1993-1997
|
Performance and competitive strategy
|
Porter (1990) - 0.85; Harrigan (1985) - 0.72; Harrigan (1986) - 0.72; Hamel and Prahalad (1989) - 0.69; Killing (1983) - 0.59; Geringer (1989) - 0.58; Reich and Mankin (1986) - 0.57; Hennart (1988) - 0.56; Ring and Van de Ven (1994) - 0.50; Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) - 0.49; Hamel (1991) - 0.48; Contractor and Lorange (1988) - 0.46; Harrigan (1988) - 0.43 |
International JVs
|
Kogut (1988) - 0.66; Parkhe (1991) - 0.66; Hladik (1985) - 0.65; Parkhe (1993a) - 0.63; Geringer (1991) - 0.62; Kogut (1989) - 0.61; Parkhe (1993b) - 0.59; Buckley and Casson (1988) - 0.58; Porter (1986) - 0.53; Osborn and Baughn (1990) - 0.48 |
Governance and transaction costs
|
Porter (1985) - 0.79; Axelrod (1984) - 0.72; Powell (1990) - 0.72; Williamson (1991) - 0.70; Williamson (1975) - 0.63; Porter (1980) - 0.62; Williamson (1985) - 0.59; Borys e Jemison (1989) - 0.56 |
1998-2002
|
Transaction costs
|
Yan and Gray (1994) – 0.82; Killing (1983) – 0.79; Parkhe (1991) – 0.79; Hennart (1988) – 0.77; Ring and Van de Ven (1994) – 0.77; Inkpen and Beamish (1997) – 0.77; Parkhe (1993a) – 0.74; Hamel and Prahalad (1989) – 0.64; Borys and Jemison (1989) – 0.63; Doz (1996) – 0.61; Hamel (1991) – 0.56; Harrigan (1985) – 0.51; Williamson (1985) – 0.46 |
Learning, networks and access resources
|
Granovetter (1985) - 0.80; Burt (1992) - 0.78; Hagedoorn (1993) - 0.73; Dyer and Singh (1998) - 0.72; Powell et al. (1996) - 0.71; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1996) - 0.71; Williamson (1991) - 0.65; Nelson and Winter (1982) - 0.63; Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) - 0.58; Cohen and Levinthal (1990) - 0.54; Mowery et al. (1996) - 0.50; Barney (1991) - 0.46 |
JVs: structure and reciprocity
|
Kogut (1988) - 0.81; Kogut (1989) - 0.64; Ring and Van de Ven (1992) - 0.53 |
Interfirm coordination
|
Gulati (1995a) - 0.82; Gulati (1998) - 0.75 |
2003-2007
|
Learning and collaboration
|
Nelson and Winter (1982) - 0.79; Hagedoorn (1993) - 0.77; Powell et al. (1996) - 0.74; Lane and Lubatkin (1998) - 0.74; Mowery et al. (1996) - 0.71; Anand and Khanna (2000) - 0.71; Kale et al. (2002) - 0.67; Kogut and Zander (1992) - 0.65; Barney (1991) - 0.62; Cohen and Levinthal (1990) - 0.62; Koza and Lewin (1998) - 0.55; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1996) - 0.50; Khanna et al. (1998) - 0.49; Hamel (1991) - 0.48 |
Governance and transaction costs
|
Oxley (1997) - 0.78; Parkhe (1993a) - 0.78; Ring and Van de Ven (1994) - 0.72; Doz (1998) - 0.72; Hennart (1988) - 0.71; Williamson (1975) - 0.68; Inkpen and Beamish (1997) - 0.66; Williamson (1985) - 0.64; Williamson (1991) - 0.61; Kogut (1988) - 0.55; Doz (1996) - 0.51 |
Alliance formation and coordination
|
Gulati (1995a) - 0.90; Gulati (1998) - 0.88; Gulati (1995b) - 0.87; Gulati and Singh (1998) - 0.78; Zaheer, Gulati and Nohria (2000) - 0.67 |
Social networks
|
Dyer and Singh (1998) - 0.69 |
2008-2012
|
Knowledge transfer and learning
|
Grant and Baden-Fuller (2004) - 0.875; March (1991) - 0.859; Kogut and Zander (1992) - 0.763; Teece et al. (1997) - 0.698; Lane and Lubatkn (1998) - 0.688; Mowery et al. (1996) - 0.681; Kale et al. (2000) - 0.653; Hamel (1991) - 0.603; Barney (1991) - 0.588; Nelson and Winter (1982) - 0.581; Khanna et al. (1998) - 0.544; Cohen and Levinthal (1990) - 0.418 |
Governance and transaction costs
|
Parkhe (1993a) - 0.779; Williamson (1975) - 0.741; Doz (1996) - 0.735; Williamson (1985) - 0.712; Kale et al. (2002) - 0.665; Kogut (1988) - 0.635; Anand and Khanna (2000) - 0.626 |
Social networks
|
Burt (1992) - 0.772; Baum et al. (2000) - 0.745; Ahuja (2000) - 0.673; Granovetter (1985) - 0.633; Uzzi (1997) - 0.604 |
Alliance formation and coordination
|
Gulati (1995a) - 0.914; Gulati and Singh (1998) - 0.903; Gulati (1998) - 0.878; Gulati (1995b) - 0.749 |