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Between risks and threats: independence and oversight power of the Brazilian Federal Audit Court in the 1988 Constituent Assembly

Abstract

Why would political actors take the risk of being controlled in the future by independent anti- corruption institutions? The paper intends to explain what motivates politicians to give independence and power to these institutions, even they are under the risk of being controlled in the future. With the process tracing method, this paper gathers evidence regarding the institutional design of the Brazilian Federal Audit Court that was approved during the Constituent Assembly in 1988. The result shows that, regardless of the politicians’ preferences, anti-corruption institutions purchase greater power through threats against the survival of political actors in contexts of future uncertainty. This diagnosis questions whether the independent anti-corruption institutions actually are an output of democratic competition, since these are not always a straight result from the majority preferences of elected representatives.

accountability institutions; horizontal accountability; independent institutions, judicial review; corruption

Centro de Estudos de Opinião Pública da Universidade Estadual de Campinas Cidade Universitária 'Zeferino Vaz", CESOP, Rua Cora Coralina, 100. Prédio dos Centros e Núcleos (IFCH-Unicamp), CEP: 13083-896 Campinas - São Paulo - Brasil, Tel.: (55 19) 3521-7093 - Campinas - SP - Brazil
E-mail: rop@unicamp.br