Integrationist methodologies to climate justice aim to formulate a conception of justice that encompasses principles of global and intergenerational justice, arguing we should treat climate issues in the light of this general theory. In this article, we contend that there are compelling reasons to pursue a minimal conception of justice, and, within this context, Rawls' late conception of public reason is particularly relevant. We propose that a minimal conception of justice for an integrationist approach need not be bound by specific overarching global principles to govern the global international society. The mechanism of public reason can facilitate agreement between climate issues and other related issues by allowing countries to appeal to reasons that reflect the shared and implicit values of constitutional democracies found in international institutions. Although this approach may introduce more ambiguity, it also results in a less idealized scenario, which in turn can contribute to integrating climate and social justice at a minimal level. In summary, we advocate for a two-fold approach, involving both a far-reaching maximum conception of justice and a flexible minimal conception that prioritizes international deliberation and shared values as the means to address diverse dimensions of justice within the global context.
Integrationism; global justice; climate justice; public reason; Rawls; legitimacy