Parties Are Not the Only Patrons: Towards a New Typology of Patronage^*

Abstract

Studies on patronage and politicization typically focus on the dilemma politicians face when recruiting public personnel. Politicians must choose between appointing loyal allies to implement policies or party members to garner political support. The term politicization typically emphasizes the political facet of the public bureaucracy. Through an integrative literature review, this paper aims to provide new insights into the concept of patronage and its relationship with the politicization of bureaucracy. The paper introduces findings from an intensive literature review of publications on patronage, bureaucracy, and politicization. A search was conducted for texts published between 2000 and 2022 on Scopus and Web of Science. Through a qualitative content analysis, 144 texts discussing the concept of patronage were read and coded to identify theories, frameworks, and measurement methods. The results indicate that the research literature tends to overly emphasize the role of political parties in the distribution of public offices. In contrast, this paper proposes a reconceptualization of patronage, highlighting the power of other stakeholders, such as interest organizations and social movements. It advances the research agenda by proposing a new typology that scholars might employ in comparative studies.

Keywords
Patronage; bureaucracy; politicization; literature review

The influence of political parties on the distribution of public offices is a major concern in the research literatures on politics and public administration (CHUDNOVSKY, 2017). Several studies address the relationship between non-elected bureaucrats and politicians within a principal-agent theoretical framework (BRESLER-GONEN and DOWDING, 2009; DORP, 2022; ENNSER-JEDENASTIK, 2014; FLEISCHER, 2016;JIANG, 2018; MEYER-SAHLING et al., 2012). According to this framework, politicians act as principals, whereas bureaucrats serve as their agents. Thus, politicians make decisions while non-elected bureaucrats are responsible for their implementation.

This ideational distinction between politics and administration is challenged by the various ways politicians intervene in administration and bureaucrats are immersed in politics (COOPER, 2021). Scholars have critically conceptualized this exchange through the notion of patronage, which is understood in two key ways: as the allocation of resources for political purposes (BRASSIOLO et al., 2020; CAMERON, 2010) and, secondly, as the power wielded by political parties in appointing individuals for public office (DI MASCIO, 2014). Further work associates patronage with other concepts, such as clientelism and corruption (CAMERON, 2010; CHUDNOVSKY, 2017; GOLDEN, 2003; LASSOU, 2017; SCHUSTER, 2020). However, in other instances, patronage stands out without a specific definition or clear typology(DERLIEN, 2003; JENNINGS, 2010; PAINTER, 2006).

The lack of a consensual definition poses challenges for comparative studies on patronage because systematic comparisons require concepts and measures capable of ‘traveling’ to diverse contexts (SARTORI, 1970). While recent reviews have focused on bureaucratic oversight and autonomy (BERSCH and FUKUYAMA, 2023; BRIERLEY et al., 2023), there remains a gap in the literature concerning a comprehensive and extensive mapping of the different concepts of patronage. This paper seeks to build upon previous studies by comparing concepts and typologies of patronage found in the most recent literature, ultimately proposing an adapted theoretical framework. By presenting the findings from an unprecedented and intensive literature review, the paper critically discusses how authors frame and operationalize the concept of patronage. Through this study, a comprehensive overview of recent publications is synthesized, addressing their strengths and gaps.

I conducted a qualitative content analysis of 144 texts that explicitly mentioned the word ‘patronage’. This paper provides an overview of how scholars have defined and measured patronage, their main theoretical frameworks and research methods, and explores the relationship between patronage and other political phenomena. The findings indicate that the research literature focuses on partisan influence, which tends to confine discussions of patronage and political appointments to political parties. In contrast, I claim policymaking within the public bureaucracy may be influenced by patrons beyond political parties, such as interest organizations, private companies, and social movements.

Accordingly, I propose a new typology of patronage that considers a more diverse range of stakeholders beyond political parties. The remainder of this paper is divided as follows. The first section exposes the methodology employed in this investigation. The next discusses the works qualitatively, indicating their advances and gaps. The third section proposes a new typology. The conclusion focuses on further steps to advance this research agenda.

Data and procedures

This investigation addresses the concept of patronage and proposes a new typology, employing an integrative literature review with a qualitative content analysis. An integrative literature review typically seeks to criticize and synthesize research articles, books, or other published materials, facilitating the development of taxonomies and theoretical models. The purpose is not to cover all publications on a topic but to combine different perspectives. Given the maturity of the patronage topic, this research aimed to assess the knowledge base and re-conceptualize the phenomenon by examining the literature available (SNYDER, 2019).

Although integrative reviews do not require systematic searches, I followed specific and clear criteria to select publications for the analysis. To provide an overview of the most recent literature, I searched publications from 2000 to 2022 on Scopus and Web of Science databases. After running tests with different combinations of keywords, the final search included the following terms: bureaucracy, bureaucrat, civil servants, government officers, government officials, interest groups, lobbying, advocacy, pressure groups, interest organisations, lobbyists, patronage, and political parties with the Boolean operators ‘OR’ (for synonyms) and ‘AND’ (for different topics). Clientelism was intentionally excluded from the keywords to avoid bias. Although clientelism is frequently associated with patronage (WEINGROD, 1968), I preferred to avoid this association to maintain neutrality in this review. The primary goal was to investigate how the literature defines patronage (in the context of the public bureaucracy and lobbying) without assuming any definition or relationship ‘a priori’.

The metadata with all publications found in the searches was downloaded into a reference file. Since Scopus and Web of Science operate differently, I combined both imported collections using a reference manager (Mendeley). After excluding duplicated texts and non-related or non-academic publications, the consolidated collection comprised 1,978 publications from 2000 and 2002 that mentioned any combination of the keywords used in the searches. In sum, I imported different collections from both databases, aggregated them using the reference manager, and eliminated duplicates and non-related materials by reading abstracts and identifying keyword mentions.

Thus, after excluding duplicates, Scopus and Web of Science returned 1,978 publications related to bureaucracy, interest groups, and patronage. I did not filter by area to include a wide range of publications from different fields. After re-reading the abstracts, I selected all texts discussing the relationship between patronage and bureaucrats, using the following criteria: period and regime (focus on contemporary regimes), stage of the policy cycle (policymaking, rulemaking, or political appointments), and type of publication (journal articles and book chapters).

I used NVivo software to read and code 415 texts about the political connections of bureaucrats. Among these texts, 144 specifically mentioned the keyword ‘patronage’¹. This paper discusses the content of these texts, which address patronage more directly. The coding process followed a deductive approach, drawing from previous studies (MAYRING, 2000). The top-level codes (Appendix B) were:

01. Concept of patronage; 02. Actors: stakeholders mentioned by authors; 03. Patronage goals, and 04. Perspectives on patronage (costs or benefits to the state and society).

These categories were determined by reading the abstracts of the general sample (N=1,978) and other texts before conducting the content analysis. The codes are not mutually exclusive, as a sentence or word may be classified into more than one category. They were constantly reassessed throughout the reading process.

As with any other study, this investigation has challenges and limitations. The number of texts was limited by language (keywords in English) and availability. I tried to minimize this bias by including a diverse range of publications in different languages. The final collection included journal articles and book chapters in English, French, Portuguese, and Spanish. Still, this study advances this research agenda by pointing out gaps in the literature and proposing new solutions for theory-building. Thus, this paper contributes to future empirical investigations by mapping existing studies and proposing a theoretical framework capable of ‘traveling’ to different contexts. This adaptability is crucial for comparative studies (SARTORI, 1970).

Patronage and politicization

In the extensive literature on patronage in the fields of political science and public administration, a consensus regarding the definition of patronage is notably lacking. Several scholars employ the terms ‘patronage’ and ‘politicization’ without providing clear definitions (COOPER, 2018; DAHLSTRÖM and HOLMGREN, 2019; DERLIEN, 2003; DOYON and KELLER, 2020; GERA, 2016; JENNINGS, 2010; LAGUNA, 2011; LEE, 2013; MARENCO, 2017; MASUD and HOSSAIN, 2021; NGUSMANTO, 2016; PAINTER, 2006; REUTER and ROBERTSON, 2012; SHARAFUTDINOVA and TUROVSKY, 2017; TING et al., 2013). Frequently, these terms overlap with political appointments as they are employed as synonyms (LOWANDE, 2019; MEYER-SAHLING, 2006; MIKKELSEN, 2018; MONSOD, 2017, among others).

The definitions of patronage vary, ranging from broader ideas of patron-client relationships to more specific concepts associating the phenomenon with certain stakeholders or goals. In US scholarship, the expression ‘patronage appointments’ refers to appointments made by parties, politicians, or the president (HUBER and TING, 2021). Grindle (2012) associates it with discretionary appointments made for political or personal reasons. Most studies assessing the American system focus on the president’s choices and powers regarding appointments, recruitment processes, and removal (LEWIS, 2011a; PARSNEAU, 2013; SNYDER, 2022). Consequently, resulting conceptualizations of patronage often exhibit a distinctive US-centric perspective. Even studies focusing on other regions, such as South America or Africa, employ concepts rooted in the American system (BERSCH et al., 2023).

Most studies relate patronage to the president or political parties in the context of appointments to public office. Overall, it is considered a strategic tool available to the executive leader to negotiate with parties and members of parliament or a means for politicians to oversee the bureaucracy (BERSH et al., 2023). As Brierley et al. (2023) explain:

Political patronage, in particular, is central to both the comparative and American politics literatures, although differences in word usage make the connections unclear. It is often of greatest interest to scholars when individuals are selected for political reasons, but the variety of such reasons disjunctures across research programs. In the US context, these political reasons mostly involve selecting bureaucrats with policy preferences similar to the principal, or what is sometimes called the official’s loyalty to the person who hired them. In comparative studies, the political reasoning is usually about the distribution of government jobs to partisans - often party workers – or what is sometimes know as spoils system (BRIERLEY et al.; 2023, p. 275).

Table 01 summarizes the predominant meanings of patronage found in the most recent studies on bureaucracy, patronage, and politicization (2000-2022). Table 01 reveals, the third, fourth, and fifth definitions, employed by several scholars, associate patronage directly with political parties. Even when scholars adopt broader definitions such as ‘patron-client relationships’, empirical studies tend to estimate patronage by examining the partisan affiliations of bureaucrats. The content analysis confirmed this, as patronage and political parties were frequently connected. From a patron-client perspective, parties are considered patrons, and their appointees are seen as clients (STARONOVA and RYBÁŘ, 2021).

Table 01
Concepts of patronage

Concept of patronage	Authors
1. Patron-client relationships	Demir, 2017; Flinders and Matthews, 2012; Jiang, 2018; Junyan Jiang and Zhang, 2020; Staronova and Rybář, 2021;Zeng, 2019
2. Exchange of jobs or other benefits for political support or loyalty	Aspinall and As’Ad, 2015; Sundell, 2014; Tadić and Elbasani, 2018; Zeng, 2019
3. Distribution of public jobs to allies or partisans	Brassiolo et al., 2020; Cameron, 2010; Cooper, 2018; Feeney and Kingsley, 2008; Kopecký et al., 2022; Lopez and Silva, 2022; Mikkelsen, 2013
4. Distribution of public jobs based on political criteria (in contrast to merit-based recruitment)	Meyer-Sahling, 2006; Nunes, 2015; Schuster, 2017, 2016
5. Power of political leaders, president, or parties to appoint	Bach, 2020; Di Mascio, 2014; Iacoviello and Llano, 2017; Llano, 2019; Mikkelsen, 2013; Scherlis, 2013; Silva and Jalali, 2016a, 2016b; Sotiropoulos, 2004
6. Pork-barrel allocations or clientelism	Golden, 2003

• Source: Elaborated by the author based on Final collection (N=144).

Nevertheless, these definitions are not mutually exclusive, as scholars usually combine different elements related to patronage. For instance, Zeng (2019) defines patronage as the distribution of public jobs to clients in exchange for their political support, combining the first two definitions in Table 01. Likewise, Mikkelsen (2013) describes it as the power of political leaders to appoint loyalists to public jobs to control public administration. Bersch et al. (2022) use the concept of ‘patronage coalition’ to refer to all appointees who are not members of the cabinet coalitions but are affiliated with political parties and selected through non-merit-based processes.

Definitions are often connected by two elements: discretion and the dichotomy between merit-based and non-merit-based criteria. According to Campbell (2020), patronage implies recruitment that prioritizes the relationship between the recruiter and the applicant over qualifications. In this context, the political dimension refers to the use of non-merit-based criteria in the selection of bureaucrats.

Thus, patronage is frequently associated with political appointments or the recruitment of bureaucrats, which may serve different purposes. The classical ‘politician dilemma’ refers to two goals related to political appointments: gaining political or electoral support and ensuring policy implementation. The president or the competent authority must choose between rewarding partisans in exchange for political support or nominating officers aligned with his/her ideological preferences to implement proposed policies (GEDDES, 1994). Phrased differently, the literature generally approaches two types of motivations behind patronage: rewarding individuals in exchange for political support and exerting control over the bureaucracy to ensure that policies are implemented (STARONOVA and RYBÁŘ, 2021).

Table 02 presents some examples of studies discussing patronage goals. It becomes evident from the table that authors tend to focus on these two goals (control vs reward or policy vs support), although other purposes exist.

Table 02
Patronage goals

Goals	Authors
Control over the bureaucracy or agencies	Bach, 2020; Bersch et al., 2022; Dahlström et al., 2022; Di Mascio, 2014; Kenny, 2015; Kopecký et al., 2016; Meyer-Sahling and Veen, 2012; Mikkelsen, 2013; Scherlis, 2013; Silva and Jalali, 2016a, 2016b; Staronova and Rybář, 2021; Üstüner and Yavuz, 2018;
Creation of political organizations	Kopecký et al., 2022; Scherlis, 2013;
Democratic goals	Bearfield, 2009
Policy goals	Kopecký et al., 2022; Meyer-Sahling, 2006; Meyer -Sahling and Veen, 2012; Scherlis, 2013;
Political support or loyalty	Colonnelli et al., 2019; Kopecký et al., 2022; Meyer-Sahling, 2006; Mueller, 2015; ; Rogowski and Simko, 2022
Reward to partisans or allies	Bersch et al., 2022; Brassiolo et al., 2020; Cameron, 2010;Meyer-Sahling, 2006; Rogowski and Simko, 2022; Silva and Jalali, 2016a; Staronova and Rybář, 2021
Reform	Scherlis, 2013; Schuster, 2016

• Source: Elaborated by the author based on Final collection (N=144).

The qualitative analysis has confirmed that the two most frequently cited goals within this research literature are control over the government and political support or loyalty. Nevertheless, control over the government is interpreted in various ways. While several scholars focus on control over the bureaucracy to implement the party’s policy goals (MEYER-SAHLING, 2006; MEYER-SAHLING and VEEN, 2012; SCHERLIS, 2013), others, such as Kopecký et al. (2022), associate control with party-building and the utilization of state resources. In this context, patronage is seen as a strategy for building parties’ organizational networks within the state. Accordingly, parties take over state institutions to advance their interests vis-à-vis their opponents.

Like the diverse concepts of patronage, these goals are not mutually exclusive. Not surprisingly, authors usually mention more than one goal or motivation (BEARFIELD, 2009; SCHERLIS, 2013), which may lead to the development of typologies of patronage (discussed in more detail below). The appointment of loyalists is seen as a strategy to increase the political leader’s control over the bureaucracy. According to scientific literacy, exerting control over the public bureaucracy aims to implement the program of the higher-level authority (policy goals). Furthermore, the reward is typically associated with an exchange for political or electoral support (COLONNELLI et al., 2019).

Nonetheless, the dichotomy between political/electoral support and policy implementation (or reward vs control) is illusory. Appointing partisans or coalition members (related to reward/support) might also facilitate policy implementation (control), as the executive leader needs political support to implement policies (ALBRECHT, 2021). According to the coding matrix (Table 03)², control over government, political support, and reward to partisans or allies are usually connected in the texts.

Table 03
Coding matrix of patronage goals

	A: Control over the government	B: Creation of political organizations	C: Democratic goals	D: Policy goals	E: Political support or loyalty	F: Reforms	G: Reward to partisans or allies
1: Control over the government	__	01	0	02	06	01	06
2 Creation of political organizations	01	__	0	01	01	01	02
3: Democratic goals	0	0	__	0	0	0	0
4: Policy goals	02	01	0	__	03	01	02
5: Political support or loyalty	06	01	0	03	__	01	07
6: Reforms	01	01	0	01	01	__	01
7: Reward to partisans or allies	06	02	0	02	07	01	__
TOTAL	16	06	0	09	18	05	18

• Source: Elaborated by the author based on Final collection (N=144).

Investigating patronage goals presents methodological challenges due to the inherent difficulty in assessing motivations. Authors employ a variety of proxies, including the number of discretionary positions, personnel appointment systems, the scale of the public sector employment, and public spending (DI MASCIO, 2014; DOYON and KELLER, 2020; KENNY, 2015; LIU, 2021; SCHERLIS, 2013). The most commonly used data source is expert surveys. Additionally, career indicators of partisan loyalty serve as a standard proxy to identify patronage and political connections among government officers (BACH, 2020). Despite the many definitions and goals associated with patronage, most studies focus on political parties. Table 04 shows the number of documents citing political organizations: political parties are cited in 56 publications regarding patronage, followed by bureaucrats (54) and politicians or elected officials (42). The research literature barely mentions other political organizations, such as interest groups, social movements, and unions.

Table 04
Coding matrix of actors

	A: Patronage
1: Bureaucrats or government employees	54
2: Citizens (public)	05
3: Interest groups	05
4: Lobbyists	0
5: Ministers	12
6: NGOs or non-profit organizations	0
7: Political parties	56
8: Politicians or elected officials	42
9: President, PM, or Executive leader	22
10: Social movements	01
11: Trade unions or professional associations	01

• Source: Elaborated by the author based on texts from the final collection mentioning ‘patronage’ (N=144).

There is a gap in the existing literature concerning the empirical investigation of patron-client relations beyond political parties. Since the authority to appoint and remove individuals usually lies with formal authorities, studies tend to concentrate on the executive leader, political parties, or politicians. Nevertheless, this formal prerogative might be informally delegated to other stakeholders, such as lower-level authorities (ALBRECHT, 2021). Furthermore, the authorities’ decisions regarding appointees may be influenced by other actors. The existing definitions and typologies of patronage predominantly focus on political parties and the dichotomy between control (policy) and reward (support). They overlook other types of patron-client relationships. Thus, the literature lacks a conceptual framework that incorporates stakeholders beyond political parties and offers more flexibility regarding patronage goals.

Social movements and other stakeholders are cited in the literature on representative bureaucracy (ABERS, 2019; ABERS and OLIVEIRA, 2015), where the term ‘patronage’ is avoided. Thus, it is noted that politicization and patronage often carry pejorative meanings when associated with clientelism, corruption, diminished state capacity, or deficiency in service delivery, among other dysfunctions (BRESLER-GONEN and DOWDING, 2009; CAMERON, 2010; DIERICKX, 2003). Nonetheless, most recent studies have highlighted that patronage might also offer certain advantages, such as responsiveness to society or political programs and innovation (CARDOSO and MARENCO, 2020; TORAL, 2020).

Towards a new typology of patronage

Although most studies relate patronage to political parties, there is evidence suggesting that other actors might affect political appointments. In the United States, for instance, interest groups may exert influence over political appointments through oversight mechanisms (BERTELLI and LYNN, 2004; BERTELLI and FELDMANN, 2007). In Brazil, a growing body of research has revealed the connections between government officers and social movements or interest organizations (ABERS, 2019, ABERS and OLIVEIRA, 2015; ALBRECHT, 2021). Yet, the literature on political appointments predominantly concentrates on political parties (LOPES and VIEIRA, 2020). These connections might affect the probability of being appointed as much as partisan affiliation. Given that government officers play a significant role in designing policies, interest groups may try to influence them by persuading public authorities to appoint their members. The process of influencing decisions might involve selecting bureaucrats and shaping policies directly.

Studies recognize that patronage might serve various purposes and actors. Some authors add adjectives to the term ‘patronage’. Meyer-Sahling and Veen (2012) use the expression ‘party patronage’ to refer to the distribution of goods (including public jobs) to party supporters. Likewise, Staronova and Rybář (2021) relate party patronage to the role of parties appointing their clients to public positions. The most complete typology is offered by Bearfield (2009), who describes four styles of patronage according to their goals: building organizations, achieving equalitarian goals, bridging political cleavages, and reforming the patronage system.

More recently, Ramos Larraburo Ramos et al. (2018) proposed a typology based on the nature of trust between patrons and appointees, as well as the skills patrons seek. The authors innovate by focusing on the different patronage roles, categorizing trust as partisan and non-partisan, and skills as either professional or political. Patronage roles include (LARRABURO et al., 2018):

01. Party professionals: “appointees combining partisan trust and techno-professional competence” (LARRABURO et al., 2018); 02. Programmatic technocrats: appointees combining non-partisan trust and techno-professional competence; 03. Apparatchiks: appointees combining partisan trust with political competence. It includes ‘party operators’, ‘commissars’, ‘brokers’, and ‘activists’; and 04. Political agents: appointees combining non-partisan trust with political skills. It encompasses ‘fixers’, ‘minders’, and ‘electoral agents’.

Both classifications advanced the research agenda by proposing a more comprehensive understanding of patronage and extending its scope beyond its relationship with clientelism. Nonetheless, they focus on elements that might be difficult to assess, such as motivations and skill sets. Furthermore, Ramos Larraburo et al. (2018) continue to focus on party systems and institutionalization. Overall, studies generally overlook types of patronage beyond partisan patronage, particularly in empirical investigations. Empirical research commonly uses partisan affiliation as a proxy for patronage, partisan engagement, or politicization (LOPEZ and SILVA, 2019). Tang et al. (2022) criticize the excessive attention given to political parties but still ignore other types of non-partisan patronage, apart from those mentioned by Bearfield (2009).

Descriptions of bureaucrats are complex and extend beyond a simple divide between political and professional dimensions, as they may have mixed experiences. Characteristics such as technical expertise and political engagement are not mutually exclusive; for instance, an appointee might have worked in various sectors such as corporations, government bodies, and research institutions (ALBRECHT, 2021). Bureaucrats might be recruited from diverse backgrounds including academia, interest groups, and the private sector (MEYER-SAHLING, 2008).

Although the research literature on public bureaucracy focuses on political parties, government officers, and politicians, it is plausible that other patrons and clients operate in this setting. Based on previous classifications (BEARFIELD, 2009; LARRABURO et al., 2018), I propose five types of patronage categorized according to the type of patron and the nature of their relationship with the client:

01. Political-individual patronage: the patron is a politician or public authority (policymaker with formal political power), and the relationship is based on ideological alignment or political bargaining (votes, policies, among other goods); 02. Political-partisan patronage: the patron is a political party, and the relationship relies on partisan affiliation or engagement; 03. Political-societal patronage: the patron is an association, social movement, or interest organization. The relationship is once more grounded in ideological alignments; and 04. Personal patronage: the exchange results from personal ties between the patron and his/her client, e.g., family or friendship.

This classification is based on ideal types rather than mutually exclusive categories. Therefore, a relationship might encompass more than one type of patronage simultaneously. This framework does not connote clientelism or corruption, as this relationship is not necessarily illicit or self-regarding. Merely appointing someone does not necessarily indicate a patronage relationship, as appointees might be recruited through formal application processes instead of being supported or nominated by an authority or organization.

This typology offers many advantages for future studies. First, it is simple and broad enough to be applied in different contexts. Second, it reinstates the core element of patronage – patron-client relations – by addressing the questions ‘Who is the patron?’ and ‘What is the nature of the relationship between the patron and the client?’. This classification departs from the concept proposed by Toral (2020), which associates patronage with the discretionary power of politicians in appointing bureaucrats. Albeit useful for distinguishing patronage from other concepts, such as clientelism, this definition might contribute to confounding patronage with other terms (e.g., political appointments and politicization).

Answering the questions above is not easy. Empirical studies might identify the types of patronage mentioned by exploring evidence related to who appoints individuals and the nature of their relationship with the appointee. This involves analyzing informal practices since the formal authority may not always be the one directly nominating the appointees. Regarding formal authority, it is possible to identify who is responsible for appointing individuals to public office by analyzing rules and statutes. However, identifying the true patron behind the political appointment made by formal authority poses the greatest challenge. This could be investigated using diverse data sources, such as interviews, surveys, and other documents. Social Network Analysis offers a valuable approach to assessing connections between patrons and clients. For instance, it can identify if they attended the same institutions (eg., OLIVIERI, 2007; PERISSINOTTO et al., 2017) or were members of the same group. Prosopography, which involves the study of collective biographies, might also help to identify connections. Empirical studies in this field rely on expert surveys. To complement these studies, it would be useful to assess the insiders' perspectives, i.e., bureaucrats and appointees, using surveys and interviews. They have critical information on appointments and the role of political and personal connections.

Moreover, this classification does not assume a direct link between patronage and the characteristics of bureaucrats. Instead, it allows empirical studies to analyze whether patron-client relations might influence the appointment of bureaucrats with specific profiles or career paths. It is worth noting that the literature tends to associate patronage with non-merit-based recruitment and bureaucrats with a political profile, as opposed to meritocratic selection, which prioritizes civil servants with technical expertise (BORGES, 2020; BRESLER-GONEN and DOWDING, 2009; CHUDNOVSKY, 2017; COOPER, 2021). This reproduces the traditional logic of dichotomy between politics and administration. Some authors (FERRAZ, 2020; POLGA-HECIMOVICH, 2021; TORAL, 2021) challenge this logic by recognizing the hybrid nature and political roles of bureaucrats. In contrast to mainstream literature, they highlight the potential benefits of patronage, such as service delivery (TORAL, 2021), bureaucratic accountability (TORAL, 2021), and the capacity of agencies to coordinate for economic growth (JIANG, 2018).

Finally, the proposed typology highlights the distinction between patronage and the politicization of the bureaucracy, although they might be connected. While bureaucratic politicization refers to the relationship between politics and administration, patronage is an exchange relationship in which a patron sponsors a client. The concept does not suggest that this exchange will always be driven by political affinity. Therefore, a broader understanding of politicization is necessary, acknowledging that it involves actors beyond political parties, such as interest groups and social movements.

Some public positions might be distributed to acquaintances or family members of political authorities (CAMERON, 2010). Cameron (2010) categorizes this as a type of ‘politicization’ less subject to political control. Similarly, Ferraz (2020) incorporates personal ties into the definition of patronage. Conversely, Mikkelsen (2013) argues that patronage is not based on familial or kinship ties, which are characteristic of nepotism. The author associates patronage with self-regarding transactions. I argue that patronage involves different types of connections, including personal relationships, without necessarily being self-regarding. It is political when this relationship is related to ideological alignment or bargaining.

Final remarks

This paper presents the findings of an extensive literature review on patronage and politicization. Through qualitative content analysis of publications, the study indicated that research on the topic is primarily focused on political parties as the prominent patrons in the distribution of public positions. Further studies are necessary to delve more deeply into the role of other organizations. Politics comprises a variety of actors and practices beyond political parties and formal institutions. For instance, interest groups might try to affect policy by appointing members or loyalists (ALBRECHT, 2021; MANCUSO and GOZETTO, 2018). Moreover, patronage might serve different goals, and it is not necessarily positive or negative. Its effects on service delivery and state capacity might be further explored.

In addition to mapping concepts, this paper proposes a new typology of patronage that highlights other actors in addition to political parties. To complement existing research, I propose four types of patronage based on the nature of the ties between patrons and their clients. In addition to reinstating the core element of the definition of patronage, this typology is more comprehensive and comprises measurable elements. Given the complexity of this topic, a triangulation of methods and techniques is needed, including prosopography, interviews and surveys with bureaucrats, and social network analysis. Further comparative studies are necessary to assess the practicability of this theoretical framework in empirical research.

The proposed typology allows future studies to examine whether certain types of patronage lead to specific bureaucrat profiles. A key challenge lies in measuring these variables. Classifying bureaucrats as ‘political’ or ‘technocrats’ might be challenging due to the hybrid nature of the public bureaucracy. Defining what qualifies as ‘political’ is both crucial and challenging. While some studies relate patronage and politicization to partisan affiliation, such data might not be available in several countries. Moreover, affiliation is not the only type of partisan engagement, and other organizations may influence appointments to public positions. Parties are not the only patrons; bureaucrats engage in different relationships and political endeavors. Recognizing this diversity is crucial to overcoming the illusory divide between politics and administration.

Acknowledgments

Pedro Floriano Ribeiro and Patrycja Rozbicka, as well as the International Political Science Association (I presented the idea for this article at last year's world congress).

References

• ABERS, Rebecca Neaera (2019), Bureaucratic activism: pursuing environmentalism inside the Brazilian state. Latin American Politics and Society Vol. 61, Nº 02, pp. 21-44.
• ABERS, Rebecca Neaera and OLIVEIRA, Marília Silva de (2015), Nomeações políticas no Ministério do Meio Ambiente (2003-2013): interconexões entre ONGs, partidos e governos. Opinião Pública Vol. 21, Nº 02, pp. 336-364.
• ALBRECHT, Nayara F. Macedo de Medeiros (2021), Reflexões sobre nomeações a cargos públicos no Brasil: a experiência de três secretarias entre 2011 e 2018. Revista Brasileira de Ciência Política Vol. 36, Nº 36, pp. 01-34.
• ASPINALL, Edward and AS'AD, Muhammad Uhaib (2015), The patronage patchwork: village brokerage networks and the power of the state in an Indonesian election. Bijdragen Tot de Taal-, Land- En Volkenkunde Vol. 171, Nº 02/03, pp. 165-195.
• BACH, Tobias (2020), Top officials' careers and the relationship between politics and administration. NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy Vol. 13, Nº 02, pp. 35-48.
• BEARFIELD, Domonic A. (2009), What is patronage? A critical reexamination. Public Administration Review Vol. 69, Nº 01, pp. 64-76.
• BERSCH, Katherine and FUKUYAMA, Francis (2023), Defining bureaucratic autonomy. Annual Review of Political Science Vol. 26, Nº 01, pp. 213-232.
• BERSCH, Katherine; LOPEZ, Felix G. F., and TAYLOR, Matthew M. (2022), Patronage and presidential coalition formation. Political Research Quarterly Vol. 76, Nº 02, pp. 762-777.
• BERTELLI, Anthony M. and FELDMANN, Sven E. (2007), Strategic appointments. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory Vol. 17, Nº 01, pp. 19-38.
• BERTELLI, Anthony M. and LYNN JR., Laurence E. (2004), Policymaking in the parellelogram of forces: common agency and human service provision. Policy Studies Journal Vol. 32, Nº 02, pp. 167-185.
• BORGES, André (2020), Política, burocracia e coordenação de políticas públicas no presidencialismo de coalizão. Cadernos ENAP Vol. 66, pp. 01-36.
• BRASSIOLO, Pablo; ESTRADA, Ricardo, and FAJARDO, Gustavo (2020), My (running) mate, the mayor: political ties and access to public sector jobs in Ecuador. Journal of Public Economics. Working paper 191.
• BRESLER-GONEN, Rotem and DOWDING, Keith (2009), Shifting and shirking political appointments for contracting out services in Israeli local government. Urban Affairs Review Vol. 44, Nº 06, pp. 807-831.
• BRIERLEY, Sara; LOWANDE, Kenneth; POTTER, Rachel Augustine, and TORAL, Guillermo (2023), Bureaucratic politics: blindspots and opportunities in Political Science. Annual Review of Political Science. Vol. 26, pp. 271-290.
• CAMERON, Robert (2010), Redefining political-administrative relationships in South Africa. International Review of Administrative Sciences Vol. 76, Nº 04, pp. 676-701.
• CAMPBELL, Jesse W. (2020), Buying the honor of thieves? Performance pay, political patronage, and corruption. International Journal of Law Crime and Justice Vol. 63, Nº 05, pp. 100439.
• CARDOSO, André Luis Rabelo and MARENCO, André (2020), Political appointments in municipal governments and bureaucratic performance: evaluating achievement. Revista de Administração Pública Vol. 54, Nº 03, pp. 360-380.
• CHUDNOVSKY, Mariana (2017), La tensión entre mérito y confianza en la Alta Dirección Pública de América Latina. Revista del Clad Reforma y Democracia Vol. 69, pp. 05-40.
• COLONNELLI, Emanuele; PREM, Mounu, and TESO, Edoardo (2019), Patronage and selection in public sector organizations. American Economic Review Vol. 110, Nº 10, pp. 3071-3099.
• COOPER, Christopher A. (2021), Politicization of the bureaucracy across and within administrative traditions. International Journal of Public Administration Vol. 44, Nº 07, pp. 564-577.
• COOPER, Christopher A. (2018), Bureaucratic identity and the resistance of politicization. Administration & Society Vol. 50, Nº 01, pp. 30-52.
• DAHLSTRÖM, Carl and HOLMGREN, Mikael (2019), The political dynamics of bureaucratic turnover. British Journal of Political Science Vol. 49, Nº 03, pp. 823-836.
• DAHLSTRÖM, Carl and LAPUENTE, Victor (2022), Comparative bureaucratic politics. Annual Review of Political Science Vol. 25, pp. 43-63.
• DEMIR, Fatih (2017), Depolitization of bureaucracy: the case of Central and Eastern European countries. International Journal of Public Administration Vol. 40, Nº 01, pp. 54-64.
• DERLIEN, Hans-Ulrich (2003), Mandarins or managers? The bureaucratic elite in Bonn, 1970 to 1987 and beyond. Governance Vol. 16, Nº 03, pp. 401-428.
• DI MASCIO, Fabrizio (2014), Exploring the link between patronage and party institutionalization: an historical-institutional analysis of the Italian transition. Democratization Vol. 21, Nº 04, pp. 678-698.
• DIERICKX, Guido (2003), Senior civil servants and bureaucratic change in Belgium. Governance Vol. 16, Nº 03, pp. 321-348.
• DORP, Eric-Jan van (2022), The Minister Wants it': self-politicisation and proxy politics among senior civil servants. Public Policy and Administration Vol. 38, Nº 04, pp. 424-444.
• DOYON, Jérôme and KELLER, Franziska Barbara (2020), Knowing the wrong cadre? Networks and promotions in the Chinese Party-State. Political Studies Vol. 68, Nº 04, pp. 1036-1053.
• ENNSER-JEDENASTIK, Laurenz (2014), The politics of patronage and coalition: how parties allocate managerial positions in state-owned enterprises. Political Studies Vol. 62, Nº 02, pp. 398-417.
• FEENEY, Mary K. and KINGSLEY, Gordon (2008), The rebirth of patronage: have we come full circle? Public Integrity Vol. 10, Nº 02, pp. 165-176.
• FERRAZ, David (2020), (A)political administration? The public manager's portrait and selection factors. Revista de Administração Pública Vol 54, Nº 05, pp. 1166-1187.
• FLEISCHER, Julia (2016), Partisan and professional control: predictors of bureaucratic tenure in Germany. Acta Politica Vol. 51, Nº 04, pp. 433-450.
• FLINDERS, Matthew and MATTHEWS, Felicity (2012), Party patronage in the United Kingdom: a pendulum of public appointments*. In: Party patronage and party government in European Democracies Edited by KOPECKÝ, Petr; MAIR, Peter, and SPIROVA, Maria. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 335-354.
• GEDDES, Barbara (1994), Politician’s dilemma: building state capacity in Latin America. Los Angeles: University of California Press. 256 pp..
• GERA, Weena (2016), The politics of ethnic representation in Philippine bureaucracy. Ethnic and Racial Studies Vol. 39, Nº 05, pp. 858-877.
• GOLDEN, Miriam A. (2003), Electoral connections: the effects of the personal vote on political patronage, bureaucracy and legislation in postwar Italy. British Journal of Political Science Vol. 33, Nº 02, pp. 189-212.
• GRINDLE, Merilee S. (2012), Jobs for the boys: patronage and the State in comparative perspective. Boston: Harvard University Press. 336 pp..
• HUBER, John D. and TING, Michael M. (2021), Civil service and patronage in bureaucracies. Journal of Politics Vol. 83, Nº 03, pp. 902-916.
• IACOVIELLO, Mercedes and LLANO, Mercedes (2017), Trust over merit: the impact of presidential power concentration on public personnel management in Argentina. Temas y Debates. Vol. 33, pp. 91–105.
• JENNINGS, Will (2010), Bureaucratic performance and control in British politics: asylum policy 1994-2007. British Journal of Politics and International Relations Vol. 12, Nº 04, pp. 539-568.
• JIANG, Junyan (2018), Making bureaucracy work: patronage networks, performance incentives, and economic development in China. American Journal of Political Science Vol. 62, Nº 04, pp. 982-999.
• JIANG, Junyan and ZHANG, Muyang (2020), Friends with benefits: patronage networks and distributive politics in China. Journal of Public Economics. Vol. 184, pp. 01-66.
• KENNY, Paul D. (2015), The origins of patronage politics: State building, centrifugalism, and decolonization. British Journal of Political Science Vol. 45, Nº 01, pp. 141-171.
• KOPECKÝ, Petr; MEYER-SAHLING, Jan-Hinrik, and SPIROVA, Maria (2022), (Extreme) political polarization and party patronage. Irish Political Studies Vol. 37, Nº 02, pp. 218-243.
• KOPECKÝ, Petr; MEYER-SAHLING, Jan-Hinrik;. PANIZZA, Francisco; SCHERLIS, Gerardo; SCHUSTER, Christian, and SPIROVA, Maria (2016), Party patronage in contemporary democracies: results from an expert survey in 22 countries from five regions. European Journal of Political Research. Vol. 55, Nº 02, pp. 416–431.
• LAGUNA, Mauricio I. Dussauge (2011), The challenges of implementing merit-based personnel policies in Latin America: Mexico's Civil Service reform experience. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis Vol. 13, Nº 01, pp. 51-73.
• LARRABURO, Conrado Ricardo Ramos; PANIZZA, Francisco, and PETERS, Guy B. (2018), Roles, trust and skills: a typology of patronage appointments. Public Administration pp. 01-39.
• LASSOU, Philippe Jacques Codjo (2017), State of government accounting in Ghana and Benin: a 'tentative' account. Journal of Accounting in Emerging Economies Vol. 07, Nº 04, pp. 486-506.
• LEE, C. (2013), Party selection of Officials in Contemporary China. Studies in Comparative International Development, 48(4), 356-379. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12116-013-9132-0
  » https://doi.org/10.1007/s12116-013-9132-0
• LEWIS, David E. (2011a), Presidential appointments and personnel. Annual Review of Political Science Vol. 14, pp. 47-66.
• LEWIS, Paul G. (2011b), Size and local democracy: scale effects in city politics. PS - Political Science and Politics Vol. 44, Nº 01, pp. 107-109.
• LIU, Chuyu (2021), Money talks: cross-ethnic patronage and ethnic conflict in China. International Studies Quarterly Vol. 65, Nº 04, pp. 985-998.
• LLANO, Mercedes (2019), The political determinants of professionalization processes in Latin America. A model of institutional change. Foro Internacional Vol. 59, Nº 02, pp. 437-477.
• LOPES, André Vaz and VIEIRA, Diego Mota (2020), Nomeações para cargos comissionados e grupos de interesse: usos, motivações e desafios retratados em pesquisas recentes. Revista Eletrônica de Administração - REAd Vol. 26, Nº 02, pp. 439-462.
• LOPEZ, Felix G. and SILVA, Thiago Moreira da (2022), O carrossel burocrático dos cargos de confiança: análise de sobrevivência dos cargos de direção (DAS) do Executivo Federal Brasileiro (1999-2017). Dados Vol. 65, Nº 02, pp.0 1-29.
• LOPEZ, Felix G. and SILVA, Thiago Moreira da (2019), Party filiation and appointment for positions in the Brazilian federal bureaucracy (1999-2018). Revista de Administração Pública Vol. 53, Nº 04, pp. 711-731.
• LOWANDE, Kenneth (2019), Politicization and responsiveness in executive agencies. Journal of Politics Vol. 81, Nº 01, pp. 33-48.
• MANCUSO, Wagner Pralon and GOZETTO, Andréa Cristina Oliveira (2018), Lobby e políticas públicas. São Paulo: Editora Fundação Getúlio Vargas. 140 pp..
• MARENCO, André (2017), Burocracias profissionais ampliam capacidade estatal para implementar políticas? Governos, burocratas e legislação em municípios Brasileiros. Dados Vol. 60, Nº 04, pp. 1025-1058.
• MASUD, Mehedi and HOSSAIN, Md. Rakib (2021), Interpreting lived experiences: the dilemmas of public sector leaders. Public Administration and Development Vol. 41, Nº 04, pp. 180-190.
• MAYRING, Philipp (2000), Qualitative content analysis. Forum: Qualitative Social Research Vol. 01, Nº 02, Art. 20.
• MEYER-SAHLING, Jan-Hinrik (2008), The changing colours of the post-communist state: the politicisation of the senior civil service in Hungary. European Journal of Political Research Vol. 47, Nº 01, pp. 01-33.
• MEYER-SAHLING, Jan-Hinrik (2006), The rise of the partisan state? Parties, patronage and the ministerial bureaucracy in Hungary. Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics Vol. 22, Nº 03, pp. 274-297.
• MEYER-SAHLING, Jan-Hinrik and VEEN, Tim (2012), Governing the post-communist state: government alternation and senior civil service politicisation in Central and Eastern Europe. East European Politics Vol. 28, Nº 01, pp. 04-22.
• MEYER-SAHLING, Jan-Hinrik; VASS, László, and VARGA, Edit Vassné (2012), Rewards for high public offices in Hungary. In: Rewards for high public office in Europe and North America Edited by BRANS, Marleen and PETERS, B. Guy. Croydon: Taylor and Francis. pp. 209-228.
• MIKKELSEN, Kim Sass (2018), Old habits die hard, sometimes: history and civil service politicization in Europe. International Review of Administrative Sciences Vol. 84, Nº 01, pp. 803-819.
• MIKKELSEN, Kim Sass (2013), In murky waters: a disentangling of corruption and related concepts. Crime, law and Social Change Vol. 60, Nº 04, pp. 357-374.
• MONSOD, Toby C. (2017), Political appointees in the Philippine bureaucracy: do increasing numbers help or harm? Philippine Political Science Journal. Vol. 38, Nº 01, pp. 01-27.
• MUELLER, Hannes (2015), Insulation or patronage: political institutions and bureaucratic efficiency. B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy Vol. 15, Nº 03, pp. 961-996.
• NGUSMANTO, Ngusmanto (2016), Pilkada 2015 and patronage practice among bureaucrat in West Kalimantan, Indonesia. Asian Social Science Vol. 12, Nº 09, pp. 236-243.
• NUNES, Rodrigo M. (2015), The politics of sentencing reform in Brazil: autonomous bureaucrats, constrained politicians and gradual policy change. Journal of Latin American Studies Vol. 47, Nº 01, pp. 121-148.
• OLIVIERI, Cecilia (2007), Política, burocracia e redes sociais: as nomeações para o alto escalão do Banco Central do Brasil. Revista de Sociologia e Política Vol. 29, pp. 147-168.
• PAINTER, Martin J. (2006), Thaksinisation or managerialism? Reforming the Thai Bureaucracy. Journal of Contemporary Asia Vol. 36, Nº 01, pp. 26-47.
• PARSNEAU, Kevin (2013), Politicizing priority departments: presidential priorities and subcabinet experience and loyalty. American Politics Research Vol. 41, Nº 03, pp. 443-470.
• PERISSINOTTO, Renato Monseff; CAVALIERI, Marco Antonio Ribas; DANTAS, Eric Gil, and DIAS, Rodolfo Palazzo (2017), Redes sociais e recrutamento: o caso dos diretores e presidentes do Banco Central do Brasil (1994-2016). Tempo Social Vol. 29, Nº 03, pp. 61-82.
• POLGA-HECIMOVICH, John (2021), The bureaucratic perils of presidentialism: political impediments to good governance in Latin America. Korean Journal of Policy Studies. Vol. 36, Nº 04, pp. 01-14.
• REUTER, Ora John and ROBERTSON, Graeme B. (2012), Subnational appointments in authoritarian regimes: evidence from Russian gubernatorial appointments. Journal of Politics Vol. 74, Nº 04, pp. 1023-1037.
• ROGOWSKI, Jon and SIMKO, Tyler (2022), Presidential patronage and executive branch appointments, 1925-1959. Presidential Studies Quarterly Vol. 52, Nº 01, pp. 38-59.
• SARTORI, Giovanni (1970), Concept misformation in comparative politics. The American Political Science Review Vol. 64, Nº 04, pp. 1033-1053.
• SCHERLIS, Gerardo (2013), The contours of party patronage in Argentina. Latin American Research Review Vol. 48, Nº 03, pp. 63-84.
• SCHUSTER, Christian (2020), Patrons against clients: electoral uncertainty and bureaucratic tenure in politicized states. Regulation and Governance Vol. 14, Nº 01, pp. 26-43.
• SCHUSTER, Christian (2017), Legal reform need not come first: merit-based civil service management in law and practice. Public Administration Vol. 95, Nº 03, pp. 571-588.
• SCHUSTER, Christian (2016), What causes patronage reform? It depends on the type of civil service reform. Public Administration Vol. 94, Nº 04, pp. 1094-1104.
• SHARAFUTDINOVA, Gulnaz and TUROVSKY, Rostislav (2017), The politics of federal transfers in Putin's Russia: regional competition, lobbying, and federal priorities. Post-Soviet Affairs Vol. 33, Nº 02, pp. 161-175.
• SILVA, Patrícia and JALALI, Carlos (2016a), Serviço ao poder ou o poder ao serviço? Patrocinato e governos partidários em Portugal. Análise Social Vol. 51, Nº 220, pp. 630-656.
• SILVA, Patrícia and JALALI, Carlos (2016b), The many faces of (party) appointments: Party government and patronage in Portugal, 1995-2009. Acta Politica Vol. 51, Nº 04, pp. 539-559.
• SNYDER, Hannah (2019), Literature review as a research methodology: an overview and guidelines. Journal of Business Research Vol. 104, pp. 333-339.
• SNYDER, Neil (2022), American Civil-Military relations and presidential power of removal. Armed Forces & Society Vol. 49, Nº 03, pp. 559-592.
• SOTIROPOULOS, Dimitri A. (2004), Southern European public bureaucracies in comparative perspective. West European Politics Vol. 27, Nº 03, pp. 405-422.
• STARONOVA, Katarina and RYBÁR, Marek (2021), Personal or party roots of Civil Service patronage? Ministerial change effects on the appointments of top civil servants. Administration and Society Vol. 53, Nº 05, pp. 651-679.
• SUNDELL, Anders (2014), Are formal civil service examinations the most meritocratic way to recruit civil servants? Not in all countries. Public administration Vol. 92, Nº 02, pp. 440-457.
• TADIC, Katarina and ELBASANI, Arolda (2018), State-building and patronage networks: how political parties embezzled the bureaucracy in post-war Kosovo. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies Vol. 18, Nº 02, pp. 185-202.
• TANG, Xiao; WANG, Yinglun, and YI, Hongtao (2022), Data manipulation through patronage networks: evidence from environmental emissions in China. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory. Vol. 33, Nº 03, pp. 01-15.
• TING, Michael M.; SNYDER JR., James M.; HIRANO, Shigeo, and FOLKE, Olle (2013), Elections and reform: the adoption of civil service systems in the U.S. states. Journal of Theoretical Politics Vol. 25, Nº 03, pp. 363-387.
• TORAL, Guilermo (2021), The benefits of patronage: how political appointments can enhance bureaucratic accountability and effectiveness. Job Market Paper.
• TORAL, Guilermo (2020), The political logics of patronage: uses and abuses of government jobs in Brazil. Doctoral Thesis Department of Political Science. Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
• ÜSTÜNER, Yilmaz and YAVUZ, Nilay (2018), Turkey's public administration today: an overview and appraisal. International Journal of Public Administration Vol. 41, Nº 10, pp. 820-831.
• WEINGROD, Alex (1968), Patrons, patronage, and political parties. Comparative Studies in Society and History Vol. 10, Nº 04, pp. 377-400.
• ZENG, Qingjie (2019), Engineering popular support for long-ruling parties: the role of clientelism. Japanese Journal of Political Science Vol. 20, Nº 02, pp. 75-92.

• 1
  The complete list of publications is available at ˂https://github.com/fierycherry/bureaucraticpolitics˃. The file ‘FinalCollection.xml’ contains the list of all 415 texts analyzed qualitatively, including the 144 addressing patronage. The NVivo project file – which allows the identification of all texts – is available upon request.
• 2
  The matrix serves to analyze the relationships between codes by showing the number of files coded with one or more codes simultaneously.
• For data replication, see: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/NB7SET

• ** Funding: São Paulo Research Foundation – Fapesp - 2019/19570-8 and 2021/13021-2.

Edited by

Revised by Karin Blikstad

Data availability

For data replication, see: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/NB7SET

Publication Dates

• Publication in this collection
  10 June 2024
• Date of issue
  2024

History

• Received
  21 Dec 2022
• Accepted
  02 Nov 2023