Abstract
Freedom of information (FOI) policymaking in Brazil is portrayed as a “successful story.” Data on adherence of the Brazilian legislation to international standards indicates its FOI institutions are in the top-ten group in the substantive dimension of FOI but are the last when it comes to the procedural dimension. What mechanism has driven this process to produce such ambivalence? This study assumes that FOI policymaking in Brazil represented an ambiguous legitimacy-based emulation process, oriented toward homogenization to the international field, but without breaking the governmental control over information. It draws on theoretical work on policy diffusion focusing on emulation and uses theories on conflicts and negotiation for power as drivers of policymaking. The results suggest this process was forged by political dynamics of disputes and compromises, and its outcomes derived from political trade-offs between key actors on controversial issues. Thus, the results materialized the preferences of non-governmental actors for a larger scope and no “eternal secrecy” and assured government offices’ prerogatives on implementation and their final decision on appeals. This case may represent a broader phenomenon, considering that comparative data indicates that this ambivalence in adherence between substantive and procedural dimensions is more significant in Latin America than in other regions.
Keywords:
political dynamics; freedom of information; transparency; policymaking; policy diffusion
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Note: The value of the substantive dimension attributed to countries corresponds to the sum of variables of right to information, scope, and promotion. And the value of the procedural dimension is the sum of requesting procedures, exceptions, appeals, and sanctions.Source: Elaborated by the authors based on the Global Right to Information Rating (2022).
* Rules established in Decreto n º50301 
Notes: Summarizing Boxes A, B, and C in the Appendix.* There are indications that these pragmatic preferences decrease resistance to FOI bill approval.** During a public hearing in the Chamber of Deputies, representatives of Transparência Brasil indicated different positions on this issue.*** Despite providing and advocating human rights standards, UNESCO has a pragmatic approach to maintaining its influence, including assisting CGU in the FOI implementation decree.Source: Elaborated by the authors.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
* The dispute for the “protagonism” did not represent one of the highlighted controversial issues, but its existence indicates battles for reputation and “legitimacy” that characterizes political dynamics events.** Although this issue was not among the controversial ones, it was essential to the political dynamics of the policymaking of FOI. It changed the government office’s immediate priority, forcing them to abandon temporally their first preference related to the final decision on appeals.*** This veto proposed by the CGU and the Civil House indicates the preference of such government bodies for the composition of the CMRI only with bodies from the federal Executive Branch.**** The 50-years maximum term represents 2.5 times more than the 20-years recommended by Article 19’s standards. Source: Elaborated by the authors.
* Despite providing and advocating human rights standards, UNESCO has a pragmatic approach to maintaining its influence, including assisting CGU in the FOI implementation decree.** During a public hearing in the Chamber of Deputies, representatives of Transparência Brasil indicated different positions on this issue.*** The committees and public hearings reports do not indicate unanimity among Deputies on this front on these issues.**** There are indications that these pragmatic preferences decrease resistance to FOI bill approvalsource: elaborated by the authors.