“Negócios familiares”: A estrutura familiar afeta o desempenho de companhias listadas?

Valcanover, Vanessa M.; Sonza, Igor B.

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Sumário

Strategic Finance • RAM, Rev. Adm. Mackenzie 24 (3) • 2023 • https://doi.org/10.1590/1678-6971/eRAMF230028.en copiar

“Negócios familiares”: A estrutura familiar afeta o desempenho de companhias listadas?

Autoria SCIMAGO INSTITUTIONS RANKINGS

Resumo

Objetivo:

Este artigo buscou verificar a influência da estrutura familiar no desempenho de companhias familiares listadas no Brasil entre 2010 e 2017. Também se analisou o impacto do monitoramento e da dualidade no desempenho dessas empresas.

Originalidade/valor:

A relevância do estudo encontra-se principalmente na utilização de variáveis inusitadas, como a participação de fundadores e descendentes como acionistas, nos conselhos de administração e como chief executive officers (CEOs), pois não foi possível identificar nenhum estudo no Brasil que tratasse dessa participação de forma fragmentada, separando os efeitos causados por fundadores e descendentes, dando maior profundidade ao tema. Além disso, o estudo desperta interesse dos mais variados públicos, abrangendo acionistas, reguladores, analistas e investidores que tenham interesse específico em como as estruturas familiares afetam o desempenho das companhias.

Design/metodologia/abordagem:

Na pesquisa, foram utilizados dados relativos a acionistas, composição do conselho de administração, executivos, vínculos familiares, famílias fundadoras, fundadores, descendentes e desempenho financeiro. Um painel de dados não balanceado foi analisado por meio do método dos momentos generalizados (generalized method of moments - GMM).

Resultados:

Verificou-se um efeito positivo do monitoramento e da dualidade no desempenho das empresas. O impacto da estrutura familiar no desempenho foi ambíguo. Fundadores e descendentes que eram CEOs ou atuavam na gestão tiveram efeitos positivos e negativos nas medidas de desempenho. Adicionalmente, a participação dos fundadores no conselho de administração impactou negativamente o desempenho. Por fim, observou-se que a propriedade familiar impacta positivamente o desempenho das empresas, sugerindo que as famílias cuidam das empresas.

Palavras-chave
estrutura familiar; laços familiares; desempenho; governança corporativa; companhias listadas

Variables	Description	Formula
ROA	It measures the profitability of a company’s total assets.	$\frac{{EBIT}_{t}}{{total assets}_{t}}$
ROE	It measures the profitability of a company’s equity.	$\frac{{Net profit}_{t}}{{equity}_{t}}$
Tobin’s Q	It indicates growth opportunities and reveals the wealth added by the market as a reflection of the company’s performance.	$\frac{{Market value}_{t}}{{total assets}_{t}}$
MB	It indicates growth opportunities and shows that the market recognizes that the company is worth more than what is recorded in its accounting data.	$\frac{{Net profit}_{t}}{{equity}_{t}}$

Variables	Formula	Signals found in the literature
Variables	Formula	IP^* * IP: internal performance (ROA, ROE);	MP^ MP: market performance (Q, MB); (+): positive and significant expected signal; (-): negative and significant expected signal; (=): non-significant effect.
Founders’ participation in the board of directors (FPD)	$\frac{Number of founders on the board}{total number of members on the board}$	+	+/-
Founders’ participation as shareholders (FPS)	Percentage of common shares owned by the founders.	+/-	+
Founder as CEO (FCEO)	Dummy: one if the CEO is a founder of the company; zero, otherwise.	+	+/-
Descendants’ participation in the board of directors (DPD)	$\frac{Number of descendants on the board}{total number of members on the board}$	+/-	+/-
Descendants’ participation as shareholders (DPS)	Percentage of common shares belonging to descendants.	+/-	+/-
Descendant as CEO (DCEO)	Dummy: one if the CEO is a descendant/heir of the company; zero, otherwise.	+/-	+/=/-
Family-owned company (FOC)	Percentage of shares owned by family members.	+/=/-	+/-

Variables	Formula	Signals found in the literature
Variables	Formula	IP^*	MP^**
Size of the board of directors (BS)	Total number of members on the board.	+/=/-	+/=/-
Independent directors (ID)	$\frac{Number of independent on the board}{total number of members on the board}$	+	+/-
Duality (dual)	Dummy: one if the CEO is also chairperson of the company; and zero, otherwise.	+/=/-	+/-
Number of executives (NEx)	Total number of executives.	+	+
Leverage (lev)	$\frac{Short and long - term debt}{-equity}$	-/+	-/+
Size	The logarithm of the company’s total assets.	+/-	+/-
Sectoral fixed effects	Dummy for each Economatica sector.	NA	NA
Temporal fixed effects	Dummy for each year.	NA	NA

Variable	Mean	Median	Standard deviation	Skewness	Kurtosis
ROA^* * Variables winsorized at 5% to control for outliers.	0.037	0.038	0.048	-0.325	3.577
ROE^* * Variables winsorized at 5% to control for outliers.	0.067	0.095	0.223	-1.051	5.005
Q^* * Variables winsorized at 5% to control for outliers.	0.610	0.362	0.637	1.647	4.862
MB^* * Variables winsorized at 5% to control for outliers.	1.595	1.133	1.451	1.124	3.353
FPD	0.088	0.003	0.135	1.838	6.478
FPS	0.060	0.000	0.155	3.411	15.611
DPD	0.302	0.253	0.272	0.794	2.989
DPS	0.090	0.000	0.198	2.827	10.726
FOC	0.436	0.446	0.326	0.183	1.774
NEx	4.381	4.000	2.959	3.087	22.111
BS	6.243	6.000	2.428	0.328	3.170
ID	0.215	0.201	0.216	0.553	2.159
Lev	0.862	0.611	2.523	13.510	197.142
Size	2.710¹ 1 in billions of dollars.	0.864¹ 1 in billions of dollars.	5.256¹ 1 in billions of dollars.	3.401	14.879

Panel A
DV	ROA			ROE			Q			MB
IV	β		Z	β		Z	β		Z	β		Z
L1	-0.245	^* ***** significant at 1%.	-14.940	-0.059	^* ***** significant at 1%.	-3.140	0.616	^* ***** significant at 1%.	20.740	-0.246	^* ***** significant at 1%.	-3.120
Dual.	0.026		1.400	-0.010		-0.810	0.409	^* ***** significant at 1%.	4.480	0.033		1.090
BS	0.000		-0.090	-0.002	^* ***** significant at 1%.	-3.020	-0.053	^* ***** significant at 1%.	-3.930	-0.002		-0.990
ID	-0.107		-1.550	-0.032	^* ***** significant at 1%.	-2.820	-0.164		-0.790	0.281	^* ***** significant at 1%.	5.510
FPD	-1.718	^* ***** significant at 1%.	-8.180	-0.164	^* ***** significant at 1%.	-2.820	0.257		0.650	0.193		1.330
FCEO	-0.154	^* ***** significant at 1%.	-2.850	-0.232	^* ***** significant at 1%.	-7.620	0.199		0.840	-0.024		-0.340
FPS	0.232		0.880	0.241	^* ***** significant at 1%.	4.630	0.246		0.260	0.362	^ significant at 5%;	2.420
DPD	0.031		1.540	-0.002		-0.050	0.863	^* ***** significant at 1%.	7.850	-0.056		-1.050
DCEO	-0.056	^ significant at 5%;	-2.040	0.000		-0.020	-0.246	^* ***** significant at 1%.	-2.900	-0.028		-0.740
DPS	0.064	^ significant at 5%;	2.300	0.061		0.880	0.482	^* ***** significant at 1%.	4.110	0.559	^* ***** significant at 1%.	5.400
FOC	0.064		0.730	0.085	^* ***** significant at 1%.	2.530	0.218		0.590	0.042		0.460
Neex	0.012	^* ***** significant at 1%.	5.090	0.003	^* ***** significant at 1%.	4.370	0.081	^* ***** significant at 1%.	8.840	0.006	^* ***** significant at 1%.	4.890
Lev.	0.034	^* ***** significant at 1%.	8.430	0.020		1.020	-0.056		-1.570	0.010		0.890
Size	0.080	^* ***** significant at 1%.	4.000	0.015	^* ***** significant at 1%.	5.590	-0.029		-0.450	0.021	^* * significant at 10%;	1.640
Const.	-0.947	^* ***** significant at 1%.	-2.910	-0.172	^* ***** significant at 1%.	-3.230	0.000		0.999	-0.565	^* ***** significant at 1%.	-3.120
EFsec	Yes			Yes			Yes			Yes
EFtemp	Yes			Yes			Yes			Yes
Panel B
Chi²	4,210.000			1,350.000			18,400.000			3,510.000
p value	0.000			0.000			0.000			0.000
Hansen	33.397			28.043			37.972			25.014
p value	0.682			0.882			0.471			0.948
Ar1	0.432			-0.899			-2.256			-1.644
p value	0.666			0.369			0.024			0.100
Ar2	-0.944			1.076			0.470			-1.072
p value	0.345			0.282			0.638			0.284

Hypotheses		Internal performance	Market performance
H1	The more there are ID, the greater the performance of family companies listed on the Brazilian stock exchange.	Rejected	Not rejected
H2	The more there are members on the board of directors, the lower the performance of family companies listed on the Brazilian stock exchange.	Not rejected	Not rejected
H3	Duality leads to a lower performance of family companies listed on the Brazilian stock exchange.	Inconclusive	Rejected
H4	The participation of family members in the management leads to a better performance of family companies listed on the Brazilian stock exchange.	Rejected	Rejected
H5	The greater the number of family members on the board of directors, the greater the performance of family companies listed on the Brazilian stock exchange.	Rejected	Not rejected
H6	The more the ownership structure belongs to family members, the greater the performance of family companies listed on the Brazilian stock exchange.	Not rejected	Not rejected

Editora Mackenzie; Universidade Presbiteriana Mackenzie Rua da Consolação, 896, Edifício Rev. Modesto Carvalhosa, Térreo - Coordenação da RAM, Consolação - São Paulo - SP - Brasil - cep 01302-907 - São Paulo - SP - Brazil
E-mail: revista.adm@mackenzie.br

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[1] Authors’ notes

Vanessa M. Valcanover is now a Ph.D. student at the Administrative Sciences Department of Federal University of Santa Catarina; Igor B. Sonza is now a professor at the Administrative Sciences Department of Federal University of Santa Maria.