Between consensus and dissension: legitimation strategies in the bureaucratic field of State in action in favelas

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Abstract

This article aims to analyze the legitimation strategies used by agents of the State field in action in favelas, as a way to bring light to the disputes in the field. Based on Bourdieu's theoretical perspective and in ethnographic field research in two favelas of Rio de Janeiro, the study conducts a rhetorical analysis on the discourse of the agents of the field, to access their legitimation strategies. The work advances by highlighting the logic behind the agents' discourses as forces that drive and shape the dynamics of the field.

Keywords: Bureaucratic field of State. Legitimation strategies. Favelas.

Entre consensos e discordâncias: estratégias de legitimação no campo burocrático do Estado em ação nas favelas

Resumo

Este artigo analisa as estratégias de legitimação utilizadas pelos agentes do campo do Estado em ação nas favelas, com vistas a trazer luz às disputas no campo. Com base na perspectiva teórica de Pierre Bourdieu, em uma pesquisa de campo de inspiração etnográfica realizada em duas favelas cariocas, foi possível investigar, por meio de análise retórica, o discurso dos agentes do campo, buscando acessar as estratégias de legitimação por eles utilizadas. O trabalho avança ao apontar as lógicas por trás dos discursos dos agentes como forças que impulsionam e moldam a dinâmica do campo. Ainda, o uso de argumentos de presença por todos os agentes do campo aponta a necessidade da apresentação de resultados materiais derivados de ações desempenhadas por agentes do Estado. Acima de tudo, a existência de disputas, guiadas por lógicas diversas, revelam que há uma liberdade fundamental para pensamentos e premissas diferentes, em nome de um mesmo Estado.

Palavras-chave: Campo burocrático do Estado. Estratégias de legitimação. Favelas.

Entre consensos y discordancias: estrategias de legitimación en el campo burocrático del Estado en acción en las favelas

Resumen

En este artículo, se pretende analizar las estrategias de legitimación utilizadas por los agentes del campo del Estado en acción en las favelas, como forma de traer luz a las disputas en el campo. Con base en la perspectiva teórica de Bourdieu, en una investigación de campo de inspiración etnográfica en dos favelas cariocas, fue posible investigar, por medio del análisis retórico, el discurso de los agentes del campo, buscando acceder a las estrategias de legitimación por ellos utilizadas. El trabajo avanza al apuntar hacia las lógicas detrás de los discursos de los agentes como fuerzas que impulsan y moldean la dinámica del campo.

Palabras clave: Campo burocrático del Estado. Estrategias de legitimación. Favelas.

INTRODUCTION

In 2013, the first author of this article started visiting two "*pacified*" favelas in the city of Rio de Janeiro, studying the actions of state agents. The favelas of Rio de Janeiro, historically built as territories of poverty and violence, were targeted since 2008 to be part of the program of pacifying police units (UPP), aimed at combating drug trafficking.

From the outset of the research, there was evidence that the agents at UPPs believed in the program and sought to affirm its legitimacy. As said by a police officer, convicted of the success of the program, to the researcher: "*if it were not working, you would not be able to come up here*" (Representative of UPP 4, Southern Zone Favela).

However, it was clear that not all state agents in the favela believed in the UPP program. Accompanied by managers of Peace Territories (*Territórios da Paz*), the researcher met police officers and the manager who accompanied her said: "*Why so many weapons? It seems that we are at war!*" (Field notes, November 21, 2013). The dissensions regarding the legitimacy of the police actions in the territory were constant and evident.

Situations of conflict between the different state agents acting in the favelas researched have been repeated again and again. Brulon and Peci (2017) show that state agents who work in "*pacified*" favelas are connected in a network of relationships between positions and can be understood as a 'bureaucratic field,' concept developed by Bourdieu (2011).

As a field, the state is composed of agents that compete among themselves and who seek to produce discourses of legitimacy to justify their dominance, as pointed out by Bourdieu (2011). The state is represented in the favelas by several agents, who present dissensions and have relationships marked primarily by disputes (BRULON and PECI, 2017). In this article, we propose to analyze the discursive strategies of legitimation used by the agents' bureaucratic field of state in action in the favelas, as a way to bring light to the logic behind the disputes in the field.

THE STATE AS A FIELD OF POWER

The concept of field is defined by Bourdieu and Wacquant (2012, p. 134) as "[...] a network, or a configuration of objective relations between positions". Therefore, the fields are relational, dynamic, contingent, and constantly changing (EVERETT, 2002).

The concept of 'field' appears with increasing frequency in organizational studies (EMIRBAYER and JOHNSON, 2008), mainly to consider the relations of power, domination, and class that these fields represent (EVERETT, 2002). In discussing the contributions of this concept, Swartz (2008) explains that the notion of field emphasizes, for example, the dynamics of conflict that are in the background in other theoretical perspectives.

Each field has its specific logic that will determine its functioning (BOURDIEU and WACQUANT, 2012). As they are associated with the idea of power or domination (EVERETT, 2002), fields are constantly compared to games.

Within this field, agents dispute the attainment of a symbolic power which, according to Bourdieu (2012, p. 7), can be understood as "[...] that invisible power which can be exercised only with the complicity of those who do not want to know that they are subject to it or even that they themselves exercise it".

Symbolic power is a transfigured and legitimized form of other forms of power. For Bourdieu (2012, p. 15), relations of force are transformed into symbolic power by a "[...] labor of dissimulation and transfiguration (in a word, of *euphemization*) which secures a real transubstantiation of the relations of power by rendering recognizable and misrecognizable the violence they objectively contain". In this sense, when this position of symbolic power is reached, the agents of the field are legitimized, i.e., are recognized and accepted by other agents. For Bourdieu (2012), the idea of legitimacy is tied to the idea of recognition.

The state, in Bourdieu's view (2012, p. 14), is understood as a bureaucratic field or field of public function, defined "[…] as the monopoly of legitimate physical and symbolic violence" capable of regulating other fields, like power above power. For Bourdieu (2011) the state is not a bloc, it cannot be understood as a monolithic unit. The state is a field, a specific sector of the field of power (BOURDIEU, 2011, p. 51). Like the other fields described by Pierre Bourdieu, the bureaucratic field of state has its logic. According to Bourdieu (2012), within this field a game is played, the legitimate political game.

Also, in the bureaucratic field of state, a search occurs for symbolic power, that is, a search for legitimacy that allows speaking in the name of the common good. It is because of this legitimacy that the state agent can exert invisible coercion (BOURDIEU, 2012). The agents fight for legitimacy to be able to speak on behalf of the whole group, the *universum*, to speak in the name of the public good, saying what is good for the public. Previous work has shown that state agents in action in Rio de Janeiro favelas can be analyzed based on the notion of bureaucratic field of Pierre Bourdieu. This argument is supported by the fact that the state agents relate to each other through disputes and cooperation, as a network of relations between positions (BRULON and PECI, 2017). Therefore, this is also the theoretical perspective adopted in this article.

FAVELAS OF RIO DE JANEIRO

The rapid spread of favelas in Brazil began at the end of the nineteenth century, when the first urban agglomeration named as 'favela' was formed in the city of Rio de Janeiro, in a place called *Morro da Providência* (OLIVEIRA, 1985). *Morro da Favella*, as it was initially called, arose in 1887 when soldiers that fought in the War of Canudos (conflict between the Brazilian government and settlers in the northeast of the country) returned to Rio de Janeiro and established in the area to put pressure on the Ministry of War to pay its debts with them after the war (VALLADARES, 2005). Gradually, the name "*Morro da Favella*" was extended to any cluster of shacks on invaded lands, which did not have public services (VALLADARES, 2005; OLIVEIRA, 1985).

At the beginning of the twentieth century, favelas began to expand (OLIVEIRA, 1985). As a result of factors such as high inflation, unemployment and migratory tendencies to urban centers, the growth of favelas accelerated and in the 1950s 7% of the total population of the city of Rio de Janeiro was living in these areas (OLIVEIRA, 1985).

Favelas have traditionally been defined from a list of usually common and generalizable characteristics portraying a scenario of precariousness. According to Zaluar and Alvito (2006), favelas were officially registered as an area marked by illegal housing, the absence of water, sewage, electricity, or urban planning.

It is worth noting that the colonial perspective of city-suburb domination, pointed out by Martins (1992) as a perspective that remains when observing the new reality of social classes, has also been applied to favelas. Favelas have been associated with the idea of something isolated and autonomous, as a territory of "*marginals*" (MACHADO DA SILVA, 2011).

From the 1980s, drug trafficking and militias began to settle in favelas. For Machado da Silva (2010), spatial segregation, a mark of large cities, favors the concentration of drug trafficking in the favelas, redefining the public image of these territories as rough areas. In this sense, the "war on drug trafficking" was based on "[…] combating drug distribution networks in favelas through armed confrontation between police and traffickers" (GRILLO, 2013, p. 5).

Sorj (2000) says social inequality should not only be considered regarding income differences. It is also important to reflect on the differential access to collective goods and services generally guaranteed by the State, such as access to running water, sewage, garbage collection or electricity. Also, according to the author, issues related to security, such as the risk of being shot or the higher probability of entering drug trafficking, are aspects of social inequality, which do not translate in economic terms. In this sense, favelas reflect social inequality in its fullest form in modern urban settings.

Public policies aimed at favelas have considered them as a homogeneous universe, but specific to the rest of the city. This vision was used to justify the specificities of the actions directed to these areas, which, from the 1980s, started to consider them as territories of violence (VALLADARES, 2005). In Brazil, state interventions in favelas can be better analyzed in the city of Rio de Janeiro, where the most significant number of government policies focused on favelas (VALLADARES and FIGUEIREDO, 1983) were formulated, including the so-considered innovative policy of "*pacification*". It is in this context that the discourses of state agents present in favelas are analyzed here.

METHOD

The research was based on 16 months of field research (from January 2013 to April 2014) in two favelas in the city of Rio de Janeiro: one in the Southern Zone and another in the Northern Zone of the city. The possibility of comparing the two zones was important, considering that the South is the wealthiest region of the city and the North is the poorest. The field research included participant observation inspired in the ethnography and used 91 semi-structured interviews.

The first author initially contacted residents in order to be introduced to the life in the favela. These contacts led to identifying the agents who represented the state and who were inserted in the daily life of the favelas. Also, it was possible to identify the residents who maintained more consistent interaction with these agents. The research conducted interviews with both the state agents and the residents in contact with them. The visits to the favelas were recorded in field notes. As the research was based on an ethnographic perspective, the study considered as 'state agents' the people identified as such by the residents. In this sense, the observation and interviews with the residents helped to identify "*the state in the favela*" and, from this initial analysis, the state agents were approached and interviewed.

The 91 interviews lasted, on average, 2 hours each. The interviewees were questioned mostly about the objectives and operation of the program, and about their beliefs about the initiative and the main results achieved so far. The saturation criterion was used to determine the number of interviews required. Interviewees are specified in Boxes 1 to 3.

Box 1

Interviewees – Southern Zone Favela

Category of the interviewee	Number of respondents
Resident	18
Representative of UPP	10
Representative of PAC	5
Representative of UPP Social	2
Representative of Peace Territories	2
Representative of CRAS	2
Representative of the Family Health Center	1
Representative of CIEP	1
Representative of Comlurb	2
Representative of ITERJ	4
Total	47

Source: Elaborated by the authors.
Key: UPP = Pacifying Police Unit; PAC = Growth Acceleration Program;
CRAS = Social Services Center; CIEP = Public Education Center;
Comlurb = city company for urban cleaning – Rio de Janeiro;
ITERJ = Institute of Land and Cartography of the State of Rio de Janeiro.

Box 2
Interviewees – Northern Zone Favela

Category of the interviewee	Number of respondents
Resident	14
Representative of UPP	11
Representative of UPP Social	2
Representative of Peace Territories	2
Representative of CRAS	6
Representative of Comlurb	2
Total	37

Source: Elaborated by the authors.
Key: UPP = Pacifying Police Unit; CRAS = Social Services Center;
Comlurb = city company for urban cleaning – Rio de Janeiro.

Box 3
Other interviewees

Category of the interviewee	Number of respondents
Representative of UPP	2
Representative of UPP Social	3
Representative of Peace Territories	2
Total	7

Source: Elaborated by the authors.
Key: UPP – Pacifying Police Unit.

Transcribed interviews, field notes, and recorded and transcribed meetings totaled 3,200 pages of data. The data analysis was performed with the aid of the computer program *Atlas.ti 7*, in order to facilitate data organization. Initially, field notes and interviews with residents were analyzed using open coding to identify the state agents that make up the bureaucratic field of state in action in the favelas. In order to analyze the agents' legitimation strategies, a rhetorical analysis was adopted, which consists of revealing the persuasive resources used in the subjects' arguments, as well as the origin of the arguments, which in their classic form can be differentiated into:

- *Ethos:* persuasive argumentation based on morality, based on character or moral codes;
- *Pathos:* arguments that persuade through appealing to emotions; and
- *Logos:* rational arguments (BAUER and GASKELL, 2004).

We have also found arguments based on the rhetorical scheme of "*presence*", which relate to a characteristic of the argument of making it more convincing when based on vivid examples or moving for the audience (SILLINCE and BROWN, 2009).

The rhetoric analysis is further complemented by the analysis of arguments as proposed in Toulmin's theory (2001). According to the author, from the dismemberment of the arguments used by the agents as legitimation strategy, considering what is the 'data' and what is proposed, one seeks access to the premise on which they stand.

The legitimation strategies in the bureaucratic field of state in action in the favelas

Bourdieu (2011) says that in the state field there is at least an agreement about the meaning of the social world. Among the agents of the state field in action in the favelas, there seems to be a consensus about what led them to the favela, an ideal motivator of all actions: "*integrating the favela into the city*".

However, not all agents seem to agree on the meaning of integration and less still on the specific means and objectives to achieve this goal. As Bourdieu (2011) pointed out, consensus may be at the basis of conflicts. Guided by this ideal, state agents

were taken to the favela, but their actions differ in the space of the favelas. To better understand this issue, we focus on the agents with whom we had the most contact in field research: the UPP, the UPP Social, the Peace Territories, the Growth Acceleration Program (PAC) and the Social Service Centers (CRAS).

For a better understanding of the disputes happening in the field, we sought to access the set of premises behind the agents' legitimation strategies, which we also refer to as agents' logic, through rhetorical analysis.

As a place par excellence for the definition of public good (BOURDIEU, 2011), the state field is composed of agents tasked with defining what is good for the public, but they do not always agree with this definition. At the UPP, there is a shared belief that this policy was a pioneer in pursuing the ideal of integration. The narrative among the agents is almost unanimous: the UPP has entered to take back the territory of the favelas and open spaces so other state agents could enter in the area with public services. Therefore, the agents' primary mission in this process of integration is to make the "*resumption of the territory that was taken by the drug traffickers*" (Representative of UPP 2, Favela in the Southern Zone).

Given this mission, the police of the UPP bet on the strong presence and do not question the use of weapons as a necessary means. The resumption of the territory is associated with the idea of transforming the favelas to what is considered "*good*". The dichotomy between "*good*" and "*evil*" is frequent in the police officers' discourse, and "*good*" in this case is represented by the values in which they believe. Therefore, achieving the desired scenario of bringing the "*good*" to the favela means to transfer their values to the population in that area.

According to Bourdieu (2011), the state produces discourses of legitimation to justify its existence as dominant. Bourdieu (2011) recognizes that in the state field, legitimation strategies may take the form of discourses. The rhetorical analysis focuses, mainly, on political discourses, and allows access to shared assumptions behind persuasive texts (SUDDABY and GREENWOOD, 2005). Thus, this study used rhetorical analysis, complemented with the analysis of arguments as proposed in Toulmin's theory (2001).

Through rhetorical analysis, it was possible to identify the agents in the UPP who use legitimation strategies based on rational arguments – called *logos* in the rhetorical analysis – focusing primarily on crime rates to support their argument. As a way of legitimizing the work carried out by the UPP, the agents appeal to the logic, based on numbers that indicate that crime has decreased in the city. Examples of this type of argument are presented in Box 4.

Box 4
Legitimation strategies – UPP – *Logos:* rational arguments based on crime rates

Legitimation strategies	Examples	Argument structure
Logos: **Rational arguments based on crime rates**	*"I follow the statistics, the crime rates drastically reduced, you can see* […] *So, it is a success"* (Representative of UPP 15, Favela in the Northern Zone).	Data: crime rates drastically reduced. (Therefore) Assumption: The UPP is a successful program. Assurance: The main source of criminality is located in the favelas, where UPPs operate.
	"So, it [the UPP program] *works because of this, you see the results out there, the crime rates reduced considerably, you do not see crimes as before"* (Representative of UPP 9, Favela in the Northern Zone).	Data: crime rates reduced considerably. (Therefore) Assumption: The UPP is a successful program. Assurance: The main source of criminality is located in the favelas, where UPPs operate.
	"The fact that the crime rates reduced, it means that it [UPP] *is a success. This is what we have seen around, in the surveys they run about it"* (Representative of UPP 7, Favela in the Northern Zone).	Data: Crime rates reduced. (Therefore) Assumption: The UPP is a successful program. Assurance: The main source of criminality is located in the favelas, where UPPs operate.

Source: Elaborated by the authors.

The statement "*the UPP is a successful program*" is supported, according to the police officers, by the information that "*crime rates reduced*" – a logical argument, based on numbers. However, there is a premise behind such an argument that needs to be highlighted: "*The main source of criminality is located in the favelas, where UPPs operate*". This premise demonstrates that, in the eyes of the police officers, the people responsible for the city's violence live (or lived), in the favelas. With the UPP working in the favelas of the city, the major criminals were arrested or fled. Consequently, improvements regarding security are observed in the indices pointed out by the police. The view that there is an "*enemy*" in the favelas, someone to be fought by the UPP, is aligned with the adoption of intense police control as a means of operation and strategy to achieve the goal of resumption of a territory lost to these "*enemies*".

It was possible to observe the use of legitimation strategies based on the rhetorical scheme of "presence", as demonstrated by Sillince and Brown (2009). UPP agents have repeatedly referred to this type of strategy to better support their legitimation arguments. Examples of presence-based legitimation strategies are presented in Box 5.

Box 5

Legitimation strategies – UPP – Presence

Legitimation strategies	Examples	Argument structure
Presence: **Argument based on evidence that is vivid or moving**	"*You can go everywhere in the community. You are safe; I say it because I go around myself. I go around everywhere in the community. In my point of view, it is pacified indeed.*" (Representative of UPP 15, Favela in the Northern Zone).	Data: It is possible to go everywhere in the community. (Therefore) Proposition: The community is pacified. Assurance: "Pacified" means that one is free to go around in the favela.
	"*If it* [UPP program] *were not working you would not be able to go up there* [the hill where the favela is]" (Representative of UPP 4, Favela in the Southern Zone).	Data: You entered the favela. (Therefore) Proposition: The UPP program is successful. Assurance: The purpose of the UPP is to make it possible for any person to go to the favela.
	"*There are no rifles here, no guys showing off with rifles in* [Favela in the Northern Zone]*, so, today in* [Favela in the Northern Zone] *the proposal of the government was successful.*" (Representative of UPP 11, Favela in the Southern Zone).	Data: There are no more rifles in the favela. (Therefore) Proposition: The governmental proposal was successful. Assurance: The government proposes to withdraw weapons from the favela.

Source: Elaborated by the authors.

In order to support the propositions advocating the success of the UPP, the agents use data that are more apparent, referring to the rhetorical scheme 'presence'. Based on data such as "*it is possible to go everywhere in the community*" or "*there are no more rifles in the favela*", these arguments emphasize that, in the struggle for the resumption of the territory via intensive action, the battle was won and nothing could be more evident than circulation of people within the favela. The recognition of the absence of the enemy's weapons (rifles) in the 'conquered' territory clearly shows the success of the UPP. This kind of argument is supported by a premise validating the declared objective of the UPP: to take back the territory dominated by drug traffickers.

The state agents of the UPP also use a form of persuasive argumentation based on morality, known as an *ethos*. This type of argument was present in two main forms — the first consists of value-based argumentative strategies, such as the examples in Box 6.

Box 6
Legitimation strategies – UPP – Value-based arguments

Legitimation strategies	Examples	Argument structure
Ethos: **Value-based arguments**	*"Resistance to our work? Yes, from people who depend on the drug trafficking to live, you know? The traffickers' families, mother, sister, niece, who before* [the UPP] *had status in the favela. They were used to saying 'my uncle is the boss,' 'I'm the boss' sister.' Things like that"* (Representative of the UPP 2, Favela in the Southern Zone).	Data: There is resistance to UPP. (Therefore) Proposition: Some people depended on the drug trafficking to live. Assurance: those resistant to UPPs depended on drug trafficking to live.
	"[...] for decade after decade, because it has always been that thing of police against the criminals and the community protecting the criminals. It is going to take time for the community to embrace the police, months, years, decades, you know? It takes tim" (Representative of UPP 17, Favela in the Northern Zone).	Data: The community has protected the criminals for decades. (Therefore) Proposition: It will take time for the community to embrace the police. Assurance: The community does not support the police because it supports the criminals.
	"Well, the majority of the population accepts the police, so, we listen to this majority, the good people" (Representative of UPP 13, Favela in the Southern Zone).	Data: The vast majority of the population in the favelas are good people. (Therefore) Proposition: The vast majority accepts and like the police's work. Assurance: Good people like the police's work.

Source: Elaborated by the authors.

The dichotomy between "*good*" and "*evil*" is evident when analyzing the argumentative strategies of the state agents of the UPP. One way to legitimize their work is to disqualify everyone who opposes it: those who are "*good*" support the UPP, those who resist the UPP are people involved with drug trafficking (which means they are not "*good*").

The premises that support the police's argument demonstrate this opposition. These arguments reveal a position of the UPP as the "good" thing that rescued the favela from the hands of drug trafficking. The premises supporting the arguments are clear. As said before, anyone who opposes the good actions of the UPP has some relation with the trafficking; or those who do not support the UPP support the criminals.

The *ethos* is also presented in the police's argument as superiority-based arguments, where some regions of the city would be better than others. The examples are shown in Box 7.

Box 7

Legitimation strategies – UPP – Superiority-based arguments

Legitimation strategies	Examples	Argument structure
Ethos: **Superiority-based argument**	*"I can say that today the community is pacified, since you, uh... can be shot* [in the favela in the Northern Zone]*, as you can be shot anywhere these days: Grajaú, Vila Isabel, Tijuca. The violence in the [Favela in the Northern Zone], is the same as in Grajaú, or Andaraí, or Vila Isabel* [neighborhoods in the city of Rio de Janeiro]. *The violence is the same"* (Representative of UPP 11, Favela in the Southern Zone).	Data: The violence in the Favela in the Northern Zone is at the same level as other neighborhoods of the city. (Therefore) Proposition: The community is pacified. Assurance: The "ideal" violence after "pacification" is the one observed in other neighborhoods of the city.
	"[...] The successful UPP nowadays is where nobody is showing off guns as a demonstration of power. Drug trafficking is everywhere, in my opinion. Drug trafficking can be found everywhere, here, in England, Netherlands, in any country in Africa. Everywhere" (Representative of UPP 11, Favela in the Southern Zone).	Data: Drug trafficking exists everywhere in the world. (Therefore) Proposition: The success of UPP does not depend on the end of drug trafficking, but on ending the public display of guns. Assurance: For UPP to be considered a success, it has to transform favelas, so they are like other countries.
	"[a UPP] It works, uh... it works, so the resident of the [Favela in the Northern Zone] does not feel as different from the resident of Pereira Nunes, of Conde de Bonfim [areas in the city of Rio de Janeiro], ok? The residents of [Favela in the Northern Zone], they are just in another area, the difference is the hill. [where the favela is located]*"* (Representative of UPP 6, Favela in the Northern Zone).	Data: Today, the difference between favela and other regions of the city is only the hills where favelas are located. (Therefore) Proposition: UPP is a successful program. Assurance: For UPP to be considered a success, it has to transform favelas, so they are like other areas of the city.
	"It is a success because people from other countries come here for the experience. Other states are replicating this...this... policy, ok? How is it not a success if people want to know what is happening in Rio de Janeiro? So, I think it works and it will... it will continue" (Representative of UPP 2, Favela in the Southern Zone).	Data: Other states are adopting the policy of UPP. (Therefore) Proposition: The policy of UPP is successful. Assurance: Other states can identify what a good policy is, and they are interested only in what works.

Source: Elaborated by the authors

The arguments show that the police use the argument that other regions of the city (and of the world) are better than the favelas, as legitimation strategies. These outer regions should be benchmarks, and if UPPs are approved in these places, it means that the program is successful; after all, these regions considered superior, can differentiate a good and a bad program.

Based on data such as "*Today, the difference between favela and other regions of the city is only the hills where favelas are located*" or "*Other states are adopting the policy of UPP*", the police maintain its argument that that "*UPP is a successful program*". There is, however, supporting this argument, the assurance that "*For UPP to be considered a success, it has to transform favelas so they are like other areas of the city*" or that "Other states can identify what a good policy is, and they are interested only in what works". The premises thus reveal the view of the police that other regions, outside the favelas, are superior and, therefore, should be a model to follow. They demonstrate that behind the idea of "*integration*" that guides the state agents (each in their way), there is an idea of homogenization among the representatives of UPPs, according to which, the improvement of favelas is about becoming as close as possible to the other regions.

The premises referred to a situation of conflict between city and favela. They lead to the notion of a territory that needs to be resumed, occupied, opened to free circulation (and the intensive police control is the strategy to achieve that end). We understand these premises as based on a *logic of confrontation*, which is a category that emerges from the data to represent

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the guiding logic of the program. The rhetorical analysis revealed that the agents that form the field of UPP seem to base their actions on premises related to a belief that in the favela there is an enemy that needs to be fought because they are responsible for the high rates of crime in the city. Moreover, the success of this confrontation is observed by clear evidence, such as freedom of circulation or the end of the intense presence of drug trafficking.

Based on the analyzes, we also refer to a *civilizational logic* when it comes to UPP. This logic is related to a set of premises about a need to transform the favela for the "*good*", providing it with higher and more "*civilized*" values that were not present in those places before. In the rhetorical analysis, such logic is revealed by argumentative strategies based on *ethos*, on arguments of morality or character. *Ethos* strategies show that police officers start from the assumption that there are "*good*" and "*evil*" – the UPP and those who support them are representatives of the "*good*", and the drug traffickers and those who support them are representatives of the "*evil*". Also, the arguments are based on the premise that regions outside the favelas are superior to them, and therefore must be imitated, to a homogenization between favela and city.

As for the Growth Acceleration Program (PAC), it is an urban infrastructure program to carry out infrastructure works in the favelas. As favelas are regions with severe deficiencies regarding infrastructure, some of them were served by the program, which focused on "*building the infrastructure that has always been deficient in the peripheral areas*" (Representative of the PAC 5, Favela in the Southern Zone). The PAC has two teams: one working with the social aspects of the program, and another focusing on the construction work. Both teams seek to fulfill their purpose using previously planned actions and do not involve the residents in their decisions. Removals are a source of frequent conflicts between residents and representatives of the PAC.

Regarding their legitimation strategies, the state agents of the PAC are, as the agents of UPP, based on argumentative strategies of presence, sustaining their arguments based on vivid elements. Some examples of this type of argument, identified through rhetorical analysis, are presented in Box 8.

Box 8
Legitimation strategies – PAC – Presence

Legitimation strategies	Examples	Argument structure
Presence: **Argument based on evidence that is vivid or moving**	"[The PAC] *works. Because such a large intervention, using millions* [of Brazilian R$] *has to work*" (Representative of PAC 1, Favela in the Southern Zone).	Data: Millions of Brazilian Reals were invested in the PAC. (Therefore) Proposition: PAC is a successful program. Assurance: A large sum of money is enough to guarantee the success of a program such as the PAC.
	"[...] *The residents may have this impression that "ah, the works are disturbing," but this is because the work is still not finished. After finishing, they will have the access roads, better circulation (or a way of circulation, because sometimes they do not have it). Moreover, there is the sanitation, and then they will see that it really [improves]*" (Representative of PAC 4, Favela in the Southern Zone).	Data: Residents are not satisfied with the inconveniences during the works of the PAC. (Therefore) Proposition: The residents still did not realize the benefits since the works are not complete. Assurance: The results of the PAC works are good for the community.
	"*Who is the most interested? Those who live in the favela, the person that will buy a TV and won't have to take it home walking from the bus stop until the top of the hill, because the delivery truck from Casas Bahia* [Brazilian department store] *will be able to get up there. The guy that broke a leg and will be able to get the car or an ambulance, go to the hospital in an ambulance. So, it is an improvement, improves a lot!*" (Representative of PAC 3, Favela in the Southern Zone).	Data: The works carried out by the PAC will facilitate access to the community. (Therefore) Proposition: The PAC greatly improves the community. Assurance: Improving the access is a great improvement for the community.

Source: Elaborated by the authors.

The PAC is privileged because it provides visible outcomes. Its representatives use this characteristic of the program as a legitimation strategy. There were many millions of Brazilian Reals invested, which will be transformed into roads "*vias carroçáveis*", facilitating the access for all residents and improving the circulation around the favela. If the residents are still dissatisfied with the program, in the eyes of their agents, it is only because their products are not yet ready and therefore not yet visible.

Based on data such as "*millions of Brazilian Reals were invested in the PAC*" or "*the works carried out by the PAC will facilitate the access to the community*", the agents support their propositions that "*the PAC is a successful program*", or "*the PAC greatly improves the community*". The assumptions behind these arguments show that for the agents, an investment of millions or the ease of access with the opening of roads are sufficient to assure that the program is successful and brings improvements to the favela.

The rhetoric analysis also revealed the use of value-based *ethos* strategies by agents of PAC, again in a similar way as used by agents of UPPs. Box 9 shows these arguments.

Box 9
Legitimation strategies – PAC – *Ethos* – Value-based arguments

Legitimation strategies	Examples	Argument structure
Ethos: **Value-based arguments**	"[With the PAC] *this is not a favela anymore, it becomes a community, and soon, a neighborhood. Then, the living standards improve, and people will like this. Then, they will stop throwing the waste on the streets, will stop the robberies, the killing, fights, throwing knives in each other heads. They will learn that this is not the way... Gosh, it is possible to be a good person, it is nice to be a good person, it is good to be good!*" (Representative of PAC 3, Favela in the Southern Zone).	Data: The PAC will improve the living standards in the favela. (Therefore) Proposition: The favela will learn how to be "good." Assurance: People with low living standards such as the residents of favelas before the PAC's actions, are not good people (they rob, kill).
	"[With the PAC] *their philosophy improved because they started to consume more and started to want more things, they realized that they have more rights. Today people are saying good things about the community, it is not everybody that say 'pra mim fazer'* [wrong use of Portuguese language, equivalent to "for I to do"], *there are people who write well, who think, work, work well. Of course, there are evil people still*" (Representative of PAC 3, Favela in the Southern Zone).	Data: Today you will find in the favela, people that work well. (Therefore) Proposition: With the PAC, the residents' philosophy improved. Assurance: Before the PAC nobody worked well in the favela.

Source: Elaborated by the authors

The dichotomy between "*good*" and "*evil*" also appears here, positioning the PAC as a program capable of bringing the "*good*" to the community, of saving them from a past where people did not know they could be "*good*", so they would kill, steal, stab each other, and speak bad Portuguese. Disqualifying the favela and its residents is a way found by agents of the PAC to legitimize the program. After all, in this logic, if today there are "*good*" people in the favela, who speak good Portuguese and even "*work well*", it is because the PAC has saved them and therefore it is a successful program.

With the data that "*today you will find in the favela people that work well*", one can support the proposition that "*with the PAC, the residents' philosophy improved*". The assurance of this argument reveals the premise that "*before the PAC nobody worked well in the favela*", assuring to the program the role of 'savior' of this population.

It is possible to observe here the arguments that are persuasive because of their emotional appeal, traditionally known as *pathos* (BAUER and GASKELL, 2004). Box 10 shows some examples.

Box 10

Legitimation strategies – PAC – *Pathos*

Legitimation strategies	Examples	Argument structure
Pathos: **Emotion-based argument**	*"I like the meetings, the meetings for integration. It is hard, isn't it? Because we cannot satisfy everybody, but we know that we are doing something good for them"* (Representative of the PAC 4, Favela in the Southern Zone).	Data: This is something good for the residents. (Therefore) Proposition: Meetings are good, even though they are not satisfactory for all the participants. Assurance: Not all residents know what is good for them.
	"Talk and convince that the infrastructure work will be on top of the person's house, that resident's home, but it is for the good of the community as a whole, isn't it? Because the entire community will be benefitted, [they will] *give up that private space so others can benefit, the entire community and the person as well will be benefitted, because the infrastructure will be beneficial during the time the person continues living in that community, right?"* (Representative of the PAC 2, Favela in the Southern Zone).	Data: The PAC works are for the good of the community. (Therefore) Proposition: residents must accept giving up their space for the PAC infrastructure works. Assurance: Representatives of the PAC know what is good for the community.

Source: Elaborated by the authors.

The arguments that appeal to emotions to legitimize the actions of the program emphasize the feelings of appreciation that the state agents had for the program, after all, the PAC is for the good of all. Although some residents have to give up their homes, they will be performing an altruistic action, thinking about the good of the community above their own.

The data is that "*the PAC works are for the good of the community*" or that it "*is something good for the residents*", thus, the initiatives around the program are worthwhile, as demonstrated in the proposition "*meetings are good, even though they are not satisfactory for all the participants*", and "*residents must accept giving up their space for the PAC infrastructure works*". The premises supporting these arguments are self-evident, considering the assurance that "*not all residents know what is good for them*", after all they are not satisfied even when facing the data that the infrastructure works are for good. Also, the "*representatives of the PAC know what is good for the community*", and assures the consistency of the argument that by leaving their homes, the residents will contribute to the common good.

In the case of the PAC, it is possible to observe similarities to the *civilizational logic* found in the UPP. The set of premises in which the agents of PAC seem to be based on are related to the belief in the existence of "*good*" and "*evil*", and the program is, as it was for the UPP, positioned as a representative of the good, to "*save*" the favela, resuming it from a past of violence and atrocities. Also, the civilizational logic guides the premise that the representatives of the program are better able to say what is good for the residents than the residents themselves. It is believed that the sacrifices that some residents had to make in order for the works to be carried out will bring good to all because the agents know what is good. It is not the intention here to say that the infrastructure works of the PAC do not bring improvements to the favela. The point is that the definition of what is an "*improvement*" is not in the hands of the residents.

With the UPP entering the favelas, as a way of meeting the demand for public safety in these spaces, the program UPP Social was proposed as a complementary policy, focused on meeting social demands. The objective of the UPP Social is understanding the demands and refer them to the responsible public agencies so they can be served. This connection also aims to strengthen the connection between the residents and the state. UPP Social is a different initiative because of the way it operates, the emphasis on listening to the residents, and the concern in preserving the residents' perspective on how problems should be solved. The program proposes to reverse the usual top-down logic of public policies.

The legitimation strategies of UPP Social show a recognition that the program has not been able to legitimize itself as the agents desired. Therefore, state agents often use arguments more directed to justify their lack of legitimacy. Using reason-based arguments (*logos*), some representatives of the program explain that it is not possible to say with certainty if the program works, as there is no formal evaluation. Box 11 presents examples of these *logos* arguments.

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Box 11

Legitimation strategies – UPP Social – *Logos*

Legitimation strategies	Examples	Argument structure
Logos: **Rational arguments based on the impossibility of formal evaluation**	*"Define what you mean by 'it works,' ok? Because at that moment you are implementing the basics, ok? I mean, I think that, from the perspective of the reception, the formal proximity, the environment created, etc, I think that the relationship is very positive. But from then on, the hypothesis that is behind this result, it is impossible to test in six months. Thus, I would say, answering your question, that what I witnessed, I observed, from my engagement, there was no time to evaluate this properly, ok?"* (Representative of UPP Social 7, General).	Data: It is not possible to evaluate the program in a short time. (Therefore) Proposition: It is not possible to say whether the program UPP Social works. Assurance: A long-term evaluation process is needed to assess whether the program UPP Social works properly.
	"It is hard to say [whether the program promoted changes in the favela]. It is so hard to measure the impact of the work [...] It is difficult for me to say" (Representative of UPP Social 4, Favela in the Southern Zone).	Data: It is hard to measure the program's impact. (Therefore) Proposition: It is hard to say whether it promotes change in the favela. Assurance: It is necessary to measure the program's impact to be able to say if it promotes change.

Source: Elaborated by the authors.

Based on the data "*it is not possible to evaluate the program in a short time*" or that "*it is hard to measure the program's impact*", agents of UPP Social propose that "*it is not possible to say whether the program UPP Social works*" or that "*it is hard to say whether it promotes change in the favela*". From rational arguments, the agents recognize the possibility of problems. They do not try, at all costs, to sustain that the program is a success, but also remember that it is still not possible to say that the program does not work or does not bring changes to the favela. The premise is clear: "*A long-term evaluation process is needed to assess whether the program UPP Social works properly*".

The inversion of logic, which seeks much more to justify the lack of legitimacy than to force legitimation strategies, was also shown in arguments of presence rhetoric scheme. Examples are given in Box 12.

Box 12

Legitimation strategy – UPP Social – Presence

Legitimation strategies	Examples	Argument structure
Presence: **Argument based on evidence that is vivid or moving**	*"Considering that we are not working at the front line, I would not say that the effect of our work is physical, and this at times makes it hard to explain what the UPP Social is. 'What do you do? What is the proposition? What have you done?' Everything is documented, it is all produced, but it is information. And information is not measurable, is it?"* (Representative of UPP Social 1, General).	Data: The effect of the activities of UPP Social is not physical. (Therefore) Proposition: It is hard to explain what is the program UPP Social. Assurance: Physical effects help to explain the programs.
	"So, many times it seems like it does not work, this is historical. Because sometimes, they are sparse measures [we carry out]. And they [population] do not identify themselves as they belong to the complex [of favelas]. When it is like Formiga [neighborhood of Rio de Janeiro], it is better. Because Formiga is just Formiga. It is UPP of Formiga. Then, anything you bring to the place is perceived by the community. When it is a complex, then it is more difficult [to be perceptible]" (Representative of UPP Social 6, Favela in the Northern Zone).	Data: Sometimes, the residents do not realize the things UPP Social brings to the favela. (Therefore) Proposition: Many times it seems that the program UPP Social does not work. Assurance: The only way to believe that the program UPP Social works, is when it presents physical things in the favela.
	"Mainly, today, I think that the most benefitted by the program would be the city administration, including the secretaries. The problem is that the city does not see this. [...] because, for the city administration, they did not realize how good this program is for them. They still did not get it, you know? For whom is paying the costs of the program (the city hall) they did not understand the potential of a program such as this one in the community. However, the program does not work as it should for those who need the most" (Representative of UPP Social 2, Favela in the Northern Zone).	Data: The city administration still was not able to see how good the program UPP Social is. (Therefore) Proposition: For the city administration, the program UPP Social does not work. Assurance: It is necessary to see the benefits of the program to be able to say that it works.

Source: Elaborated by the authors.

It can be seen in the arguments of presence rhetoric scheme that the agents of UPP Social credit the program's lack of legitimacy (which they assume) to the absence of physical and vivid results. This conclusion is based on the data "*the effect of the activities of UPP Social is not physical*", which supports the proposition that, therefore, "*it is hard to explain what the program UPP Social is*". When considering the criticism of the program regarding its results, it is important to reinforce that the lack of a physical and more visible effect, makes it difficult to explain, and, therefore, it is fair to say that physical effects facilitate the explanation of programs. The questions about the program are observed in the data "*sometimes, the residents do not realize the things UPP Social brings to the favela*", which supports the proposition "*many times it seems that the program UPP Social does not work*", Also, the recognition that the operation of the program is questioned is justified based on the premise that "*the only way to believe that the program UPP Social, works is when it presents physical things in the favela*". It is possible to notice a reflection from managers around the questions directed to the UPP Social, but also an attempt to justify the program, not taking for granted the idea that the program does not work or is poorly defined. The intention here is not to legitimate the program by disqualifying those who criticize it, but rather to present a justification for the arguments questioning the program.

Emotion-based arguments (*pathos*) are part of the repertoire of legitimation strategies of agents of UPP Social. Some examples are presented in Box 13.

Box 13
Legitimation strategies – UPP Social – *Pathos*

Legitimation strategies	Examples	Argument structure
Pathos: **Emotion-based argument**	*"Apparently we are disturbing them. We are inside the city government, pointing out to the local government their own mistakes. You go to them and say 'you are doing it wrong.' This is something that is never going to work. And each area says 'I'll keep doing it this way.' It is very complicated. You are there, there is a system you feed telling the mayor the mistakes they are making. It is complicated"* (Representative of the UPP Social 2, Favela in the Northern Zone).	Data: UPP Social is inside the city administration, telling the local government all their mistakes. (Therefore) Proposition: It is difficult for the program to work. Assurance: The city administration is uncomfortable with the fact that the program points out its mistakes.
	"[...] I think it [the program] *will, it... it is a sensitive point for the city. I think, the favelas in Rio, they are very, they are, for many people, a reality that is very disturbing, it is something they did not want to exist, and you are all the time bringing it to their attention: 'look, the favela is there'. I think it is uncomfortable for people, I think many people get annoyed of being reminded all the time about the favela that is out there, they would rather forget about it. I'm not saying it is just the government, there is the public opinion too, which also has a role, makes a difference in the political projection, let's say, the media is very strong to promote or delegitimize programs and so on. So, I think there is this discomfort"* (Representative of UPP Social 4, Favela in the Southern Zone).	Data: UPP Social highlights delicate issues in the city administration, and this is uncomfortable. (Therefore) Proposition: It is hard for UPP Social to be projected politically. Assurance: A program's political projection depends on the feeling it inspires.
	"But we have some jobs that are rewarding. Some changes in perception that, you know, are amazing. We feel this in the field. The fact that we are well accepted. We do not do many things in the field, but you realize that everybody stops... stops to listen to us, everybody is receptive to us, you know? If it was another government agency, it would not [...], would not be invited to anything, you know? But we are still invited" (Representative of UPP Social 3, Favela in the Southern Zone).	Data: Managers of UPP Social are well accepted in the field. (Therefore) Proposition: The works they conduct are rewarding. Assurance: Being well accepted in the field is a positive outcome for the work they do.

Source: Elaborated by the authors.

Also, as a way of justifying the program's weak legitimacy (which is openly acknowledged by the agents), the representatives of UPP Social point out the emotions of those who, in some way, do not give the program its due value. If the city hall or public opinion in general do not recognize the value of the program and delegitimize it in some way it is because the UPP Social creates in them a discomfort, for reminding them of a delicate issue such as the favelas.

It is considered as data for the agents that "*UPP Social is inside the city administration, telling the local government all their mistakes*" and, therefore, "*it is difficult for the program to work*". The premise is that "*the city administration is uncomfortable with the fact that the program points out its mistakes*" and therefore does not give the program the proper support it needs to work. After all, the UPP Social is based on the follow up of demands. The program's work will gain the "*visibility*", as required in the arguments of 'presence', only if the demands they request for the local government are minimally fulfilled. Moreover, based on the data that "*UPP Social highlights delicate issues in the city administration, and this is uncomfortable,*" the proposition is that "*It is hard for UPP Social to be projected politically.*" As for the assurance, the "*program's political*

projection depends on the feeling it inspires". As the program UPP Social generates such discomfort, it is delegitimized, not only by the local government, but by public opinion in general.

The set of premises guiding the actions of the UPP Social are different from those observed in the UPP and the PAC. To achieve its objective, the program seeks to reverse the top-down logic of public policies and tries to formulate them from the bottom up, from the reality of the residents and of the field managers, who seek to understand this reality. Moreover, with the recognition that their views are not those that define what is "*good*" or "*evil*", or "*right*" and "*wrong*", agents of the UPP Social partly accept the criticisms from residents and other players. They understand that the criticism makes sense, after all, if they cannot see the results of the program, how can they believe it works? We give the name *logic of inversion* to the new logic that appears here as the set of premises based on the belief that the values and the reality of the residents are also valid and should be considered in decision making regarding the actions of the state in favelas.

The objective of the program *Territórios da Paz* (Peace Territories) is to identify and collect the demands of the region, playing a role of strengthening networks. In the same way as UPP Social, the Peace Territories program considers that the solutions to community problems should be bottom up. The agents identified the sensitive demands and showed residents how to proceed to get these demands served.

The rhetorical analysis reveals an implicit or explicit recognition that the program has struggled to be legitimated. Among the legitimation strategies presented by the agents of the Peace Territories program, there is a predomination of arguments to justify the legitimacy problems instead of arguments showing direct legitimation. The most common strategies adopted are arguments based on *logos* and *presence*. Box 14 presents examples of *logos* arguments.

Box 14

Legitimation strategies – Peace Territories – *Logos*

Legitimation strategies	Examples	Argument structure
Logos: **Rational arguments**	*"The quantification in terms of public policy is very difficult, because it has to be evaluated in the long-term, with control groups. You cannot evaluate a program, for example, working in pacified territories. We are not able to have a group formed with pacified territories that have the program and a control group of pacified territories that did not have the program in order to carry out an evaluation. We are not able to do that"* (Representative of the Peace Territory 2, General).	Data: It is hard to carry out a long term quantitative evaluation of the Peace Territories program. (Therefore) Proposition: It is impossible to evaluate the effectivity of the program. Assurance: To evaluate the effectivity of a policy, it is necessary to carry out a long-term quantitative evaluation.
	"We do not have an official channel to communicate and show how complex and rich our work is, offering a useful program that we build, create, finish. We do not have that! […] *So, there is this thing. And the state government does not really know who we are… the Secretary doesn't know, let alone the rest of the government. It's true!* […] *There is a lot of this, we are often in embarrassing situations trying to find the legitimacy of our work and we face these crazy situations"* (Representative of the Peace Territory 4, Favela in the South Zone).	Data: The Peace Territories program does not have an official channel through which it can demonstrate the complexity of the program and its actions. (Therefore) Proposition: The state government does not know the program. Assurance: It is necessary the existence of official channels to publicize the program so it can be well known.

Source: Elaborated by the authors.

Agents of the Peace Territories program have rational arguments (*logos*) and argue that since it is not possible to conduct a long-term quantitative evaluation of the program, it is not possible to assess whether the program is effective or not. As in the case of UPP Social, this argument reveals the assumption that it is possible that the Peace Territories program is not effective. However, the agents also point out that the effectiveness of the program cannot be definitively ruled out, since no long-term quantitative evaluation has been carried out. In this sense, by assuming the possibility of failure, the assurance

that "*to evaluate the effectivity of a policy, it is necessary to carry out a long-term quantitative evaluation*" saves the program from a definitive delegitimation.

The fact that the program is not well-known, which is an aspect that affects legitimacy, is also justified on the basis of *logos* arguments. Data stating "*the Peace Territories program does not have an official channel through which it can demonstrate the complexity of the program and its actions*", is considered, therefore, "*the state government does not know the program*". This form of arguing helps to legitimize the program as it points to another cause for the fact that the program is unknown: it is not the lack of effectiveness of the program, but the fact that its effective actions are not properly publicized.

The arguments using the rhetoric scheme of 'presence,' are presented in Box 15.

Box 15
Legitimation strategies – Peace Territories – Presence

Legitimation strategies	Examples	Argument structure
Presence: **Argument based on evidence that is vivid or moving**	"*And, for exactly that reason we had a problem of visibility, because when other projects and proposals signed their names X, Y, we did not. This did not help us in terms of visibility.*" (Representative of the Peace Territory 2, General).	Data: The Peace Territories program did not sign projects and proposals (failing to take ownership). (Therefore) Proposition: the program had a problem related to visibility. Assurance: Signing projects and proposals help programs to get visibility.
	"*If the program was not working, it would not be operating now, it would have been extinct as has happened with other programs, for example… no products elaborated here by Peace Territories were extinct because of inefficiency.*" (Representative of the Peace Territory 4, Favela in the Southern Zone).	Data: The Peace Territories Program was not extinct. (Therefore) Proposition: The program works. Assurance: When a program does not work, it is extinct.

Source: Elaborated by the authors.

The arguments of *presence* also followed, in some cases, the strategy to justify the lack of legitimacy (recognized by the agents). The data that the program did not sign the projects and the proposals so that residents could take ownership for the activities, is a justification for the lack of visibility. Thus, the problem is recognized but another justification is proposed in order not to delegitimize it: the lack of visibility is not because the program does not carry out actions, but because it does not take ownership of activities choosing not to put its brand on them.

However, among the arguments of *presence* it is possible to find those defending the proposition that the program is successful. In the above example its operation is justified from the data that so far the program has not been extinguished. It still exists, so it works.

In its similarities with the program UPP Social, Territories of Peace seems to be based on premises that refer to the *logic of inversion*, here perhaps taken to an even more extreme point. Although it has adopted an objective similar to that of the UPP Social (following up demands), the Territories of Peace program realize that it is necessary to strengthen community networks so that they fulfill their own demands, not only by inverting the logic of public policies, but also by trying to eliminate the need for an intermediary. The program encourages the actions of the residents and lets them sign and take ownership for joint actions. However, the adverse effects of this logic of inversion on the program's legitimacy can be observed in the rhetorical analysis.

CRAS, in turn, presents a proposal that differs from all the programs previously presented. In order to provide the population with access to their rights, strengthening family ties, CRAS plays a preventive role. In more concrete terms, the Social Service Center (CRAS) is the local government's agency responsible for the families' access to public services such as the conditional

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cash transfer program *Bolsa Família*, and the management of the *Cadastro Único*, a database of underprivileged families that allows access to benefits such as special fees or exemption of fees in public exams to job positions for civil servants. CRAS provides information on rights for the general population and offers support groups for families.

The legitimation strategies used by CRAS reveal that the performance of prevention program can bring legitimacy problems. CRAS, when working on prevention, has difficulties to show concrete and apparent results. Thus, agents of CRAS are engaged in strategies to justify the lack of legitimacy, or they try to point out more subjective and emotional aspects as indication of the program's success.

The main arguments used by agents of CRAS were classified as 'presence' or '*pathos*'. Box 16 shows examples of 'presence.'

Box 16
Legitimation strategies – CRAS – Presence

Legitimation strategies	Examples	Argument structure
Presence: **Argument based on evidence that is vivid or moving**	*"An old saying people use 'enxugando gelo'* [N.T. drying ice, meaning an act that is useless and senseless] [...] *I think this is because we don't see the product of our work, you know? Research is the same thing, you are doing your research, if you don't see the results, there is this weird feeling because you worked hard and didn't get anywhere. I think this is the issue with the Secretary, you build something, this is complicated, because... there is the sensation you did not do anything"* (Representative of CRAS 8, Favela in the Northern Zone).	Data: CRAS is not able to see the outcomes of its activities. (Therefore) Proposition: The agents of CRAS have the feeling they do not do anything meaningful. Assurance: To be able to see the outcomes of the actions it is important to feel useful.
	"for example, in the group we serve, there are people from this community registered here in the system, uh... I don't remember exactly but we had around 4 thousand people registered in Bolsa Família*, you know? Because the communities here are not so large. Here in the area of the territory* [that region in the Northern Zone of Rio de Janeiro, which encompasses areas not covered by this specific CRAS] *there are 38 thousand families, oh sorry not families, 'people' using the language of the IBGE* [Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics]. *But 38 thousand overall [...]. So, if we consider all of that we do not have the results. But the program works, it manages to serve those underprivileged families"* (Representative of CRAS 8, Favela in the Northern Zone).	Data: In the region where CRAS is operating there are 4,000 families in the [conditional cash transfer program] Bolsa Família. (Therefore) Proposition: CRAS is a successful policy. Assurance: The effectiveness of CRASS can be evaluated by the number of families served by the Bolsa Família program.

Source: Elaborated by the authors.

In order to justify a possible loss of legitimacy, agents of CRAS use arguments of *presence* and argue that, given the data that "*CRAS is not able to see the outcomes of its activities,*" the result is that "*the agents of CRAS have the feeling they do not do anything meaningful*". Based on the premise that "*to be able to see the outcomes of the actions is important to feel useful*", the agents justify themselves by the lack of concrete results to be presented as a means of proving that the agency really works, that it is successful in its actions.

However, the agents argue using the most concrete proof they have, which are the numbers from their main product, the conditional cash transfer program *Bolsa Família*. As a prevention program, which cannot quantitatively evaluate the results of the actions, the agents provide the numbers they have: "*In the region where CRAS is operating there are 4,000 families in the Bolsa Família*". Therefore, "*CRAS is a successful policy*".

However, this seems to be the only concrete element that can be pointed out. In the absence of other alternatives, the agents' legitimation strategies use *pathos* arguments, based on emotional responses from residents to sustain the legitimacy of the program. Some examples are presented in Box 17.

Box 17

Legitimation strategies – CRAS – *Pathos*

Legitimation strategies	Examples	Argument structure
Pathos: **Emotion-based arguments**	*"Some of the mothers of these youngsters came to thank us for the* Pró-Jovem *program. 'The things you did for my son. He really changed because of this work.' They thanked us because we offered a jiu-jitsu coach, the fact that the kid works with other kids. So, I think this is a positive thing, the community recognizes the public structure, recognizes the work, knows what is done in this structure. When we go to the communities, and we are not able to go to all of them, I think there is a perspective from the community too. We go to the community, serve the people there, and get the feedback from the people, and I think this is very positive. I think this is what we got here in the CRAS, we got visibility"* (Representative of CRAS 8, Favela in the Northern Zone).	*Data: Residents of the communities recognize the work of CRAS.* *(Therefore)* *Proposition: CRAS has visibility.* *Assurance: The visibility of the program is defined by residents' recognition.*
	"Do you know how I know this works? When you cancel an activity and children come anyway. Now the group from 07 to 17 years old is over, the facilitator was asked on facebook why the group does not restart" (Representative of CRAS 1, Favela in the Southern Zone).	*Data: Children in the community demand the continuity of the activities of CRAS.* *(Therefore)* *Proposition: CRAS is a successful policy.* *Assurance: The effectiveness of the program is defined by the residents' demands for its services.*
	"However, the impression is, especially regarding social services, that this is secondary. [...] What do you want? Don't you want the person to achieve their goals? They are in a vulnerable position, or they are already on the streets, without family ties. What do you want? We want to work with the family so this does not happen. It is better for the state (and cheaper) to prevent this. You work on the prevention. But what happens is different. There is no recognition for the professional that works in the front line and I find it really weird, because we work with these things, a negative burden, emotional burden. Why are we not recognized for the burden we are submitted to at work? This is absurd" (Representative of CRAS 3, Favela in the South Zone).	*Data: CRAS works with prevention.* *(Therefore)* *Proposition: The work of CRAS is not recognized.* *Assurance: Works on prevention are not recognized.*

Source: Elaborated by the authors.

The agents point out that "*residents of the communities recognize the work of CRAS*", or that "*children in the community demand the continuity of the activities of CRAS*" to support their propositions that, therefore, "*CRAS has visibility*", or "*CRAS is a successful policy*". They start from the premises that "*the visibility of the program is defined by residents' recognition*", or that "*the effectiveness of the program is defined by the residents' demands for its services*", as an alternative to the most frequent premises that argue that concrete, and therefore visible, results are the evidence that assure the program works. These were the alternatives the agents found to use as arguments when they realized that "*the work of CRAS is not recognized*" since "*CRAS works with prevention*".

We call the set of premises that supports the arguments of the CRAS's agents as *logic of prevention*. Following this logic, the program seeks to anticipate demands and inform the population about their rights, as well as offering benefits, such as the conditional cash transfer program "*Bolsa Família*", which is designed to prevent future difficulties. As the effects of prevention cannot be measured, the lack of more visible results affects the legitimacy of the program and, therefore, the agents use legitimation strategies to clarify the problem. The strategy is to offer an alternative justification to avoid a potential delegitimation and to obtain recognition of the residents as a program with a significant result.

Through rhetorical analysis, it is possible to observe that agents try to legitimize themselves through discourse and, following their own logic, using different strategies to do so. Realizing this phenomenon helps to understand the functioning of the state as a field of power and the engine behind disputes between agents.

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

This article analyzes the discursive legitimation strategies used by agents of the bureaucratic field of state in action in the favelas to bring light to the disputes in the field. Although earlier works have already presented the understanding of the state as a field of power (BOURDIEU, 2011; FLIGSTEIN and MCADAM, 2012) and, consequently, the existence of a dispute of legitimacy, this study advances by pointing out the logic supporting the discourses of state agents, as a force that drives and shapes the dynamics of the field. We concluded that the legitimation strategies used by the agents of the field seem to be based on premises that reveal different, often conflicting, logics. Differences in basic premises may be behind disputes between agents. In this study, although all state agents carry the same ideal of integrating the favela into the city, the best way to reach it is not consensual and varies according to the set of premises that guide each agent.

The analysis carried out in this research suggests that, if there is a processual dynamic marked by conflicts between agents in the field, this is because there is a set of premises – not always shared by all agents – that supports, governs, and shapes their actions. In the same way, agents based on similar or non-conflicting logics, such as the UPP and PAC, find the possibility of acting together. In this sense, the analysis of the set of premises on which the agents' discourses are based helps to anticipate possibilities for joint actions or potential competition.

In the bureaucratic field of state in action in the favelas, arguments of presence are very relevant and are used by all agents as a legitimation strategy. This conclusion points to the need to present vivid evidence of the results obtained from the state agents' actions. Social programs, for example, have their legitimacy affected by not being able to provide visual and apparent results from the immaterial outcomes of the activities conducted. This reflection is fundamental to rethink the performance of public organizations, especially those focused on prevention or resolution of social problems.

Also, legitimation strategies already help to anticipate the agents' positions in the field. The UPPs and the PAC reinforce their legitimacy, and the justification discourse of agents of CRAS, UPP Social, and Peace Territories demonstrate the concern on justifying their lack of legitimacy.

A limitation of the research is the assumption that the programs are homogeneous internally. The interviewees were presented in this study as representatives of the programs, i.e., as responsible for uttering the official discourse on which the program is based.

The understanding of the state as a field and the application of the concept of bureaucratic field have only recently gained momentum in the discussions in Administration. The use of this concept makes it possible to analyze internal disputes within the State, whose origins and basic principles were pointed out in this article. Above all, such disputes reveal that there is a fundamental freedom for diverse thoughts, different premises and logics, although these agents are all representatives of the same state.

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