ABSTRACT
Thought experiments in factual science consists on the representation of an imaginary scenario. Starting with the presentation of a hypothetical or counterfactual situation and the description of initial conditions, the reader is asked to mentally perform some operation, to manipulate certain variables or to put into operation some apparatus or instrument. In virtue of this exercise, it would be possible to obtain new knowledge about the natural world. The debate on the functions of thought experiments in physics is focused on determining the validity of the empirical knowledge that these devices are capable of providing. Brown (1991, 2011) supports the idea that, in exceptional cases, thought experiments can perform probative functions. The so-called “Platonic Thought Experiments” allow us to intuit laws of nature and provide an a priori justification of the proposed hypotheses. We hold that Brown's connection between thought experiments and laws of nature exhibits a problematic aspect of his philosophy: the unjustified commitment with an inflationary metaphysics. We show that it is possible to explain the mechanism through which these devices provide new knowledge and give an account of both their heuristic power and their evidential value from modest metaphysical commitments.
Keywords:
Thought Experiments; Laws of Nature; A priori Knowledge; Inference to the Best Explanation; Dispositionalism