From mechanicism to selectionism: a brief contextualization of the radical behaviorism transition

The radical behaviorism, as a philosophy of the behavior science formulated by B. F. Skinner, has been a target for endless criticisms and attempts of labeling, since its creation. Among the main criticisms is the widely spread idea that the radical behaviorism and its science, the behavior experimental analysis, adopted an eminently mechanicist posture. Trying to show the misconception of this statement, this essay presents a possible interpretation and contextualization of the radical behaviorism development, where it is mainly highlighted, the need to observe that, although Skinner has started his psychology studies within a mechanicisttradition,hesoon adopts a positionof criticizing thistypeof thought, besidespresenting as inhis scienceasin hisphilosophy, a distance each time greater of the mechanicism, and an every time more coherent approach of a selectionist point of view.

radical behaviorism; mechanicism; selectionism