This article investigates the performance of the Brazilian Senate in light of the current bicameral structure. Since the Senate is almost always a reviewing body, and since amendments are an objective indicator of its role in revision, the article analyzes the variables which influence senators to amend the projects which are reviewed. It is assumed that the senators are not merely "rubber-stamping" projects, nor are they recalcitrant about using their veto powers. The general hypothesis is that the senators' choices depend on variables such as the bicameral configuration of representation, the position of the House in the decision-making process, and the origin of the legislation. Along general lines, it was noted that bicameralism in Brazil minimizes the chances of conflict in the Senate; however, it was noted that certain variations in the composition of coalitions and in the degree of bicameral divergence of party forces accentuate senators' willingness to amend the projects that come before the House.
bicameralism; House; Executive Branch; parliamentary behavior
