When and How do Bureaucratic Conflicts Matter in Trade Policy? Evidence from the US Trade Policymaking Process during the Clinton Administration (1993–2001)

The study of the role played by bureaucracies contributed substantively to the analysis of the domestic determinants of foreign policy outcomes, particularly by softening the premise of the state as a unitary-rational actor. However, the potential of focusing on bureaucracies to analyse US trade policy outcomes has been severely underestimated by the most recent IPE scholarship, which tends to focus on the Congress and interest groups, and to consider the Executive a unitary actor. Based on elements of the bureaucratic politics model, this article uses evidence from the US trade policy during Clinton’s administration (1993–2001) in order to present arguments regarding how and when bureaucratic conflicts matter the most, and highlight the relevance of these conflicts in the trade decision-making process.

Key words
United States; Executive; Trade Policy; Decision-making; Bureaucratic Conflicts

Authorship

Rodrigo Fagundes Cézar

Institut de Hautes Etudes Internationales et du Developpement (IHEID), Geneva, Switzerland; rodrigo.fagundes@graduateinstitute.ch.Institut de Hautes Etudes Internationales et du DeveloppementSwitzerlandGeneva, SwitzerlandInstitut de Hautes Etudes Internationales et du Developpement (IHEID), Geneva, Switzerland; rodrigo.fagundes@graduateinstitute.ch.

Rodrigo Fagundes Cézar is a PhD candidate in International Relations/Political Science at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (IHEID), Switzerland. He holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from the Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo (‘San Tiago Dantas’ Post-Graduate Program), Brazil. He has worked at UNDP Brazil, and held a research fellowship position at the International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth (IPC-IG). His PhD research (‘The making of the trade-labor linkage in the United States and European Union’) approaches the domestic determinants of labour standards in preferential trade agreements from a comparative perspective. His research interests include: foreign policy analysis, trade policymaking in the United States and European Union, and policy networks.

SCIMAGO INSTITUTIONS RANKINGS

Tables

Tables (2)

Table 1 Departments and agencies with foreign economic policy bureaus Department of Agriculture Office of Energy Policy Global Change Program Office World Agricultural Outlook Board Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis Economic Development Administration International Trade Commission Technology Administration Department of Energy Energy Advisory Board Office of Nuclear Energy Technology Policy and International Affairs Office Department of Justice Drug Enforcement Administration Environment and Natural Resources Federal Bureau of Investigation Foreign Claims Settlement Commission Immigration and Naturalization Service Department of State Economic and Business Affairs Educational and Cultural Affairs International Narcotics and Enforcement Population, Refugees, and Migration Trafficking in Persons Western Hemisphere Affairs Department of the Treasury Bureau of the Public Debt Financial Management Service Internal Revenue Service Bureau of the U.S. Customs Service Office of Economic Policy Office of International Affairs Other Agencies National Security Council National Economic Council Office of Science and Technology Policy USTR Council of Economic Advisers U.S. Export-Import Bank Federal Reserve System Overseas Private Investment Corporation Trade and Development Agency Environmental Protection Agency Agency for International Development Source: Dolan (2002) Table 2 Typical position of selected US bureaucratic agencies towards trade policy Department of State Supports trade liberalisation and usually refrains from imposing sanctions on strategic partners that are important for the US international security strategy, such as Japan and China. It considers that trade policy must reinforce US foreign policy strategy. Department of Treasury Supports trade liberalisation and gives particular attention to the interest rates of the international economy; major objective is to keep an environment favourable to private investment and to the value of the US dollar Department of Commerce Supports trade liberalisation and the expansion of US exports in an aggressive manner, if necessary, in order to open markets; responsible for the application of some of the US trade remedies. United States Trade Representative (USTR) Supports the promotion of fair and free trade; seeks access to foreign markets for US businesses and protection of industries from ‘unfair’ practices. Historically, it has also played the role of honest broker. National Economic Council (NEC) Favourable to the trade preferences of the president, which are usually biased towards liberalisation (liberal presidency thesis [1]). Assertiveness depends on the participation of the president and the members indicated to run the Council United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Supports fair trade; faces a split between import-sensitive (e.g. sugar and peanut) and export-oriented (e.g. soybeans, corn and wheat) producers. With a relevant share of its constituency being politically powerful import-sensitive producers, constant side payments are due in order to pursue further trade liberalisation. Department of Labor Supports fair trade; has recently supported the inclusion of strong labour clauses in trade agreements; in spite of being wary of trade liberalisation, has not opposed big agreements such as NAFTA. [1] According to the liberal presidency thesis (Karol 2000), usually the President’s preferences do not change in response to their party affiliation. It means that both Republican and Democrats presidents are in general in favour of trade liberalisation. Source: Based on Destler (1996; 2005), Cohen, Paul and Blecker (2003), and Cohen (2000)

Table 1 Departments and agencies with foreign economic policy bureaus

Department of Agriculture	Office of Energy Policy
	Global Change Program Office
	World Agricultural Outlook Board
Department of Commerce	Bureau of Economic Analysis
	Economic Development Administration
	International Trade Commission
	Technology Administration
Department of Energy	Energy Advisory Board
	Office of Nuclear Energy Technology
	Policy and International Affairs Office
Department of Justice	Drug Enforcement Administration
	Environment and Natural Resources
	Federal Bureau of Investigation
	Foreign Claims Settlement Commission
	Immigration and Naturalization Service
Department of State	Economic and Business Affairs
	Educational and Cultural Affairs
	International Narcotics and Enforcement
	Population, Refugees, and Migration
	Trafficking in Persons
	Western Hemisphere Affairs
Department of the Treasury	Bureau of the Public Debt
	Financial Management Service
	Internal Revenue Service
	Bureau of the U.S. Customs Service
	Office of Economic Policy
	Office of International Affairs
Other Agencies	National Security Council
	National Economic Council
	Office of Science and Technology
	Policy
	USTR
	Council of Economic Advisers
	U.S. Export-Import Bank
	Federal Reserve System
	Overseas Private Investment Corporation
	Trade and Development Agency
	Environmental Protection Agency
	Agency for International Development

Source: Dolan (2002Dolan, Christopher. 2002. Striking a balance: presidential power and the National Economic Council in the post-Cold War. PhD Thesis, University of North Carolina, US.)

Table 2 Typical position of selected US bureaucratic agencies towards trade policy

Department of State	Supports trade liberalisation and usually refrains from imposing sanctions on strategic partners that are important for the US international security strategy, such as Japan and China. It considers that trade policy must reinforce US foreign policy strategy.
Department of Treasury	Supports trade liberalisation and gives particular attention to the interest rates of the international economy; major objective is to keep an environment favourable to private investment and to the value of the US dollar
Department of Commerce	Supports trade liberalisation and the expansion of US exports in an aggressive manner, if necessary, in order to open markets; responsible for the application of some of the US trade remedies.
United States Trade Representative (USTR)	Supports the promotion of fair and free trade; seeks access to foreign markets for US businesses and protection of industries from ‘unfair’ practices. Historically, it has also played the role of honest broker.
National Economic Council (NEC)	Favourable to the trade preferences of the president, which are usually biased towards liberalisation (liberal presidency thesis [1]). Assertiveness depends on the participation of the president and the members indicated to run the Council
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)	Supports fair trade; faces a split between import-sensitive (e.g. sugar and peanut) and export-oriented (e.g. soybeans, corn and wheat) producers. With a relevant share of its constituency being politically powerful import-sensitive producers, constant side payments are due in order to pursue further trade liberalisation.
Department of Labor	Supports fair trade; has recently supported the inclusion of strong labour clauses in trade agreements; in spite of being wary of trade liberalisation, has not opposed big agreements such as NAFTA.

[1] According to the liberal presidency thesis (Karol 2000Karol, David. 2000. ‘Divided Government and U.S. Trade Policy: Much Ado about Nothing?’ International Organization 54 (4): 825–44.), usually the President’s preferences do not change in response to their party affiliation. It means that both Republican and Democrats presidents are in general in favour of trade liberalisation. Source: Based on Destler (1996Destler, Ian. 1996. The National Economic Council: a work in progress. Washington: Institute for International Economics.; 2005), Cohen, Paul and Blecker (2003Cohen, Stephen, Joel Paul and Robert Blecker. 2003. Fundamentals of US foreign trade policy. Boulder: Westview Press.), and Cohen (2000Cohen, Stephen. 2000. The Making of United States International Economic Policy: Principles, Problems, and Proposals for Reform. 5th ed. Westport, CT: Praeger.)

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When and How do Bureaucratic Conflicts Matter in Trade Policy? Evidence from the US Trade Policymaking Process during the Clinton Administration (1993–2001)

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