ABSTRACT
First, I consider a few motivations to idealize epistemic logics1 in such a degree that brings up the problem of logical omniscience [LOP]. I argue that the main motivation to hold omniscience is of a philosophical-scientific2 background (Stalnaker 1991STALNAKER, R. “The Problem of Logical Omniscience”, in: Synthese, 89(3), Belief and Rationality, 425-440, Springer, 1991.), in the sense philosophers have a not so peculiar way of investigating underlying mechanisms, i.e., the interaction of several different components of complex systems may be better understood in isolation, even if such components are not found isolated in a realistic context. It is defended that the implicit and explicit knowledge distinction (Fagin and Halpern 1988) is compatible that view since idealizations made by modal epistemic logic are so strong that the agents they describe hardly have anything in common with real agents. I conclude by showing how LOP can be accommodated in the logic of being informed (Floridi 2006______ “The Logic of Being Informed”. Logique et Analyse, 49, pp. 433-460, 2006. ) using the Inverse Relationship Principle (Barwise and Seligman 1997BARWISE, J. and SELIGMAN, J. Information Flow: The Logic of Distributed Systems, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.).
1Epistemic modal logics and the logic of being informed may collapse in many scenarios, as shown in previous articles (blind review omitted).
2Does not necessarily imply in a naturalized epistemology a la (Quine 1981QUINE, W. V. Theories and Things. Cambridge, Mass.; London: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1981.). For a plea for non-naturalism as constructionism see (Floridi 2017______ “A Plea for Non-naturalism as Constructionism”. Minds and Machines, 27(2), 269-285, Springer, 2017.).
Keywords:
Logical Omniscience Problem; Knowledge; Semantic Informatio