O voto remoto pode mitigar os problemas de agência?

Marasca, Letícia; Sonza, Igor Bernardi

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RAM. Revista de Administração Mackenzie

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Sumário

Strategic Finance • RAM, Rev. Adm. Mackenzie 25 (4) • 2024 • https://doi.org/10.1590/1678-6971/eRAMF240010 copiar

O voto remoto pode mitigar os problemas de agência?

Autoria SCIMAGO INSTITUTIONS RANKINGS

RESUMO

Objetivo:

Os membros do conselho são essenciais na resolução de con- flitos de agência. Entretanto, muitos estão impossibilitados de exercer sua função devido à distância, não participando das reuniões do conse- lho. A partir da Instrução nº 561, a Comissão de Valores Mobiliários (CVM) regulamentou o voto a distância para os Conselhos de Adminis- tração, permitindo maior participação e maior envolvimento. Nesse contexto, esta pesquisa examina o efeito do voto remoto dos conselhos de administração na remuneração dos executivos e no desempenho financeiro das empresas de capital aberto no Brasil.

Originalidade/valor:

Esta pesquisa é inovadora na medida em que exami- na o efeito do voto remoto do Conselho de Administração nas variáveis de remuneração do CEO e desempenho financeiro da organização, com a utilização de uma metodologia inovadora.

Design/metodologia/abordagem:

Utilizou-se um método quase-experi- mental (diferença-em-diferenças), para avaliar os efeitos de um deter- minado grupo (tratamento), antes e depois do evento, reduzindo signi- ficativamente a endogeneidade ao considerar um choque exógeno ao sistema.

Resultados:

Como resultado, a estimação do modelo principal revela diferenças estatisticamente significativas entre os grupos de tratamento e controle sobre a lucratividade e a remuneração dos executivos, indi- cando que o voto remoto mitigou problemas de agência ao gerar um efeito de substituição por incentivos explícitos (evidenciado pela dimi- nuição da remuneração dos executivos) e por proporcionar maior desempenho contábil para as empresas.

Palavras-chave:
desempenho financeiro; remuneração de executivos; diferença-em-diferenças; voto a distância; conselhos de administração

Variable	Acr.	Description/formula	Author
Dependent variables – Performance
Return on assets	ROA	$\frac{E B I T^{1}}{T o t a l A s s e t s}$	Gaur et al. (2015)Gaur, S. S., Bathula, H., & Singh, D. (2015). Ownership concentration, board characteristics and firm performance. Management Decision, 53, 911–931. https://doi.org/10.1108/MD-08-2014-0519 https://doi.org/10.1108/MD-08-2014-0519... , Sonza and Kloeckner (2014)Sonza, I. B., & Kloeckner, G. D. O. (2014). Does corporate governance influ- ence the efficiency of Brazilian companies? Revista Contabilidade & Finan- ças, 25(65), 145–160. https://www.scielo.br/j/rcf/a/v4DMSYyNtFyNJWy 3bRRqffC/?lang=en&format=pdf https://www.scielo.br/j/rcf/a/v4DMSYyNtF... , and Frank and Goyal (2008)Frank, M. Z., & Goyal, V. K. (2008). Trade-off and pecking order theories of debt. Handbook of Empirical Corporate Finance, 135–202. https://doi. org/10.1016/B978-0-444-53265-7.50004-4 https://doi. org/10.1016/B978-0-444-5326...
Return on equity	ROE	$\frac{N e t I n c o m e}{E q u i t y}$	Gaur et al. (2015)Gaur, S. S., Bathula, H., & Singh, D. (2015). Ownership concentration, board characteristics and firm performance. Management Decision, 53, 911–931. https://doi.org/10.1108/MD-08-2014-0519 https://doi.org/10.1108/MD-08-2014-0519... and Sonza and Kloeckner (2014)Sonza, I. B., & Kloeckner, G. D. O. (2014). Does corporate governance influ- ence the efficiency of Brazilian companies? Revista Contabilidade & Finan- ças, 25(65), 145–160. https://www.scielo.br/j/rcf/a/v4DMSYyNtFyNJWy 3bRRqffC/?lang=en&format=pdf https://www.scielo.br/j/rcf/a/v4DMSYyNtF...
Tobin‘s Q	Q	$\frac{{(MVE + PS + D)}^{2}}{T o t a l A s s e t s}$	Futema et al. (2009)Futema, M. S., Basso, L. F. C., & Kayo, E. K. (2009). Capital structure, divi- dends and interests on equity: tests in Brazil. Revista Contabilidade & Finan- ças, 20(49), 44–62. and Tristão and Sonza (2021)Tristão, P. A., & Sonza, I. B. (2021). Increase in leverage driven by international financial reporting standards adoption. Revista de Administração Contemporânea, 25(4), e200157–e200157. https://doi.org/10.1590/1982- 7849rac2021200157.en https://doi.org/10.1590/1982- 7849rac202...
Dependent variables – Executive compensation
Average remuneration	RM	$l o g (\frac{A v . E x e c . R e m u n e r a t i o n}{N u m b e r o f E x e c u t i v e s})$	Krauter (2013)Krauter, E. (2013). Executive remuneration and financial performance: A study of Brazilian companies. Revista de Educação e Pesquisa em Contabili- dade, 7(3)., Aguiar and Pimentel (2017)Aguiar, A. B. D., & Pimentel, R. C. (2017). Remuneração de executivos e desempenho no mercado brasileiro: Relações contemporâneas e defasa- das. Revista de Administração Contemporânea, 21(4), 545–568. http://dx.doi. org/10.1590/1982-7849rac2017160228 http://dx.doi. org/10.1590/1982-7849rac2... , Jensen and Murphy (1990)Jensen, M. C., & Murphy, K. J. (1990). Performance pay and top-manage- ment incentives. Journal of Political Economy, 98(2), 225–264. https://www. jstor.org/stable/2937665 https://www. jstor.org/stable/2937665... , and Kaplan (1994)Kaplan, S. N. (1994). Top executive rewards and firm performance: A com- parison of Japan and United States. Journal of Political Economy, 102(3), 510–546. https://doi.org/10.1086/261944 https://doi.org/10.1086/261944... .
Shares and options	AP	Log (value of executive’s shares and options)	Jensen and Murphy (1990)Jensen, M. C., & Murphy, K. J. (1990). Performance pay and top-manage- ment incentives. Journal of Political Economy, 98(2), 225–264. https://www. jstor.org/stable/2937665 https://www. jstor.org/stable/2937665... and Sonza and Kloeckner (2014)Sonza, I. B., & Kloeckner, G. D. O. (2014). Does corporate governance influ- ence the efficiency of Brazilian companies? Revista Contabilidade & Finan- ças, 25(65), 145–160. https://www.scielo.br/j/rcf/a/v4DMSYyNtFyNJWy 3bRRqffC/?lang=en&format=pdf https://www.scielo.br/j/rcf/a/v4DMSYyNtF...

Covariates²				F	C
Number of executives	NE	Log (number of executives)	Chen et al. (2008)Chen, Q., Goldstein, I., & Jiang, W. (2008). Directors’ ownership in the U.S. mutual fund industry. Journal of Finance, 63(6), 2629–2677. https://doi. org/10.2139/ssrn.685202 https://doi. org/10.2139/ssrn.685202... , Granzotto and Sonza (2019)Granzotto, A., & Sonza, I. B. (2019). Compensar ou monitorar os execu- tivos? Revista de Administração, Contabilidade e Economia, 18(3), 393–418. https://doi.org/10.18593/race.20740 https://doi.org/10.18593/race.20740... , and Schmid and Wurster (2016)Schmid, S., & Wurster, D. J. (2016). Are international top executives paid more? Empirical evidence on fixed and variable compensation in manage- ment boards of German MNCs. European Journal of International Manage- ment, 10(1), 25–53. https://doi.org/10.1504/EJIM.2016.073981 https://doi.org/10.1504/EJIM.2016.073981...	-	+
Tenure of executives	TE	Log (average tenure of the executives)	Chen et al. (2008)Chen, Q., Goldstein, I., & Jiang, W. (2008). Directors’ ownership in the U.S. mutual fund industry. Journal of Finance, 63(6), 2629–2677. https://doi. org/10.2139/ssrn.685202 https://doi. org/10.2139/ssrn.685202... , Granzotto and Sonza (2019)Granzotto, A., & Sonza, I. B. (2019). Compensar ou monitorar os execu- tivos? Revista de Administração, Contabilidade e Economia, 18(3), 393–418. https://doi.org/10.18593/race.20740 https://doi.org/10.18593/race.20740... , and Schmid and Wurster (2016)Schmid, S., & Wurster, D. J. (2016). Are international top executives paid more? Empirical evidence on fixed and variable compensation in manage- ment boards of German MNCs. European Journal of International Manage- ment, 10(1), 25–53. https://doi.org/10.1504/EJIM.2016.073981 https://doi.org/10.1504/EJIM.2016.073981...
Number of directors	ND	Log (number of directors)	Hermalin and Weisbach (2003)Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (2003). Board of directors as an endog- enously determined institution: A survey of the economic literature. Eco- nomic Policy Review, 9(1). https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract_id=794804 https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?... , Jensen (1993)Jensen, M. C. (1993). The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems. The Journal of Finance, 48(3), 831–880. https:// doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04022.x https:// doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.199... , Granzotto and Sonza (2019)Granzotto, A., & Sonza, I. B. (2019). Compensar ou monitorar os execu- tivos? Revista de Administração, Contabilidade e Economia, 18(3), 393–418. https://doi.org/10.18593/race.20740 https://doi.org/10.18593/race.20740... , and Conyon et al. (2019)Conyon, M. J., Haß, L. H., Vergauwe, S., & Zhang, Z. (2019). Foreign experi- ence and CEO compensation. Journal of Corporate Finance, 57, 102–121. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.12.016 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017....	+ -	-
Tenure of directors	TD	Log (average tenure of directors)	Chen et al. (2008)Chen, Q., Goldstein, I., & Jiang, W. (2008). Directors’ ownership in the U.S. mutual fund industry. Journal of Finance, 63(6), 2629–2677. https://doi. org/10.2139/ssrn.685202 https://doi. org/10.2139/ssrn.685202... , Sonza and Kloeckner (2014)Sonza, I. B., & Kloeckner, G. D. O. (2014). Does corporate governance influ- ence the efficiency of Brazilian companies? Revista Contabilidade & Finan- ças, 25(65), 145–160. https://www.scielo.br/j/rcf/a/v4DMSYyNtFyNJWy 3bRRqffC/?lang=en&format=pdf https://www.scielo.br/j/rcf/a/v4DMSYyNtF... , Granzotto and Sonza (2019)Granzotto, A., & Sonza, I. B. (2019). Compensar ou monitorar os execu- tivos? Revista de Administração, Contabilidade e Economia, 18(3), 393–418. https://doi.org/10.18593/race.20740 https://doi.org/10.18593/race.20740... , and Conyon et al. (2019)Conyon, M. J., Haß, L. H., Vergauwe, S., & Zhang, Z. (2019). Foreign experi- ence and CEO compensation. Journal of Corporate Finance, 57, 102–121. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.12.016 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017....	+	-
Size	Size	Log (total assets)	Klapper and Love (2004)Klapper, L. F., & Love, I. (2004). Corporate governance, investor protection, and performance in emerging markets. Journal of Corporate Finance, 10(5), 703–728. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0929-1199(03)00046-4 https://doi.org/10.1016/S0929-1199(03)00... , Krauter (2013)Krauter, E. (2013). Executive remuneration and financial performance: A study of Brazilian companies. Revista de Educação e Pesquisa em Contabili- dade, 7(3)., Aguiar and Pimentel (2017)Aguiar, A. B. D., & Pimentel, R. C. (2017). Remuneração de executivos e desempenho no mercado brasileiro: Relações contemporâneas e defasa- das. Revista de Administração Contemporânea, 21(4), 545–568. http://dx.doi. org/10.1590/1982-7849rac2017160228 http://dx.doi. org/10.1590/1982-7849rac2... , and Cai et al. (2023)Cai, X., Jiang, F., & Kang, J. K. (2023). Remote board meetings and board monitoring effectiveness: Evidence from China. Review of Financial Studies, Forthcoming. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3450328 http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3450328...	+ -	+
Leverage	AL	$\frac{s h o r t a n d l o n g t e r m d e b t}{E q u i t y}$	Rajan and Zingales (1995)Rajan, R., & Zingales, L. (1995). What do we know about capital structure? Some evidence from international data. The Journal of Finance, 50, 1421–1460. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1995.tb05184.x https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1995... , Lemmon et al. (2008)Lemmon, M., Roberts, M., & Zender, J. F. (2008). Back to the beginning: Persistence and the cross-section of corporate capital structure. The Journal of Finance, 63, 1–37. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01369.x https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008... , and Frank and Goyal (2008)Frank, M. Z., & Goyal, V. K. (2008). Trade-off and pecking order theories of debt. Handbook of Empirical Corporate Finance, 135–202. https://doi. org/10.1016/B978-0-444-53265-7.50004-4 https://doi. org/10.1016/B978-0-444-5326...	- +	-
Sectorial fixed effects	Sector FE	Dummies: 1 company belongs to the industrial sector and 0 otherwise	Sonza and Kloeckner (2014)
Time fixed effects	Time FE	Dummies: 1 company belongs to the year in which the data is generated and 0 otherwise	Sonza and Kloeckner (2014)

Treatment group
Before the shock						After the shock
Var.	(n)	Mean	Min.	Max.	SD	(n)	Mean	Min.	Max.	SD	t
ROA	736	0.02	−0.22	0.23	0.07	736	0.04	−0.22	0.23	0.07	−5.09	***
ROE	736	0.04	−0.59	0.72	0.17	736	0.09	−0.59	0.72	0.17	−5.11	***
Q	736	0.66	0.07	4.26	0.62	736	0.78	0.07	4.26	0.68	−3.49	***
RM	416	1.95¹	0.00	15.70¹	2.04¹	208	1.86¹	0.00	11.40¹	1.81¹	0.49
AP	416	0.72¹	0.00	14.80¹	2.09¹	200	1.57¹	0.00	33.10¹	4.99¹	−2.98	***
NE	416	4.60	2.00	13.00	2.21	208	4.56	2.00	9.00	1.86	0.23
TE	408	4.90	0.50	21.00	3.72	197	5.67	0.50	21.00	3.85	−2.36	**
ND	648	0.82	0.48	1.32	0.17	649	0.82	0.48	1.32	0.16	0.15
TD	412	4.65	0.50	19.2	3.60	200	5.22	0.90	19.2	3.77	−1.78	**
Size	736	6.41	5.19	7.65	0.59	736	6.48	5.19	7.82	0.61	−1.97	**
AL	736	1.82	0.10	16.81	2.46	736	1.76	0.10	16.81	2.15	0.47
ROA	424	0.04	−0.18	0.23	0.07	424	0.05	−0.13	0.23	0.06	−1.48	*
ROE	424	0.10	−0.59	0.72	0.20	424	0.12	−0.59	0.72	0.18	−1.27
Q	424	1.00	0.07	4.26	0.98	424	1.11	0.10	4.26	0.98	−1.69	**
RM	224	3.12	0.10	31.00	4.21	112	3.60	0.24	12.90	3.10	−1.05
AP	224	2.91	0.00	28.00	5.57	112	3.88	0.00	43.00	9.08	−1.21
NE	216	6.39	2.00	14.00	3.01	108	6.78	2.00	14.00	2.87	−1.11
TE	224	5.33	1.00	13.25	3.03	112	5.49	1.00	11.50	2.82	−0.47
ND	424	0.90	0.48	1.32	0.15	424	0.90	0.48	1.32	0.15	0.60
TD	224	4.48	0.86	13.14	2.57	112	4.94	1.30	10.20	2.45	−1.55	*
Size	424	7.12	6.00	8.53	0.57	424	7.20	6.09	8.53	0.55	−2.03	**
AL	424	2.23	0.13	16.81	2.68	424	2.46	0.10	16.81	3.17	−1.10

	ROA		ROE		Q	RM		AP
Before
Treatment	0.03		0.06		0.65	14.19		13.84
Control	0.08		0.12		0.72	14.47		13.29
Difference	−0.06	*******	−0.06	*******	−0.07	−0.28	*******	0.55
SD	(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.05)	(0.07)		(0.34)
t	8.83		−4.2		−1.36	−3.95		1.60
After
Treatment	0.04		0.09		0.78	14.10		14.13
Control	0.05		0.09		0.81	14.97		13.89
Difference	−0.01		0.00		−0.03	−0.86	***	0.24
SD	(0.01)		(0.02)		(0.06)	(0.10)		(0.40)
t	0.93		0.00		0.49	8.78		0.60
DID	0.05	***	0.06	***	0.04	−0.58	***	−0.31
DP	(0.01)		(0.02)		(0.08)	(0.12)		(0.53)
t	5.10		2.79		0.53	4.81		0.59

Variable	ROA		ROE		Q		RM		AP
Variable	(n = 869)		(n = 869)		(n = 869)		(n = 853)		(n = 356)
Treat	−0.05	***	−0.11	***	−0.24	***	−0.02		−1.68	**
t	−5.34		−3.97		−5.64		−0.19		−2.22
Post	0.00		0.03		0.16	***	0.42	***	−0.42
t	0.13		0.94		2.49		3.59		−0.83
DID	0.02	**	0.01		0.06		−0.42	***	0.16
t	2.36		0.55		1.19		−4.94		0.33
NE	0.00		0.00		0.02	***	−0.09	***	−0.09
t	1.37		−0.44		2.62		−6.08		−0.81
TE	0.00	***	0.00		−0.01	*	0.03	***	−0.08
t	3.16		1.44		−1.66		2.72		−1.49
ND	−0.06	***	−0.14	***	−0.15		−0.36		−4.10	***
t	−4.33		−2.97		−1.50		−1.40		−3.24
TD	0.00	***	0.01	***	0.01		-0.07	***	0.20	*
t	4.83		2.93		1.04		−5.69		1.77
Size	0.00		0.01		0.03		0.92	***	0.83
t	−0.50		0.62		0.71		11.09		1.39
AL	−0.01	***	−0.03	***	−0.03	***	−0.02		0.01
t	−5.33		−3.04		−4.71		−1.38		0.16
Constant	0.11	**	0.14		0.22		9.17	***	1.12	**
t	1.93		0.91		0.65		14.97		2.24
Sector FE	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
Time FE	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
R²	0.55		0.39		0.81		0.65		0.66

	ROA		ROE		Q	RM		AP
Before
Treatment	0.03		0.06		0.58	14.11		13.47
Control	0.06		0.09		0.58	14.51		12.95
Difference	−0.03	**	−0.03		0.00	−0.40	*	0.53
SD	(0.01)		(0.03)		(0.11)	(0.14)		(0.70)
t	−2.55		−0.90		0.01	−2.84		0.76
After
Treatment	0.03		0.07		0.75	14.15		13.93
Control	0.07		0.12		0.75	14.75		13.45
Difference	−0.04	*	−0.05	*	0.00	−0.60	*	0.48	*******
SD	(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.04)	(0.06)		(0.28)
t	8.05		4.67		0.04	9.76		1.72
DID	−0.01		−0.02		0.00	−0.20		−0.05
DP	(0.01)		(0.03)		(0.11)	(0.15)		(0.75)
t	0.38		0.76		0.02	1.30		0.07

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[1] Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Letícia Marasca, Avenida Roraima, 1000, Camobi, Santa Maria, Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil, ZIP code 97105-900. Email: leticiamarasca@yahoo.com.br