Power-Sharing (POS) |
Constitutions endure where there are power-sharing institutions |
1 = POS > 0.742 0 = POS < 0.742 |
Coppedge et al. (2020)COPPEDGE, Michael; GERRING, John; KNUTSEN, Carl Henrik; LINDBERG, Staffan I.; TEORELL, Jan; ALTMAN, David; BERNHARD, Michael; FISH, M. Steven; GLYNN, Adam; HICKEN, Allen; LÜHRMANN, Anna; MARQUARDT, Kyle L.; McMANN, Kelly M.; PAXTON, Pamela; PEMSTEIN, Daniel; SEIM, Brigitte; SIGMAN, Rachel; SKAANING, Svend-Erik; STATON, Jeffrey K.; CORNELL, Agnes; GASTALDI, Lisa; GJERLØW, Haakon; MECHKOVA, Valeriya; RÖMER, Johannes von; SUNDTRÖM, Aksel; TZELGOV, Eitan; UBERTI, Luca Jacopo; WANG, Yi-Ting; WIG, Tore, and ZIBLATT, Daniel (2020), V-Dem Codebook v10. Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. Available at ? https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemds20 ?. Accessed on March 24, 2022. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemds20...
|
Amendment (AME) |
Constitutions endure where there exist minor hurdles to amending the current constitution |
1 = High Degree of Judicial Review and Low Majority to pass a constitutional amendment in the legislature 0 = Low Degree of Judicial Review or High Majority to pass a constitutional amendment in the legislature |
Negretto (2012)NEGRETTO, Gabriel L. (2012), Replacing and amending constitutions: the logic of constitutional change in Latin America. Law and Society Review. Vol. 46, Nº 04, pp. 749-779.; Comparative Constitutions Project (2021) |
Legacy of Replacement (LEG) |
Constitutions endure in countries with a small legacy of replacing constitutions |
1 = LEG > 13 0 = LEG < 13 |
Comparative Constitutions Project (2021) |
Continuous Mobilization (MOB) |
The lack of unrelenting large social mobilizations is linked to constitutional endurance |
1 = MOB > 1.86 0 = MOB < 1.86 |
Coppedge et al. (2020)COPPEDGE, Michael; GERRING, John; KNUTSEN, Carl Henrik; LINDBERG, Staffan I.; TEORELL, Jan; ALTMAN, David; BERNHARD, Michael; FISH, M. Steven; GLYNN, Adam; HICKEN, Allen; LÜHRMANN, Anna; MARQUARDT, Kyle L.; McMANN, Kelly M.; PAXTON, Pamela; PEMSTEIN, Daniel; SEIM, Brigitte; SIGMAN, Rachel; SKAANING, Svend-Erik; STATON, Jeffrey K.; CORNELL, Agnes; GASTALDI, Lisa; GJERLØW, Haakon; MECHKOVA, Valeriya; RÖMER, Johannes von; SUNDTRÖM, Aksel; TZELGOV, Eitan; UBERTI, Luca Jacopo; WANG, Yi-Ting; WIG, Tore, and ZIBLATT, Daniel (2020), V-Dem Codebook v10. Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. Available at ? https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemds20 ?. Accessed on March 24, 2022. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemds20...
|
Number of Rights (RG) |
Constitutions survive if they have enshrined a substantial number of rights |
1 = RIG > 48 0 = RIG < 48 |
Comparative Constitutions Project (2021) |
Autocratic Constitutions (ACO) |
Constitutions persist when they are not a heritage from the previous authoritarian regime |
1 = Autocratic Constitution 0 = Non-Autocratic Constitution |
Albertus and Menaldo (2018)ALBERTUS, Michael and MENALDO, Victor (eds) (2018), Constitutions as elite deal making. In: Authoritarianism and the elite origins of democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 63-98.
|
Constitutional Endurance (OUT) |
Do constitutions survive in the democratic period? |
1 = Yes 0 = No |
Comparative Constitutions Project (2021); Landau (2019)LANDAU, David (2019), Constituent power and constitution making in Latin America. In: Comparative constitution making. Edited by LANDAU, David and LERNER, Hanna. Northampton: Edward Elgar. pp. 567-588.; Negretto (2020, 2012)NEGRETTO, Gabriel L. (2020), Constitution-making and liberal democracy: the role of citizens and representative elites. International Journal of Constitutional Law. Vol. 18, Nº 01, pp. 206-232., 2012NEGRETTO, Gabriel L. (2012), Replacing and amending constitutions: the logic of constitutional change in Latin America. Law and Society Review. Vol. 46, Nº 04, pp. 749-779.) |