There is an extensive literature to study the effects of the judiciary power on how political systems work. Is there a judicialization of politics? Our point is that the answer to that question is connected to theoretical questions about the ways to prove and where scholars should look in order to detect the effect of judiciary in democratic systems. In this work we analyze the judicialization of politics under the perspective of the definition of the rules of electoral competition. In order to prove our argument, this article studies how TSE (brazilian judiciary court) rules coalitions in Brazil's political system, known as "verticalização" _the uniformity of party coalitions at state and federal levels. Our case study shows that TSE, in fact, not only interprets the law but, actually, establishes rules, taking the place of the legislative body _which, in turn, made another move. The analysis suggests that the question of judiciary of politics should be seen as an strategic interaction between the two powers.
judicialization of politics; electoral coalition; Judiciary Power; verticalização
