The presence of Kant and its possible influence in Nietzsche's philosophy is a controversial issue. If in his early writings Nietzsche is clearly influenced by Kant, his mature period texts no longer allow anyone to see clearly the content of the dialog established therein, once Nietzsche assumes a radical view against Kant. This view hides that, regardless the disruptions done in face of the transcendental Idealism, Nietzsche remains debtor to Kant. An aspect of this debt is the notion of regulative fiction. We intend, thus, to show: first, that Nietzsche's conception that the falsity of a judgment does not constitute an objection to itself is a decisive trace of his anti-dogmatic thought and, secondly, to argue that this anti-dogmatism has ascendancy in Kant's conception of regulative principles.
Kant; Nietzsche; Regulative principles; Regulative fiction