Abstract
The text examines how Nietzsche conflates the critical element of his philosophy with the constructive ethical formulations that he advocates. His aim is to show that Nietzsche's positive formulations retain a kind of normative guidance, even though in a minimal sense. Given that this supposed normative guidance must maintain coherence with his critique - and therefore must be distinct of the traditional conceptions which are criticized -, I start by identifying some elementary commitment that the philosopher assumes at the time of his critique in order to clarify the nature and the status of the conception of normativity that these commitments admits. Thereby I arrive at a description where although any evaluative judgment rests on a basic subjective element, this element is enough to ensure his normative force. At the end of text, I suggest one possible characterization of Nietzsche's position as a variation of perfectionism where a formal description of values that are defined regarding his capacity of promoting excellence is conjugated with a requisition of a particular type of self-reliance, whose function is to grant normative force to these values.
Keywords:
value; criticism; normativity; perfectionism