IMPACT OF THE FOREIGN EXPERIENCE OF BOARD DIRECTORS ON THE PERFORMANCE OF PUBLICLY TRADED BRAZILIAN COMPANIES

MACHADO, VAGNER N.; SONZA, IGOR B.

doi:10.1590/1678-6971/eRAMF210152

VAGNER N. MACHADO Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Vagner N. Machado, Avenida Independência, 3751, Vista Alegre, Palmeira das Missões, Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil, CEP 98300-000. E-mail: vagnernaysinger@gmail.com

Federal University of Santa Maria (UFSM), Palmeira das Missões, RS, Brazil.

Vagner N. Machado, master from the Department of Accounting, University of Vale do Rio dos Sinos (Unisinos); Igor B. Sonza, Ph.D. from the Business School, Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS). Vagner N. Machado is now an assistant professor at the Department of Administration of Federal University of Santa Maria (UFSM); Igor B. Sonza is now a professor at the Center for Social and Human Sciences of UFSM.

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8111-8494

IGOR B. SONZA

Federal University of Santa Maria (UFSM), Santa Maria, RS, Brazil.

Vagner N. Machado, master from the Department of Accounting, University of Vale do Rio dos Sinos (Unisinos); Igor B. Sonza, Ph.D. from the Business School, Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS). Vagner N. Machado is now an assistant professor at the Department of Administration of Federal University of Santa Maria (UFSM); Igor B. Sonza is now a professor at the Center for Social and Human Sciences of UFSM.

https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5403-3279

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Vagner N. Machado, Avenida Independência, 3751, Vista Alegre, Palmeira das Missões, Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil, CEP 98300-000. E-mail: vagnernaysinger@gmail.com

Vagner N. Machado, master from the Department of Accounting, University of Vale do Rio dos Sinos (Unisinos); Igor B. Sonza, Ph.D. from the Business School, Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS).

Vagner N. Machado is now an assistant professor at the Department of Administration of Federal University of Santa Maria (UFSM); Igor B. Sonza is now a professor at the Center for Social and Human Sciences of UFSM.

Dependent variables - accounting performance
Variables	Description	Authors
ROE	Net profit/equity	Gaur et al. (2015)Agyei-Boapeah, H. (2019). Foreign acquisitions and firm performance: The moderating role of prior foreign experience. Global Finance Journal, 42, 1-15. doi:10.1016/j.gfj.2018.02.001 https://doi.org/doi:10.1016/j.gfj.2018.0... , Giannetti et al. (2015)Akpan, E. O., & Amran, N. A. (2014). Board characteristics and company performance: Evidence from Nigeria. Journal of Finance and Accounting, 2(3), 81-89. doi:10.11648/j.jfa.20140203.17 https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jfa.20140203.... , and Liao et al. (2017)Almeida, H., & Campello, M. (2007). Financial constraints, asset tangibility and corporate investment. The Review of Financial Studies, 20(5), 1429-1460. doi:10.1093/rfs/hhm019 https://doi.org/doi:10.1093/rfs/hhm019...
ROA	Operating income/total assets	Darmadi (2011)Arellano, M., & Bond, S. (1991). Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo evidence and an application to employment equations. The Review of Economic Studies, 58(2), 277-297. doi:10.2307/2297968 https://doi.org/10.2307/2297968... , Gaur et al. (2015)Blundell, R., & Bond, S. (1998). Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models. Journal of Econometrics, 87(1), 115-143. doi:10.1016/S0304-4076(98)00009-8 https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-4076(98)00... , Giannetti et al. (2015)Bond, S. (2002). Dynamic panel data models: A guide to micro data methods and practice. Portuguese Economic Journal, 1, 141-162. doi:10.1007/s10258-002-0009-9 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10258-002-0009-... , Cao et al. (2019)Cao, F., Sun, J., & Yuan, R. (2019). Board directors with foreign experience and stock price crash risk: Evidence from China. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 46 (9-10), 1144-1170. doi:10.1111/jbfa.12400 https://doi.org/10.1111/jbfa.12400... , and Wen et al. (2020)Choi, H. M., Sul, W., & Min, S. K. (2012). Foreign board membership and firm value in Korea. Management Decision, 50(2), 207-233. doi:10.1108/ 00251741211203533 https://doi.org/10.1108/ 002517412112035...
Dependent variables - market performance
MB	VM ^* * VM = market value (stock price versus the number of shares outstanding). /equity	Giannetti et al. (2015)Chung, K. H., & Pruitt, S. W. (1994). A simple approximation of Tobin’s Q. Financial Management, 23(3), 70-74., Cao et al. (2019)Conyon, M. J., Haß, L. H., Vergauwe, S., & Zhang, Z. (2019). Foreign experience and CEO compensation. Journal of Corporate Finance, 57, 102-121. doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.12.016 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.... , and Wen et al. (2020)Darmadi, S. (2011). Board diversity and firm performance: The Indonesian evidence. Corporate Ownership and Control Journal, 9(1), 524-539.
Tobin´s Q (Q-t)	(MVE + PS + D)^ Suggested by Chung and Pruitt (1994), whose market value is the sum of MVE - firm's stock price multiplied by the number of common shares outstanding; PS - settlement value of the preferred shares outstanding; and D - total debt (current liabilities minus current assets plus inventories and long-term debt). / total assets	Darmadi (2011)Davidson, R., & MacKinnon, J. G. (1993). Estimation and inference in econometrics. New York: Oxford University Press., Choi et al. (2012)Dimaggio, P. J., & Powell, W. W. (2005). A gaiola de ferro revisitada: Isomorfismo institucional e racionalidade coletiva nos campos organizacionais. Revista de Administração de Empresas, 45(2), 74-89. , and Giannetti et al. (2015)Doidge, C., Karolyi, G. A., Lins, K. V., Miller, D. P., & Stulz, R. M. (2009). Private benefits of control, ownership, and the cross-listing decision. The Journal of Finance, 64(1), 425-466. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01438.x https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008...

Independent Variables - Foreign Experience
Variables	Description	Authors	Signal
EEA	Number of directors with academic foreign experience/Total number of directors	Giannetti et al. (2015)Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.0... , Iliev and Roth (2018)Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.0... , Cao et al. (2019)Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.0... , Perlin et al. (2019)Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.0... , and Wen et al. (2020)Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.0...	+
EEP	Number of directors with professional foreign experience/Total number of directors	Giannetti et al. (2015)Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.0... , Iliev and Roth (2018)Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.0... , Cao et al. (2019)Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.0... , and Wen et al. (2020)Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.0...	+
Dest	Number of foreign executives/Total number of executives	Darmadi (2011)Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.0... , Choi et al. (2012)Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.0... , and Giannetti et al. (2015)Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.0...	+
Cest	Number of foreign directors/Total number of directors	Darmadi (2011)Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.0... , Masulis et al. (2012)Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.0... , Choi et al. (2012)Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.0... , and Giannetti et al. (2015)Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.0...	+/-
Pest	Percentage of stocks owned by foreign investors	Giannetti et al. (2015)Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.0... , Khlif et al. (2017)Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.0... , and Agyei-Boapeah (2019)Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.0...	+/-

Control variables
Variables	Description	Authors	Signal
Ncon	Log (total number of directors)	Giannetti et al. (2015)Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.0... , Gaur et al. (2015)Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.0... , and Wen et al. (2020)Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.0...	-
Cind	Number of independent directors/Total number of directors	Masulis et al. (2012)Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.0... , Akpan and Amran (2014)Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.0... , and Giannetti et al. (2015)Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.0...	+/-
Busy	Number of directors who occupy seats in other boards)/Total number of directors	Faleye et al. (2011)Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.0... , Giannetti et al. (2015)Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.0... , and Iliev and Roth (2018)Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.0...	-
Tcon	Log (average tenure of the board directors)	Güner et al. (2008)Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.0... , Giannetti et al. (2015)Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.0... , and Iliev and Roth (2018)Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.0...	+
IMC	Log (average age of the board of directors)	Darmadi (2011)Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.0... , Akpan and Amran (2014)Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.0... , and Giannetti et al. (2015)Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.0...	+
Turnover Cons	Dummy: 1 - year of the turnover of Chairman of the board; 0 - other years.	Güner et al. (2008)Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.0... , Faleye et al. (2011)Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.0... , and Giannetti et al. (2015)Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.0...	+/-
Econ	Board level of education: 0 - undergraduate; 1 - graduated; 2 - MBA; 3 - Master; 4 - Ph.D.; and 5 - post-doctoral.	Fraga and Silva (2012)Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.0... , Akpan and Amran (2014)Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.0... , and Perlin et al. (2019)Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.0...	+
Dcons	Dummy: 1 - there was a change in the composition of the board in the same year; 0 - otherwise	Güner et al. (2008)Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.0...	+/-
Dual^* * Entrenchment variables.	Dummy: 1 - CEO and chairman are the same person; 0 - otherwise.	Faleye et al. (2011)Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.0... and Wen et al. (2020)Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.0...	-
Nex^* * Entrenchment variables.	Log (number of executives)	Jensen and Warner (1988)Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.0... and Giannetti et al. (2015)Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.0...	+/-
Tex^ * Entrenchment variables.*	Log (average tenure of the executives	Goyal and park (2002)Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.0... and Giannetti et al. (2015)Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.0...	-
IME ^* * Entrenchment variables.	Log (average age of the executives)	Giannetti et al. (2015)Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.0... and Liao et al. (2017)Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.0...	-
EExec^ * Entrenchment variables.*	Executives´ level of education: 0 - undergraduate; 1 - graduated; 2 - MBA; 3 - master; 4 - Ph.D.; and 5 - post-doctoral.	Akpan andAmran, (2014)Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.0... and Gaur et al. (2015)Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.0...	+
Dpest	Dummy: 1 - There was a change in foreign ownership in the same year; and 0 - otherwise.	Agyei-Boapeah (2019)Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.0...	+/-
Total Assets (AT)	Log (total assets)	Faleye et al. (2011)Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.0... , Giannetti et al. (2015)Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.0... , Iliev and Roth (2018)Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.0... , Cao et al. (2019)Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.0... , and Wen et al. (2020)Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.0...	+
Leverage (AL)	(Current liabilities + Non-current liabilities)/equity	Faleye et al. (2011)Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.0... , Choi et al. (2012)Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.0... , and Giannetti et al. (2015)Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011). The costs of intense board monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(1), 160-181. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.0...	+/-

	Dependent variables				Independent variables
	Q-t	MB	ROA	ROE	EEA	EEP	Cest	Dest	Pest
Mean	1.09	1.55	0.08	0.07	2.09	1.44	0.34	0.08	7.85
Median	0.87	1.14	0.02	0.09	2.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
P10	0.29	0.09	-0.12	-1.88	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
P25	0.55	0.57	-0.02	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
P75	1.34	2.15	0.06	0.19	3.00	2.00	0.00	0.00	5.85
P90	2.25	3.89	0.12	0.32	5.00	4.00	1.00	0.00	32.62
Var.	0.68	1.97	0.01	0.05	5.35	3.82	1.28	0.19	297.58
Minimum	0.16	-0.20	-0.28	-0.57	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Maximum	3.48	5.12	0.17	0.49	14.00	14.00	9.00	6.00	99.84
SD	0.82	1.40	0.10	0.22	2.31	1.95	1.13	0.44	17.25
Assym.	1.54	1.12	-1.21	-0.94	1.52	2.10	4.17	7.97	2.76
Kurtosis	4.95	3.53	4.64	4.70	6.01	9.24	22.00	85.31	10.75

	Ncons	Cind	Tcon	Econ	IMC	Nex	Tex	IME	Eexe	AL	⁽¹⁾ (1) In billion, converted in US dollar in 04/04/2019 by R$ 3,88. RL	⁽¹⁾ (1) In billion, converted in US dollar in 04/04/2019 by R$ 3,88. PL	⁽¹⁾ (1) In billion, converted in US dollar in 04/04/2019 by R$ 3,88. AT
Mean	6.55	1.42	3.46	2.25	56.52	4.48	3.99	51.38	1.57	1.79	0.45	0.29	0.79
Median	6.00	1.00	2.50	1.50	56.33	4.00	2.50	50.50	1.60	1.36	0.11	0.10	0.25
P10	3.00	0.00	0.50	0.75	48.08	2.00	0.50	43.06	1.00	0.01	0.00	000	0.00
P25	5.00	0.00	1.10	1.00	51.67	3.00	1.00	46.50	1.00	0.59	0.00	0.00	0.01
P75	8.00	3.00	4.40	2.00	61.20	6.00	5.00	55.00	2.00	2.40	0.40	0.26	0.71
P90	10.00	4.00	7.41	2.80	65.66	8.00	9.82	63.00	2.25	4.80	0.95	0.64	1.95
Var.	7.85	2.93	11.83	8.71	60.95	7.44	19.66	77.52	0.32	5.07	4.33 x 10⁶	1.57 x 10⁶	0.90 x 10⁶
Minimum	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-1.84	0.00	-1.07	0.00
Maximum	19.00	13.00	25.00	20.00	86.00	33.00	29.50	86.00	4.00	8.28	11.70	5.95	1.16 x 10
SD	2.80	1.71	3.44	2.95	7.80	2.72	4.43	8.80	0.57	2.25	1.05	0.64	1.53
Assym.	0.50	1.30	2.47	3.37	-1.04	2.43	2.24	-0.46	-0.02	1.27	5.58	4.54	3.71
Kurtosis	3.44	5.36	11.53	14.16	12.40	17.71	8.86	9.64	3.30	4.97	43.75	28.57	19.89

GMM (SYS) - validation tests
Tests	Regressions
	ROA	ROE	Qt	MB
Chi2	97.93(0.00)	80.36(0.00)	104.48(0.00)	232.60(0.00)
Hansen	56.34(0,57)	67.50(0.53)	71.08(0.54)	63.14(0.76)
Ar1	-2.94(0.00)	-2.90(0.00)	-2.89(0.00)	-3,48(0.00)
Ar2	-1.40(0.16)	0.56(0.58)	-1.31(0.19)	-0.88(0.38)
Endogeneity	13.11(0.00)	0.10(0.75)	326.41(0.00)	216.26(0.00)

		Dependent variables
	ROA	ROE	MB	Qt
D (-1)	0.45^* ***** Significant at 1%;	0.13	0.42^* ***** Significant at 1%;	0.58^* ***** Significant at 1%;
D (-1)	(3.43)	(0.72)	(3.23)	(0.00)
		Independent variables
EEA	-0.01^ significant at 5%;	0.01	*-0.12^ * significant at 10%.**	-0.02
EEA	(-2.39)	(0.30)	(-1.83)	(-1.01)
EEP	0.00	0.00	-0.10^* * significant at 10%.	-0.03^ significant at 5%;
EEP	(0.49)	(-0.16)	(-1.66)	(-1.99)
Cest	0.01	*-0.06^ * significant at 10%.**	*0.17^ * significant at 10%.**	0.02
Cest	(0.58)	(-1.84)	(1.71)	(0.66)
Pest	-0.37^ significant at 5%;	-0.70	1.52	0.51
Pest	(-2.23)	(-1.50)	(0.93)	(1.16)
		Control variables
Cind	0.00	0.01	-0.01	0.00
Cind	(0.05)	(0.25)	(-0.11)	(0.10)
IMC	0.02	0.44	3.65^ significant at 5%;	0.55
IMC	(0.15)	(0.90)	(2.29)	(1.04)
IME	0.26^ significant at 5%;	-0.71	-1.34	-0.42
IME	(2.19)	(-1.47)	(-1.24)	(-1.15)
EExec	0.09	0.03	0.95	0.11
EExec	(1.42)	(0.17)	(1.18)	(0.48)
Econ	0.00	-0.14**	0.27	0.06
Econ	(-0.15)	(-2.17)	(0.98)	(0.69)
Ncon	0.07	0.14	-0.36	-0.14
Ncon	(1.20)	(0.87)	(-0.53)	(-0.86)
Nex	0.08^ significant at 5%;	0.04	1.01^ significant at 5%;	0.34^* ***** Significant at 1%;
Nex	(2.04)	(0.36)	(2.40)	(2.54)
Dual	0.00	0.03	0.31	0.10
Dual	(-0.02)	(0.35)	(0.74)	(0.72)
Busy	-0.01	-0.04^* ***** Significant at 1%;	0.04	-0.01
Busy	(-0.76)	(-1.62)	(0.46)	(-0.35)
AL	0.00	-0.08^* ***** Significant at 1%;	0.13^ significant at 5%;	-0.03^ significant at 5%;
AL	(-0.63)	(-4.94)	(2.13)	(-1.99)
AT	0.01	*0.08^ * significant at 10%.**	0.11	0.05
AT	(0.88)	(1.72)	(0.73)	(1.06)
Dpest	0.02	0.03	-0.08	0.07
Dpest	(0.66)	(0.35)	(-0.28)	(0.87)
Dcon	*-0.04^ * significant at 10%.**	0.03	-0.04	-0.06
Dcon	(-1.90)	(0.52)	(-0.19)	(-1.09)
EFInd	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
EFTemp	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-1.49	-0.37	-11.80	-1.35
Constant	(-1.90)	-0.16	(-1.77)	(-0.62)

[1] Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Vagner N. Machado, Avenida Independência, 3751, Vista Alegre, Palmeira das Missões, Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil, CEP 98300-000. E-mail: vagnernaysinger@gmail.com

Brasil

Brasil

IMPACT OF THE FOREIGN EXPERIENCE OF BOARD DIRECTORS ON THE PERFORMANCE OF PUBLICLY TRADED BRAZILIAN COMPANIES

ABSTRACT

Purpose:

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