The state of Florida and its orange and sugarcane producers stand at the center-stage of United States - Brazil economic relations and the Free Trade in the Americas (FTAA) drama. Powerful and persistent, the political importance of these modest economic interests is amplified by Florida's pivotal role in United States' presidential elections of late. Magnified by the the state's pivotal role in the Electoral College, Florida orange and sugarcane interests have effectively restricted the autonomy of the U.S. Executive. This paper employs Putnam's(1988) international agreement ratification theory and examines these industries campaign contributions to explore the Level II ratification challenges associated with the political influence of Florida's primary protectionist forces. This examination demonstrates how factional interests and political institutions can intersect to amplify the political importance of narrow, territorially prescribed industries under conditions of high electoral uncertainty. Lastly, the article explores the implications of these intractable interests upon U.S.-Brazil relations and Brazilian trade policy.
Trade Policy; Electoral College; Regional Integration; U.S.-Brazil relations
