



## NATURE AND HISTORY IN HEGEL'S IDEALIST PHILOSOPHY: ONTOLOGICAL CLUES FOR UNDERSTANDING THE BEING AND CORPOREALITY

*NATUREZA E HISTÓRIA NA FILOSOFIA IDEALISTA DE HEGEL: INDÍCIOS ONTOLÓGICOS PARA A COMPREENSÃO DO SER E DA CORPOREIDADE HUMANA* 

*NATURALEZA E HISTORIA EN LA FILOSOFÍA IDEALISTA DE HEGEL: INDICIOS ONTOLÓGICOS PARA LA COMPRENSIÓN DEL SER Y DE LA CORPOREIDAD HUMANA* 

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**Abstract:** This literature review presents the development of nature and history as categories in Hegel's work. More solid – albeit abstract – indications are found in his work of a path towards an ontology of social being. Such a path enables us to observe the logical-conceptual treatment of these categories and to achieve an initial comprehension about the body – a major topic in the Physical Education debate – within this process. We conclude that such development presents a logical-dialectical operation about these categories and about the notion of the body itself. However, it is still limited in its excessively abstract treatment, by focusing on spirit and logic to address these and other categories.

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## 1 INTRODUCTION

The debate about the body in Brazilian Physical Education – in the context of the critical and progressive “Renewal Movement” (CASTELLANI FILHO, 2019) based on what was called a “project towards rupture” (HUNGARO, 2010) – was marked by a challenge to positivistic-oriented scientism anchored in a complex relationship with science that reduced the body to its natural determinations by circumscribing its view to mechanistic and deterministic views of nature, human beings and the relations between them.

Therefore, in the context of the “Renewal Movement”, distinct theoretical-methodological contributions were made to significant theoretical undertakings in order to overcome – on a theoretical level – dichotomies, dualisms and hegemonic mechanistic views about the topic of the body in the field of Physical Education.

Influenced by Philosophy (especially phenomenological thinking) and Anthropology (especially its interpretive strand), the sphere of culture was raised to the status of main concept for understanding the different perspectives present in the ongoing debate in the area – not only but especially with regard to understanding the body. The symbolic aspect of human behavior became a fundamental contribution to establish the area’s identity (DAÓLIO, 2004). According to Daólio, the debate on the determinations of Physical Education has culture as a core element, and several current interpretations would suffer from a fundamental problem: separation of nature and culture, inherited from modern thinking. To a large extent, this assumption led the debate in the area to come close to and appropriate certain theoretical-methodological references from the Social and Human Sciences, especially and predominantly Clifford Geertz, in systematizations with an anthropological bent, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Michel Foucault, in more epistemologically oriented ones (MOREIRA, 1995; ZOBOLI, 2007; NÓBREGA, 2009, among others).

One of those gaps is easily noticed: views based on – Hegelian and Marxian – dialectical logic. Such a tradition, which has considerably advanced the understanding of relations between nature and history (or nature and culture) are addressed and criticized under a trend towards homogenization of Enlightenment and Modern philosophy – understood, to a large extent, as if they operated by dividing nature and culture and as if the dualism between human being-body (subject of culture) and nature were some sort of development of that split.

As a consequence, there is certain disregard for some modern thinkers and the recognition of the ontological status of nature<sup>1</sup> in human formation (initiated by Hegelian dialectics in that period and further developed in Marx’s social theory).

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1 This point is still little explored in the Physical Education debate, and it deserves more attention. There are different views regarding the ontological status of nature as observed in the work of Bassani and Vaz (2011). Based on Theodor Adorno and Susan Buck-Morss, the authors state that nature or history as an ontological premise leads to loss of the *multidimensional meanings* of each concept and seek to discuss the concept of second nature found in some authors from German philosophy (in the early works of Lukács, Walter Benjamin and Adorno). Likewise, the work of Jocimar Daólio points to human nature as cultural nature (DAÓLIO, 1995). On the other hand, there are also works based on Marxian-Lukácsian ontology in which nature (its inorganic and organic dimensions) is an ontological sphere of the social being (ORTIGARA, 2002; HUNGARO, 2008; SILVA, 2017; among others) with which the human being (singular and generic) undergoes a constant socio-metabolic process, and from which a second nature emerges: the constitution of human generosity.

This article – which is part of a broader investigation focused on the contributions of Marx's social theory to understanding the body – is a response to the mistaken view that all Modern thinking operated by separating nature and history (culture). Based on Lukács (2010; 2012; 2013), we assume that Marx made significant efforts to understand what beings are in a particular context: social relations of production under the bourgeois social order. Such topic led him to reflect on that (human) being who is nature while transforming nature through his or her conscious activity. As a result, the author provided us with an explanation about what we are in this particular – bourgeois – social order, but, at the same time, he exposed beings' historical-universal elements.

By noting that the – essential – distinctive feature of human beings is the fact that they objectify themselves, and their foundational objectification is labor, that is, intentional transformation of nature by human beings, Marx ended up pointing out something that is essential in human beings: they objectify themselves. Therefore, whether in capitalism, feudalism, classical antiquity or future societies, that distinctive feature will be present: the ability to objectify their consciousness. From this interchange between nature and human beings (who are also nature), other forms of objectification are established (art, science and language).

An initial consideration, therefore, demonstrates that a human being (a body) is both nature and history (culture). Thus, under the theoretical inspiration adopted, understanding the matter of the body required investigating the relationship between nature and history. We needed to know the process of constitution of the being regarding the inorganic, organic and social spheres (LUKÁCS, 2010; 2012; 2013).

Such fundamental issue has gotten attention in philosophy since antiquity. However, considering the limits of this investigation, we focused on modernity and, especially, on authors whose attention fell on ontological elements.

For Lukács (2012), Kant's contribution was significant, but he did not present a satisfactory solution to the (supposed) antinomy between nature and history. Lukács sees the ontological recognition of nature becoming more solid – albeit with an idealist bent – in Hegel's philosophy.

Initially, therefore, the study focused on reviewing the historical-logical development of the categories of nature and history in the philosophical system of Georg W. F. Hegel. We resorted to some of his works: *Science of Logic* (SoL), the *Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences in Compendium* (EPS), particularly its second volume on the *Philosophy of Nature* (FoN).

The interpretation of Hegel's work was based on the analysis of Marx in his *Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts* (2010) and the rigorous studies of Lukács in his work *The Young Hegel* (LUKÁCS, 2018) and in the first volume of *Ontology of Social Being* (LUKÁCS, 2012; 2013). For Lukács, Hegelian thought saw its greatest development in the structuring of dialectical logic as a method of investigation. In addition, there are also elements for an *authentic* ontology as well as for a false ontology (MARX, 2010; LUKÁCS, 2012; LUKÁCS, 2018; BARATA-MOURA, 2012; RANIERI, 2011).

## 2 SOME NOTES ON HEGEL'S OBJECTIVE IDEALISM

The study of Hegel's philosophy is essential to understand the development of the concepts of nature and history – from the debate on reason and freedom.

Hegel criticized Kant, especially regarding the irrationalist traits of his views expressed in his claim about the “thing-in-itself” or the *noumenon*. Hegel also criticized the idealist philosophy of that time, the views of nature and *being* developed by contractualist philosophers, and (French) mechanistic materialism. In other words, he faced the culture broth of his time.

According to Lukács (2018), the Hegelian system marks the transition from subjective idealism to objective idealism: internalized consciousness – originating in consciousness itself – is set in motion, that is, the objective process of the subject. From the transformation of substance into subject, the identical subject-object is realized. Therefore, the being is both Idea and reality.

Lukács (2018) observes that the transition from subjective idealism to objective idealism raises “[...] the question of philosophical attitudes towards reality, towards existence independently of consciousness” (LUKÁCS, 2018, p. 312).

Nevertheless, always according to Lukács, the forms of objective idealism present in Hegelian thinking would still be no more than a pseudo-solution to address the issue of objective reality.

In the first Hegelian form, empirical reality appears as a product of the *Setzens* (posit) “[...] posited by the philosophical subject [...]” and, in addition, there is another non-positated reality – a reality that does not depend on human consciousness, that is, religious reality. Such understanding demonstrates the extremely idealistic character in which there is union between the subjective principle and the objective principle, “[...] the opposition between man and the world in the union of man and God” (LUKÁCS, 2018, p. 313). Thus, a mystical pseudo-reality emerges that becomes a possible way for the emergence of irrationalisms that can be filled with “[...] all sorts of reactionary contents” (LUKÁCS, 2018, p. 313).

The second type of objective idealism in Hegel is found in *The Phenomenology of Spirit* (PoS) – the explanation of the world as self-production and self-knowledge of the spirit. Objective reality is only one form of its various stages of externalization (*Entäußerung*). Lukács argues that, here, significant although limited elements are raised for understanding a dialectic of human development, the legality of nature, and history in a more progressive sense (LUKÁCS, 2018) – Marx put it “back on its feet,” in the materialist sense.

Hegel abandoned the Enlightenment's fundamental divergent representation of the unity between reason and nature, but without sacrificing their view that the realm of reason is a peculiar product of human beings themselves as they are in reality. Chauí (2000) explains that, while from an (objectivistic) perspective, empiricists and innatists believed that rational knowledge of things came and derived from things themselves and that truth would be the correspondence between the thing and the idea about the thing, from another – subjectivistic – perspective, rational knowledge

would depend exclusively on the subject of knowledge, on the structures of sensibility and understanding, as devised by Kant.

Hegel understood reason in a broader way: it is not exclusively objective or subjective; it is rather the unity of these spheres that establishes the necessary relationship between the laws of thinking and the laws of the real, which would cover all creations of the human spirit in history, such as art, religions and political systems (CHAUÍ, 2000; MENESES, 2003; ANDERY *et al.*, 2012). For Hegel, as noted, human passions are also found in rational evocation. He does not conceive earthly human reality as containing unknowable elements; on the contrary, he looks further into it and makes reason something more grounded in the concrete (LUKÁCS, 2012).

Hegel's logical system demonstrates both the path that consciousness takes to knowledge and the passage from subjectivity to objectivity – which are later united in the *Idea*, namely: Science, Being, Essence, Concept (INWOOD, 1997; RANIERI, 2011; HEGEL, 2012; HEGEL, 2018). Next, a brief description of what the Idea is, given its relationship with Hegel's view on Life.

For Hegel, the *Idea* is both *in-itself* and *for-itself*. It is also essentially an object of logic and is associated with the convergence of subjectivity, objectivity and the concept; it is unity between perception and objectivity. In other words, the Idea must serve as adequate objectivity of the concept, as unity of concept and reality. It is the full realization of a concept; it is the universal whose expression is present in the particularity of the concept, but which is not synonymous with transcendence as it encompasses movement (for Hegel, the Idea has its reality in objectivity; it is not an abstract being, but rather a *becoming*) (RANIERI, 2011; HEGEL, 2012; HEGEL, 2018).

“The idea is the adequate concept, the objectively true, or the true as such” (HEGEL, 2018, p. 237). This view starts from a direct dialogue with Kantian concepts, for which the idea was posited as a projected totality, as something necessary, but as “[...] the goal which, as the archetype, we must strive to set up as a maximum and to which we must bring actuality as it presently stands ever closer” (HEGEL, 2018, p. 238). Therefore, Hegel claims that the Idea is the unity of concept and objectivity rather than just a goal to be approximated.

### 3 LIFE: FROM CONCEPT TO IDEA, A ROUTE TO A PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE AND CORPOREITY IN HEGEL

According to Hegel, *Life* as an Idea is something so concrete and real that, by itself, it does not seem to fit under the scope of logic. But this apparent aspect is questioned by the author, since just as pure logic deals<sup>2</sup> with ideas – such as that of absolute truth that requires an exercise, a procedure that essentially means knowing –, Life (as an immediate idea) can be understood as thought and concept that are subjectively presented in psychological and anthropological forms, among others.

Initially, the idea of Life is considered and known in its immediacy (as assumption) through the concept itself. That is, the concept leads to seeing Life in this

2 Later followed by *applied* logic – which deals with concrete knowledge – present in other sciences.

first determination so that such consideration is not void or lacking. Therefore, Hegel seeks to show that Life in its logical-philosophical system would receive a “treatment” that is different from other non-philosophical sciences.

Before proceeding with our reflection, it is important to note that natural Life, considered and known by other (non-philosophical) sciences, differs from the logic of Life in Hegelian thought, since it is associated and related to the Spirit. By assuming this approximation, the concept is broader than that found in other sciences. Life under logic (of science and philosophy) will be considered, conceptualized and structured within real sciences and philosophy of nature.

Now, this Hegelian view is crucial to reflect on the body, since the understanding of Life in its interconnection between nature and history, in unity, points out ways to overcome the body-spirit dichotomy. It provides a more saturated understanding of determinations. Traditionally, Life appears partly as opposed to spirit (in non-philosophical sciences): spirit is not natural and appears in opposition to nature.

Given the consideration of the unity of Life and spirit, (natural) Life is partly a *means* for the spirit (which puts it in opposition to natural Life), while the spirit, in turn, is a *living individual* and Life is *its body*. This unity of the spirit with its corporeity-corporeality is created from the spirit itself as *ideal*.

Hegel, however, stresses the contradiction of this reasoning and exposes that, in its logic, Life assumes a *dialectical* relationship with spirit:

As *natural* life and as referring to spirit, life obtains a *determinateness from its externality*, in one case through its presuppositions, such as are other formations of nature, and in the other case through the purposes and the activity of spirit. The idea of life by itself is free from both the conditioning objectivity presupposed in the first case and the reference to subjectivity of the second case (HEGEL, 2018, p. 247).

Following the logical process of conceptualizing Life, Hegel explains that it has to be considered in and for itself, as absolute universality. Added to this is the notion that between nature and spirit, a new construct emerges that Hegel will call *Soul* and which is further developed when the author explains the three conceptual moments of Life organized in the interconnection between the categories of singularity, particularity and universality (BAVARESCO, 2010).

### 3.1 LIFE AS A LIVING INDIVIDUAL

The living individual is singularity. It is defined by Hegel as *soul* but understood as the concept in itself, as the principle that initiates and moves itself. In other words, the soul is understood as the equivalent of *psychic*, that is, what is in human beings' set of mental phenomena. Hegel observes: “The living being has this corporeity at first as a reality immediately identical with the concept; to this extent, the corporeity has this reality in general by nature” (HEGEL, 2018, p. 250).

In this passage, it is important to note that the notion of individual does not appear disconnected from corporeity as a natural organism. According to Bavaresco (2010), such corporeity of the living individual corresponds to the syllogistic interconnection of soul-body-external objectivity. The body-organism is the *living objectivity of*

*the individual*, which has to be animated by the concept that has *universality* (the individual's own living objectivity), *particularity* and *singularity* as its determination (HEGEL, 2018; BAVARESCO, 2010).

### 3.2 LIFE AS A VITAL PROCESS

The individual comes into tension with its original presupposing and, as a subject existing in and for itself, sets itself in opposition to the presupposed objective world. It is understood that the world is the negative (negation understood as the necessary moment of the dialectic that tensions the Being in its relationship with externality) rather than a self-subsisting one (put forward originally). The living individual will stand in direct and continuous tension with this externality which will therefore be taken up again in consciousness.

Therefore, the living individual is related to externality, the outside world, as a particularity initiated by lack-need. At the same time, such lack-need demonstrates the individual's autonomy and dependence on the environment. That is, in the concept, the individual is split, which exposes the contradiction experienced and felt by it as *pain* – contradiction exists effectively in the pain of living beings. The objectivity of the world becomes an object for the individual who is able to assimilate the object in its internality on the process. Life, then, is realized by understanding itself, as an end in itself, through the degrees of self-feeling until it reaches the awareness of its generic universality (HEGEL, 2018; BAVARESCO, 2010).

### 3.3 LIFE IN THE PROCESS OF THE GENUS

In general terms, according to Bavaresco (2010), genus is the moment when the individual returns, in full, to itself. This return is caused by the individual's ability to produce and reproduce. In this sense, "[...] the generic individual carries in itself all objectivity as a totality, so it is capable of recognizing other individuals. The generic individual is expressed as the duplication of the individual" (BAVARESCO, 2010, p. 24). Genus is a universal identity that organizes itself in generations that engender and propagate themselves as living people (BAVARESCO, 2010).

For Hegel, the genus process in which singular individuals *supersede* their indifferent, immediate existence in one another and die in that negative unity has as the other side of their product the realized genus, which has become identical to the concept. In the genus, the isolated singularities of individual Life perish, in which the immediacy of individuality dies, and the spirit arises (HEGEL, 2018).

Thus, as explained above, the entire logical development on the category of Life in Hegel addresses its understanding as a natural determination of the sensible being. Hegel sees the absolute Idea as mediation of logic, nature and spirit. In nature, the Absolute Idea is externalized as it is partially realized as a logical idea, but it needs to leave it and go to another sphere (HEGEL, 2018). In Hegel's words: "The idea, namely, in positing itself as the absolute *unity* of the pure concept and its reality and thus collecting itself in the immediacy of being, is in this form as totality – nature" (HEGEL, 2018, p. 333).

#### 4 PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE AND HISTORY IN HEGEL

When it comes specifically to the EPS (2012a) and the second volume that addresses *The Philosophy of Nature*, Hegel approaches Life not only as a logical determination of being but also as a determination of the sensible being, that is, of the Idea in its externalization. Hegel continues the operation of his logic when addressing and passing from Being to Idea and from Logical Idea to nature, focusing on the analysis of the Idea of nature as a universal principle and its determination in the subsidiary principle of the living organism that occurs through the three processes that differ from the only concrete syllogism of Life as the immediate *being-there* of reason (HEGEL, 1997; 2012b; BAVARESCO, 2010).

The relationship between the Logical Idea and nature initiated at the end of the SoL and which advances in *The Philosophy of Nature* is, according to Inwood (1997), a controversial issue:

At the end of *SL*, the logical IDEA freely 'releases itself' (*sich . . . entlasst*, 'lets itself go') or by a free 'resolve' (*Entschluss*) determines itself as the 'EXTERNAL' or 'INTUITIVE' [...] This transition from logic to nature is quite different from the transitions (*Übergänge*, from *übergehen*, 'to go, pass, over') linking categories *within* the *Logic*. Hence the logical idea does not immediately become LIFE, the stage of nature that is the most obvious counterpart to the highest phase of logic, but returns, as it were, to its beginning and becomes the sheer being of SPACE. It then passes through the phases of MECHANICS (space and TIME, matter and motion, absolute mechanics, viz. the planetary system), physics (passing from light to the chemical process), and organic physics (the earth as an organism and organic life).

Such successive processes in the logic that operates the passages do not mean that nature has a history: in Hegelian view, the fossil is never alive, for example. What you have in nature are phenomena that develop in cyclical and repetitive ways. Note that history, for Hegel, is conceptualized in a broader way than the views of his time, such as: the understanding of the sequence of historical events and the study and reporting of these events. For Hegel, history "[...] is the way of being of reason and truth, the way of being of human beings; therefore, we are historical beings" (CHAUÍ, 2000, p. 59). That is, history is the work of reason itself.

Lukács' (2018) investigation of Hegel – which looks into the development of the philosophical system in the writings from the Hegel's youth up to the time of writing and publication of the *PoS* – demonstrates that Hegel's view about history advances in relation to German philosophy's views, as this category is addressed in different moments of his trajectory. It also stresses that the main element is the connection between time and philosophy that underlies Hegel's view of human development.

Consciousness, which is in itself and elevates itself, objectifies itself. It is a product of the global evolution of humanity – even though consciousness itself has understood such evolution not as history but rather as a series of human destinies that have an objective order in them. Only when the subject goes through the evolutionary process does it understand the real objectivity that is effective history, which does not cease to be a conscious product of humanity's activity. When the subject itself knows his actual history, when consciousness knows itself, then there is the possibility to go



through history as a whole in a retrospective way, which allows us to apprehend the paths that humanity has trodden, the general laws regulating it, including those of economics. This process will be realized in the development of the absolute spirit (in art, religion and philosophy-reason) (LUKÁCS, 2018).

In his later works, Hegel changed his views, maintaining the principles of the relationship between universal history and philosophy, but also developing the category of cunning of reason,<sup>3</sup> by understanding that reason can govern history. On the cunning of reason, Lukács says that this expression rises to the status of a central category based on the recognition of labor as a founding category, as it expresses the fundamental relations between teleology and causality:

Hegel sees in labor the mobilization of forces of nature independently of their natural tendencies, even against their natural tendencies, based on the knowledge of the causality present in them and of their use by teleology of concrete work. (LUKÁCS, 2018, p. 28).

While there are also distinct development periods of Hegel's view on history, as Lukács (2018) points out, it is possible to provide a synthesis, supported by Inwood (1997): Hegel was skeptical about the intentions of philosophical historians to provide information about the beginning or the end of history, because, for him, history ends with the present (self-consciousness) and when full freedom is realized – even though it admits the occurrence of new events in present history.

## 5 FINAL CONSIDERATIONS: ON BEING AND CORPOREITY IN HEGELIAN PHILOSOPHY

From the study developed, it was possible to identify that Hegelian philosophy is a path towards a solution for the relationship between nature and history. We have seen that his view of *Idea* is not a simple mechanical identification of nature and its physical properties. Hegel addresses nature within a logical-dialectical process in which the recognition of an externality to Being operates – which is externalized and leaves its immediacy, confronted with the negativity necessary for the constitution of identity, foundation and concept. However, such a process is not a simple formal logical path. It is already given in its own interiority (in the essence of the very being or object).

Thus, in this processuality that results in man's estrangement from externality – recognized in the difference between being-estranger (*Fremsein*) and being-estranged (*Entfremdetsein*), thus nature is estranged – it is observed that a significant distinction is already found in Hegel between the understanding of the natural sciences and the mechanistic materialism that operates with the notion that there is a nature that is estranged from and indifferent to the human point of view (LUKÁCS, 2012). This sense is important in Hegelian logic that provides an ontological determination of nature.

3 Cunning of reason means that "[...] men make their own history themselves and the actual driving-force behind the events of history is to be found in the passions of men and in their individual, egoistic aspirations; but the totality of these individual passions nevertheless ends by producing something other than what the men involved had wanted and striven to attain. Nevertheless, this other result is no fortuitous product, on the contrary, it is here that the laws of history, the 'reason in history', the 'spirit' (to use Hegel's terms)" (LUKÁCS, 2018, p. 473).

Other significant elements for understanding the topic of the body were found in Hegelian texts (*FoN*, *EPS*) and in the analyzes of Lukács and Bavaresco. Furthermore, the authors present elements that, by taking the understanding of nature further, provided relevant reflections for thinking about the body from the passage of sensible consciousness to objectivity and the unity of the logical idea with nature – a relationship that becomes known based on the movement from abstract to concrete.

While it is stated in *SoL*, based on the concept of Life, that corporeity-corporeality is given as the immediate of the soul (of the living individual) and, consequently, it is nature's soul, in *PoN*, when addressing the relationship between nature and externality, Hegel understands it as an “[...] external contradiction” (HEGEL, 2012b, p. 11). But it is not external to the being, because our bodies (living and natural organisms) are constituents of the individual. Hegel does not consider that nature is external to man or to the body, as this is a part of nature (BAVARESCO, 2010).

At the same time, for Hegel, nature is a contradiction that cannot be solved, as it is found “[...] between the need for the concept and its own contingency” (BAVARESCO, 2010, p. 27). This is due to the fact that nature has as its fundamental determination the externality that appears as negative to consciousness and Idea. Thus, nature is left to chance and necessity; it appears without an autonomous interiority that makes freedom of spirituality possible (HEGEL, 2012b; BAVARESCO, 2010).

In summary, with Hegel, we can infer that corporeity-corporeality is found in the living contradiction of the passage from Being to nature. The body is existent in itself and, in a certain way, placed as exterior to sensible consciousness and to the Idea. However, in this externality, the body can only become a concept because there is recognition of the existence of itself interconnected as a living whole. In the processuality of the consciousness/externality relationship, the process of individualized identification of matter arises (as a process of recognition of individuality) manifested as an animal organism and its possibility for movement and, INITIALLY, its main determinations are those found in its body: chance, lack, need.

As an organic body, then, it is also a manifestation of matter, of the Idea that is exteriorized and concretized. It is a return to the primary ideality of nature, which is the return to real totality (the body itself), to present Life itself, but now, as a movement perceived in the consciousness of Being that enables it to become/recognize itself as Being.

Despite all the advances, for Lukács, the antinomies of modern thought itself are present in Hegelian thought, and they arise from the clash between two ontologies that frequently operate in opposition. Despite their opposition, their interconnection derives from the fact that both arise from the same reality in a historical-philosophical sense.

Lukács says that, already in *PoS*, Hegel took a big step in addressing the processuality of thought in its relation to objectivity (also understood as the processuality of reality), which presents itself as a concrete *becoming*. Engels, according to Lukács, recognized in his time that Hegel was the first to raise it to the condition of concept

referenced in the human being, “[...] the dynamic unity of man’s ontogenetic and phylogenetic development” (LUKÁCS, 2012, p. 199).

On the other hand, there is a second ontology in Hegel – and this one is false – in which, in the recomposition of the spirit, it is possible to identify the objectivity of reality and consciousness. That it would be possible for the in-itself to become full identification between subject and object and that it would lead to an eschatological understanding of human development, that is, sacrificing processuality as if there were an end in history – when subject and object could finally be identical.

Like Marx, Lukács perceives another limiting factor: the excessive emphasis on the Spirit being supported by itself (even though the social formation of the spirit itself is recognized). Thus, it ends up being a story of the spirit, although in unity with nature.

Now, it seems that even with its limits, the dialectical tradition since Hegel does not operate with the separation between nature and culture. Therefore, this tradition must be resumed to enrich the critical debate on the body in Physical Education. If Hegel himself would be enough to counter this mistaken view in our area – that modern thought in general dichotomized culture and nature – with Marx, we would have a stronger and more fundamental answer in which nature assumes an ontological status dialectically interconnected with the historical processuality of the social being – a topic that deserves separate systematization.

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**Resumo:** A presente revisão de literatura visa apresentar o desenvolvimento das categorias natureza e história na obra hegeliana. Entende-se que neste filósofo encontram-se indícios mais sólidos, ainda que abstratos, de um percurso para uma ontologia do ser social. Tal percurso permite observar o trato lógico-conceitual destas categorias, assim como torna possível a compreensão inicial sobre o corpo – tema tão presente no debate da Educação Física – no interior deste processo. Conclui-se que tal desenvolvimento apresenta uma operação lógico-dialética acerca destas categorias e sobre a própria noção sobre o corpo. Porém, ainda apresenta limites quanto ao trato excessivamente abstrato ao apostar no espírito e na lógica para tratar destas e de outras categorias.

**Palavras chave:** Ser humano. Revisão. Filosofia do século XIX. Natureza.

**Resumen:** La presente revisión de literatura tiene como objetivo presentar el desarrollo de las categorías naturaleza e historia en la obra hegeliana. Se entiende que en los escritos de este filósofo se encuentran indicios más sólidos, aunque abstractos, de un recorrido hacia una ontología del ser social. Tal recorrido permite observar el tratamiento lógico-conceptual de estas categorías y hace posible la comprensión inicial sobre el cuerpo —tema tan presente en los debates de la Educación Física— en el interior de este proceso. Se concluye que tal desarrollo presenta una operación lógico-dialéctica acerca de estas categorías y sobre la propia noción sobre el cuerpo. Sin embargo, aún presenta límites en cuanto al enfoque excesivamente abstracto al apostar por el espíritu y la lógica para abordar estas y otras categorías.

**Palabras clave:** Ser humano. Revisión. Filosofía del siglo XIX. Naturaleza.

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#### CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

The authors declare that this work involves no conflict of interest.

#### AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS

**Marcel Farias de Sousa** took part in the design and outlining of the study, writing and critical revision of the article.

**Edson Marcelo Hungaro:** took part in advising, reviewing the original manuscript, and writing and final review of the article.

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#### EDITORIAL RESPONSIBILITY

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