Total executive compensation |
∆REMT |
Total executive compensation of the current year - total compensation of the previous year / market value in t-1. |
(+) |
Jensen and Murphy (1990)Jensen, M. C., & Murphy, K. J. (1990). Performance pay and top-management incentives. Journal of Political Economy, 98(2), 225–264., Victor (2013)Victor. F. (2013) Estrutura de propriedade e remuneração executiva: Efeitos diretos e indiretos da regulamentação (Tese de doutorado, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Porto Alegre, RS, Brasil)., and Brandão et al. (2019)Brandão, I. D. F., Vasconcelos, A. C. D., Luca, M. M. M. D., & Crisóstomo, V. L. (2019). Composition of the board of directors and pay-performance sensitivity. Revista Contabilidade & Finanças, 30(79), 28–41. doi:10.1590/1808-057x201806610 https://doi.org/10.1590/1808-057x2018066...
|
2 |
CEO duality |
DCEO |
A dummy variable that assumes 1 if the CEO is also the chairman and 0 if not. |
(+) |
Amzaleg et al. (2014)Amzaleg, Y., Azar, O. H., Ben-Zion, U., & Rosenfeld, A. (2014). CEO control, corporate performance and pay-performance sensitivity. Journal of Economic B0ehavior & Organization, 106, 166–174. doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2014.07.004 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2014.07.0...
and Jaiswall and Bhattacharyya (2016)Jaiswall, S. S. K., & Bhattacharyya, A. K. (2016). Corporate governance and CEO compensation in Indian firms. Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics, 12(2), 159–175. doi:10.1016/j.jcae.2016.06.001 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcae.2016.06.0...
|
2 |
Board independence |
IND |
Proportion of independent board members in the board of directors. |
(+) |
Hermalin and Weisbach (2003)Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (2003). Boards of directors as an endogenously determined institution: A survey of the economic literature. FRB New York – Economic Policy Review, 9(1), 1–39.
|
2 |
Ownership concentration |
CAC |
Percentage of ordinary shares held by the three largest shareholders. |
(-) |
Chen et al. (2015)Chen, S., Lin, B., Lu, R., & Zhang, T. (2015). Controlling shareholders’ incentives and executive pay-for-performance sensitivity: Evidence from the split share structure reform in China. Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 34, 147–160. doi:10.1016/j.intfin.2014.10.003 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intfin.2014.10...
and Brandão et al. (2019) |
2 |
Shareholders' agreement |
AC |
A dummy variable that assumes 1 for the presence of a shareholders' agreement and 0 for its absence. |
(+) |
SSilva et al. (2018)Silva, A. L. P. D., Lana, J., & Marcon, R. (2018). Agreeing and impacting: The effect of the shareholders’ agreement on firms’ market value. Brazilian Business Review, 15(1), 88–104. doi:10.15728/bbr.2018.15.1.6 https://doi.org/10.15728/bbr.2018.15.1.6...
|
2 |
Remuneration committee |
CREM |
A dummy variable assumes 1 for the presence of a remuneration committee and 0 for its absence. |
(+) |
Brandão et al. (2019Brandão, I. D. F., Vasconcelos, A. C. D., Luca, M. M. M. D., & Crisóstomo, V. L. (2019). Composition of the board of directors and pay-performance sensitivity. Revista Contabilidade & Finanças, 30(79), 28–41. doi:10.1590/1808-057x201806610 https://doi.org/10.1590/1808-057x2018066...
) and Kanapathippillai et al. (2019)Kanapathippillai, S., Mihret, D., & Johl, S. (2019). Remuneration committees and attribution disclosures on remuneration decisions: Australian evidence. Journal of Business Ethics, 158(4), 1063–1082. doi:10.1007/s10551-017-3736-7 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-017-3736-...
|
2 |
Variation in the market value |
∆VM |
(Market value of the current year - market value of the previous year)/ market value of the previous year. |
(+) |
Jensen and Murphy (1990)Jensen, M. C., & Murphy, K. J. (1990). Performance pay and top-management incentives. Journal of Political Economy, 98(2), 225–264. and Brandão et al. (2019)Brandão, I. D. F., Vasconcelos, A. C. D., Luca, M. M. M. D., & Crisóstomo, V. L. (2019). Composition of the board of directors and pay-performance sensitivity. Revista Contabilidade & Finanças, 30(79), 28–41. doi:10.1590/1808-057x201806610 https://doi.org/10.1590/1808-057x2018066...
|
1 |
Return on equity |
ROE |
Net profit of the company in the current year / company's equity in t-1. |
(+) |
Brandão et al. (2019)Brandão, I. D. F., Vasconcelos, A. C. D., Luca, M. M. M. D., & Crisóstomo, V. L. (2019). Composition of the board of directors and pay-performance sensitivity. Revista Contabilidade & Finanças, 30(79), 28–41. doi:10.1590/1808-057x201806610 https://doi.org/10.1590/1808-057x2018066...
|
1 |
Company size |
TAM |
Ln (total assets) in t-1. |
(+) |
Brandão et al. (2019)Brandão, I. D. F., Vasconcelos, A. C. D., Luca, M. M. M. D., & Crisóstomo, V. L. (2019). Composition of the board of directors and pay-performance sensitivity. Revista Contabilidade & Finanças, 30(79), 28–41. doi:10.1590/1808-057x201806610 https://doi.org/10.1590/1808-057x2018066...
|
1 |
Company sector |
SETOR |
A dummy variable for each sector of activity classified by Economática. |
(+) |
Brandão et al. (2019)Brandão, I. D. F., Vasconcelos, A. C. D., Luca, M. M. M. D., & Crisóstomo, V. L. (2019). Composition of the board of directors and pay-performance sensitivity. Revista Contabilidade & Finanças, 30(79), 28–41. doi:10.1590/1808-057x201806610 https://doi.org/10.1590/1808-057x2018066...
|
1 |
Period of analysis |
ANO |
A dummy variable for each year of analysis. |
|
Brandão et al. (2019)Brandão, I. D. F., Vasconcelos, A. C. D., Luca, M. M. M. D., & Crisóstomo, V. L. (2019). Composition of the board of directors and pay-performance sensitivity. Revista Contabilidade & Finanças, 30(79), 28–41. doi:10.1590/1808-057x201806610 https://doi.org/10.1590/1808-057x2018066...
|
1 |