

**Isocrates' *Encomium of Helen*: Argumentation in Many Layers / O Elogio de Helena de Isocrates: argumentação em muitas camadas**

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**ABSTRACT**

Around 390 BC, Isocrates wrote a text dedicated to the mythical Helen, *Encomium of Helen*. According to the rhetorician, his objective was to praise that character, who was recognized in two of Homer's main works, the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. Although the isocratic text has already been thoroughly studied, we believe that Discourse Analysis will provide a more in-depth view of the text and its argumentative strategies. Thus, our objective is to analyze how the argumentative construction of the *Encomium of Helen* took place. From the analysis, it was possible to notice that discourses have different layers, that Isocrates uses Helen's story as a foundation for his argumentation and that the rhetorician reproduces imaginaries of femininity and masculinity, although this was not an explicit objective.

**KEYWORDS:** *Encomium of Helen; Argumentation; Socio-discursive imaginaries; Femininity; Masculinity*

**RESUMO**

*Por volta de 390 a.C., Isócrates escreveu um texto dedicado à mítica Helena, Elogio de Helena. Segundo o rétor, seu objetivo era enaltecer aquela personagem, reconhecida em duas das principais obras de Homero, a *Ilíada* e a *Odisseia*. Embora o texto isocrático já tenha sido exaustivamente estudado, acreditamos que a Análise do Discurso proporcionará uma visão mais aprofundada do texto e de suas estratégias argumentativas. Assim, nosso objetivo é analisar como se deu a construção argumentativa do Elogio de Helena. A partir da análise foi possível perceber que os discursos possuem diferentes camadas, que Isócrates utiliza a história de Helena como base para sua argumentação e que o retórico reproduz imaginários de feminilidade e masculinidade, embora este não fosse um objetivo explícito.*

**PALAVRAS-CHAVE:** *Elogio de Helena; Argumentação; Imaginários sociodiscursivos; Feminilidade; Masculinidade*

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## Introduction

The figure of Helen was immortalized in two of the most famous literary works in history. The *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, attributed to Homer, in the 8th century BC, portray the events of the Trojan War, which began with the dispute for the most beautiful woman in the ancient world. In a polytheistic world, references to gods and goddesses are frequent in that literature. Helen played an important role in the mythical-religious culture of that time, being portrayed and recreated in several texts, gaining new plots and generating fascination even today. Around 390 BC, Isocrates creates his *Encomium of Helen*, as a response to the homonymous text of Gorgias. In line with what Aristotle proposed when dealing with the epideictic genre, we believe, following Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, that the encomium, a more specific type of the epideictic genre, has functions other than just aesthetic, such as reinforcing the values that the speaker believes to be important.

Our proposal is to analyze how the argumentative construction of Isocrates' work took place. Despite being an ancient text and, therefore, having already been the focus of many studies, we believe that the Discourse Analysis and more specifically the *Argumentative Analysis of Discourse*, proposed by Ruth Amossy, can bring fundamental contributions to the understanding of the work. Although this theory is heir to the old rhetoric, it revisits some of its main concepts and proposes new ones, such as the argumentative dimension, which, in our view, provides deeper analysis. In addition to this perspective, we will dialogue with other scholars of rhetoric, such as Aristotle himself and also Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca.

### **1 The *Argumentative Analysis of Discourse*: The Encomium between an Argumentative Dimension and an Argumentative Goal**

Contrary to what has been said a few times (cf. Quintiliano, 1920; Burke, 1945), the epideictic genre would not only have an aesthetic function, nor would it only serve to enhance the speaker himself, who, in his speech, would be interested in showing his rhetorical skills. According to Aristotle, the epideictic, which would have the encomium

*Bakhtiniana*, São Paulo, 19 (4): e64920e, Oct./Dec. 2024

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as one of its sub-genres, “consists in either praise or blame” (Aristotle, *Rhet.* I 3, 1358b 11-12; 2018, p. 11). In this sense, it was common for the speaker to praise/blame individuals, groups of individuals, such as those killed in war, and also gods. According to the rhetorician, the speaker who praises/blames has the purpose of portray people or events as noble or shameful. Perelman, in a similar sense, stated about the epideictic that “The objective is always to strengthen a consensus around certain values that one wants to prevail and that should guide action in the future” (Perelman, 1982, p. 20). When using the epideictic, we can say that the speaker has an argumentative project, in the sense of reinforcing values and causing changes in society.

It is important to recall two notions proposed by Amossy (2010) in the book *L'argumentation dans le discours*, that reflect, in our view, her main contributions to studies on argumentation, these being the notions of argumentative dimension (*dimension argumentative*) and argumentative goal/objective (*visée argumentative*). It is at this point in her theory that Amossy takes up Plantin's postulate, for whom there are levels of argumentativity. However, if for Plantin (2008), the opposition of ideas is what characterizes argumentation, Amossy believes that opposing ideas don't need to be explicit, as words are always a response to words already spoken by other people. Therefore, it is not possible to say that there is argumentation only when there are opposite points of view. According to Amossy, there are discourses that are more argumentative than others, but they are all argumentative to some extent and the clash of points of view, or what she calls public polemic, would characterize the highest level in terms of argumentation.

In this sense, not all discourses have an argumentative objective, in the sense that “they do not convey any intention to persuade and do not expect to make the addressee adhere to a position clearly defined by programmed strategies” (Amossy, 2008).<sup>1</sup> However, even discourses devoid of persuasive intent can still exert some influence, “guiding ways of seeing and thinking” (Amossy, 2008).<sup>2</sup> In this way, *argumentative goal* is linked to an explicit argumentative intention, while the dimension


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<sup>1</sup> In: French: “ils ne véhiculent aucune intention de persuader et n'entendent pas rallier l'allocataire à une position clairement définie par des stratégies programmées.”

<sup>2</sup> In French: “en orientant des façons de voir et de penser.”

is something constitutive of discursive dialogism or it is an argument not assumed, present in texts whose alleged objective is other than to persuade. On the dimension side, we would have the scientific article, television reports, autobiographies, fictional literature and everyday conversation itself. While on the objective side we would have the electoral discourse, publicity, manifesto and editorial.

Therefore, we agree with the researcher when proposing a continuum that would represent the different degrees of argumentativity. Taking this into account, we can think that the encomium would be somewhere in the middle of the continuum (*Figure 1*), since, although it does not have an explicit argumentative objective, on a deeper level, as we said, it can establish social values.



*Figure 1:* The encomium between an argumentative dimension and an argumentative goal. *Source:* Own authorship.

## 1.2 The Argumentative Analysis of Discourse: Reviewing the Old Rhetoric

In addition to the concepts of the argumentative dimension and argumentative goal, Ruth Amossy's theory incorporates, albeit not identically, some of the key ideas from ancient rhetoric. In her work *L'argumentation dans le discours* [Argumentation in Discourse], Amossy acknowledges an argumentation that extends beyond mere logical operations, considering all elements of discursive materiality as significant. Furthermore, argumentation cannot be isolated from the communicative situation in which it occurs, and it unfolds through the interplay of three elements: ethos, pathos,

*Bakhtiniana*, São Paulo, 19 (4): e64920e, Oct./Dec. 2024

and logos. In Amossy's argumentative project, the author gives the same importance to the three rhetorical proofs. So, before starting the analysis, we're going to present some important concepts of this theory.

As we mentioned, argumentation takes place in the interrelation of the text and its context, since the effectiveness of the word is neither purely external nor purely linguistic. *Ethos*, in this perspective, is not just social (external to the discourse) nor just discursive. For Amossy, *ethos* is both, a social and discursive construction. Thus, the researcher proposes two notions, their being discursive *ethos* and previous *ethos*. The first one, the discursive *ethos*, is defined as "the image that the speaker constructs, deliberately or not, in his speech" (Amossy, 2010, p. 69).<sup>3</sup> It is important to highlight that the discursive *ethos* concerns both the construction of images of oneself and images of others in the discourse. The previous *ethos*, in turn, is defined as being "[...] the image that the audience can have of the speaker before his speech" (Amossy, 2010, p. 69).<sup>4</sup> Generally, to create this previous image, the audience takes into account the institutional status of the speaker, their position in a certain field that gives legitimacy to their speech and collective representations.

An important notion when dealing with *ethos* is that of stereotype. First, because the construction of the image of the audience goes through a process of stereotyping. Thus, the speaker will be able to act more effectively on him if he leans on shared representations. In this sense, when the speaker fits his audience into a certain group, he can use values and beliefs shared by that group to better influence it. Likewise, the speaker must frame his way of saying and his saying in collective schemes that he believes are valued by his target audience. Finally, Amossy (2010) also points out the importance of the self-image constructed in the discourse, as it is able to reinforce, reformulate and even change the previous image, if it is the speaker's interest. Thus, if a speaker finds himself fitting into a stereotype that doesn't serve his purpose, he can try to change it discursively.

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<sup>3</sup> In French: "l'image que le locuteur construit, délibérément ou non, dans son discours."

<sup>4</sup> In French: "l'image que l'auditoire peut se faire du locuteur avant sa prise de parole."

The importance of images of oneself and the other in the argumentative endeavor is remarkable. However, we will present the other two proofs, which are equally important. If in argumentation, *ethos* is linked to the scope of discourse production, *pathos* turns to the reception of the discourse by the audience.

Greeks and Latins, ancient rhetoricians, such as Aristotle and Cicero, recognized the role of emotions in achieving persuasion. However, this rhetorical proof was viewed negatively by others, like Plato, Seneca and Epictetus.<sup>5</sup> This controversy relies on the fact that emotions blind the eyes, prevent judgment and wisdom, so they should be controlled. At that time, in the opposite sense to emotions, *logos* would be understood as a synonym for reason, according to which discourses should be built.

Following Amossy's ideas, we defend the view that "the emotional and rational elements are woven into the same discursive web and thus prove to be inseparable" (Amossy, 2010, p. 173).<sup>6</sup> Amossy relies on authors, such as Plantin, for whom it is possible to think of a reason for emotions. In this sense, Amossy believes it is not possible to separate reason and emotion, since these would be engendered from a doxic basis, that is, from an apprehension of common sense, besides being linguistically materialized in the discourse.

Plantin determines, in turn, an organization to deal with the issue of emotions, proposing: the direct designation of emotions, which occurs when "emotion is clearly designated by a term of emotion" (Plantin, 2010, p. 62);<sup>7</sup> indirect designations of emotions, which reconstruct possible emotions through linguistic clues (color and verb terms) and through situational and attitudinal commonplaces, which are related to Amossy's (2010) idea of *doxa*, as we will see later. Bringing up other researchers who also defend a rational side of emotions, Charaudeau (2000) alerts us to the fact that emotion should be treated as a targeted effect, since discourse analysis does not have a methodological apparatus to study the effect produced. It is worth returning to Lima's

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<sup>5</sup> Platão. (2007). *Republic*. D. Lee, Trans.. Penguin Classics.; Sêneca. (2015). *On Anger, on Leisure, on Clemency*. S. Braund, Trans.. Oxford University Press.; Epictetus. (2014). *Discourses and Selected Writings*. R. Dobbin, Trans.. Penguin Classics.

<sup>6</sup> In French: "les éléments émotionnels et rationnels sont tissés dans la même trame discursive et s'avèrent, de ce fait, inséparables."

<sup>7</sup> In Portuguese: "a emoção é claramente designada por um termo de emoção."

idea, according to which, just as there are different levels of argumentativity, there is also a gradation of emotions, since “Everything depends on the evaluation of the subject involved, on how and how much they sees themselves affected in his relationship with the other” (Lima, 2018, p. 96).<sup>8</sup>

*Logos*, until recently, acquired a merely logical, or demonstrative, sense linked to reason, as what happens in works such as of Toulmin, Ducrot and Perelman. Expanding on the ideas of these theorists, for Amossy, *logos* is everything that integrates the structure of discourses. In this sense, Amossy distances herself from researchers who consider it being only the logical, or demonstrative, part of discourses. For the discourse analyst, *logos* is the very construction of language and is supported by linguistic-discursive elements. The most important is to think about how these elements contribute to the construction of *ethos* and *pathos*. For instance, the uses of denial and interrogation; lexicon; reported speech; quotes; modifiers; implicit; connectives; examples; metaphors; analogies; argument types etc.

After presenting the three rhetorical dimensions, we turn our gaze to what, since ancient rhetoric, has been a fundamental element for discursive persuasion, that is, *doxa*, although it has not always been seen from the same perspective. As Amossy (2002b) recalls, Aristotle theorized about the *endoxa* in his treatise on dialectics, *Topics*, based on the observation of sophistic practice. For the Greek philosopher, the *endoxa* would be what seems to be true for everyone, even if it is not really true. It would also be an element capable of seeking an agreement in the city. For other philosophers,<sup>9</sup> such as Plato, only genuine knowledge, that is, *episteme*, should be taken into account. *Doxa* was also called into question by Cartesianism, and already in the 19th century the negative view of common sense reached its peak, being associated with stereotypes and clichés.

Moving closer to the rhetorical tradition, we take into account, for example, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, who demonstrate important roles performed by *doxa* in

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<sup>8</sup> In Portuguese: “Tudo depende da avaliação do sujeito envolvido, de como e do quanto ele se vê afetado em sua relação com o outro.”

<sup>9</sup> Plato. (2007). *Republic*. D. Lee, Trans.. Penguin Classics.; Descartes, R. (2011). *Discourse on the Method*. I. Maclean, Trans.. Oxford University Press.; Kant, I. (1998). *Critique of Pure Reason*. P. Guyer & A. Wood, Trans.. Cambridge University Press.

persuasive communication, such as adapting to the audience, creating an average representation of the public to better persuade them and so forth. Doxa is so important since in many domains it is not possible to take into account only episteme to resolve conflicts, that is, “It is only by relying on the audience’s opinions, beliefs, and representations that a (virtual) interaction allowing for meaning and efficacy can be built” (Amossy, 2002a, p. 468).

According to Amossy (2002b), the same term was not always used to designate shared knowledge or ideas. Depending on the field of research, we find terms such as “public opinion,” “verisimilitude,” “common sense,” “common place,” among many others. While not exactly synonymous, we agree with Amossy on the idea that “Broadly speaking, however, all that is considered true, or at least probable, by a majority of people endowed with reason, or by a specific social group, can be called doxic.” (Amossy, 2002b, p. 369). In the last part of the article, we will deal specifically with one of these doxic elements, the socio-discursive imaginaries, as understood by Patrick Charaudeau.

## **2 An Argumentative Analysis of Helen’s Praise**

### **2.1 Building Credibility**

In his Rhetoric, Aristotle reminds us that to obtain persuasion, the discourse must be constructed in a way that leaves the impression that the speaker is trustworthy. Similarly, Charaudeau and Maingueneau bring their concept of credibility as:

a notion that defines the truthfulness of a person’s words (what he says is credible) or of a situation. (this situation is not credible). It therefore results from a judgment carried by someone on what he sees or hears, and consequently on the person who speaks and who is thus deemed credible. This judgment, which consists in measuring the aptitude of the speaking subject to tell the truth through his act of enunciation, means that any speaking subject who wants to be



believed tries to stage his speech in such a way that he can receive this label of credibility (Charaudeau; Maingueneau, 2002, p. 154).<sup>10</sup>

In this sense, Credibility is not a quality linked to the subject's social identity, it is constructed discursively. So what we are going to show next is the construction of images of oneself, that is, of *ethé*, that could bring credibility to Isocrates, so that he would be listened to and taken seriously.

To build his credibility, Isocrates' strategy is to create negative images of philosophers, sophists, teachers, and their schools, while at the same time moving away from them and creating, even if implicitly, positive images of himself. It is possible to say that, with this, he also tries to change his previous *ethos*, that is, his sophistic ethos, since he was accused of being one of them. It is worth remembering that "he resembles the sophists in accepting payment for teaching, in offering instruction in the skills needed for success in public life, and in writing speeches that were models for imitation by others." (Kennedy, 1994, p. 43). Kennedy (1994) also says that the rhetorician was fully aware of the existence of hostility against him, which made him write *Antidosis* when he was much older. Although in this work Isocrates may have made more evident his desire to distance himself from the sophists, this also appears in the *Encomium*, as an attempt to create credibility for himself. In this sense, these positive images of themselves can help build their credibility with those who are also contrary to the ideas defended by philosophers, sophists and teachers.

The first image that Isocrates tried to build to create his credibility was what we called the *ethos* of truthfulness, as we will demonstrate with the next two texts:

#### Text 1

"*There are some* who think it a great thing if *they* put forward an *odd, paradoxical* theme and can discuss it without giving offense. *Some people* have grown old denying that it is possible to say what is false, to contradict anything,

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<sup>10</sup> In French: "une notion qui définit le caractère de véracité des propos d'une personne (ce qu'il dit est crédible) ou d'une situation (cette situation n'est pas crédible). Elle résulte donc d'un jugement porté par quelqu'un sur ce qu'il voit ou entend, et par voie de conséquence sur la personne qui parle et qui est ainsi jugée crédible. Ce jugement, qui consiste à mesurer l'aptitude du sujet parlant à dire le vrai à travers son acte d'énonciation; fait que tout sujet parlant qui tient à être cru cherche à mettre en scène son discours de telle sorte qu'il puisse recevoir ce label de crédibilité."

or to compose two opposing speeches about the same subjects, *others* maintaining that courage, wisdom, and a sense of justice are all the same thing — that we have none of them by nature and that there is a single science (episteme) concerning all of them. *Still others* spend their time in disputes that provide no benefit but can make trouble for their students. If I saw that *this wasted effort* in speeches had come about recently and that these people were taking pride in the originality of their discoveries, I would not be so amazed at them. But who is there now who is *so behind in learning* that he does not know that *Protagoras* and the *sophists* of his time left us compositions such as these, as well as some that are even more troublesome? How would anyone top *Gorgias*, who dared to say that none of the things that are is, or *Zeno*, who tried to show that the same things are possible and again impossible, or *Melissus*, who put his hand to discovering demonstrations that the things in nature, which are infinitely many in number, are altogether one?”(Isocrates, Helen 1-3; 2000, pp. 32-33) (Our highlights).

In this passage, Isocrates uses argumentation by illustration “to strengthen adherence to a known and accepted rule, by providing particular instances which clarify the general statement” (Perelman; Tyteca, 1971, p. 357). In the analyzed text, the rule possibly accepted by most people is that some people defend “odd” and “paradoxical” themes. Isocrates’ criticism of these ideas continues with negative assessments of this practice, referring to it as “this wasted effort.” Also, he uses the *ad personam* when he accuses those people of being “so behind in learning” to disqualify them. Furthermore, Isocrates compares them to older philosophers such as Protagoras, Zeno and Melissus, in order to transfer their potential bad reputation to those he is criticizing. Finally, to distance himself from these people and ideas, Isocrates uses pronouns such as “some,” “they,” “others,” “these people,” implying that he is not part of this group. So he might be trying to create an *ethos* of truthfulness for himself. In this case, Isocrates uses the anti-model to implicitly make the reader think what the model would be and realize that he would be the model. The anti-model can be understood as the one “[...] who is despised and cited as an example of bad taste and low life” (Perelman, 1982, p. 112). With that, the reader should realize that unlike these people, Isocrates would not defend paradoxical ideas.

The next image that we’ll highlight as a rhetorician’s attempt to generate credibility is what we call *ethos* of intelligence, as shown in the next two texts.

## Text 2

“To *me* the most ridiculous thing of all is that *they* seek to persuade *us* through *their* speeches that *they* have knowledge of politics, when *they* could demonstrate this in the very field in which they claim to teach. *Those* who argue that they are intelligent and claim to be sophists<sup>11</sup> ought to surpass and be superior to private citizens not on subjects that have been ignored by others but on those over which everyone competes! But as it is now *they* are acting like someone who pretends to be the best athlete but enters an arena where no one else cares to compete” (Isocrates, Helen 9-10; 2000, p. 34) (Our highlights).

In this text, the polarization between an “I” and a “they” is much clearer, since Isocrates takes the stage using the pronouns “me” and “us.” The divergence of points of view is much more marked. Isocrates criticizes those who deal with subjects that nobody cares about, since arguing about them is so much easier. To reinforce his argument, the rhetorician makes use of an analogy between those who claim to be intelligent and athletes in an arena, evidencing the same conclusion, that it is much easier to win a game when no other player wants to compete. The use of the arena and athletes was also strategic, as everyone would recognize the situation as ridiculous and possibly agree with Isocrates. Moving away from those who would not be intelligent, the rhetorician wants the reader to see him as intelligent and that he would indeed have knowledge of politics.

Also the rhetorician uses the value of what is useful to criticize those who teach useless things and who would not be intelligent people. The image of intelligence is created because the reader must realize the greater intention of Isocrates with his text, that is, to defend his political position, Panhellenism, which will become clearer in the course of our analysis. It is necessary to remember according to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca that “One appeals to values in order to induce the hearer to make certain choices rather than others and, most of all, to justify those choices so that they may be accepted and approved by others” (Perelman; Tyteca, 1971, p. 75). Common sense generally accepts that what is useful matters more than what is not useful.

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<sup>11</sup> It is necessary to clarify that, in this case, the word “sophist” was used in its ancient and original sense, meaning intelligence.

Teaching Panhellenism, which has as one of its main points that it is useful to society, would make Isocrates be seen as intelligent.

After criticizing other authors and claiming that it is easy to deal with insignificant subjects, Isocrates asserts the need for intelligence to discover news about subjects that everyone talks about. In his words “It is not characteristic of the same *intelligence* to speak worthily about both kinds of subjects. (...) *It is rare to discover something that no one has said before about well-known subjects*” (Isocrates, Helen 13; 2000, p. 35) (Our highlights). Again, the rhetorician makes use of a shared value in his argument. In this case, he takes up the idea that what is rare matters most. By creating a new version of Helen’s story using discursive resources different from those who have already written about her, such as Gorgias, Isocrates tries to show how intelligent he is.

The last image that we will highlight and that could contribute to Isocrates’ credibility is the *ethos* of certainty. Therefore, the notion of modality is especially important for pragmatic studies. In general, it can be understood as “the attribution of modalities to an utterance, by which an enunciator expresses an attitude towards his interlocutor and towards the contents of his utterance” (Johansson; Suomela-Salmi, 2011, p. 96). This attitude is marked in the speech through verbal tenses, appreciative judgments, expressions, affirmations, interrogations, injunctions, adverbs, among many other linguistic marks. In this sense, Koch (2002, p. 86) defines what she called the modality of knowledge and certainty as “the maximum degree of engagement of the speaker and the intention to impose his arguments on the speaker, presenting them as incontestable.”<sup>12</sup> Examples of this modality will be shown next.

First, we highlight the frequent presence of rhetorical questions such as “What intelligent person would try to praise misfortune?” (Isocrates, 2000, p. 34) and also “how can we not praise her, honor her, and believe her to have excelled over all who have ever lived?” (Isocrates, 2000, p. 41). This is the type of question in which answers are not expected from either the interlocutor or the speaker, as, in fact, it is an interrogation that does not question. On the contrary, the interrogations are made only

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<sup>12</sup> In Portuguese: “o grau máximo de engajamento do locutor e a intenção de impor ao alocutário os seus argumentos, apresentando-os como incontestáveis.”

for the speaker to assert himself as the holder of those answers. Thus, it can cause the effect that the speaker has knowledge.

Another resource found in Isocrates' text that can contribute to his *ethos* of certainty is the frequent use of certain adverbs that can convey the idea that the speaker is sure of what he is talking about, as in: “*Surely* the gods did not put an ordinary person in charge of determining a matter over which they found themselves in such great dispute. They *clearly* picked the best judge” (Isocrates, Helen 46; 2000, p. 42) (Our highlights), “They *clearly* take refuge there because of their weakness.” (Isocrates, Helen 10; 2000, p. 34) (Our highlights); “His argument is not drawn from the same forms (*ideai*) nor is it about the same subject matter as an encomium. It is *entirely* the opposite” (Isocrates, Helen 15; 2000, p. 35) (Our highlights). Choosing these words, Isocrates tries to cause in the interlocutor the impression that he is sure of what he is talking about, that there is no doubt about what he is saying.

We saw some strategies that Isocrates uses to try to create positive images of himself and, possibly, generate credibility. We emphasize that the rhetorician tries to distance himself from those he devalues and who he believes are devalued by others as well, creating, albeit indirectly, positive images for himself. Isocrates tries to change his previous *ethos*, constructing *ethé* as true, intelligent, holder of political knowledge and concerned with what is useful for society. All of this was done so that he would have credibility, that is, to be listened to and taken seriously.

Credibility strategies are usually scattered throughout the text. In the *Encomium of Helen*, however, it is interesting to note that they are concentrated on the first three pages of Isocrates's text. Only after that, he actually begins his praise of Helen. The apparent lack of connection between this beginning and the rest of the text can be explained in this way: Possibly, Isocrates knew of the need to change his previous *ethos*, or at least try, so that the reader would continue reading. After imagining that his credibility was somehow guaranteed, he starts his praise. We affirm beforehand that under the guise of praising Helen, Isocrates intends to actually defend his political position.

## 2.2 Praising Helen

To analyze which argumentative strategies were mobilized to praise Helen, we separate Isocrates' praise of Helen into five arguments, which are what we call: argument about Zeus; argument about Theseus; argument about the kings; argument about Alexander and, finally, argument about Helen. Following the thematic order of the text, we start with the argument about Zeus.

### Text 3

“I shall make the beginning of her family the beginning of my speech. Of the many demigods sired by Zeus, *he was proud to be called father of this woman alone*. Although he had taken special interest in the son of Alcmene (Heracles) and the sons of Leda (Castor and Pollux), *he honored Helen so much more than Heracles* that although he gave him *strength*, which can overcome others by force, *he endowed her with beauty*, which naturally rules even might itself. Since *he knew* that distinction and brilliance arise not from peace but from wars and struggles, and wanted not only to raise them physically to the level of the gods but to give them everlasting renown, He made Heracles' life onerous and dangerous, but he gave her a nature that was admired and fought over” (Isocrates, Helen 16-17; 2000, p. 36) (Our highlights).

In this passage, Isocrates makes use of the argument from authority. According to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca this argument “uses the acts or opinions of a person or group of persons as a means of proof in support of a thesis” (Perelman; Tyteca, 1971, p. 305). In the text, Isocrates takes up the mythical figure of Zeus, recognized by common sense as the father of the gods, showing that if he valued Helen it is because she, in fact, should be valued and praised. It is noteworthy that this is possibly a highest authority, a God, since while humans are prone to errors, gods are not. The importance of Helen for Zeus is highlighted, firstly, in the pride of this God in being her only father and also in the idea that Zeus would have honored Helen “much more than Heracles,” who, in itself, was already valued as the Greek hero. Isocrates shows that Zeus would have placed more value on Helen than on Heracles, creating a hierarchy of values between beauty and strength. Although we don't know if this hierarchy was, in fact, created by Zeus, the Greek rhetorician, using the argument of authority and by

saying “he knew,” wants to give the impression that it was. Thus, Isocrates creates images of Helen as the beautiful and admirable woman.

Moving on to the second argument, we are going to analyze the argument about Theseus. Although Isocrates mentions that Theseus wanted “intimacy” with Helen, even if she wasn’t “yet at her peak” and that “he seized her by force,” the rhetorician seems willing to let that go, as Theseus would have many other qualities. What Isocrates is going to do is try to change Theseus’ previous *ethos*, which had him known as Helen’s kidnapper and sexual harasser, and build a more positive *ethos* for him. To do so, Isocrates will use the argument by association, what is evidenced by the rhetorician himself when he states: “I think that the strongest basis for argument (*pistis*) will be if we can demonstrate that those who loved and admired her [Helen] were themselves more admirable than the rest” (Isocrates, Helen 22; 2000, p. 37). Returning to Perelman’s theory, when explaining about coexistence liaisons, he clarifies:

it seems that prototype of such liaison is the relationship between a person and his manifestations. Everything that is affirmed about a person is justified by how that person manifests himself (Perelman, 1982, p. 90).

Thus, previous positive acts become a kind of capital that is incorporated to Theseus to build a good reputation for him. In this sense, Isocrates wants the reader to conclude that if Theseus was admirable and if he admired Helen, it is because, in fact, she was admirable.

For this, first, Isocrates is going to compare Theseus to Heracles. To this end, the rhetorician, again, creates a hierarchy of values, and while Heracles was honored for more renowned and greater deeds, Theseus was even more prestigious because his deeds were more useful and would benefit everyone and not just himself. Thus, Isocrates makes use of the common idea that what is for the collective good is worth more than what benefits only one person. To illustrate this idea, he narrates at length about several of the great risks that Theseus faced for the common good. According to Perelman, the illustration is used “to give it a certain presence in consciousness” (Perelman, 1982, p. 108). In this sense, Isocrates tells that Theseus “single-handedly”

defeated the bull sent by Poseidon, demonstrating his courage; that he was a hero, since he “freed the inhabitants of the city from great fear and distress” and “put a stop to their violence,” referring here to the fight “against the two-natured centaurs.”

We will not highlight all the achievements of Theseus presented by Isocrates for that one to be classified as the “benefactor of the Greece as much as of his homeland,” even though the rhetorician spent almost three pages trying to build this positive *ethos* for Theseus and erasing his previous negative *ethos*, for his attempt to rape Helen. However, let’s highlight one of these “great achievements” because it appeals to emotions as a persuasive resource.

#### Text 4

“At about the same time, the monster was reared in Crete, Born of Pasiphae” the daughter of the Sun (*Helios*); by the oracle’s command the city was sending it twice *seven youths as tribute*. When Theseus saw them being led off, escorted by the entire populace to *a lawless death*—yet one foreseen, so that they were mourned while still living—he was *so upset* that he thought *it would be better to die than to live and rule a city that was compelled to pay such a sorrowful tribute* to its enemies. He joined the sailing and conquered a nature that combined man and bull and had the strength to fit such a physical combination. He returned *the youths* safely to their parents and *liberated the city from so lawless, terrible, and inescapable an injunction*” (Isocrates, Helen 27-28; 2000, p. 38) (Our highlights).

Although it is not clear what emotion Theseus felt, since Isocrates only mentions that he was “upset,” the description of the situation and the pathetic words the rhetorician uses can help us (re)construct an emotion and understand the reason for this emotion. The intention of Isocrates is, possibly, to make the reader of the text feel the same emotions that Theseus felt and this pathetic effect would lead the reader to realize the importance of Theseus and the reason for his valorization as a hero and “benefactor of the Greeks.” We will argue that Isocrates tries to make the reader feel pity, which according to Aristotle is:

Let pity, then, be a sort of pain at an apparently destructive or painful bad thing happening to someone who does not deserve it, and one that a person might expect himself or one of his own to suffer, and this

*Bakhtiniana*, São Paulo, 19 (4): e64920e, Oct./Dec. 2024



when it appears close at hand. For it is clear that the person who is going to feel pity must actually be such as to think that he, or one of his own, might suffer some such bad thing as is mentioned in the definition, or one like it or nearly like it (Aristotle, *Rhet.* II 8, 1385b13-19; 2018, p. 73).

To create the reasons for pity, Isocrates recalls the *topos*, understood here as a ready-made argument, from the youth, that is, from those who have their whole life ahead of them and who don't deserve to be killed in a tribute. Therefore, pity can be felt for the suffering experienced by those who did not deserve it. In addition to this doxic element, the lexicon used contributes to accentuate emotion, such as "lawless death": "such a sorrowful tribute": "lawless, terrible and inescapable an injunction." The reader is led to imagine himself in that situation, as an acquaintance of these young people. In this context, Theseus becomes the hero, honest and brave who thinks that "it would be better to die than to live and rule a city that was compelled to pay such a sorrowful tribute to its enemies."

To these images (*ethé*) of brave, hero, honest and "the benefactor of the Greeks," Isocrates adds the *ethos* of the one who has "military knowledge" and who is a good ruler of the city. This idea appears when Isocrates highlights Theseus' merit for ruling tyrannically and, thus, consolidating the villages of Attica, making Athens "so great that from that time to this it is the greatest in Greece" (Isocrates, *Helen* 34-35; 2000, p. 40). To conclude his argument about Theseus, the rhetorician claims that it is not possible to find "a more credible witness" and "a more competent judge." So by Isocrates logic, if Theseus valued Helen, everyone should value her.

It's important to note that the concept of usefulness and collective interests, along with the positive images crafted for Theseus, serves to strengthen Isocrates' political ideology. In summary, as Mirhady, Papillo, and Too (2000) point out, Isocrates advocated for Panhellenism, which aimed at fostering unity among the Greek city-states against the threat of Persia. Isocrates perceived Athens as the foremost city in Greece and sought the collaboration of other cities. However, these cities were hesitant to relinquish their autonomy. The researchers also tell that, for Isocrates, some shared values separated Greeks from non-Greeks and that cities should unite against enemies,

emphasizing the importance of solidarity and the common good. Therefore, the praise of Helen through the narrative of Theseus not only serves as a tribute to Helen but also aligns with Isocrates' support for Panhellenism. The Greek rhetorician desired to be viewed in a similar light to Theseus – as a heroic and principled leader capable of guiding a city. In essence, Isocrates aimed to convey an image of himself that mirrored the virtues and leadership qualities associated with Theseus.

After lecturing at length on Theseus, Isocrates begins to narrate some events highlighting the choice of a husband for Helen when she had already reached the appropriate age. First he talks about the kings and then he talks about Alexander,<sup>13</sup> who ended up becoming Helen's husband. On kings, Isocrates was very brief, content to say that: "They could have taken first-rate women in their own cities, but they scorned marriages at home and came to court her" (Isocrates, Helen 39; 2000, p. 41). The argument from authority is used again to show Helen's worth. In that case, he calls collective authorities, "*all* the kings and sovereigns." Again, the rhetorician wants the reader to transfer the value of these authorities to Helen. So, if they, who were the powerful ones of the time, chose her, it is because, in fact, she deserved praise.

Before we go into the argument about Alexander, we have to remember that he was the one chosen by the gods to judge the beauty contest between Hera, Athena and Aphrodite. Alexander chose the goddess of beauty and love as she offered him in exchange for the victory, the marriage to Helen. As we will demonstrate, Isocrates wants the reader to transfer Alexander's value to Helen. To do so, the rhetorician will try to create a positive *ethos* for Alexander saying that he wasn't an "ordinary person" and that "a mortal who has won the honor of becoming *a judge of gods* must be a person of *outstanding intelligence*" (Isocrates, Helen 47; 2000, p. 42). In this passage, Isocrates uses divine authority, which, according to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1971), is considered the greatest and undisputed authority. The rhetorician also makes use of the value of what is rare, since, generally, what is rare is more worthy. Therefore, the rhetorician wants to build the image that Alexander was a unique, exceptional and intelligent person. From these positive images, Alexander is possibly also seen as an

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<sup>13</sup> It is noteworthy that in some versions of the myth, the character Alexander is named Paris.

authority for readers and his value is again transferred to Helen. If Alexander, who was valued, chose to marry Helen, it is because she should be valued and praised as well.

Only in his last argument Isocrates will speak directly about Helen. Until now, we could see that all her value came from the value of other men. Still at the end of the text, when Isocrates praises Helen for a characteristic of hers, beauty, stating that “She had the most *beauty*, which is *the most venerated, most honored, and most divine quality in the world*,” the rhetorician takes up male divine authorities to validate the importance of this characteristic. To show how beauty was important, Isocrates uses arguments by example saying that even Zeus who was “the most powerful of all” preferred to lower himself to approach it [beauty], that is, “He joined *Danaë* as a golden shower. He became a swan when he fled into the bosom of *Nemesis* and again likened himself to one when He wed *Leda*” (Isocrates, Helen 59; 2000, p. 45). From the examples, Isocrates wants readers to form generalizations that beauty is important over other virtues and that, therefore, Helen is of great value and should be praised. Although beauty is an important element in Helen’s story, we will focus on it in the next section, when we will address socio-discursive imaginaries.

So far, we’ve seen that Helen was praised by the authority of other men. Certainly, in a male supremacist society, or what we would now call patriarchal, Isocrates chose those arguments that would have the most force in front of his readers. If the rhetorician had constructed his text with the authority of women, he would probably not even be listened to, since these authorities would not be recognized as such. Only men’s worth could justify Helen’s worth. But for herself, she has no value. Her value arises through the eyes of men.

Finally, we must realize that by using these male authorities, Isocrates wanted to transform Helen’s previous *ethos*. Traditionally, Helen has always been viewed negatively, as the cause of a war that decimated the Greek population. To this day, Helen is compared to other fatal women, such as Eve, who caused men to fall from Paradise, Pandora, who spread all evil, and Medea, the infanticide. In order to defend Panhellenism, Isocrates created a more positive *ethos* for Helen. So, instead of being the *femme fatale*, she should be seen as the one who united men in pursuit of a common

social good. War itself is reframed in the rhetorician's text. Isocrates does not mention the great losses, but highlights the benefits of the Trojan War. As he enlightens us, "Helen is the reason we are not enslaved to the foreigners," and "the Greeks formed a common mind and created a shared military force against the foreigners because of her" (Isocrates, 2000, p. 47). Also, he still highlights the progress achieved with the war: "we took even great cities and much land away from the foreigners" (Isocrates, 2000, p. 48).

### **2.3 Sociodiscursive Imaginaries in Helen's Encomium**

Helen's story allowed Isocrates to show, in his view, the importance of Panhellenism and its main characteristics, perhaps the main one being the usefulness of uniting men for the common good. However, the discursive construction of male authorities to praise Helen and, consequently, the defense of his political project also tells us about the society of ancient Greece, a patriarchal society. Even if it was not the rhetorician's intention to legitimize male sovereignty, we defend the idea that his discourse has the potential to do so, since, as we said, every speech has an argumentative dimension (Amossy, 2010). In order to continue our analysis, in this section, we will deal with what Charaudeau came to call socio-discursive imaginaries, but first we will, briefly, explain this concept of semiolinguistic theory.

Before speaking properly about the concept of socio-discursive imaginaries, we must notice the existence of many terms that cover the same semantic field. We remember "cliches," "stereotypes," "common places," "prejudices," etc. We corroborate Charaudeau's idea that it is not easy to establish precise differences between them, since they "refer to what is said repetitively and that, in such a way, ends up being sedimented (recurrence and immutability), and describes a characterization considered simplifying and generalizing (simplification)" (Charaudeau, 2007).<sup>14</sup> In her theory of argumentation in discourse, Amossy (2010) prefers to speak of "doxic elements," such as

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<sup>14</sup> In French: "réfère à ce qui est dit de façon répétitive et qui, de ce fait, finit par se figer (réurrence et fixité), et décrit une caractérisation jugée simplificatrice et généralisante (simplification)."

“interdiscourse,” “*topoi*,” “received ideas,” “stereotypes” etc., to refer to elements that have something doxic in them, that is, something that is common and shared socially. As we are going to base ourselves on a concept proposed by Charaudeau, we will stick to the nomenclature chosen by him.

The semiolinguist criticizes the notion of stereotype in more detail, stating that there are ambiguities in it, after all, if, on the one hand, the stereotype would have the function of establishing a social link, on the other, it is rejected for distorting or masking reality. Due to this ambiguity, which would also be present in the other terms, Charaudeau proposes his concept of socio-discursive imaginaries. Mainly influenced by Durkheim’s notions of “collective representation,” Moscovici’s “social representations,” and Castoriades’ “social imaginaries,” Charaudeau proposes the sociodiscursive imaginaries as:

a form of apprehension of the world that is born in the mechanics of social representations, which, as stated, builds meaning on the objects of the world, the phenomena that are produced, human beings and their behavior, transforming reality into a significant reality (Charaudeau, 2007).<sup>15</sup>

According to the author, imaginaries are mechanisms for the construction of reality, which allow us to understand the world. They are, then, social since the representational symbolization of the world takes place in domains of social practice, such as the artistic, political, judicial, religious, educational, among others. Thus, they serve as a social link with the help of institutions. Furthermore, imaginaries are discursive, as they “[...] are engendered by the discourses that circulate in social groups, organizing themselves into coherent systems of thought, creators of values, playing the role of justification of social action and depositing themselves in collective memory” (Charaudeau, 2007).<sup>16</sup> It is worth clarifying that, in relation to the imaginaries,

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<sup>15</sup> In French: “un mode d’appréhension du monde qui naît dans la mécanique des représentations sociales, laquelle, on l’a dit, construit de la signification sur les objets du monde, les phénomènes qui s’y produisent, les êtres humains et leurs comportements, transformant la réalité en réel signifiant.”

<sup>16</sup> In French: “sont engendrés par les discours qui circulent dans les groupes sociaux, s’organisant en systèmes de pensée cohérents créateur de valeurs, jouant le rôle de justification de l’action sociale et se déposant dans la mémoire collective.”

there is no right or wrong, as they can receive different views in different social domains and times.

#### **2.4 Socio-discursive Imaginaries in Helen's Encomium: Gender Issues in Ancient Greece**

Taking into account Charaudeau's concept of socio-discursive imaginaries, we will be able to understand better the society of ancient Greece. Thus, we will see that femininity, generally, is linked to beauty, which is its greatest value, while masculinity is represented by domination and strength. They are values that Isocrates' text can reinforce or build from its argumentative dimension.

Blondell (2013) tells us that defining beauty was almost an obsession in Ancient Greece. However, if, for women, it was linked to the physical, indicating puberty and the right time for marriage, for men, beauty was related to physical strength and represented the appropriate moment to face the battlefields. In the words of the author, "The beauty of perfected femininity is, by contrast, construed as intrinsically erotic, and inextricably tied to the domain of sex and reproduction" (Blondell, 2013, p. 2).

Certainly, feminine beauty and masculine strength are the main themes that sustain Helen's story and the Isocrates text. In countless moments, Helen's beauty is highlighted. At the beginning of the text, Isocrates mentions that Theseus "was so overwhelmed by her beauty," and then, when talking about the gods, Isocrates explains that "she had the most beauty, which is the most venerated, most honored, and most divine quality in the world."

What we notice differently about the story of Isocrates when compared to more traditional versions of the myth is that it erases the common idea that Helen's physical beauty would have been the source of the evil that provoked the war. Traditionally, female beauty has been shown to have the power to cause conflict, as in the beauty contest itself portrayed in the myth. Although the rhetorician tries to change the imaginary of fatal beauty, he maintains the representation that a woman must be beautiful to be valued and also that with beauty she would gain many advantages, such as Helen who won many suitors.

Beyond the imaginary of feminine beauty, we will see that, with the resumption of the Helen myth, of heroes and wars, whether civil or amorous, other representations will emerge linked to the masculine and feminine. And even though the history of the Trojan War was written around the 8th century BC, ancient civilizations remained in constant war until about the first millennium BC, so depictions of war still had meaning for the Greeks of Isocrates' period.

As Van Nortwick (2008) tells us, the ancient Greeks were very curious about the differences between men and women, and this was evident in the writings of many speakers. In addition to superior male strength, the author says that the most marked and reproduced differences, including in texts by Aristotle and Hippocrates, would be the wet nature of women in opposition to the dryness of men. It is worth recalling, taking up Bourdieu (2002), that biological physical differences between the sexes can be seen as “natural” justifications for the social difference of gender, giving the impression of being natural to what is actually an imposed choice, that is, arbitrary. This kind of thinking was then rationalized in various ways:

war requires physical strength, and men are naturally stronger than women; because they are naturally drier than women, men are simply healthier in general, and thus more reliable in combat; soldiers must depend on each other when they risk their lives to defend their communities, and women are by nature more prone to lying and untrustworthy behavior; discipline is necessary for a smoothly functioning army, and women are more reproachful and combative than men (Van Nortwick, 2008, pp. 74-75).

The *Encomium of Helen* not only involves the theme of war, but highlights, for example: the physical strength of Heracles and, also, the challenges and dangers he faced; the courage of Theseus in kidnapping Helen; the heroism of Theseus and Heracles for facing danger; the physical appearance of Theseus when he “conquered a nature that combined man and bull” etc. Wars were, therefore, a place to express masculinity and all its elements, physical strength, courage, and domination. War gives the winner honor and status, as we saw with Theseus and Heracles, but also gives possessions/territories. In the case of the Trojan War, the biggest prize was marriage to

the woman considered the most beautiful, Helen. It is in this sense that we can say that the story of Helen recovered by Isocrates also evidences what we call here the “war of love,” and it brings to light the imaginary that men own women.

According to Abrantes (2011), in Ancient Greece, the matchmaking tradition relied on the fulfillment of two requirements. The first one concerned the delivery of gifts from suitors to the father of the possible bride and the other was a procession towards the husband’s house, which symbolized the delivery of the woman to him. Generally, these gifts were animals, clothes, jewelry and had the function of showing the bride’s father that the suitor was able to take care of his future wife. Marriage had purely financial interests, while the bride’s father received a payment for the daughter, the husband stayed with the woman, who should guarantee his economic growth by giving him sons, who would perpetuate the family’s name.

The woman was, then, just the currency of an exchange that took place between men, which is clear in some moments of the text. When Isocrates tells of Theseus’ intention to kidnap Helen, the author justifies it by saying “Since he could not obtain her from her parents,” in which, the word “obtain” objectifies the character and brings the idea of possession, since one has possession of objects, not people. The same idea comes from the use of the word “deposited” in “He seized her by force and deposited her in Aphidna, in Attica,” when Theseus had already kidnapped Helen. Helen is treated as an object, passive, without a will of its own, which is still evident in “Before it was decided who would marry her,” where passive voice is used. The woman’s financial objectification would also explain Alexander’s decision in the beauty contest, which, by becoming Zeus’ son-in-law, would achieve a noble position and give his children a great future.

Still on marriage in Ancient Greece, Abrantes (2011, p. 227) explains that, prior to the ceremony, “a verbal contract was signed between the one who had promised the woman for marriage, usually her father, and the groom”<sup>17</sup> and that in the absence of the bride’s father, a male close relative would have to do so, as the woman was considered

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<sup>17</sup> In Portuguese: “um contrato verbal entre aquele que havia prometido a mulher em casamento, geralmente seu pai, e o noivo.”



legally incapable. Women, therefore, were not only passive objects but were under male dominance. Marriage was not the only sector in which women were under the control of men, that is, they also had to be submissive to them in the political, social, and legal spheres. In Athenian society, women “were considered psychologically not autonomous, not free, and unable to control themselves” (Lessa, 2011, p. 260).<sup>18</sup> Men, on the other hand, were described “around notions of self-control, rationality, and of capacity to not give way to emotion” (Lessa, 2011, p. 260).<sup>19</sup>

Lessa (2011) further explains that women were only responsible for obeying the behavioral norms created by men for their own benefit. Regarding education for women, the researcher says that it was informal education, that is, that they learned weaving and spinning through their conviction with their mothers or governesses, and that they rarely learned to read and write. Importantly, “through education was imposed on wives women’s conventional model characterized by submission, by silence and reclusion” (Lessa, 2011, p. 260).<sup>20</sup> In the second section of this work, we had the opportunity to verify that Helen’s value was built from male authority, this being another example of the power of men, only they have the power to give them value, only they control what is valued and what is not and, yet, only they have the power of the word. Likewise, the woman remains silent regarding marriage, unable to say whether she wants to get married or not, as in Helen’s case.

Despite the nearly twenty centuries that passed between the text of Isocrates and today’s society, it would not be difficult to prove how masculinity and femininity are still supported by imaginaries such as the ones we have highlighted. As we could see, the socio-discursive imaginaries are social representations materialized in discourses, which are repeated by the instances of power and, thus, remain engraved in our memory.

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<sup>18</sup> In Portuguese: “Elas, na sociedade dos atenienses, eram consideradas psicologicamente não autônomas, não livres e incapazes de controlarem a si próprias.”

<sup>19</sup> In Portuguese: “eram centradas em torno das noções de auto-controle, racionalidade e de capacidade para não dar meios à emoção.”

<sup>20</sup> In Portuguese: “através da educação era imposto às esposas o modelo convencional feminino caracterizado pela submissão, pelo silêncio e pela reclusão.”

## Conclusion

Since ancient rhetoric, we know that, in order to persuade an audience, the speaker must start from elements that are already accepted by the interlocutor. It is necessary, then, to seek points of contact. In our analysis, Isocrates does this all the time. First, we looked at the discursive strategies used to build images that could give him credibility and for him to be taken seriously. We saw that he tries to build positive images of himself taking into account what he thought would be valued by his audience. At the same time, he tried to move away from what would be devalued, in this case, the sophists, their ideas and their followers. Thus, he would be trying to change his previous *ethos* and build a better image for himself.

Then we saw male authority being used to praise Helen, in an attempt to change her previous *ethos* and defend Panhellenism. After that, we showed that Isocrates used Helen's story as a background since it is built on the basis of representations of men and women that were also accepted when the *Encomium* was written. Thus, men were valued mainly for their physical strength, while women gained prominence for their beauty. Possibly, if the rhetorician had constructed a story that subverted the imaginaries of masculinity and femininity, his defense of Panhellenism would have had less chance of being accepted. Finally, we defended the importance of the argumentative dimension. The epideictic discourse, commonly used to reinforce values, ended up reinforcing and reproducing gender imaginaries, even though this was not Isocrates' main purpose.

It is possible to say that discourses have many layers. In the case analyzed, on a more superficial layer, Isocrates claims that he wanted to praise Helen, but, on a slightly deeper level, we saw that he was trying to defend his political dream. In an even deeper layer, that of the argumentative dimension, we find that it may have influenced ways of seeing and thinking about masculinity and femininity. To know the meaning of a text it is necessary to explore all of them, from the most superficial or explicit to the most profound and implicit, the latter being our main focus here. From all this, we realize that the speaker does not even have full control of the senses of his speech. Furthermore,

some of these representations are still present in today's world, evidencing the power that discourses have to, purposefully or not, create and reinforce what should or should not be valued in men and women. So, often, what seems natural is actually an arbitrarily imposed choice presented in such a way that people do not notice the imposition.

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## Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank Dr. Christopher Tindale, from the Centre for Research in Reasoning, Argumentation and Rhetoric, University of Windsor, Windsor, ON, Canada, for his support during the elaboration of this work.

Translated by the article's author.

*Received December 20, 2023*

*Accepted April 26, 2024*

*Bakhtiniana*, São Paulo, 19 (4): e64920e, Oct./Dec. 2024

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## Research Data and Other Materials Availability

The contents underlying the research text are included in the manuscript.

## Reviews

Due to the commitment assumed by *Bakhtiniana. Revista de Estudos do Discurso* [*Bakhtiniana. Journal of Discourse Studies*] to Open Science, this journal only publishes reviews that have been authorized by all involved.

## Review I

The well written article, raises interesting questions and makes a necessary link between ancient rhetoric and current studies, especially those of Discourse Analysis. The presentation of Ruth Amossy's theory is clear, as it provides relevant information to anyone interested in the subject. Therefore, the following comments are suggestions for future work.

In dealing with ethos, and especially because the article seeks to establish a connection with ancient texts, we believe that Dominique Maingueneau could also be quoted with great benefit. Thinking about ethos as Maingueneau does, would help to situate and problematize statements such as "In this sense, Credibility is not a quality linked to the subject's social identity, it is constructed discursively." This is how it is for the sophists, because for the *bonus uir peritus dicendi*, the premise for speaking well is being coherent. If we think of legitimization, what is constructed intradiscursively must necessarily be based on extradiscursive values (attention to public expectations, agencying of the values of that society, etc). What matters is that ethos is a procedure, a deliberate and voluntary construction, a process. In other words, it is not something "natural," and it goes beyond a mere identification, but implies an ethical world, of which the warrantor of the discourse is an integral part and to which he gives access.

It is also important to remember James Crosswhite's interpretation, based on Perelman, that the epideictic, far from being neutral, is central, since it reinforces existing agreements to guarantee the conditions of argumentation (persuasion by ties of community). But the main point is that Isocrates' encomium is not exactly an encomium, but a paradoxical encomium. This aspect of the text, crucial to its understanding, should be taken into account in future work.

The text does not seem to have given much importance to the fact that Isocrates' eulogy is a response to Gorgias'; this competition was typical of the universe of sophistry and has everything to do with the epideictic. It would also be interesting to point out that Isocrates went down this path. Why? For what purpose? We believe that these reflections would add a lot to the discussion proposed by the text. We also suggest turning to the Rhetoric of Herenius manual, which, with its categories to obtain benevolence for the speaker or, on the other hand, to ensure that it is not granted to the adversary, gives us the necessary material to think about both the deliberative and the

paradoxical encomium (when what belongs to the categories of contempt, hatred and indignation is satirically exalted).

Some very specific comments:

- In the Portuguese summary, we suggest using *rétor* instead of *retórico*;
- The statement “composed by Homer” should be relativized - “attributed to Homer,” “as Tradition says” etc.
- In “However, if for Plantin, the opposition of ideas is what characterizes argumentation, Amossy believes” etc, the reference is missing.
- In conclusion, this article is a delight to read, original and interesting, contributing to both classical studies and Discourse Analysis. APPROVED

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Reviewed on January 11, 2024.

## Review II

1. Adequacy of the work to the proposed theme; The work is adequate to the proposed topic, and the title is appropriate.
2. Explanation of the work’s objective and coherence of its development in the text; The text presents the analysis it intends to carry out clearly and rigorously in addition to the theoretical framework it will use to carry it out. All the work is developed with these objectives, in a text with the right divisions and with a linear and explicit development.
3. Conformity with the proposed theory, demonstrating the latest knowledge of the relevant bibliography; The proposed reading corresponds with the theoretical bases mentioned, and these are applied in an exquisite manner.
4. Originality of the reflection and contribution to the field of knowledge; This is an unprecedented analysis in the terms in which it is carried out and that certainly brings contributions to the area in which it is inserted. Thus, it could leverage similar analyses of other discourses.
- 5 Clarity, correctness and suitability of language for scientific work. A clear use of the language, appropriate progression and compliance with all the scientific requirements. APPROVED

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Reviewed on February 23, 2024.