Resumo em Português:

O artigo examina o estatuto da moral ao longo da obra de Descartes, da «moral por provisão» do Discurso à «moral como sabedoria» da carta-prefácio à edição francesa dos Princípios. A constituição da metafísica neste ínterim, com a separação entre a verdade e o bem, permite a Descartes tomar a «moral como sabedoria» como perfeita e definitiva não obstante a dúvida epistemológica que esta moral traz em seu âmago.

Resumo em Inglês:

The article examines the place and nature of morals in Descartes's works, from the « provisional morals » of the Discourse to the conception of morals as wisdom in the letter-preface to the French edition of the Principles. Descartes's elaboration of his metaphysics, with the separation of the truth from the good, allows him to assume his later view of morals as wisdom as definitive and perfect despite the epistemic doubt intrinsic to this morals.

Resumo em Francês:

L'amitié et l'affinité intellectuelle qui caractérisèrent les rapports de Hobbes avec Gassendi forment un tissu ténu dont il n'est point aisé de démêler la trame. Aux côtés de points de convergence clairement définis, telle la commune aversion envers le dualisme et l'innéisme cartésiens, et par-delà des divergences non moins nettes dans leurs orientations philosophiques particulières, le sens des parcours maintes fois parallèles doit encore être éclairé de façon circonstanciée. Le terrain privilégié sur lequel élever une confrontation étroite entre deux auteurs est sans doute la construction d'une psychologie profondément marquée par des prémisses empiriques et dont l'orientation vise à établir une relation très étroite entre les processus de la perception, du désir (appetitus) et de la volonté avec ce qui les détermine matériellement et mécaniquement. On peut même affirmer que les écrits de Gassendi rédigés au tout début des années 1640 définissent une série d'hypothèses innovatrices sur lesquelles s'inscrit une certaine convergence avec les élaborations de Hobbes à elles contemporaines. Sous ce profil, le groupe de textes remontant aux années 1640-41, et où le philosophe d'Aix s'interroge sur la nature des phénomènes lumineux, est emblématique. L'explication du comportement des corps lumineux en terme de systole et de diastole, l'interprétation de la propagation de la lumière s'inspirant de la pure actualité cinématique (en polémique ouverte et explicite envers les thèses de la Dioptrique de Descartes sur la luminosité comme simple inclinaison au mouvement), le vacuisme (qui est propre à Gassendi, servant justement à rendre compte des phénomènes d'expansion et de contraction des sources lumineuses et qui, à cette époque, n'était pas encore exclu par Hobbes), la représentation, enfin, tout à fait matérielle et mécanique des phénomènes d'irradiation, voilà autant d'aspects de la recherche de Gassendi qui peuvent facilement être confrontés aux écrits de Hobbes.

Resumo em Inglês:

Hobbes' and Gassendi's friendship and intellectual affinity constitute a tight thread hard to be untied. Beyond clearly defined convergent views such as the common aversion to Cartesian dualism and innatism and clear divergences in their specific philosophical orientations, the meaning of their often similar trajectories must be precisely clarified. The privileged context for a comparison between them is doubtless the construction of a psychology deeply influenced by empirical premises and whose aim is to establish a close relation between the processes of perception, desire (appetitus) and will on the one hand and their mechanical and material causes on the other. One can claim that Gassendi's works written in the beginning of the 1640s introduce a number of new hypothesis on the bases of which emerge a certain convergence with Hobbes' views developed in the same occasion. The texts written during the years 1640-41 where Gassendi inquires on the nature of light are emblematic. A number of aspects of Gassendi's inquiry can be easily confronted with Hobbes' writings: his explanation of the behavior of luminous bodies in terms of systole and diastole; his interpretation of the propagation of light, which is inspired-in a explicit and open polemical fashion against Descartes's thesis in his Dioptics about luminosity as nothing but inclination to movement-by the plain cinematic actuality; his belief in the existence of the void, which is peculiar to Gassendi, making possible the explanation of the phenomena of expansion and contraction of luminous sources (a view which was not at the occasion excluded by Hobbes); and finally, the material and mechanical representation of the phenomena of irradiation.

Resumo em Português:

Este artigo analisa comparativamente o papel que a ciência e a técnica ocupam nas sociedades descritas em A cidade do Sol de Tommasio Campanella, a Nova Atlântida de Francis Bacon, Panorthosia de Jan Amós Comenius e o Complemento à Nova Atlântida de Joseph Glanvill.

Resumo em Inglês:

This article evaluates the role that science and technology plays in the societies described by early modern utopias, making a comparative analysis of Tommasio Campanella's City of Sun, Francis Bacon's New Atlantis, Jan Amós Comenius' Panorthosia, and Joseph Glanvill's The summe of my lord Bacon's New Atlantis.

Resumo em Português:

Em Pascal encontramos um duplo registro da questão moral: por um lado, o autor dos Pensées dirige uma dura crítica aos ideais morais da filosofia, especialmente aos do estoicismo; por outro, ele afirma uma "verdadeira moral" que "zomba da moral". A análise desse duplo registro será feita a partir de quatro contextos encontrados nos Pensamentos: 1- O contexto epistemológico da diferença entre espírito geométrico e espírito de finesse, ao qual se remetem os termos correlatos "moral do espírito" e "moral do julgamento"; 2- O contexto antropológico da "desproporção do homem" e da virtude como meio-termo; 3- O contexto antropológico - teológico da miséria e da grandeza do homem 4- O contexto metafísico-teológico da teoria das "três ordens de coisas". A "verdadeira moral" constitui-se, afinal, por dois movimentos: no primeiro, a moral pascaliana é simplesmente naturalista e compartilha do espírito mecanicista do seu século. Em seu segundo movimento, ela é teológica e constitui-se essencialmente como uma hermenêutica do desejo.

Resumo em Inglês:

We find in Pascal a double approach to the moral issue. On the one hand the author of the Pensées strongly criticizes the moral ideals of philosophy, in particular those of Stoicism but, on the other, he claims that there is a "true morals" which "mocks of morals". We here analyze this double approach from the point of view of four contexts exhibited in the Pensées: 1- The epistemological context that distinguishes the "esprit de géométrie" and the "esprit de finesse" which points, respectively, to a "moral of the ' esprit'" and to a "moral of judgment". 2- The anthropological context of the "disproportion of men" and of virtue as mean 3- The anthropological-theological context of the misery and greatness of man. 4- The metaphysical-theological context of the theory of the "three orders of things". The "true morals" is construed in two movements. In the first, Pascal's morals is naturalistic and shares the mechanism of his time. In the second, it is theological and emerges essentially as an hermeneutics of desire.

Resumo em Português:

Tanto Nicholas Malebranche como Pierre-Daniel Huet foram inicialmente positivamente influenciados pelas Meditações de Descartes e ambos terminaram por perceber falhas nesta obra. No que concerne o dualismo mente e corpo, Malebranche buscou fortalecer a posição cartesiana abandonando o critério de clareza e distinção em favor de um princípio de intencionalidade. Huet abandonou o cartesianismo como um todo em favor do ceticismo. A fonte destas respostas diversas está nas avaliações distintas que fizeram da integridade de Descartes.

Resumo em Inglês:

Both Nicholas Malebranche and Pierre-Daniel Huet were at first positively influenced by Descartes's Meditations, and both came to perceive shortcomings in that work. With respect to mind-body dualism, Malebranche attempted to strengthen Descartes's position by jettisoning clarity and distinctness basing it instead on a principle of intentionality. Huet jettisoned the whole position in favor of skepticism. The source of their different responses lay in their different estimations of Descartes's integrity.