analysis, to give up his condition of subject in directing a cure. The “loan” of the analyst to the signifiers and to the object gives up his own. The subjective destitution, as we have above indicated, supposes that had had the fall of the signifier came from the Other and that represented the subject. The symbolic ballast, fruit of the identifications, when destituting itself, reduces the subject to his division. These identifications, in their term, concerned to the subject position in the fantasy, outlining the relation with the *fantasistic* object. Now, the subject reduced to his division, makes the object that he has been structured by the Other, fall, experiencing from here as it lacking: the object a. For “The analyst fall is intervention in the real. It is in it that the analyst occupies the unknown place, from the object a of the unique subject in question: the analysand” (DOMB, 1996, p. 115).

The vanishing of the Other, his lack, his inconsistency – produced in the end of analysis – takes out the reason of directing to him the question about the desire (his own and of the Other), or yet, takes off the identifications produced by the ideal signifier, proceeding from the Other, at the same time in which frees the analysand to correspond to these identifications.

As we have already said, the subjective destitution supposes the loss of fundamental trait that identified a subject, with the consequent *desêtre* (fr.), which evokes a certain non-personalization in the final. In the subjective destitution, therefore, the logic of the phallic affirmation and of the demand is displaced by the not-all logic: not everything that is affirmed in the signifier [S(A)], and the object that intends to attend the Other is only a subterfuge to his real face, object a, impossible to determine and satisfy.

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