Chinese Double Effect on Brazilian Foreign Policy (2003-2018)

O duplo efeito chinês na política externa brasileira (2003-2018)

Abstract

This research examines contemporary Brazilian foreign policy, and its central concern is to explore how China’s global rise has impacted the general guidelines of Brazilian foreign policy from 2003 to 2018. We argue that China has had a double impact on Brazilian foreign policy: (i) restraining its scope due to the restrictive nature of Sino-Brazilian relations, primarily via commerce and political divergence, and (ii) enhancing Brazil’s autonomous insertion in the international system due to the structural gaps produced by Chinese diplomatic support in the global sphere and from the convergence of specific agendas. A case study on Sino-Brazilian relations is conducted with typologies on foreign policy actions elaborated by Schweller (1994). Then, we propose that Brazilian foreign policy, through the ‘bandwagoning for profit’ strategy, sought to interpret a Jackal position within the international system. Our variables are defined based on Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell (2016), considering the structural stimulus of China’s rise as the independent variable, the permissiveness, and clarity of the international system as the intervening variable, and the behaviour of Brazilian foreign policy as a dependent variable.

Keywords
foreign policy; Chinese rise; Brazil; neoclassical realism; bandwagoning for profit

Resumo

Esta pesquisa examina a política externa brasileira contemporânea, e sua preocupação central é explorar como a ascensão global da China impactou as diretrizes gerais da política externa brasileira de 2003 a 2018. Argumentamos que a China teve um duplo impacto na política externa brasileira: (i) restringindo seu escopo devido à natureza restritiva das relações sino-brasileiras, principalmente via comércio e divergência política, e (ii) aumentando a inserção autônoma do Brasil no sistema internacional devido às lacunas estruturais produzidas pelo apoio diplomático chinês na esfera global e pela convergência de agendas específicas. Um estudo de caso sobre as relações sino-brasileiras é conduzido com tipologias de ações de política externa elaboradas por Schweller (1994). Em seguida, propomos que a política externa brasileira, por meio da estratégia de ‘bandwagoning for profit’, buscou interpretar uma posição de chacal dentro do sistema internacional. Nossas variáveis são definidas com base em Ripsman, Taliaferro e Lobell (2016), considerando o estímulo estrutural da ascensão da China como variável independente, a permissividade e a clareza do sistema internacional como variável interveniente e o comportamento da política externa brasileira como variável dependent

Palavras-chave
política externa; ascensão chinesa; Brasil; realismo neoclássico; bandwagoning for profit

Introduction

Shifts in foreign policy are commonly related to a combination of causal variables (Hudson and Vore 1995; Giacalone 2012). Likewise, the changes in the external behaviour of a state over its different administrations are sometimes attributed to domestic factors, sometimes to the preponderance of systemic factors (Milani and Pinheiro 2013).

In this article, we examine the role of a rising actor with a revisionist potential in the international system – China – on the transformations in Brazilian foreign policy (BFP) from the Sino-Brazilian strategic relations. Our central question is to explore how China’s global rise has impacted the general guidelines of Brazilian foreign policy from 2003 to 2018.

As South America is a primary strategic region for the BFP, the increasing Chinese involvement in international commerce as a buyer of natural and energy resources represented a significant opportunity for Brazilian international insertion (Vadell 2011) and a challenge to US influence in the region (Strüver 2014). In this regard, the foreign policy of Brazil exhibited a multifaceted approach of an intermediate emerging power operating within the constraints of an extra-regional power (Jordaan 2003; Lima 2013). This conduct entails the conventional approach of pragmatic alignment since the end of the 20th century, as outlined by Lessa (1998), and the non-restriction of strategic alliances to achieve absolute gains, which also corresponds to the implementation of the ‘bandwagoning for profit’ performance in the BFP (Rodriguez 2013).

Our central hypothesis holds that China’s rise has had a double effect on the BFP by (i) restraining its scope due to the restrictive nature of Sino-Brazilian relations, primarily via commerce and political divergence, and (ii) enhancing Brazil’s autonomous insertion in the international system due to the structural gaps produced by Chinese diplomatic support in the global sphere and from the convergence of specific agendas. We use the typologies elaborated by Schweller (1994) to delineate the diverse strategies of external action in the context of the World Wars in the past century. This research employs those typologies to evaluate China’s global rise and its implications for the BFP regarding the Sino-Brazilian strategic partnership. We propose a second hypothesis that Brazil’s bandwagoning for profit strategy in the international system interpreted a Jackal posture at different levels by following China at the global sphere – in the role of Wolf.

In this study, we employ the hypothetical-deductive method, with a descriptive and exploratory procedure based on a bibliographical review, especially from secondary sources. We conduct a case study (Elman, Gerring and Mahoney 2016) on Sino-Brazilian relations among three different governments: Lula da Silva (2003-2010), Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016) and Michel Temer (2016-2018).

Our variables are defined in accordance with Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell (2016), considering China’s rise as the structural stimulus and independent variable for the BFP. As intervening variables, we define the permissiveness and clarity of the international system, which have an impact on the perception of the BFP decision-making process, thus configuring our dependent variable.

The research is divided into three sections, besides this introduction and our final remarks. First, we present a theoretical discussion on the fundamental features of neoclassical realism and its potential for analysing foreign policy. Secondly, we review the trajectory of Chinese global emergence and the strengthening of its relations with Brazil during the 1990s, then we describe Sino-Brazilian relations during the Lula, Rousseff and Temer administrations. The third section discusses adaptations of the BFP to the effects of China’s rise for the ‘bandwagoning for profit’ strategy.

Potential and limits of Neoclassical Realism for Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA)

The first approaches to understanding foreign policy and the processes that lead the states to make decisions were developed in the middle of the last century (Snyder, Bruck and Sapin 1954; Sprout and Sprout 1957; Brecher, Steinberg and Stein 1969). Since then, the number and quality of theoretical propositions for analysing foreign policy have increased, studying the decision-making process from the smallest to the most significant explanatory variables (Hudson 2014: 7).

The FPA subfield has positioned the state as a conduit between the domestic and international realms, combining systemic stimuli with the needs of various groups within the state (Gourevitch 1978; Putnam 1988). By employing this approach, it is feasible to comprehend the alterations in foreign policy direction and anticipate diverse state conducts in the international arena (Holsti 1970).

Neoclassical realism goes hand in hand with FPA by taking into account the interaction between levels of analysis. Moreover, it refines the neorealist proposal by returning to the classical perspective of the adjustment of structural variables to domestic conditioning factors (Schweller 1997; Feng and Ruizhuang 2006). This creates a reciprocal causality between foreign policy and international policy. If decision-makers are aware of the opportunities created at the structural level, they can link them to domestic resources and to the relationship with civil society in order to seek favourable action in foreign policy (Rose 1998).

Neoclassical realism defines itself as refined theory capable of analysing and predicting foreign policy behaviour, viewing foreign policy as the result of interactions between the international system and processes within the state. Consequently, Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell (2016: 20-25) understand state behaviour and foreign policy viability through four variables: (i) the leader’s ability to deal with the systemic stimuli, (ii) the degree of clarity in the international system, (iii) rationality and (iv) the difficulty of mobilising domestic resources.

However, the interconnection of variables in foreign policy practice will depend on the degree of permissiveness in the international structure. The clarity of the system, which is associated with its anarchic nature, is determined by how international interactions present threats and opportunities for national actors (Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell 2016: 94). In turn, permissiveness within the international system denotes that each state has the opportunity to implement its own foreign policy agenda, but it does not mean that the environment provides specific information for particular strategies to be adopted (Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro 2009: 77).

The level of permissiveness or restrictiveness of a strategy is not solely determined by the clarity of the external scenario because states can recognise threats or opportunities in both permissive and restrictive conditions. Additionally, the state’s decision-making may not be influenced by inputs from the system (Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell 2016: 55). The formulation of state-level foreign policy strategy is guided by the selection and modification of certain patterns and ideas associated with government foreign policy behaviour. The preferences, values, and interests of influential groups in power usually shape subsequent foreign policy orientation (Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell 2016: 90-92).

Schweller (1994) posits that foreign policy strategy should not be limited to balancing and bandwagoning, as both approaches become complementary in the context of international anarchy. This neoclassical proposition for comprehending states’ behaviour at a structural level builds upon Waltz’s (1979) security concern of bandwagoning and it can be observed in the conduct of emerging intermediate powers.

Furthermore, the reasons for this conduct are assessed by acknowledging that not all states are satisfied with their status quo in international dynamics. According to Schweller (1994), foreign policy strategies can be divided among states that try to maintain or revise their status quo. The top tier is composed of Lions (global leaders who strive to uphold the status quo to preserve global order) and Lambs (actors with limited capabilities who follow the Lion’s actions to maintain the status quo). In the second tier are the Wolves (countries that endeavour to alter the arrangement of the global order and possess the ability to do so) and the Jackals (actors without sufficient resources to modify the order but aiming to benefit from systemic opportunities, especially those created by the Wolves, to enhance their position within the order).

Thus, ‘bandwagoning for profit’ constitutes a customary strategic option for the Jackal and the Lamb due to the need for supplementary capabilities to directly influence the structural order. Within this bandwagoning strategy, these states frequently align their foreign policy with great powers because of the potential to gain more significant advantages (profit). Therefore, it is critical that the strategic nature of this conduct depends on the degree of constraint imposed by major powers in international politics, as outlined by the variables posed by Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell (2016).

Since structural stimuli are treated as independent variables affecting the outcomes for both Jackals and Lambs, the global scenario can be perceived in four distinct manners in the terms of foreign policy decision-making: (i) permissive and with high clarity, considered ideal for achieving gains from foreign policy; (ii) permissive and with low clarity, restricting the optimisation of gains; (iii) restrictive and with high clarity, allowing the recognition of international stimuli but limiting foreign policy options; and (iv) restrictive and with low clarity, making it difficult to eventually align with the Lion or the Wolf and requiring foreign policy to start only from domestic variables.

Chinese rise as an independent variable with double effect

Since its establishment in 1949, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which has centralised the nation’s foreign and economic policy. In the first decade of CCP’s rule, Mao Zedong initiated industrialisation policies. The growth of the Chinese economy began to accelerate by approximately 3% per year, driven by incentives for rural migration and labour attraction (Zhu 2012).

Following the death of the revolutionary leader, Deng Xiaoping’s administration (1978-1992) aimed to end China’s isolation in international politics. Beginning at the domestic level, Xiaoping continued the Maoist programme, incorporating the Four Modernisations Plan as official government policy in 1978. This plan prioritised investments in the agricultural, educational, scientific-technological, and security sectors. The dismantling of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) played a crucial role in mitigating the surging poverty and low national productivity in China. Furthermore, Chinese foreign policy has been shaped by objectives such as peaceful coexistence, participation in multilateral processes, and coordination of an interdependent economy, ever since (Courmont 2012: 185).

During the 1980s, the Chinese government pursued external growth and strengthened diplomatic ties outside the socialist bloc by implementing the ‘Open Door Policy.’ To this end, they levied low operating fees for foreign industries, established joint ventures, and created economic zones in urban areas across China. This attracted foreign investment and subsequently increased capital flow. The liberalisation of trade and capital accumulation in industry occurred gradually, experimentally, and in a decentralised fashion, facilitated by government tax incentives and autonomy granted to small group management (Lai 2005; Zhu 2012). As a result, China’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) saw an increase in annual growth from an average of 3-5% to 8% during this period (Yao 1999).

After the Cold War’s demise, three elements began to work together in the guidance of China’s expansion. First, the externalisation of national companies according to the ‘Going Out’ policy, which helped to re-establish the socialist model through mixed economy, regulation, and state planning in the national market. Additionally, the incorporation of ideological principles grounded in Maoist revolution values and standard participation in the liberal regime played an important role. This unique and pragmatic strategy enabled China to produce substantial domestic savings and achieve trade surpluses, thereby increasing both imports and exports, and investment attraction (Chow 2004; Shambaugh 2013).

Secondly, the concept of Peaceful Rise during the turn of the century played a crucial role in fostering global economic cooperation during Jiang Zemin’s tenure (1993-2003). This rhetoric notion, introduced by Zheng Bijian, the former Vice-President of the Central Party School (CPS), was modified and legitimised as government policy under Hu Jintao’s leadership (2003-2013) (Suettinger 2004). The Peaceful Rise diplomacy was officially based on five key points, which included taking advantage of global peace to promote China’s development through its global actions; employing China’s own strength and independent hard work; continuing with the policy of openness and active international trade and economic exchanges, making it a long-term project; and refraining from impeding or posing a threat to any other country (Bijian 2005).

Finally, China rose to prominence in the role of Wolf amid the emergence of intermediary powers unsatisfied with the status quo and the liberal-democratic order. Since the 1970s, the CCP has endeavoured to legitimise the Maoist regime by creating distance from the bipolar Cold War competition. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the CCP raised concerns about the danger associated with the balance of power created by global actions of great powers (Mazarr, Heath and Cevallos 2018: 14). The Chinese revisionist movement aimed to create a global governance model that was comprehensive, multipolar, and integrated with western institutions to meet the demands of emerging powers (Schweller and Pu 2011).

Nevertheless, China opposed the regional security alliances that were consolidated by the unipolar post-Cold War moment (Shambaugh 2001). Instead, the country highlighted its preference for a system of strategic partnerships that would enable it to take part in the global regime while simultaneously articulating bilateral relations and placing itself in peripheral regions (Buzan 2010). Participation in financial institutions helped modernise and develop the Chinese economy (Xiao 2015). The endorsement of a liberal regime enabled China to achieve solid domestic savings and trade surpluses, particularly with the USA (Chow 2004). Thus, the redistribution of Chinese resources and capital has facilitated a rise in urban employment rates and productivity in both the public and private domains, resulting in a substantial surge in the manufacturing and industrial sectors (Pautasso 2006). Thanks to this, the Chinese government weathered the 1997 Asian crisis, which somewhat challenged the influence of liberal financial institutions and utilised Chinese revisionist leadership, establishing fresh strategic alliances, notably in Latin America.

Since the establishment of the G20 in 1999, China has been actively engaged in dialogue with global economic powers, striving to re-structure economic governance in accordance with the new power distribution (Xiao 2015). China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 marked a significant achievement towards expanding its adherence to the international regime and the promotion of global investments and exports. The Chinese government’s policy of worldwide expansion was integrated into the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006-2010) and institutional changes were implemented with a more significant state involvement in business administration. State-owned enterprises underwent a process of ‘vertical integration’ under the supervision of the state-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), giving priority to the security area, strategic economic sectors, social welfare, and ultimately, profitability (Zhiting 2017).

The financial crisis of 2008 revealed the vulnerability of western financial mechanisms and institutions. Consequently, China has taken on a revisionist role, particularly in the G20, promoting gradual and democratic changes to the global financial system while considering the global economy’s imbalance (Ramos 2014). Furthermore, China became the primary holder of US public debt that same year, which has prevented a potentially dominant shift. Due to substantial funding from institutions including Eximbank, the China Development Bank (CDB), and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), direct investment rose significantly over the subsequent decade and even expanded to non-strategic areas in both the USA and Europe.

In response to the perceived threat to the liberal order, the Chinese government attempted to reduce tensions by modifying the Peaceful Rise diplomacy to ‘Peaceful Development’ in 2011. This adjustment reasserted its solidarity with western powers and the interests of emerging states (State Council of the People’s Republic of China 2011). Thus, the discursive shift brought about the institutionalisation of a cooperative and inclusive relationship between states, both politically and economically. It legitimised mutual gains from comprehensive trade dynamics, among other measures, which reinforced the international system’s trust in China (Schweller and Pu 2011; Johnston 2017).

Since 2013, Xi Jinping has pursued the reform agenda in the international regime. Meanwhile, the Chinese government has utilised the norms and dynamic nature of multilateral institutions to re-enforce national development and foster collaboration with strategic partners across different regions of the world. In recent years, there has been an increasing ideological charge, particularly with the implementation of ‘Warrior Wolf’ diplomacy, contrasting with the traditional approach of US hawks. This has accentuated the conflict between the hegemonic power initiatives, with two different national organisation models (Russell 2021).

The pursuit of this objective has intensified economic diplomacy, highlighting two areas: global governance together with financial and physical integration. Concerning the former, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) was signed with fellow Asian states in 2012 and by 2018 it accounted for 39% of the world’s GDP, rendering it the most sizeable free trade agreement in global terms (Shotaro 2020). The establishment of an economic bloc has enabled China to engage with diverse nations to take charge of a global supply chain, placing countries at an equal standing in the international marketplace. This facilitates bilateral communication and paves the way for fresh regional partnerships.

Regarding the second point, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) highlights China’s aim of enhancing economic interdependence by forming various strategic partnerships on a global level. The Chinese government has initiated a physical integration phase with neighbouring countries, which is facilitating the creation of new trade networks for the distribution of Chinese production capacity. Furthermore, this integration is diversifying the utilisation of international reserves and supporting the internationalisation means of Chinese companies, amongst other objectives (Pautasso et al. 2021).

Xi Jinping’s assertiveness has exacerbated the commercial and technological dispute with the USA. Since Sino-American relations resumed in 2000, China’s participation in the WTO has intensified competition in scientific, industrial, and technological sectors (Camoça and Araújo 2021). Additionally, implementation of the Made in China 2025 policy for business and industrial planning has resulted in mounting tensions between the two powers. In 2018, the USA experienced a record-breaking trade deficit of US$418b with China. To counter this, the US government implemented tariffs of approximately US$250b on Chinese goods, including machinery, food products, and manufactures. Consequently, the Chinese government responded by imposing tariffs worth US$110b in the same year, leading to a series of tariff barriers (Pautasso et al. 2021).

Finally, the enhancement of ties between the Obama administration and the Taiwanese government was a key factor in exacerbating the Sino-American conflict, while also hindering China’s global recognition. Consequently, China refrains from endorsing democratic values and advocating human rights, which could further undermine its bid to isolate Taiwan (Mazarr, Heath and Cevallos 2018: 15).

Announcing China’s rise as our independent variable, we maintain that this phenomenon required the recognition of structural changes from the BFP, resulting in the adoption of the ‘bandwagoning for profit’ strategy through the Sino-Brazilian strategic partnership. In the following section, we identify the two effects based on this strategy. In a permissive scenario, Brazil, the largest producer of primary products in South America and an emerging middle power, benefited from China’s situation and responded by deepening its strategic partnership. Therefore, the role of Jackal was strengthened by the independent variable (China’s rise). On the contrary, in a restrictive environment, China’s interference in the region and Brazil’s shift towards primary exports have contributed to stigmatising Brazil’s intermediary status on the global stage, as well as containing its South American political and economic influence. Hence, China has emerged as a limiting factor for the BFP, leading to a withdrawal from the Jackal’s initiative.

Enhancing: gaps in power structures

Diplomatic ties between Brazil and China date back to 1974, when China joined the UN and the political non-alignment agenda of Third World nations was prevalent. The end of the Cold War, coupled with the institutionalisation of power relations and the gradual decline of US dominance, enabled nations to redistribute their power (Schweller and Pu 2011). China’s rise was facilitated by the opportunities presented by the interdependent dynamics emerging within the international order. The growth of China’s industry during the 1990s prompted the exploration for fresh markets to satisfy the country’s energy and raw material demands to fuel economic expansion (Shambaugh 2013: 44).

In the 1980s, the process of re-democratisation in Brazil led to increased collaboration with the Asian continent, encompassing the industrial, scientific-technological, and commercial sectors through national market complementarity (Oliveira 2010). The shared identity of Brazil as a regional power fostered alignment in global decision-making processes in the diplomatic sphere (Courmont 2012: 188). In 1993, a notable series of visits from Foreign Minister Qian Qichen (March) and Prime Minister Zhu Rongji (May and June) aimed to promote the relationship to the status of a ‘strategic partnership’ – a milestone in the foreign policy of both countries.

The partnership’s initials successes stemmed from collaboratively planning research to facilitate airspace cooperation and peace, which culminated in a series of agreements signed between 1994 and 1996. Subsequently, the National Institute for Space Research (INPE) and the China Academy of Space Technology (CAST) launched the first Sino-Brazilian Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS) in 1999 as a result of their partnership. During the same year, a joint declaration was signed by ministers from both countries during a visit to Beijing. The declaration highlighted the significance of bilateral cooperation in human rights, stating it as a fundamental necessity for the creation of a favourable economic environment.

The bilateral memorandum of understanding from 2002 ratified cooperation in the production and processing of sugarcane. The Chinese interest in renewable energies has led to increased production of this Brazilian resource, thus facilitating the transfer of Chinese technology for its industrial processing. Three additional CBERS satellites were constructed as part of the space programme, including the 2003 launch of CBERS-2, with the purpose of monitoring biomes and urban development. Brazil’s interest in the recently formed partnership was primarily driven by commercial expectations, to offset the negative impact on its production structure, attain greater support in international forums, attract foreign investment, and facilitate access to technological products (Biato Jr. 2010).

Upon the completion of thirty years of diplomatic relations in 2004, President Lula’s inaugural visit to Beijing resulted in the recognition of China as a free-market economy through a fresh memorandum promoting greater openness for commercial exchange and increased Chinese investment into Brazil. Consequently, the Sino-Brazilian High-Level Concertation and Cooperation Commission (COSBAN) was established as the primary mechanism for bilateral dialogue. The initial meeting in 2006 established South-South collaboration as a major strategy to address partnership issues and urged Brazil to broaden its range of exports products, reinforce business collaboration, and boost investment in infrastructure, particularly (Biato Jr. 2010).

The strategic nature of the partnership in the 21st century was determined by the resumption of Brazilian visits to Beijing since 1995, when former President Fernando Henrique Cardoso declared support for China’s entry into the WTO. This resulted in the successful establishment of the Brazil-China Business Council (CEBC). Also, COSBAN held three additional meetings (2012, 2013, and 2015) in order to re-evaluate the diversification of Brazil’s export portfolio. Notably, this diversification experienced a qualitative leap forward with sales of beef and Embraer aircraft.

The formalisation of the BRICS group between 2006 and 2011 favoured the projection of the multipolar scenario endorsed by China and other emerging states (Schweller and Pu 2011). The inaugural meeting of the ‘BRIC’ coalition in Yekaterinburg publicised the shared dissatisfaction of the countries regarding the distribution of power on IMF voting rights and the World Bank quota system (Stuenkel 2017). Cooperation among the BRICS after 2008 was directed by the financial agenda and the aim to reform global financial mechanisms, along with relative economic stability and a shared identity. The group’s incomplete institutional character allowed for Sino-Brazilian partnership diversification of collaborations, without endangering action in the global order (Stuenkel 2017: 237). In 2014, the multilateral channel was strengthened through the collaborative efforts that led to the establishment of both the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Contingent Reserve Agreement (CRA). These initiates enhanced financing options for projects among the participating countries and also established a reserve fund of approximately R$100b to alleviate the impact of any future economic crisis.

In 2009, China overtook other countries and became Brazil’s biggest economic partner. In 2012, China became Brazil’s key supplier of imported products. It was also the primary recipient of the country’s exports. Nevertheless, the two states elevated their bond to a Global Strategic Partnership. Essentially, this designation aims to enhance the intergovernmental relationship through joint planning.

Between 2011 and 2015, there were 36 meetings, either bi- or multilateral, during which Sino-Brazilian cooperation displayed the complementary nature of strategic sectors in the partnership. Three key points were emphasised: firstly, a bilateral focus on trade and investment; secondly, the consecration of the strategic partnership, enabling the exploration of relations in multilateral organisations through common objectives; and thirdly, the affirmation of a shared historical and geographical identity.

The harmony between Jackal and Wolf was evidenced by their bilateral meeting on the margins of the G20 and BRICS summits held from 2011 to 2015. In addition to discussing trade matters, their agenda encompassed health concerns via the Joint Health Action Plan (2011) and science, technology and innovation via the first Brazil-China High-Level Dialogue (2011). The 2012 and 2013 meetings initiated a strategic climate agenda dialogue, promoting Brazil’s ratification of the Paris Agreement in 2016. Additionally, discussions around migration issues were held, including visa-free travel and tourism facilitation at the III Brazil-China Consultations Meeting on Migration and Consular Issues (2013). Space cooperation persevered with the launch of two additional CBERS satellites in 2013 and 2014. The 2012 Ten-Year Plan, signed as a component of the Global Strategic Dialogue, aimed to diversify Brazil’s export portfolio by 2021.

Furthermore, in 2015, both nations endorsed the Joint Action Plan which aims to confirm cooperation in trade and investment with the intention of extending the proportion of technology-added products in Brazilian exports. During his official visit to Beijing in September 2017, former President Michel Temer aimed to strengthen cooperation with China. To achieve this goal, he signed fourteen agreements, including a framework agreement between the Chinese state-owned company Sinosure and the National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES) to provide investment guarantees in Brazil.

The Sino-Brazilian co-operation was important in setting up the BASIC group in 2009, which dealt with a collective environmental agenda between Brazil, South Africa, India and China. This coalition played a pivotal role by pledging to operate in a united way during the UN Climate Change Conference of that year. The BASIC group integrated the climate agreements into global discussions, holding parallel meetings with the USA, the EU and other developing nations. The group committed to a coordinated reduction in greenhouse gas emissions of between 36-39% by 2020 (Cervo and Lessa 2014). At the last three ministerial meetings of the group (in Morocco in 2016, and in China and Germany in 2017), Brazil and China emphasised the significance of climate discussions in constructing the international regime’s norms.

By regarding China’s external conduct as a stimulus for Brazil, the rise of China has succeeded in creating connections not just in commerce, but also in the financial, political-diplomatic, cultural, and environmental sectors. Given the permissive context, the BFP, acting as the Jackal, aligned its objectives with the economic developments in China, driven by the high demand for resources and increased financial transactions, as well as with the political movements tied to strategic partnerships, diverse alliances, and international organisations.

Constraint: risks of economic re-primarisation and reduction in Brazil’s protagonism

Since the 1970s, China’s domestic reforms and process of internationalisation have led it to become the world’s top manufacturing and exporting country at the beginning of the 21st century (Bekerman, Dulcich and Moncaut 2014). This new pattern of Chinese industrial specialisation has created a need to seek primary resources, driven by China’s sped up industrialisation. During this process, Brazil became one of the leading providers of inputs, increasing the Sino-Brazilian trade balance.

Brazil exported significant quantities of steel and petrochemicals during the 1980s. However, in the subsequent decade, bilateral trade experienced a reversal in price trends due to high Chinese demand for commodities. As a result, the price of manufactures increased while that of commodities declined (Nogueira and Haffner 2013).

Chart 1
Brazil’s trade balance with China (in billions of US dollars)

From 1995 to 2002, the agricultural share decreased by 50%, while iron ore became increasingly prominent on the export list during this period. Meanwhile, the proportions of chemicals, machinery, and electronics remained largely unchanged. China’s entry into the WTO and the subsequent growth of commodity prices further emphasised the importance of the agricultural and mineral sectors in Chinese imports, resulting in soya beans becoming Brazil’s top or second top export to China. This is highlighted in Chart 2.

Chart 2
 Product share of exports to China (2003-2018)

At this rate, Brazil pursued a path of cyclical convergence with the Asian powerhouse, resulting in highly competitive trade flows and intense specialisation in primary resources (Cunha and Xavier 2010). The significant increase in bilateral trade led to an asymmetrical relationship characterising the strategic partnership during the 2000s. Furthermore, a progressive reduction in the involvement of major developed economies can be identified as a recent challenge to US political and economic power in South America’s trade. This trend has negatively impacted Brazil’s export basket, as highlighted by Oliveira (2016: 146).

Chart 3
Share of Brazil’s exports by country

In fact, the projection of Chinese power in the region led to economic limitations on Brazil’s operations in South America, narrowing its sphere of influence, particularly after the financial crisis (Pecequilo 2013). The surge in imports of Chinese technological goods and manufactures caused a decline in the trade of durable goods between Brazil and Argentina, which was a consequence of Chinese competitive inequality in the region (Bekerman, Dulcich and Moncaut 2014). China’s expansion into South America has re-shaped MERCOSUR’s commercial focus, as neighbouring countries, particularly Argentina, have opened up to Chinese demand, allowing China to become a provider of economic benefits and thus restricting Brazil’s influence (Actis 2015; Bil and Pezzarini 2022).

Chart 4
Profile of Chinese investments in Brazil, by sector (2005-2018)

In this regard, Brazil’s macroeconomic growth was not favourable as its national production structure adapted to the export market in line with recovering central economies (Hiratuka and Sarti 2016). Direct investments from China to Brazil facilitated the construction of a productive integration pattern that followed the commercial structure’s profile by importing technological manufactures and exporting commodities and primary products.

On a diplomatic level, China’s rise and engagement with South America occurred during the same period when the ‘Washington Consensus’ lost credibility with the ‘Pink Tide’ administrations. Furthermore, in the productive sector, the asymmetry between China and Brazil has intensified. The strategic dialogue has slowed down as China is uneasy about the security agenda, its veto power in expanding the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and Chinese interests being preponderant in BRICS.

Becoming Brazil’s primary trading partner, China implemented a comparable trade policy with numerous other South American countries. This policy subsequently limited Brazil’s ability to maintain strong relationships with its neighbours. Although China’s emerging identity showed convergence and favoured intensified trade and investment flows, its foreign policy lacked the necessary soft power to amend political relations and promote the broad interests of its strategic partnerships. This lacking soft power was evidenced by its economic initiatives (Urdinez and Rodrigues 2017), while action in multilateral forums remained secondary (Guilhon-Albuquerque 2014).

Adapting BFP to China’s rise through ‘bandwagoning for profit’

In order to investigate the effects of China’s rise in the BFP, we explore the environments of permissiveness and clarity as intervening variables in the Lula, Rousseff and Temer administrations’ pursuit of ‘bandwagoning for profit’ strategy.

The Lula administration (2003-2010): specific regional and global objectives

With the emergence of the ‘Pink Tide’, the diversification of Brazilian partnerships, and post-hegemonic regionalism, the Sino-Brazilian alliance became more apparent amid China’s entry into South America and the development of global governance through active participation in multilateral forums and coalitions (Vigevani and Cepaluni 2007; Wylde 2012; Nolte 2019). The Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Itamaraty) played a crucial role in solidifying the country’s foreign policy proposals. It aligned itself with the agenda of the Workers’ Party (PT) and fostered a strategic culture of the BFP. This culture was reinforced through the internationalisation of national institutions and companies, including Petrobras and the BNDES. These institutions served as crucial channels for attracting foreign investment and promoting policies for economic growth (Faria 2012; Pickup 2016).

In the regional dimension, China has prioritised relations with not only Brazil, but also other South American countries. Furthermore, the growing emphasis on exporting primary commodities and forming new strategic partnerships in the Southern Cone has diminished Brazil’s competitiveness in the region (Carmo, Bittencourt and Raiher 2014). This, to some extent, has resulted in fewer regional clarity regarding Brazil’s actions, particularly during Lula’s second term in office (2007-2010). In the context of efforts to establish institutional frameworks for South America (UNASUR and MERCOSUR), Brazil’s aspiration to take charge in the region was more significant in comparison to limiting US presence and pursuing a global role (Malamud and Rodriguez 2013).

The processing of a new strategic culture on the global stage has allowed for the strengthening of the Sino-Brazilian relationship and Brazil’s repositioning within the hegemonic order. Despite this, Brazil’s greater diversification of diplomatic relations and intensive presidential diplomacy allowed for some manoeuvring in the face of China’s rise. Brazil’s participation in both the G4 (Germany, Brazil, India, and Japan) and IBSA (India, Brazil, and South Africa) provided opportunities to complement Itamaraty’s actions with those of various state agencies, thereby creating margins for strategic action in a permissive scenario (Pinheiro, Lima and Hirst 2010).

China’s recent expansion into South America is fuelling competition with US hegemony, as noted by Nolte (2013). Thereby, China’s focus on global governance norms is transforming the political landscape, and its assertive tactics are aligned with the role of Wolf. Meanwhile, Brazil’s political and economic influence in the region has been weakened by China’s growing power, as highlighted by Vaz (2018). Consequently, BFP behaviour in this first period is perceived in high permissive context but with low clarity, related primarily to its dependent economic ties with China. As a result, the preponderance of Brazil in multilateral channels as a profit for its diplomacy was restricted by China. Therefore, the optimisation of the Jackal posture was benefitted from the diversification of global partnerships and broader coalitions.

The Rousseff administration (2011-2016): Lula’s legacy amid domestic crisis

At the beginning of her government, Dilma Rousseff engaged with international forums and coalition groups while also striving to establish Brazil’s position in the global political and economic agenda (Saraiva 2016). The defence of multilateralism and the establishment of core mechanisms of the BRICS confirmed the expectations of the Brazilian progressive political forces on a global scale, building upon the legacy of the Lula period. However, an ambiguous and restrictive environment arose as the international focus turned to the crises in Syria and Crimea, coupled with limitations resulting from the aftermath of the Arab Spring, as well as US and European economic recovery efforts.

These factors subsequently hindered Brazil’s participation in the G20, thereby affecting global political and economic re-structuring (Cornetet 2014). Domestic factors were impacted, resulting in a decrease in the industrial sector’s share of GDP. This has raised concerns about potential economic reprimarisation, in addition to a decline in exports and business confidence. These outcomes can be attributed to corruption scandals and the deterioration of coalition presidentialism (Cervo and Lessa 2014; Silva 2022).

The policies and ideas directed at China were underpinned by a strategic culture established under Lula’s term continued by Rousseff’s administration. Despite low structural permissiveness due to the financial and Arab crises, the Sino-Brazilian dialogue was strengthened through the Global Strategic Partnership, agreements on joint economic action, space cooperation, and significant influx from Chinese direct investment. However, the scarce innovation and low competitiveness of Brazil’s industry and the service sector, altogether with social disenchantment and economic retraction immobilised the Jackal posture better played during its predecessor. Thus, it confirmed that in this type of scenario, domestic variables end up being preponderant and policy-oriented efforts are strongly constrained and dependent on the structural variable (Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell 2016).

The Temer administration (2016-2018): foreign policy restructuring

Following the impeachment of Rousseff, Vice-President Michel Temer assumed office in August 2016. In the subsequent two and a half years, the ‘New Foreign Policy’ aimed to de-ideologize the BFP and incorporate the demands of dissatisfied domestic groups in power (Silva 2019). Accordingly, Temer’s foreign policy was dominated by internal factors amid an international context of low clarity, but with high permissiveness for the implementation of the new coalition in power strategic guidelines (Moreira 2020).

The BFP underwent a major restructuring during a short-term period, displacing the dominant strategic culture during the PT governments (2003-2016) while prioritising free-trade agreements and institutional flexibility, which also led to the detriment of the autonomous agenda and the revisionist identity (Álvarez and Zelicovich 2020). This movement also extended to the posture with China, which remained Brazil’s primary commercial partner, continuing some of the pragmatic values of the BFP towards its partnerships.

In this view, the realignment with traditional partners, especially the USA, Japan and the EU, and the institutional flexibility with the resumption of centre-right governments in South America took place amid the circumstantial permissiveness of allocating liberal policies. The Sino-Brazilian relationship prioritised bilateral treaties, focusing on attracting China’s investment through contracts and agreements with Chinese companies, such as Sinosure and China Communication and Construction Company. However, the priorities readjustment in the BFP guidelines implied a protocol action about the environmental agenda and in the multilateral scope with Beijing (Casarões 2021).

In addition, the political detachment from the Jackal’s posture operated during this period due to the deepening of the China-USA dispute. Nevertheless, the difficult normalisation with Trump’s administration relied on a strengthening of the trade agenda with Beijing (Casarões 2021). Therefore, the international context provided high clarity and permissiveness to the renewed BFP guidelines, especially in the regional dimension, corroborating with a pragmatic retreat in Jackal’s posture. At the same time, Temer’s administration tried to sustain a position of greater accommodation to the norms of the liberal-democratic regime, meaning that democracy under US command resulted in restructuring the BFP within the ‘bandwagoning for profit’ strategy.

Final remarks

During our research, it was presented that Neoclassical Realism offers a comprehensive approach for studying foreign policy. This involves the analysis of structural factors via variables and processes within the state. The outcome of this analysis is the implementation of foreign policy, which typically reflects interests and values originating from the domestic domains, following an understanding of the relevant international context. We aimed to contextualise China’s rising influence on the structural changes identified by the BFP at three different administrations (Lula, Rousseff, and Temer). Our analysis utilised the BFP’s actions as a dependent variable, capturing the degree of permissiveness and clarity within the international scenario.

To present the different responses of the BFP through Chinese action, we highlight that the Brazilian insertion triggered a ‘bandwagoning for profit’ strategy (Schweller 1994). Thus, we tried to investigate how China’s global rise has impacted the general guidelines of Brazilian foreign policy from 2003 to 2018. As an independent variable, we analysed that China served as a stimulus enhancing and constraining the BFP during the governments of Lula (2003-2010), Rousseff (2011-2016) and Temer (2016-2018).

The favourable circumstances for bandwagoning for profit had significant consequences primarily within the political-economic domain. Noteworthy are the domestic economic reforms that took place in China since the mid-1970s, which enabled the country to ascend globally and form strategic ties with Brazil in the 1990s. China’s entry into the WTO in 2001 and Brazil’s recognition of it as a market economy in 2004 facilitated the trade agenda and boosted China’s dominance within the BRICS.

Closer trade relations were facilitated by a complementary alignment of national interests, shared identity with the emerging discourse, and a revisionist stance towards the international order, which was initially perceived as permissive of Lula’s aspirations. However, the limitations of Brazil’s conduct through Sino-Brazilian partnership can be attributed primarily to trade issues. The rise in prices of primary products with a high demand from China played a central role in consolidating Brazil’s structural dependence on its export basket.

Under Rousseff’s terms, the diplomatic and financial priority given to the Sino-Brazilian strategic partnership, alongside continuous discourse, enabled the Jackal’s role. However, the partnership’s role has been restrained by the reform of the UNSC and economic reprimarisation, leading to a mere rhetorical emphasis. The repositioning of the BFP priorities during Temer’s administration aimed for a more significant political rapprochement with western and liberal governments. This altered the BFP’s focus on ‘bandwagoning for profit’ towards the Wolf.

Neoclassical realist theory, supported by the variables described by Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell (2016), highlighted the margins of permissiveness and clarity for achieving the ‘bandwagoning for profit’ strategy, providing a description of governments’ external actions towards major powers. Considering the process of structural change affecting domestic perceptions, it was observed that the role of Jackal oscillated, such as characteristic of Brazilian external behaviour as a middle power.

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Publication Dates

• Publication in this collection
  09 Sept 2024
• Date of issue
  May/Aug 2024

History

• Received
  07 Mar 2023
• Accepted
  11 Jan 2024