Resumo em Inglês:

Liberalism and Marxism are two schools of thought which have left deep imprints in sociological, political and economic theory. They are usually perceived as opposite, rival approaches. In the field of democracy there is a seemingly insurmountable rift around the question of political versus economic democracy. Liberals emphasize the former, Marxists the latter. Liberals say that economic democracy is too abstract and fuzzy a concept, therefore one should concentrate on the workings of an objective political democracy. Marxists insist that political democracy without economic democracy is insufficient. The article argues that both propositions are valid and not mutually exclusive. It proposes the creation of an operational, quantifiable index of economic democracy that can be used alongside the already existing indexes of political democracy. By using these two indexes jointly, political and economic democracy can be objectively evaluated. Thus, the requirements of both camps are met and maybe a more dialogical approach to democracy can be reached in the debate between liberals and Marxists. The joint index is used to evaluate the levels of economic and political democracy in the transition countries of Eastern Europe.

Resumo em Inglês:

What does it take to make a coalition successful? Bigger coalitions are more likely to be successful because the GATT/WTO is a consensus-based institution and countries are informally penalized if they isolate themselves. Through a Bayesian statistical analysis, the article corroborates the above hypothesis. To further investigate the research question, qualitative case studies of the G-10 in the Uruguay Round and the Public Health Coalition in the Doha Round are conducted. These cases show that the more convincing the framing of a position, the better are the chances of coalitions keeping a large number of followers and supporters, thereby affecting their odds of success. By building a unique database and applying a new research design to the topic, the study rigorously tests theories about coalitions that had previously only been proposed but not empirically analyzed.

Resumo em Inglês:

What factors determine the diffusion of social policies? This article examines the launching of conditional cash transfer programs by Brazilian municipalities to explore this problem. The literature of political science asserts that such programs have been widely implemented because they correspond to an alternative policy strategy adopted by governments facing opposition to implement universal public policies. So, political competition would be at the root of CCT launching. This article presents an alternative explanation. From 1995 to 2001, local governments created or emulated the Bolsa Escola Program (BEP) in all regions of the country. Sucha a path continued after the lauching of the national Bolsa Escola by the federal government. Why did some local governments decide to adopt the national BEP and others did not? To answer these questions, the research tests the influence of structural, internal and external variables on the dissemination of CCT programs. Two main hypotheses are tested. The first asserts that local political competition is positive for policy diffusion. The second hypothesis claims that party alignment between the municipal and federal levels increases the likelihood of municipalities adopting the federal BEP. The research uses Event History Analysis to test statistically the impact of political incentives on policy diffusion among São Paulo State's municipalities. Two types of policy diffusion are examined: horizontal and vertical. The findings confirm that political competition influences the horizontal diffusion among municipalities. Unexpectedly, vertical diffusion does not occur because of party alignment or political competition. Rather, levels of socioeconomic development drive policy emulation.

Resumo em Inglês:

The legislative success of governments in Latin America has been explained by two main theories. For some authors, the main explanation involves the proactive and reactive powers of the chief executive. Other scholars argue that negotiations with deputies for portfolios and pork are the most important factors behind success in approving legislation. This paper proposes an innovative methodological strategy to test the mechanisms behind each of these theories. Original survey data of 12 Brazilian state-level assemblies is examined to assess elites' attitudes in regard to governors' strategies to obtain legislative support. Results suggest that there is not a unique equilibrium to the problem of coalition formation in multiparty settings. Deputies with concentrated constituencies, from more decentralized parties, and from conservative parties, tend to believe that the most efficient way a governor can obtain legislative support is to negotiate amendments with deputies. On the other hand, the more scattered a legislator's constituency and the more liberal or centralized his or her party, the more likely a deputy is to think that governors achieve better legislative success when they negotiate cabinet positions.