ABSTRACT
This article is about the individuation of incorporeal beings in the Kalām fī maḥḍ al-ẖayr or Liber de Causis (LdC). Bearing that in mind, I will introduce the hierarchy of beings, especially the distinction between the intellect and the soul. After a brief parallel between the types of principles in the LdC (first cause, intellect and soul) and in Proclus’ Elements of Theology (One, limit-unlimited, henádes, intellect and soul), I will discuss the absence of the divine henádes in the LdC and some difficulties faced by the anonymous author due to his changes in the Proclian metaphysical model. Riggs (2017) understands that the anonymous author of the LdC developed a new theory to explain the individuation of beings based on two kinds of activities: the act of creating performed by the first cause and the act of informing performed by the first created intellect. However, these two activities are not able to justify some aspects of individuation since each one of them is a unique act performed by an external principle, i.e., the first cause and the first intellect, not by an immanent one. An alternative interpretation of the theory of individuation found in the LdC will be proposed based on two criteria: the principle of similarity (LdC X) and the principle of proportionality (LdC IX, XI).
Keywords
Medieval philosophy; neoplatonism; arabic philosophy; reception