Bodies, intentions, and affections: reflections for non-representational studies of organizational practices

Abstract

In this article, three discussion points are important for us to present critical reflections on deepening organizational theory. Our central aim is to relate the discussion on corporeality, intentions, and affections as non-representational analytical dimensions for studies of organizational practices, particularly with regard to the (re)creation of power relations when they promote inclusions or exclusions in practice. First, we highlight the problem of organizational theory in neglecting the body, intentions, and affections from an anti-rationalist and anti-cognitivist perspective. We advocate a pre-reflexive immersion in contact with organizational practices. Second, we suggest the analytical category of bodily-affective intentionality to perform such a pre-reflective immersion in understanding organizational practices since it is through this analytical perception that affective atmospheres or flows of affect are constituted. Third, we re-look at the notions of differences, performance, and performativity to understand how the bodily-affective intentionality (re)produces inclusions and exclusions in organizational practice. Finally, we offer reflective questions for further research in the area with the expectation that the proposed analytical relationship imbricated between bodies, intentions, and affections together with the concepts of atmospheres, differences, performance, and performativity, contributes to the area of non-representational Organizational Studies, in general, and to the area of practice-based studies, specifically.

Keywords:
Non-representational theories; Organizational practices; Body-affective intentionality; Atmosphere; Difference

Resumo

Neste artigo, o objetivo central é posicionar a discussão sobre corporeidade, intenções e afetos como dimensões analíticas não representacionais para os estudos das práticas organizacionais, particularmente no que se refere à (re)criação de relações de poder que promovem inclusões ou exclusões na prática. Em primeiro lugar, evidenciamos o problema de a teoria organizacional negligenciar os corpos, as intenções e os afetos sob uma perspectiva antirracionalista e anticognitivista. Assim, argumentamos em favor de uma imersão pré-reflexiva em contato com as práticas organizacionais. Em segundo lugar, sugerimos a categoria analítica da intencionalidade corporal-afetiva como imersão pré-reflexiva na compreensão das práticas organizacionais, uma vez que é por meio dessa percepção analítica que se constituem as atmosferas afetivas ou os fluxos de afetos. Em terceiro lugar, resgatamos as noções de diferenças, performance e performatividade para compreender como a intencionalidade corporal-afetiva faz fluir inclusões e exclusões nas práticas organizacionais. Ao final, oferecemos questões reflexivas para novas pesquisas na área, com a expectativa de que a proposta de relação analítica entre corpos, intenções e afetos, em conjunto com os conceitos de atmosferas, diferenças, performance e performatividade, contribua, de modo geral, para área dos Estudos Organizacionais não representacionais, e, em específico, para a área dos Estudos Baseados em Prática.

Palavras-chave:
Teorias não representacionais; Práticas organizacionais; Intencionalidade corporal-afetiva; Atmosfera; Diferença

Resumen

En este artículo, tres puntos de discusión son importantes para presentar reflexiones críticas en la profundización de la teoría organizacional. Nuestro objetivo central es relacionar la discusión sobre la corporeidad, las intenciones y los afectos como dimensiones analíticas no representativas para los estudios de las prácticas organizacionales, particularmente en lo que respecta a la (re)creación de relaciones de poder cuando promueven inclusiones o exclusiones en la práctica. En primer lugar, destacamos el problema de la teoría organizativa al descuidar el cuerpo, las intenciones y los afectos desde una perspectiva antirracionalista y anticognitivista. Abogamos por una inmersión prerreflexiva en el contacto con las prácticas organizacionales. En segundo lugar, sugerimos la categoría analítica de intencionalidad corporal afectiva para realizar dicha inmersión prerreflexiva en la comprensión de las prácticas organizacionales, ya que es a través de esta percepción analítica que se constituyen las atmósferas afectivas o flujos de afecto. En tercer lugar, rescatamos las nociones de diferencias, rendimiento y performatividad para entender cómo la intencionalidad corporal-afectiva (re)produce inclusiones y exclusiones en la práctica organizacional. Al final, ofrecemos preguntas reflexivas para futuras investigaciones en el área con la expectativa de que la relación analítica propuesta imbricada entre cuerpos, intenciones y afectos en conjunción con los conceptos de atmósferas, diferencias, desempeño y performatividad, contribuya al área de los Estudios Organizacionales no representativos, en general, y al área de los Estudios Basados en la Práctica, en particular.

Palabras clave:
Teorías no representativas; Prácticas organizacionales; Intencionalidad corporal-afectiva; Atmósfera

INTRODUCTION

The problem

Non-representational or more than representational theories, as proposed by Lorimer (2005), furnish the background for the reflection in this article. Such theories emerge in the field of human Geography, more precisely in Cultural Geography, as a response to social constructivism, which separates the world from the meanings attributed to it, that is, from its cultural representation (Anderson & Harrison, 2010; Paiva, 2017). Thus, they align with the representational perspectives of reality, which frame it in conceptual grids and make it stable, disregarding the performances, processes, and becomings that constitute it.

On this wise, we can state that non-representational theories have some fundamental principles, such as the notions of practice, everyday life, performance and performativity, embodiment and body, virtuality, and spatiality in terms of time and space (Cadman, 2009). These theories, which are more similar to a research approach that involves different theories (Paiva, 2017), have inspired work in distinct areas of knowledge.

Recently, we can observe this influence not only in Geography (Dornelles, 2021; Silva & Arruda, 2021) but also in Ethnography (Vannini, 2014), Cultural Studies (Moores, 2021), Linguistics (Lopes, 1989), Marketing (Hill, 2015; Hill et al., 2014) and Organizational Studies (Beyes & Steyaert, 2011; Lorino et al., 2011). Thus, we became aware that comprehending organizational practices, bodies, and affections contributes fundamentally to the non-representational understanding of organizing.

Among the authors who operate the “practice turn,” it is possible to highlight those who develop a broader theory of practice, such as Pierre Bourdieu and Theodore Schatzki, and those who have used practice as a relevant concept in their work, such as Michel Foucault, Anthony Giddens, Harold Garfinkel and Bruno Latour (Alvarenga, 2017; Miettinen et al. 2009; Passos & Bulgacov, 2019). In terms of theoretical traditions that inspire these authors, we can highlight four approaches: the Marxist tradition, German phenomenology, symbolic interactionism, and Wittgenstein’s legacy (Alvarenga, 2017; Bispo, 2015).

Among the different possibilities of theories about practice, in this article, we use Schatzki’s (2006) understanding, along with his phenomenological influences, associated with non-representational studies of organizational practices based on three interconnected analytical points: bodies, intentions, and affections. For the author, practices consist of know-how, explicit and implicit rules, shared understandings, material arrangements, and teleological-affective structure (Schatzki, 2006, 2012). That happens because, for Schatzki (2006, p. 1863), the organization “[...] is a set of practices and material dispositions” that occurs collectively and in everyday life or solely collectively or in everyday life through the meanings shared between (as) practitioners. Therefore, practice, which takes place in an orderly manner in the social context, is constitutive of organization and directs our gaze as researchers toward (and through) practice.

When focusing on practices and their organizational character, we need to be attentive to the know-how shared between practitioners, id est, how they carry out their activities, and how they learn to carry out them. Schatzki (2006, 2012) addresses the rules, whether explicit or not, that guide practitioners around the action and activity or solely action or activity. In addition to know-how and guidelines, it is also possible to consider the presence of material artifacts that constitute an organizational structure in which the people involved in the practice share meanings and intentions with each other. For this article, we use the concept which states that organizational practices are know-how. Such practices occur in everyday life through the collective and constitute themselves by rules, intelligibility, and shared understandings present in the know-how of practitioners.

The following sentence makes up one of the central assumptions of our reflection: if we want to analyze the depth of organizational practices in a non-representational view of organizing, we must interconnect the analytical dimensions of corporeality, intentionality, and affections toward the comprehension of the existing power relations. We argue that, to a certain extent, the analytical dimensions of intentions and corporeality in organizational practices have been evidenced in previous research (Figueiredo, 2015; Figueiredo & Cavedon, 2015), although the analytical discussion on affections remains weakened. Thanem and Knights (2012, p. 93) have warned for some time about the lack of research that reports “our bodily experiences” experienced in the world because we want to “manage our emotions and our bodies” with a high level of negligence in the way we affect and are affected. Perhaps this will help us understand Gherardi’s (2009, 2010, 2017, p. 10) regarding the analytical return to practices and affection still being poorly articulated since it is necessary to “instigate practice scholars to become more sensitive to the affective dimension.”

Therefore, there is an urgent need to discuss the relationship between bodies, intentions, and affections in Organizational Studies. This urgency justifies itself by the lack perceived since Hindmarsh and Pilnick (2007) when embodied conduct in the organizational environment became a critical resource for understanding the skills incorporated in the execution of work. In Practice-Based Studies, Yakhlef (2010, p. 410) explored the neglect of corporeality in organizational learning processes and pointed out that “[...] the human body (including the mind) is considered the means to experience and access to the world (practical and social)”. The dilution of the Cartesian boundaries between body and mind has been a recurring effort in the Practice-Based Studies literature, aiming to overcome this dichotomy observed in research in the area (McConn-Palfreyman et al., 2019; Miettinen et al., 2009; Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011).

Our understanding of the body and corporeality overcomes such dichotomy. Indeed, we are interested in uncovering the different bodies acting in practice and understanding how these bodies, marked by intentions and affections, can cause inequalities in organizational practices. Dale and Latham (2015) recognized the intertwining of our mundane corporeities in the way we envision experiences in organizational processes in the face of exclusions, inequalities, and hierarchies. Thus, we recognize what Bispo and Gherardi (2019, p. 372) recently called “research based on incorporated practice,” in which the body becomes a path to understanding the relationships of inclusion and exclusion that exist in organizational practices, arising from the way we affect and are affected by others, and by ourselves, through intentions.

By considering the body, the affections, and intentionalities in an interconnected way, we aim to overcome what McConn-Palfreyman et al. (2019, p. 255) called the “limited epistemological view” of corporeality which is reduced only to its carnal dimension. In this way, corporeality, while including relational acts in the experience of the world, is constructed through the heterogeneity, dynamism, and interdependence of fluxes of affections as we hear, feel, touch, and are part of the world (Dale & Latham, 2015; Flores- Pereira et al., 2008, Thanem & Knights, 2012), or, at a strict level, organizational practices. Intentionalities correspond to the meanings intermittently attributed to corporeality. In a non-representational aspect of organizational practices, we confronted the rationalist view of corporeality and affections, which preserves the “affirmation of the primacy of practices or movement” (Moores, 2021, p. 1190).

Accordingly, intentionality is the inseparable dimension of the distinct ways we incorporate practices. For Figueiredo (2015, p. 527), intentions attribute meanings of constant vigilance to being inserted in the experience of the world and help in the pre-reflective understanding of how bodies and marks of corporeality sustain the “unequal distribution of power” that interferes with organizational relationships. We argue that the interconnected relationship between intentionality and corporeality, proposed by Figueiredo (2015), represents a first step towards answering the disturbing question previously raised by Thanem and Wallenberg (2015, p. 236) about “what bodies can do” in the “affectively embodied organizational life”; however, this step still needs further development.

Furthermore, it is relevant to highlight that the articulation of the themes of intentionality, body, and practices, as addressed in the works of Figueiredo (2015) and Figueiredo and Cavedon (2015), is the basis for aligning the paradigm of embodiment, highlighted by Flores-Pereira (2010), and the corporal and intentional condition of practitioners within the non-representational analysis of organizational practices with onto-epistemological premises influenced by phenomenology. That allowed us to link the affective discussion to embodied intentionality.

In this way, Figueiredo and Cavedon (2015) indicate that the concept of incorporated intentionality refers to the manifestation of a mode of knowledge that arises without conscious elaboration. Thus, intentionality exists outlined without a strictly rational and cognitive domain, whose corporeal and non-reflective character is able to evidentiate the sensitive knowledge present in practices. Consequently, it is not a rational conception of intentionality pertinent to the residual humanism discarded by Cadman (2009). It refers to the body’s predisposition to action, as was initially formulated by Bourdieusian theory. Figueiredo and Cavedon (2015) clarify the importance of the incorporated and pre-reflective components of everyday experience in the elaboration of the practice.

For Hill et al. (2014), it is urgent to examine such unreflective aspects since most of our life is mediated by them, and the body is conditioned for action by spatial and/or material and semiotic sets. It is necessary to emphasize that embodied knowledge is in an extra-discursive domain and, therefore, difficult for researchers to access. One of the ways to reveal it would be to find gaps or ruptures that occur in these daily actions of practices.

Thus, precognitive actions enable access to the body’s non-discursive records, that is, to the intensities of affections, which are robust, non-representative embodied forces capable of threatening the social order. Such precognitive actions are constituted by registers effectively felt but with a complex translation into language, as they are intensities that do not fit perfectly with the name we give to emotions. However, they strongly incorporate everyday experiences and, according to Hill (2015), they have three effects: a) they are disturbing, as their force is intensive; b) they produce automatic bodily responses by referring to precognitive modes of action; and c) within a collective, as in the organizational process, its movement shapes the behavior of participants in an unpredictable way.

Hence, in addition to bodily intentionality, we also glimpse the importance of affection. Previously, Thanem and Wallenberg (2015) had already mentioned the need to elaborate on our affective relationships in the organizational environment and consider the way in which our ability to affect and be affected appears to have an unequal distribution of power. Perhaps this prompted Bispo and Gherardi (2019, pp. 378-379) to question “Where is the affection?” and “What does he do?” or even “Where is the body?” related to what Dale and Latham (2015) called entanglements between bodies that are different and continuous.

In this paper, we sustain the concept that fluxes of affections make up what a non-representational view of organizing calls affective atmospheres (Anderson, 2009) or organizational atmospheres (Borch, 2009). This approach helps us understand how we affect and are affected in a network of organizational practices (Schatzki, 2006). Another argument we seek to build throughout our reflection is that different bodies that perform practices make flow intentionalities through distinct affections, exercising power relations. For this reason, we propose articulation with the notions of differences, performance, and performativity from deconstructivist perspectives (Piscitelli, 2002), which dialogue with non-representational theories.

Thus, we believe it is possible to understand how bodily-affective intentionalities (re)construct inclusions and exclusions in practice. Our objective in this article is to position the discussion of corporeality, intentions, and affections as a non-representational analytical dimension important for studies of organizational practices, particularly concerning the (re)creation of power relations that promote inclusions or exclusions in practice. We name our proposal bodily-affective intentionality for an interconnected analytical relationship as the main contribution to the area of non-representational Organizational Studies, in general, and to Practice-Based Studies, more specifically.

BODY-AFFECTIVE INTENTIONALITY

We are beings existing in an incarnated dimension. In this dimension, organizational practices are experienced with different intentionalities, corporeality, and affections. Our proposal for an analytical dimension for organizational practices seeks to situate a perspective of corporeality (embodiment) that recognizes the body-intention, the body-affection, and the body in a collective condition of experience in the world.

The body was perceived through ontological aspects that place social symbolism in the relationship between the body and society. At the same time, the perception of corporeality was also constructed through hierarchical social relations of the body seen as an object or even of the body socialized within norms and political order. From the perspective of corporeality that we adopt, the body is a concept understood as collective in connection with the practical world. As Yakhlef (2010) has already recalled, our bodies build links with the practiced world in correspondence with situated requests.

Different perspectives of corporeality in social sciences were highlighted by Flores-Pereira (2010). In the survey prepared by this author, the onto-epistemological perception of the lines of research on the body and corporeality starts to be reflected in the symbolic, hierarchical, political, and incorporated analytical categories, more broadly, in Social Sciences, and more specifically, in Studies Organizational. Sometimes, the body is a symbolic object perceived by its bodily and cognitive responses, and sometimes, the still objectified body begins to be hierarchized according to the aesthetic, sexual, and gender roles that classify the corporal condition. Plus, the objectification of the body is also perceived as a social and political element and, therefore, involves surveillance, control, and norms imposed by society. In all three of these analytical dimensions, we can infer that corporeality is inserted into ontological perceptions of the body as a symbolic, hierarchical, or political-normative object. We detail the discussion proposed by Flores-Pereira (2010) in the columns of Box 1, which emphasizes the analytical condition of the body according to the approach of Social Sciences and Organizational Studies.

The analytical synthesis of the body undertaken by Flores-Pereira (2010) also directed our efforts to seek new analytical conditions of the body and corporeality. The proposal of the body-person (embodiment) as a new research paradigm has onto epistemological bases that move away from the sociocultural dimension of symbolic representation and approach pre-reflective, subjective, experienced, lived, and incorporated conditions. After all, the body and corporeality can assume a condition of anti-rationalist and anti-cognitivist analysis through the elaboration of intentions and affections in conjunction with embodiment, understood as the “[...] person-body that lives primarily in a world of practice and not of abstraction” (Flores-Pereira, 2010, p. 422). This analytical statement allowed us to add the phenomenological bases of the embodiment paradigm to the premises of Practice-Based Studies, which also share phenomenological assumptions, to exalt the importance of the body and corporeality for non-representational studies of organizational practices.

The elucidation of the analytical condition of the body, addressed in Practice-Based Studies, represents our effort to align onto epistemological perceptions of the body within the organizational practices that support our analytical proposal of corporal-affective intentionality. We argue that organizational practices are intentionally embodied and experienced in the body. The practice is tacit, pre-reflective, and inscribed in bodies. The body carries meanings and intentions in (and through) practice. That is our analytical basis. The research by Figueiredo (2015) and Figueiredo and Cavedon (2015) are contributions that directly influence our proposal for an interconnected analysis between bodies, intentions, and affections, even though other research has also contributed to the construction of our analyses (e.g., Bell & Vachhani, 2019; Gherardi, 2000; Hindmarsh & Pilnick, 2007; Nicolini, 2009; Pérezts et al., 2014; Thanem & Wallenberg, 2014; Yakhlef, 2010).

Thus, we share the understanding of Figueiredo and Cavedon (2015, p. 339) that embodied intentionality manifests “[...] a form and knowledge without consciousness or intentionality without intention”. The importance of this definition lies in helping to understand practical consciousness through bodily conditions before rational and cognitive establishment. With this, we comprehend that intentionalities are body responses that cause effects on practices and their non-representational aspects, as they support affective actions as a force to mobilize the practice. Intentionalities are the meanings attributed to corporeality that make affections flow. With the research of Figueiredo (2015) and Figueiredo and Cavedon (2015), we can infer that intentionality is an analytical dimension inseparable from corporeality. In addition to this understanding, we can argue that intentionality is incorporated through association in the way affections are perceived and supported.

Corporeal-affective intentionality is developed based on these premises that involve corporeality and intentions, considering the practical reality of what practitioners perform in their context of actions and meanings. Also, the practical context conducive to confronting the bodily actions of practitioners in a pre-reflective and precognitive way is intertwined with the material context in which they find themselves. The crossing of corporal-affective intentionality happens through practitioners and material arrangements, in Schatzki’s terms (2006, 2012), that support the practice and its durability. Thus, intentionality cannot be understood as an exclusive capacity of practitioners. After all, it is in the involvement with materiality that it conforms and enables the asymmetrical distribution of affections and, ultimately, power.

Bodies carry, situate, and maintain patterns of organization through intentions and affections in time and space. How we perceive bodies and bodily processes in organizational practices implies how we describe the body condition in (and through) practice.

Recently, Bell and Vachhani (2019) argued that practiced bodily encounters provide apprehensions and feelings that connect and organize bodies in the concrete dimension,material and intelligible of practice. Thus, the corporeality that we mobilize here is one in which the body is recognized as “[...] result and scenario of a game of connections and forces” (Beyes & Steyaert, 2011, p. 8), a “body as a place of the political” (Jiménez-Garcés, 2015). Thus, corporeality intertwines the practitioner (with the practice) and gives opportunities for intentions and affections. The body, in turn, is continually composed and recomposed through other bodies, as its capacity is due to its active and relational engagement with other bodies in a given location (Buser, 2014).

Different embodiments can be perceived in organizational practices and discussed in the ahead section. Such perceptions are linked to the meanings practitioners attribute to themselves and the practice, expressing distinct intentions. Meanings are a collective construction of practice. They establish rules and expected behaviors and, at the same time, demarcate differences and the structure of relational power. Therefore, we associate the analysis of the corporeality of organizational practices with the intentional dimension of meanings arranged between human practitioners and the material arrangements in collective practices. For Figueiredo (2015), embodied intentionality refers to an analytical perception of practices based on the meanings constructed through habits, culture, and history. The author explains that the understanding of these meanings is identified in the reflexivity among practitioners through corporeality and the developed bodily devices. Therefore, to this author’s comprehension, we add that understanding the meanings of incorporated intentionality makes the construction of affections flow.

The conception of affection in non-representational theories is strongly inspired by the construction made by Gilles Deleuze. Affection for Deleuze (1978) is a production equivalent to the notion of force presented by Foucault (2009). It emerges as an energetic result of the interaction of bodies; it is an experiential force or intensity, and its practice is political. In other words, Deleuze (2002) presents affection as a force or power that emerges from encounters with alternative existing modes. Affection is “reminiscent of ‘affect’ and ‘being affected’ and therefore of dynamic and interactive dimensions that the term emotion lacks” (Reckwitz, 2012, p. 150).

As a continuous, fluid, and dynamic process, affection happens in particular places (Buser, 2014). However, as it produces consequences of movement and time for the bodies involved, it raises processes of becoming, which can be classified as chaotic impulses, as they depend on the dynamics of what is effectively experienced (Deleuze & Guattari, 2010). Thus, becoming inhabits the plane of immanence because social existence is produced through an analysis of the conditions specific to such existence, and being the body composed of relationships, it always constitutes a question of becoming (Deleuze, 1978).

Based on such thought, Buser (2014) indicates that the non-representational theory characterizes affection as transpersonal since it is not located in personal experiences but emanates between bodies; it is not part of cognition, distinguishing itself from emotions, feelings, and other forms of perception and interpretation of the possible states that result; and, finally, the approach encompasses how bodies can be affected in a given social context. Based on this understanding, the non-representational notion of affective atmospheres is developed.

Hence, Anderson (2009) presents the notion of atmospheres as singular and indeterminate affective qualities, spatially discharged, that emanate the aggregation of bodies but overcome it. They would, therefore, be characterized by almost objective feelings, like the “[...] feeling of emptiness communicated by a chilling verse, a tragic feeling, or the immobile opacity of landscapes” (Anderson, 2009, p. 79).

Such atmospheres can also be understood as perceptual-affective relationships between sensual bodies (human and material arrangements) existing in an affective space, or, put another way, “a specific sensitivity to perceptions, impressions and affects” (Reckwitz, 2012, p. 255). Through atmospheres, affections are transmitted between people and objects; odors, lights, and colors, therefore a relevant role in its production (Borch, 2009). Furthermore, they can be cultivated through creating and recreating when it comes to spaces and times (Beyes & Steyaert, 2011) via organizational atmosphere policies, which can encourage specific affections and maintain the unstable structures of an organization (Borch, 2009).

Box 1
Analytical construction of the body and corporeality

Bodily-affective intentionality as an analytical dimension, therefore, allows us to unveil how affective atmospheres are formed through the understanding of meanings existing in the corporeality of practitioners and the material arrangements that surround them during the distribution of affections. In other words, it provides an understanding of the bodily meanings that create, recreate, or maintain affections and atmospheres that lead to inclusion and exclusion in organizational practices. It is worth highlighting that corporal-affective intentionality is disconnected from conscious actions and establishes a pre-reflective immersion in contact with organizational practices.

It is also important to highlight that this identification of flows of affections in practice involves material arrangements: the distribution of affections in organizational practice encompasses not only the intentional corporeality of practitioners but also what Schatzki (2006) called “material arrangements” in the relationship arranged between practitioners, objects, rules, emotions, structures, performance, and actions. Reckwitz (2012, p. 253) considers that “[...] the processes of affecting and being affected need to be observed among all types of entities, including objects and also human subjects”. Thus, despite our emphasis on the practitioner, due to their ability to act intentionally, this ability can be the outcome of an affective interaction with material arrangements.

With due reservations, we understand that the analytical dimension of practice implies the material body of human practitioners and material arrangements; the intentionality of practitioners in the practice network, who (re)create and continue the practice; and the transmission of affections among practitioners, which occurs through the socio-material relationality of practice and creates affective atmospheres. Our analytical proposal understands that organizational practice can be understood when the meanings elaborated by bodies interconnected to the flows of affections that establish affective atmospheres and, consequently, networks of emotions are understood.

On this wise, we understand that affective atmospheres make up a fertile field for political distinctions. With this, we can affirm that intentions, bodies, and affections are a tangle of power relations. Power and influence: mechanisms that offer rules, material arrangements, and actions taken within the practice hierarchy. This conception of power aligns with Foucauldian understanding. For Foucault (2009), power is relational and contestable. Power maintains an intrinsic relationship with knowledge, as it is exercised through it and constantly produces it. The individual, therefore, is not the other one of power but its center of transmission and one of its first effects. The constitution of this power is diffuse and is present in the agency of practitioners, reflecting the ability to affect and be affected in practice. Understanding the interdependence of these analytical points is understanding the intertwined relationship of corporal-affective intentionality.

The explanatory reading of a given organizational practice and its respective atmosphere needs to recognize the corporal-affective intentions of the practitioners. That requires understanding that “affective activity is a form of social practice” (Wetherell (2014, p. 9) and that “[...] distinct affective repertoires emerge in bodies, minds, individual lives, relationships, communities, across generations and in social relations” (Wetherell, 2014, p. 9) Therefore, to understand this more political character of affective bodily intentionalities, we recommend a careful analysis of the bodies involved, particularly the differences that constitute them.

DIFFERENCES, PERFORMANCE, AND PERFORMATIVITY IN THE PRODUCTION OF BODIES, INTENTIONS, AFFECTS, AND INEQUALITIES

When we mobilize the analytical category of corporal-affective intentionality, we must reflect on which bodies we are dealing with. That is a fundamental prerogative for us to understand how corporeal-affective intentionalities are constructed and (re)construct power relations. That is because the body is not neutral, and the practice only happens through intentional relationships (Schatzki, 2006). Every moment, we inform, through the body, our histories, origins, and differences. The bodies intended in the organizing practice also emanate data and provoke affection, thus building affective atmospheres.

A relevant inspiration for this reflection is the notion of Avtar Brah (2006), who understands difference based on four dimensions: identity, subjectivity, experience, and social relations. The difference insofar as experience indicates that “experience is the place of subject formation” (Brah, 2006, p. 360), which leads to diverse possibilities of experiences and social spaces in which the practitioner is “inserted.”

In this way, the practitioner experiences difference via social relations, which “[...] highlights the historically variable articulation of micro and macro power regimes” (Brah, 2006, p. 363). By power regimes, for example, Brah (2006) refers to gender, race, and class inequalities. In this way, it is possible to establish a relationship between the author’s idea of power and the notion of power mobilized in this article since it is a diffuse, relational, articulated, and incorporated power that restricts or enables our agency in practice. It is the power of affection that can culminate in inequality. Therefore, power is intertwined in practice as well as in bodies.

The difference when it comes to subjectivity and identity refers to how “[...] the processes of formation of subjectivity are at the same time social and subjective” (Brah, 2006, p. 370) since, as previously mentioned, the difference is not static. It is essential to remember that contrasts mark the body intentionally and affectively and that “[...] the entire body, in its physicality, mentality, and spirituality is productive of power, and it is within this relational space that the mind/body dualism disappears” (Brah, 2006, p. 373). Therefore, it is significant to consider that to understand how corporal-affective intentionality is constructed, it is also necessary to understand the history of the bodies in question, that is, in which social relations these bodies are inserted, what experiences they have, what subjectivities cross them and in which identities they anchor themselves throughout these singular and plural experiences.

Butler’s (2003) concepts of performance and performativity also constitute substantial notions in this debate regarding how intentional and affective bodies make up themselves. When investigating the genre, the author identifies it as an act that requires repeated performances, which are “[...] at the same time re-enactment and new experience of a set of meanings already socially established; and also the mundane and ritualized form of its legitimation” (Butler, 2003, p. 200). Despite focusing specifically on gender throughout the section in question, the author’s ideas allow us to understand various identity processes from a deconstructivist perspective, which questions totalizing theoretical models, such as the idea of the universal subject, as well as “[...] approaches that formulate an understanding of difference having as reference an exogenous, external other, a procedure that maintains the principle of internal cultural unity and coherence” (Piscitelli, 2002, p. 14).Butler’s (2003) concepts of performance and performativity also constitute substantial notions in this debate regarding how intentional and affective bodies make up themselves. When investigating the genre, the author identifies it as an act that requires repeated performances, which are “[...] at the same time re-enactment and new experience of a set of meanings already socially established; and also the mundane and ritualized form of its legitimation” (Butler, 2003, p. 200). Despite focusing specifically on gender throughout the section in question, the author’s ideas allow us to understand various identity processes from a deconstructivist perspective, which questions totalizing theoretical models, such as the idea of the universal subject, as well as “[...] approaches that formulate an understanding of difference having as reference an exogenous, external other, a procedure that maintains the principle of internal cultural unity and coherence” (Piscitelli, 2002, p. 14).

Returning here to the notion of performance, we postulate that it cannot be understood as a deliberate choice by the performer - or practitioner, as we call it within our theoretical mobilization. That is, performances take place “within” regulatory models or compulsory systems. In this way, performance can be understood as an act, while performativity concerns the reproduction of norms that guide the intelligibility of the body in time and space (Butler, 2009).

In no sense can it be concluded that the part of the gender that occurs is the “truth” of gender; performance as a delimited “act” distinguishes from performativity in that the latter consists of a reiteration of norms that precede, constrain, and exceed the performer and, in this sense, cannot be taken from the fabrication of “will” or “choice” of the performer. Reducing performativity to performance would be a mistake (Butler, 1993).

( Brah’s reflections 1993, 2003, 2009) and (2006) allow us to problematize the body and its affective intentionality. However, Butler 1993, 2003, 2009), through the notions of performance and performativity, allows the demystification of naturalized and crystallized identity categories, which mark bodies, showing that they are ongoing and never finished constructions within regimes of power and discourse, called by the author “power matrices.” Thus, operating through genealogical criticism, the author “[...] investigates political stakes, designating as the origin and cause categories of identity that are effects of institutions, practices, and discourses whose points of origin are multiple and diffuse” (Butler, 2003, p. 9).

Considering the above, we believe that the notions of differences, performance, and performativity allow us to distinguish and locate bodies while at the same time understanding their intentions and affectations that constantly (re)define the atmospheres of organizational practices and respective inequalities. As Küpers (2017) states, the notions of performance and performativity allow us to understand specific realities constituted by performances related to profit, patriarchy, and racism, among others, that make organizations instruments of domination. Such notions also lead to the development of alternative paths through which new practices become accessible and cultivated.

Our analytical proposal directs attention to different social contexts, moving from macro-analytical contexts to specific contexts of microanalysis within organizational practices. The regulatory model, or the macro regimes of power, is presented by a broader dashed spherical line, which contains the analysis of the microsocial context associated with organizational practices, as illustrated in Image 1. In organizational practices, we involve different bodies, countless intentions, and diverse affections that occur through multiple performances. In the course of interactive processes between performances that occur in organizational practices, the affective atmosphere takes place, and inclusions and exclusions are felt throughout the “embodied relational encounters that are central” (Bell & Vachhani, 2019, p. 683) to compression of the flows of affections that constitute the performances. These, in turn, are made up, or formed, by different performances, which intertwine bodies, affections, and intentions. Through those performances, affective atmospheres are created and generate inclusions and exclusions in (and through) practice.

Figure 1
Proposed analytical model

To exemplify, we rescue the context used by Figueiredo and Cavedon (2015): an artisanal sweet shop in which the know-how practice is transmitted asymmetrically due to the incorporated intentionality of the practitioners. More precisely, while men accessed the know-how of making sweets, women (also depending on race) had knowledge only to make sweets. This scenario, through the analytical category of corporal-affective intentionality, reveals to us how differences in gender and race are performed within regulatory systems, informing how flows of affection occur in the practice of organizing artisanal sweets.

In other words, the female confectioner did not access the knowledge of artisanal sweets in such a way that the gender difference shaped her experience. Her performance, therefore, is “constrained” by performativity in force in this organization, as well as the performance of the master confectioner, reproducing, in a more or less coherent way, a regulatory system that foresees the dominance of the practice only by men.

Other interesting examples can be seen in recent studies on affective atmospheres (Lindberg & Lundgren, 2022; Ruppert, 2022). The study by Lindberg and Lundgren (2022), in particular, investigates how the affective atmosphere of an online healthcare system induces older people in a rural area to endorse digital solutions and, consequently, the neoliberal conception of active old age. Such solutions, critically, can be understood as the result of dismantling health institutions for this population. The text makes a relevant contribution by demonstrating that the study of affective atmospheres not exclusively highlights how they occur in relationships between humans and material arrangements but also enables problematizations about how these atmospheres (re)create hegemonic discourses and practices. Here, we add that this understanding can be subject deepened by considering the notion of differences that mark bodies in relation (elderly in a rural area and health technologies), as well as the performances and performativity at play in this relationship.

Examining research practice represents another perspective for understanding how differences and performances construct intentionalities and distribution of affections. After all, the bodily-affective intentionality of researchers creates atmospheres and directs the flows of affections in the investigated field. Therefore, considering the researchers’ identities, subjectivities, experiences, and social relationships, it is crucial to understand their performances and performativity in the field and the consequent affections constructed, whether investigating informal work, gender, culture, or tourism, among other social phenomena. These considerations lead to important questions such as: what can the researcher’s intentional affective body trigger in the field? Identification, admiration, esteem, affection, relaxation, sympathy, repulsion, tension, antipathy, contempt, discomfort?

Therefore, we maintain that the differences and performances of the body can intervene in the learning relationships of practice (Figueiredo & Cavedon, 2015) and cause strangeness between researchers and practitioners. An illustrative example is the experience lived by one of the authors of this text. During the master’s research in a popular culture organization, the researcher’s body performance revealed her non-place in that practice and a relationship of distinction between those who investigate and those who are investigated. Another example concerns the affectations produced on the researcher by the material elements of the investigated field, capable of redirecting the research (Ferreira et al., 2021).

The possibilities of flows of affection for intentional bodies in organizational practices are not run out with these examples. We emphasize, however, the importance of the analytical proposal presented here.

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

In this article, our main objective was to position the discussion on corporeality, intentions, and affections as non-representational analytical dimensions for the studies of organizational practices, particularly concerning the (re)creation of power relations that promote inclusions or exclusions in practice.

Throughout our argument, we call corporal-affective intentionality the proposal for an intertwined and non-representational analytical relationship capable of contributing to a broader understanding of organizational practices through the concepts of performance, bodies, affections, intentions, and affective atmospheres interconnected in our analytical proposal. In this way, we seek a critical contribution to the areas of non-representational Organizational Studies and Practice-Based Studies, using an anti-rationalist and anti-cognitivist perspective.

After all, we argue that corporal-affective intentionality assumes an analytical potential of organizational practices when the factors described below are considered.

The body, which was on the margins of the discussion undertaken in Organizational Studies, needs to gain centrality in organizational processes because before we experience and understand the world, we incorporate it.

Intentionality, as an articulated category and associated with corporeality, allows an analysis of the body loaded with meanings and senses that drive the practitioner, enabling the understanding of organizational practices through different performances.

Affection, added to the category of embodied intentionality, is a force or power in flux in practice, which (re)produces power relations of inclusions or exclusions.

Using these understandings, we highlight that the proposed analytical dimension allows for a better understanding of affective atmospheres, that is, the affective flows of practice, as well as constructing inclusions and exclusions through differences, performances, and performativity, which constitute bodies in relation. In this way, we attempt, through the rescue of notions of difference, performance, and performativity, to locate the bodies that are in relationship in the context of organizational practices. Based on this understanding of the intentional body, we reflect on how a given body affects and is affected in practice, (re)creating power relations.

Therefore, we hope that our analytical proposal will contribute to the production of knowledge by positively impacting three axes: (a) the relationship between teaching and research, (b) the area of non-representational Organizational Studies and the subarea of Practice-Based Studies, and (c) the sociocultural context of empirical research.

The contribution to teaching and research is related to the rapprochement between theory and practice in the area of non-representational Organizational Studies in topics such as business, management, and administration. That occurs as research stops being conceived as a representation of something, and the researcher starts to consider themselves as practitioner concerning the phenomenon investigated. Substantial questions can contribute to this reflection: how does the relationship between theory and practice help to rethink the path we teach and research organizational practices? What are the practical implications of discussing bodies, intentions, and affections in the research and teaching-learning process? Why is it urgent to raise awareness among new scholars, theorists, and practitioners of administration, management, and business about affections, bodies, and intentions?

We grasp that non-representational theories in Organizational Studies are a relevant contribution of this article, considering that studies in the area are incipient. We also see it as a contribution to non-representational Organizational Studies, in general, and to Practice-Based Studies such as the theoretical proposal of corporal-affective intentionality. This proposal requires onto-epistemological alignments that imply important methodological decisions for new research projects.

In this fashion, we wish to instigate reflection through the following problematizations for new empirical research: what limits restrict or free the expression of corporeality? When we analyze organizational practices, which corporeities are we describing and theorizing about? Can these corporeities change? If we assume so, how can we perceive these changes in practice? How is it to identify the intentions attributed to corporeality? Can these intentions cause inclusions and exclusions in practice? How can we recognize the existing affections concerning the specific analysis of a given organizational practice? How do different corporeities nourish affections? What intentions can we see through perceived affections?

We believe that the reflections presented above help to instigate studies aimed at the non-representational understanding of organizational reality, particularly organizational practices. Recognizing corporeal-affective intentionality as an analytical dimension of organizational practices has direct implications when considering how we envision phenomena of interest to Organizational Studies. After all, our onto-epistemic positions imply comprehension and understanding of organizational practices and can reproduce inequalities present in the exercise of performing research.

In this article, we seek to call for the urgency of understanding our bodies, intentions, and affections in the marginal and precarious practices from which we find ourselves positioned in the world. But we still question: is it possible to carry out this task in (and through) practice?

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• DATA AVAILABILITY

  The entire dataset supporting the results of this study was published in the article itself.

REVIEWERS

• 10
  Ana Silvia Rocha Ipiranga (Universidade Estadual do Ceará, Fortaleza / CE - Brazil). ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8095-6800
• 11
  Mariana Mayumi Pereira de Souza (Universidade Federal de Viçosa, Viçosa / MG - Brazil). ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2845-9214

• PEER REVIEW REPORT

  The peer review report is available at this link: https://periodicos.fgv.br/cadernosebape/article/view/91503/85939

• 13
  [Translated version] Note: All quotes in English translated by this article’s translator.

Edited by

Hélio Arthur Reis Irigaray (Fundação Getulio Vargas, Rio de Janeiro / RJ - Brazil). ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9580-7859

Fabricio Stocker (Fundação Getulio Vargas, Rio de Janeiro / RJ - Brazil). ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6340-9127

Data availability

The entire dataset supporting the results of this study was published in the article itself.

Publication Dates

• Publication in this collection
  19 Aug 2024
• Date of issue
  2024

History

• Received
  12 Oct 2022
• Accepted
  24 Aug 2023