

The professionalization of Brazilian federal bureaucracy (1995-2014): advances and dilemmas

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The paper analyzes the professionalization process of Brazilian federal bureaucracy, aiming to uncover advances and persistent dilemmas that have been present in Brazil's recent democratic period, between 1995 and 2014. Following a literature review of the historical evolution of federal bureaucracy, the paper discusses key dimensions related to the professionalization of the public service. It concludes that there was a wide range of advances with regard to recovery and diversification of the workforce, financial valuation, and training, among others. However, dilemmas and challenges remain, especially related to the historical gap between careers and positions in federal public administration.

Keywords: bureaucracy; professionalization; reforms; federal government; Brazil.

Profissionalização da burocracia federal brasileira (1995-2014): avanços e dilemas

O objetivo deste artigo é analisar o processo de profissionalização da burocracia brasileira no âmbito da administração pública federal. Nesse sentido, a pesquisa se propõe a responder quais seriam os avanços e dilemas persistentes no período democrático recente, entre 1995 e 2014. Após uma revisão de literatura da evolução histórica da burocracia federal, o trabalho discute dimensões centrais relativas à profissionalização do serviço público no país. Conclui-se que houve um conjunto amplo de avanços no que tange a recomposição e diversificação da força de trabalho, valorização pecuniária, aumento da qualificação, entre outros. Todavia, permanecem dilemas e desafios, sobretudo, no enfrentamento do fosso histórico entre carreiras e cargos na administração pública federal.

Palavras-chave: burocracia; profissionalização; reformas; administração pública federal; Brasil.

La profesionalización de la burocracia federal brasileña (1995-2014): avances y dilemas

El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar el proceso de profesionalización de la burocracia brasileña del gobierno federal. En este sentido, la investigación pretende responder cuáles son los avances y dilemas persistentes en el período democrático reciente entre 1995 y 2014. Después de una revisión de la literatura sobre la evolución histórica de la burocracia federal, el artículo analiza las dimensiones clave relacionadas con la profesionalización del servicio público de país. De ello se concluye que existe una amplia gama de avances con respecto a la recuperación y la diversificación de la fuerza laboral, la valoración financiera, el aumento de la formación, entre otros. Sin embargo, los dilemas y desafíos permanecen, sobre todo para hacer frente a la brecha histórica entre carreras y puestos en la administración pública federal.

Palabras clave: burocracia; profesionalización; reformas; gobierno federal; Brasil.

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1. INTRODUCTION

The main purpose of this article is to analyze the professionalization process of Brazilian federal bureaucracy. The paper discusses the historical formation of the country's public service focusing foremost on recent changes that have impacted the professionalization of federal bureaucracy. The research attempts to describe the current configuration of Brazilian federal bureaucracy in order to analyze if changes implemented by democratically elected governments (1995 to 2014) have advanced on the improvement of bureaucracy and if they overcame the history of inequalities inside the federal executive personnel.

The word bureaucracy may be understood in many different ways. In this paper, bureaucracy refers to the state's permanent personnel, namely non-elected government agents, career members or not. Bureaucracy is one of the institutional pillars for the efficient functioning of the democratic system and for the enforcement of the rule of law, because it enables continuity, coherence and relevance in public policies and reassures greater impartiality and objectivity to public authority (Stein et al., 2006). On the other hand, its fragility lead to ineffectiveness and misuse of public funds, commonly seen in Latin American countries.

In such context, the seminal work by Evans and Rauch (1999) analyzes the relation between bureaucracy, using a 'Weberian scale' that measures meritocratic recruitment and career structures, and the economic growth of 35 developing nations between 1970 and 1990. Results suggest a strong correlation between weberian bureaucracy characteristics and higher growth rates in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in analyzed countries. The case of the so-called Asian Tiger nations reflects this connection very well, considering that highly professional and meritocratic bureaucracy in strong and independent countries are regarded as decisive factors in the development of these nations (Stein et al., 2006).

It is important to highlight that, despite its fundamental role, bureaucracy is subordinated to the government, elected or not. Nevertheless, its degree of autonomy, which varies according to the merit system — adoption of impersonal and inflexible rules for career admission and advancement —, stability and adequate wage tend to reflect on the bureaucratic capacity to develop and implement public policies (Abrucio, Loureiro and Pacheco, 2010). In other words, higher autonomy means lower chances of arbitrary acts or interference of politicization and particularism.

In the three decades that followed the reinstatement of democracy in Brazil, the country has been living a growing strengthening of the attributions of the democratic state, with contradictions and differing levels of maturity between the various areas of public administration, and federal, state and municipal domains.

In the federal domain, studies demonstrate that Brazilian bureaucracy shows a high degree of professionalism when compared to other developing nations (Evans and Rauch, 1999), considering professionalization pertaining to the level of compliance with the requisites of the classic bureaucratic model. Likewise, comparing studies in Latin America, Stein and colleagues (2006), based on indexes that combine autonomy and operational capacity, place Brazil, and also Chile and Costa Rica, as countries that have a meritocratic bureaucracy, that is, with a certain level of instruction or specialized knowledge, composed by permanent public servants hired on a merit-based system and integrated into professional careers with proper incentives. Therefore, in such countries, public agents express opinions and strongly influence the decision making process.

However, this is not an absolute concept; contrarily, bureaucratic evaluations are relative, especially because the level of development greatly varies between different countries and historic moments. Brazil is not an exception. What explains, then, the professional development of federal bureaucracy? If, on the one hand, literature describes Brazilian federal bureaucracy as professional, on the other hand, the history of the public service in Brazil points to the old dilemma of the gap in skill and valuation levels within public servants. In order to better understand the current scenario, this article will debate the historic development of federal bureaucracy and investigate the effects of recent changes.

A timeline analysis will demonstrate that, since the beginning of the democratization process (1985), public service has been passing through many and deep transformations. It includes a managerial reform in the 1990's, and more recently, the restructuring of the state apparatus under a discourse of restoring national development. The period is marked by a relative financial stability, broader access to public welfare policies (as proposed by the 1988 Constitution) and expansionist policies that strengthened the domestic market and reduced poverty and social inequality.

In order to analyze the evolution of Brazilian federal bureaucracy during this period, the research will focus on the following dimensions: admission and composition of personnel, wage policies, performance evaluation, appointment of non-elected agents and education/skill level. Regarding the latter dimension, it is appropriate to analyze the role of government schools in the improvement of specific careers in federal public administration and in the technical-managerial development of the wide range of agents engaged in the public policies led by federal government.

Besides this introduction, the article adopts an objective approach to the historic evolution of the professionalization of public service in the country, in order to contextualize the current configuration. Subsequently, key variables are analyzed, from 1995 to 2014, such as the evolution of personnel composition and admission, wage policies, performance evaluation systems, occupancy of political appointments, among others. Lastly, final considerations on the advancements and dilemmas found in the professionalization process of Brazilian public administration are presented.

2. THE HISTORY OF BUREAUCRACY IN BRAZIL

Evidently, the institutionalization of personnel is not a consequence of a single historic moment or a decision of one particular government. Instead, the complexity inherent to the bureaucratic makeup of a nation involves a broad set of transformations susceptible to socioeconomic changes that will not necessarily converge, from an ideological point of view. Therefore, a situational analysis intending to explain the makeup of a bureaucracy should refer to its historic evolution, once it regards a development process with several variables.

It is worth noting that, in spite of the transformations that Brazilian bureaucracy went through, even though it has a positive evaluation in international comparisons, many negative secular aspects are still noticeable today.

In Brazil, the process dates back to a long colonial period, in which coexisted the centralist action of the Portuguese Crown, usually not very effective, and the force of a local patrimonial public power, marked by personalism and the private usage of the public space (Abrucio, Loureiro and Pacheco, 2010). This fusion of different models of public administration was viable due to the fact that the

Crown, to a great extent, restricted itself to collecting taxes, while leaving the responsibility of public administration to local politicians, as Carvalho (2011:1) exposed very well:

Collection was the basic function of the civil service, which took a delegated form, meaning that the Crown transferred public affairs to the local powerful. Those, in term, regardless of not being Crown officials, had the power to make political appointments, within boundaries set by the Crown.

The power of the local clans in the conduction of public affairs involved making political appointments, which was considered an honor and also a strategy for coopting the so-called “good man”. Without any merit-based criteria, the structure of public administration was, therefore, an extension of the power that the clans held, along with their economic and military dominance. (Viana, 1999; Leal, 2012).

Despite some changes, introduced by the reforms promoted by the Marquis of Pombal, secretary of state of the Portuguese kingdom between 1750-77, in the XVIII century, it was when the Portuguese Crown moved to Brazil, in 1808, that the construction of a national state began, especially of a new Brazilian elite. The need for structuring the bureaucracy was the natural consequence of the advancements in construction work and caused the creation of new political agencies, which was intensified after the independence, with the challenge of building national unity and sovereignty (Carvalho, 2011).

Over this period, the seeds of the workings of the Brazilian state started to appear. The bureaucracy of the Empire was little effective and mostly featured as a tool for the practice of grooming and clientelism. The power of the oligarchies in command of the public offices was somewhat altered, reflecting on the stable character of office occupancy, which varied according to the composition of the Parliament and of the State Council, in detriment of factors such as technical skill.

Conversely, the development of a bureaucratic elite selected by merit, with uniform educational background, mostly conducted in Europe, started taking place. However, the small amount of meritocracy of the public administration entry method was still very far from the weberian classic model.

Essentially, the so-called “literate elite”, comprised mostly by lawyers, engineers and medical doctors (Viana, 1999), became more influent in the Brazilian state and existed along another segment of bureaucracy, one with a less skilled profile and a strong patrimonial component (Faoro, 1958).

With the proclamation of the Republic, in 1889, there was anticipation of change in the public administration, considering the discourse of revolutionary modernization of the period. However, the First Republic (1889-1930) is marked by the weakening of the Brazilian state, especially in the federal level. With political power in the hands of state governors, the subnational patronage prevails, via leadership of local rulers, known as “colonels” (Leal, 2012), in detriment of the professionalization of bureaucracy, exception made for the military and diplomatic careers.

In terms of proportion of the workforce, in the First Republic, rural population was predominant, with little demand for public services. Governmental action was very limited and reflected a period of reduced public employment, as exposed by Carvalho (2011:42):

The small dimension of public employment compared with the population was the counterpart of the reduced offer of public services in the country. Until the 1930’s, the support of export activities,

collection of taxes and maintenance of public order in urban centers were prioritized, granting a secondary place to services such as post offices and telegraphs, schools, hospitals and isolated colleges, in which services provided were very specific and restricted to large cities.

As an example, between 1872 and 1920, the ratio between public and military servants and the population rose from 0,37% to 0,6%, a very small fraction when compared with current standards or with developed nations (OECD, 2010). Besides the inexistence of swelling in the bureaucratic apparatus, two other characteristics were maintained in the transition between the Empire and the Republic: i) the persistence of public service admission based on personal criteria; and ii) the elitism of highly qualified and highly remunerated civil servants in top government office (Graham, 1968).

After more than 100 years as a sovereign nation, only in the 1930's, Brazilian public administration begins its reform process. Societal and governmental changes connected to the transition from a more agricultural to a more industrial country and, consequently, to a nationalist economical development project, demanded the modernization of the state apparatus, in order to introduce the necessary changes (Lustosa, 2008; Torres, 2012).

During the first term of president Getúlio Vargas, from 1930 to 1945, a wide range of public agencies, moreover in the productive sector, such as Vale do Rio Doce and The National Steelworks Company were created. In addition, the State also acted towards restructuring public services. The public administration reform proposal had as a main guideline the professionalization of the bureaucracy following the weberian model. In order to implement such changes, a few rules were adopted, with the intention of valuing merit-based federal government personnel, such as: competitive tendering, job stability and career plans.

A significant share of those changes was developed after the creation of the Public Service Administration Department (Dasp) in 1938, with the main purpose of promoting bureaucratic rationalization of the public service, having great influence from the organization of the North American civil service (Carvalho, 2011). According to Abrucio, Loureiro e Pacheco (2010:36), "a bureaucracy was, at once, created aiming development, institutionally linked to merit and universalism, and being the first one capable of producing public policies in a larger scale".

However, the effects of the administrative reform in the Estado Novo (1937-45), even though valuable in its efforts to overcome secular patrimonialism in search for more rational and efficient standards of public administration, did not meet their initial goals. Undoubtedly, it meant a significant change; nonetheless, many obstacles for implementing a universal merit-based system derived from the ambiguous ways in which president Vargas handled the national oligarchies. The occupancy of public office via public tender was far inferior to the number of political appointments. Consequently, some careers and agencies became bureaucratic insulations, merit-based and qualified, very distinct from the majority of the public service.

If in the democratic period from 1945 to 1964 significant changes were not observed, the same will not be true during the Military Regimen. The Decree-Law 200 of 1967, under strong influence of the Comestra (*Special Committee for Studies on the Administrative Reform*), may be considered the second administrative reform in the country. Beyond its principles, the norm also established the organization of federal public administration, rules for budgeting and financial administration, public procurement and civil organization.

The main policy, in a context of state economic intervention, involved a wide decentralization process or, more precisely, a dispersal of the activities in direct administration agencies. Strategic planning and coordination activities become priorities, aiming to incentive managerial flexibility, especially for indirect administration. In this regard, some careers were created founded in merit-based principles, besides modifying public service statute from the regimented form to general consolidated labor laws, with labor rules more similar to the private sector (Carvalho, 2011; Torres, 2012).

Despite the advancements in public sector occupancy, this reform reinforced the gap between the technocratic and modern State of indirect administration and the bureaucratic, formal and lagged State of direct administration. Not by chance, the insulation process was intensified, which was very well characterized by the bureaucratic rings phenomenon. This phenomenon involves the establishment of negotiation liaisons between Government and the interests of certain civil society groups, with the peculiarity of not characterizing genuine and independent lobby groups, but actually taking part in the state apparatus, usually under the leadership of a State employee (Cardoso, 1973).

The re-democratization, started in 1985, brought some important advances regarding the professionalization of the public service. Among them, it's worth highlighting the universalization of the public tender principle as means for admission in public service and the establishment of the *RJU* (Single Judicial System), both instituted by the Federal Constitution of 1988. The latter extends to autarchies and foundations the stability already existing for the servants in direct administration. Furthermore, the creation of governance schools, such as *Enap* (*National School of Public Administration*) and *Cedam* (*Center for the Development of Public Administration*), both linked to the Human Resources Secretariat, indicating a growing concern with the training and qualification of State personnel, previously never treated as a priority.

After a period of few relevant changes in the Fernando Collor (1990-92) and Itamar Franco (1002-94) administrations, the Fernando Henrique Cardoso mandate begins with a reformist discourse, associating the continuity of financial stability and economic growth recovery with a process of administrative reform geared towards more efficiency in the public sector (Souza, 2001).

Based on the internationally widespread propositions of the new public management (NPM), especially in developed nations, the reformist project proposed a rearranging of the State's intervention scope and the overrun of the bureaucratic public administration model, allegedly inefficient and surpassed by crony and not enough universal interests, by the managerial model. In short, Carneiro and Menicucci (2011:10) described the new public management (NPM) as:

A label, given by consultants to define the reforms in the public sector in order to emphasize the common elements with a model that attacked the core of the basic progressive public administration principles, especially substituting the emphasis on general rules by the emphasis on results. These transformations are attached to the political and ideological movement, with roots in economy concepts, of proposals and actions in the sense of a Government reform.

In Brazil, the proposal, to a good extent, was embodied in the *PDRAE* (Directive Plan for the Reform of the State Apparatus) from 1995. The basic premise was that the Latin American crisis

was a State crisis. Besides reducing State activities, via privatizing and publicizing some sectors, the operation of the so-called strategic core was intended to have a regulatory role and be guided by the management model of public administration (Matias-Pereira, 2008; Brazil, 1995). Therefore, instead of the inflexibility and inefficiency that were a mark of the administrative machinery, the public service would turn to a result based management format, similar to that of the private sector.

In practical terms, the central axis of the institutional changes was embodied in the no 19 Constitutional Amendment from 1998, except for the privatizing endeavors and the deriving establishment of regulatory agencies, in institutional terms (Carvalho, 2011), the results of the other changes proposed by the State reform were less effective, especially in the structural evaluation (rationalization) and in the creation of executive agencies (flexibility) and social organizations (publicization).

Similarly to other international experiences (Pollit and Bouckaert, 2011), the Brazilian management reform did not transform the workings of the state apparatus, as the *PDRAE* announced. The project lead by the Minister of Federal Administration and State Reform, Bresser-Pereira, is defended as a broad strategy for strengthening the composition of the State's permanent personnel (Bresser-Pereira, 1996; Pacheco, 2010). Regarding the professionalization of the public service, the Plan focused on promoting the strategic core, in other words, strengthening State careers, in both qualification and wages (Pacheco, 2010).

After approving the 1995 reform and the presidential alternation, in 2003, the government did not present a firm proposal of administrative reform. On the contrary, the period was marked by constant critique of the reformist wave, especially of the idea that a reduced state machinery was necessary to overcome the State fiscal crisis. The debate meant to go beyond the dichotomy between minimal and maximal State. The constant demand for economic development, overcoming historic infrastructure obstacles, the pressure towards social security and the discourse of the paying the Brazilian "social debt" — to address poverty and inequality — required a bureaucracy not only quantitatively, but also qualitatively, able to face those challenges. As in the Lula government (2003-10), the Dilma Rousseff mandates (2011-14) also did not adopt an official reformist discourse, although both implemented a set of measures regarding personnel management. During this period, however, the topic remained present in the public agenda, especially due to a strong pressure from public servant trade unions for personnel restitution and better wage conditions.

In this respect, the present work seeks to deepen the understanding of the result, in terms of bureaucracy professionalization, of the policies of five presidential administrations (FHC, Lula and Dilma), from 1995 to 2014, and thereby answer the following question: what are the advancements and dilemmas from the period that remain in federal public administration?


In order to approach the professionalization process of the bureaucracy in the period, this article analyzes the following variables: i) personnel and admission; ii) wage policies in the public sector; iii) performance evaluation; iv) political appointments; and v) education and qualification.

2.1 EVOLUTION IN PERSONNEL AND ADMISSION

As mentioned in the previous topic, the political and economic transformation during the first years of the Brazilian re-democratization had a great impact not only in the profile but also especially in the format of the workforce in federal public administration.

The first relevant variable to examine personnel is the quantitative analysis of active civil servants in the Executive Power. Considering the crucial role that the 1998 Federal Constitution played in the structuring of personnel, Graphic 1 illustrates this evolution from this date until the end of 2014.

GRAPHIC 1 QUANTITATIVE EVOLUTION OF ACTIVE CIVIL SERVANTS IN THE EXECUTIVE POWER (1998-2014)



Source: Brazil (2015). Specifically developed.

The data clearly portray a strong quantitative reduction process in federal government between 1989 and 2000, declining from 700 thousand servants to less than 500 thousand servants. Among the main explanations, it is worth highlighting the intensification of the privatizing efforts and the subnational government decentralization process in several public policy areas. Furthermore, there is a strong pressure from retirements, considering that between 1995 and 2003 it surpasses the number of 20 thousand retirements per year, exactly in the two periods of social security reform (1998 and 2003) which caused a “rush” to retirement due to the uncertainty regarding the alteration of established rules. The phenomenon is dampened from 2004, when the average drops by half (Brazil, 2015).

In this scenario, it is possible to divide the period in two very distinct moments: one of reduction (1995-2002) and another one of reversion or re-composition of active personnel in the Federal Executive (2003-14). The deceleration in retirements undoubtedly influences the first movement; however, another difference is in the fact that the federal government started broadening, significantly, the number of public tenders, which raised the annual quantitative of entering servants. The

annual admission rate between 2003 and 2014 is higher than 21 thousand, meanwhile between 1995 and 2000 the average quantitative of entering servants revolved around 8,5 thousand¹ (Brazil, 2015).

The argument, frequently fostered by public opinion, of swelling of the public machinery, does not find an empirical basis, considering that, even with the process of personnel replacement after 2003, the current quantitative amount is still very far from what it was 25 years ago. It is important to point out that, in the meantime, the federal government expanded its activity scope, especially in social policies, in agreement with what is disposed in the Federal Constitution. In addition to that, OECD data demonstrate that public employment in Brazil, considering the three government levels, revolves around 11%, while this average revolves around twice this percentage in countries that are members of the organization.²

Another interesting aspect of the period involves the distinct changes in the career and position profiles that have been accepted since 1995. Data from the Personnel Statistic Report (Brazil, 2015) confirm that, during the process of implementing the management reform (1995-2000), admission in careers inside the strategic core were prioritized,³ in consonance with the *PDRAE* (Directive Plan for the Reform of the State Apparatus). Those careers correspond to around 25% of all admissions, while the average for the period from 2003 to 2014 is around 10%. However, if in the first moment admission was restricted to only 14 careers/positions, in a second moment there was significant diversification. Besides the aforesaid number, another 34 careers/positions whether formerly or recently created, received new admissions.

In sum, two different moments can be in fact observed regarding the structuring of the workforce in the federal Executive, which reflect different political strategies and the influence of the economic environment as well as the changes in the social security rules. The reconstitution of personnel after 2003 is, to a certain extent, influenced by the government's expansionist policies that reflected on measures to intentionally strengthen State capacity in order to face the challenges of national development, what can justify, for example, the creation of the careers of infrastructure analyst, social policies analyst and regulation specialist.

2.2 WAGE POLICIES IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR

Wage policies in the public sector are a defining aspect in the understanding of the professionalization of bureaucracy. Besides being the greatest pecuniary incentive, the salary can also be analyzed in regards to the valuation of the public servant. An adequate wage policy tends to play a fundamental role in attracting good professionals, competing with the private sector.

Due to the complexity of the public sector, especially in the Brazilian Federal Executive power, dozens of different positions coexist. Therefore, it is natural for a salary hierarchy to exist (wage framework) in the public sector, which, according to Marconi (2010), is usually influenced by: i) the complexity of the duties; ii) required skills; iii) inherent responsibilities; iv) performance.

¹ Given the inconsistencies of the data referring to the years of 2001 and 2002, the choice was to exclude information from BEP regarding such years.


² It is important to be cautious about international comparisons whenever considering different political and institutional structures such as the type of government, if unitary or federal, the distinction between civilian and military personnel and what is pertinent to all Powers or specific to one.

³ Careers in government management, auditing, diplomacy, judiciary and regulatory agencies are considered strategic core or typical careers.

Nonetheless, those variables are rarely precisely and transparently measured and compared. Additionally, financial and budgetary availability, the political pressure of corporations, weather in large scale or with access to high office, as well as the strategies for personnel management policies are decisive in determining wage composition.

In order to analyze the adopted wage policies, Graphic 2 portrays the evolution of the average income of the two main groups of active civil servants, strategic core careers and *PCC* (Offices and Careers Pan), later altered to *PGPE* (Federal Executive General Personnel Plan), using the initial salary as reference. Even though both correspond to higher education careers, they correspond to the two extremes of the federal wage policy.

GRAPHIC 2 EVOLUTION OF AVERAGE WAGE FOR ACTIVE CIVIL SERVANTS IN THE EXECUTIVE POWER, 1996-2014 (R\$ ADJUSTED BY THE IPCA)⁴



Sources: Brazil (2015) and IBGE (2016). Specifically developed.

⁴ Values deflated according to the *IPCA/IBGE* (Index of Prices to the Broad Consumer) (December of the respective year X December 2014).

The data indicates very different wage policies. The first relevant aspect is the fact that, in spite of prioritizing recruitment for strategic core careers, in terms of salary, those servants have faced a decrease in purchase power. The reduction, between 1996 and the end of the political term (2002), is of around 35% — five percent lower than the income loss of the PGC personnel.

The situation changes with governmental wage policies between 2003 and 2009. With a strong valuation of the strategic core careers, also known as typical careers, which obtained an increase of approximately 230% in their actual income figures. Since 2010, however, the nominal increases for those careers haven't been able to stand up against inflationary depreciation, causing loss in purchase power. On the other hand, civil servants in the PGC careers didn't have any income readjustment until the year 2005. Yet, in the last 10 years readjustments have exceeded 80%.

The discourse, at this point, involved not only the valuation of the public service, but also the need to meet the incomes in the private sector. It is important to also consider the pressure from the labor unions, historically connected to the Labor Party (PT), in this process of wage increase for federal public servants. Furthermore, the policy of constant wage increase reflects, to a great extent, a moment of growth in the GDP, especially between the years of 2004 and 2010.


Regardless of the advancements in the valuation of public servants, the wage gap presents itself as an important dilemma. Until 2002, the average wage of the PGC revolved around 40% of the average wage of the strategic core careers. Nonetheless, this difference has increased substantially in the following years. That supports the idea of a greater valuation of the typical careers, which also started to receive fixed bonuses instead of variable salaries, as we will see in the following topic. In the last five years analyzed, the gap once again decreases, going back to the 29% threshold observed in 2003, due to improvements in the PCG position wages and to the actual depreciation of the wages in the strategic core positions.

Naturally, wage policy is not only defined by the financial and budgetary context of public finances and by economy growth, but it also exerts an impact in both of those variables. In this sense, public personnel costs must be analyzed in terms of their sustainability. Graphic 3 demonstrates the evolution of such expenses between 1997 and 2014. With deflated values, the bars represent the evolution of expenses in absolute values (R\$ billions), while the lines represent the percentage of GDP taken by those expenses.

The first interesting point is the relative stability of the expenses when using the GDP as reference. During this timeframe, expenses do not go beyond the 5% threshold. It is also possible to observe that an expressive increment in payment, as seen in frame 2, has a strong impact in absolute terms, raising expenses by around 70 billion between 2003 and 2010. However, when compared to the GDP, the percentage remained stable, mostly because of the years with significant economic growth. Unlike the last four years, when the decrease in GDP growth is reflected in the expenses with personnel.

Consequently, the sustainability of this element in the last 20 years is clear, considering that the most recent period has been characterized not only by the reconstitution of personnel, but also by improvement of the average income of the federal public servant. Even counting those expenses, the federal expenses with personnel in 2014 (3,98% of the GDP) are lower than in 1997 (4,27% of the GDP), according to the numbers of the National Treasury Secretary.

GRAPHIC 3 EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL EXPENSES WITH PERSONNEL — 1997 TO 2014 (R\$ ADJUSTED BY THE IPCA INDEX)



Sources: STN (2016) and IBGE (2016). Specifically developed.

2.3 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

Inside the public service, performance evaluation is a very complex matter, which relates not only to wage value, but has also a central role in the debate concerning valuation and professionalization of the public administration. The topic becomes even more relevant when considering the recent changes in the settings of public administration discussed in the previous topics. With the processes of recomposing the workforce, reorganizing careers and growing wage adjustments, evaluating the performance of the public worker is an essential management mechanism in order to deal with the many purposes, such as admittance after probative internship, career development, promotion and gratifications. But what is the concept of performance evaluation? According to Balassiano and Salles (2004:6):

It's a systemic diagnosis of the commitment between individuals and the organization and over critical incidents, both positive and negative, that take place during a certain period of time. As such, it enables the development of projects and programs for constant improvement. Therefore, performance evaluation must be an integrating action with organizational strategies, in order to fulfill what is established as its mission and reach what is foreseen as its future vision plan. Performance evaluation is a management strategy.

This is of course a very broad perspective, which, logically, is not always seen in a positive way. If on the one hand some say that it has contributed to the achievement of several goals, such as transparency in costs and results, improvement on the quality of the services and employee motivation (Goldsmith and Effer, 2006), on the other hand, critics say that simply transferring practices from the private sector might bring more problems than solutions.

Still, like what has been happening in developed nations, the practice has been growing significantly in Brazil in the last decades. In the federal government, the initiative that created the foundation for the current performance evaluation system appeared in the 1970's, with Law 5,645, from 1977, and its regulatory decrees. The regulations established career development guidelines for civil servants in direct administration (Velasco and Silva, 2010).

With Law 8,112, from 1990, the performance evaluation becomes mandatory for admission after the probative internship. The topic is also embedded in the Federal Constitution (Amendment no 19, from 1998), which even widens the possibilities of removal from a public servant position, in the event of unsatisfactory performance; however, this provision never advanced as planned.

Starting in 1995, a process of multiplication of the evaluation systems specifically directed to the definition of bonuses and gratification of public servants took place. In fact, according to Velasco and Silva (2010), they began to suffer distortions over the years as they started to pay fixed bonuses, due to obstacles in implementing efficient evaluation systems.

In 2008, Law 11,784 establishes a new system for performance evaluation, which proposes a systematic and continuous individual and institutional evaluation of the public servant in the offices and entities that compose the Civil Personnel System of the federal Executive. The new regulation aims to not only subsidize the wage policies, but also to cooperate in training processes, career development and handling of personnel. The main innovation of the system⁵ is the introduction of inclusive evaluation mechanisms, namely: the 360° evaluation, the establishment of the CAD (*Performance Evaluation Monitoring and of the Performance Evaluation Managing Commission*). Notwithstanding, the Sidec (*Career Development System*) is created for the members of those careers, establishing, in general terms, objective and merit-based criteria for career progression and promotion, among them, the presence in special commissions, presence in training activities and technical or academic production. In spite of its principles, aimed at the strengthening of bureaucracy professionalization, Sidec has not been regimented since 2008.

Despite the expansion of bonuses for a specific group of typical careers, according to the data from the *Personnel Statistic Report* (Brazil, 2015), around 45% of federal Executive servers (237 thousand) receive variable wages according to their performance evaluation, both individual and institutional. Even with the diversity in evaluations, the comprehensiveness of the evaluation systems and the attempts of improvement of the performance evaluation model introduced since 2008 are beneficial.

⁵ Decree n° 7.133, from March 19, 2010, regulates criteria and procedures that must be observed in individual and institutional performance evaluations and the payment of bonuses and performance gratification.

Notoriously, the establishment of a broader system, that is not restricted to payment, presents itself as the big challenge in this dimension of the professionalization of federal bureaucracy. It is, however, worth highlighting the advancements of the last years, not only in the outreach of the evaluation practices but also in the institution of formal and innovative rules for performance evaluation in Brazilian federal bureaucracy.

2.4 OCCUPATION OF POLITICAL APPOINTMENTS

As in any democratic regime, Brazilian public administration has political appointment positions to fill. At the federal level, approximately 23,000 DAS (*High Level Management and Advisory*) positions are allocated within ministries and a few state-owned companies. The system encompasses a set of advisory and management positions that are more abundant at lower levels of responsibility and wages, and are scarcer as the ladder goes up to higher level positions, including the equivalent of “junior ministers”.

The acronym DAS, as we mentioned, refers to High-Level Management and Advisory positions, which are organized and doled out according to a “criteria of trust”, citing Law 5,645/1970, Article 3. DAS-6 are secretaries, directors of public authorities (*autarchies*) and foundations, and undersecretary positions in the Presidential Office. DAS-5 positions are ministers’ chiefs of staff, department directors, internal control secretaries, and undersecretaries responsible for organizing budgets and human resources. General coordinators, chiefs of staff of foundations and heads of cabinet advisory fill DAS-4 positions. DAS-3 positions are doled out to coordinators, DAS-2 positions are filled by heads of division and DAS-1 positions are for section chiefs and minor advisories.

Created during the 1967 administrative reform, a number of changes in jurisdiction for DAS positions have since been introduced, but these appointments are still one of the main categories of employment in the federal government (D’Araújo and Lameirão, 2011).

Although the criteria for appointments have changed, DAS positions are still flexible. The Brazilian system is classified as “employee-based” because it allows political appointees to be recruited from a pool of outsiders as well as civil servants, unlike the pure “career-based” Weberian model in which only those who pass civil service examinations may fill political appointment positions.


Both models have advantages and shortcomings. In Brazil and in the United States, the flexible personnel system opens a larger space for filling key positions with people from diverse backgrounds and professional experiences. This is especially interesting in policy areas with strong linkages to the private sector and NGOs. From a political point of view, this model allows the president and his ministers to have a certain degree of freedom to reward allies, coopt opponents and to manage power assets. Those aspects are crucial for coalition management in a multiparty democratic system.

It is important to point out that the professionalization of bureaucracy is not necessarily impaired by any of the models, considering there are safeguards to maintain impersonality and rationality in the performance of the civil servants. According to Longo (2007:59), “professional public administration is directed and controlled by politicians, but does not respond to clientelist

pressure, and requires the preservation of a field of independence and impartiality in its operation, for matters of public interest”.

Another important issue about DAS positions is their quantitative configuration. Graphic 4 shows the proportional evolution of each of the six existing DAS levels, as well as their total between 1997 and 2014:

GRAPHIC 4 PROPORTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF DAS POSITIONS (1997-2014)



Sources: Brazil (2015) and IBGE (2016). Specifically developed.

The first important aspect is the fact that until 2002, stability in the total number of positions was maintained, despite some heterogeneity in the general composition. There was an increase in the number of higher-level DAS positions. The same pattern of growth can be observed with greater intensity from 2003 to 2010.

During this period, DAS positions increased by 27%, especially at the higher level (DAS-4 to 6). This is due to the rise in ministerial portfolios from the beginning of president Lula’s government in 2003. He created ministries and secretariats linked to the Office of the President in strategic sectors, especially in the area of social policies — Social Development, Women’s Rights etc. — and infrastructure — Civil Aviation, Ports etc. The argument for this new ministerial configuration is the importance of building a state needed to meet the challenges of development in its multiple dimensions.

On the other hand, if we analyze from the ratio of DAS positions compared to the total number of active civil servants in the Executive, we see that it is stable. In both 2003 and 2014, this ratio was only 3.6%.

Regarding the professionalization of the bureaucracy, three variables related to the doling out of DAS positions can be analyzed: DAS appointees as civil servants or “outsiders”, their academic expertise, and their gender.

As mentioned before, the Brazilian system is “employee-based” and gives political leaders a lot of discretion to decide who gets political appointments. This subject is highly debated in Brazilian public opinion. According to Pacheco (2008:3), the predominant view in the country is that “political appointment positions have always been filled by clientelist or partisan logics”. In other words, the vast majority of the DAS positions, according to this argument, is occupied by “outsiders”, without any ties to the public administration (without the need for a competitive examination for admission and without job stability), and due to personal ties with the directors.

Empirical evidence, however, shows that this is a wrong perception. Civil servants, mainly from the federal government, occupy most of the DAS positions. Table 1 of the Appendix will show this, based on data from the BEP (*Statistical Bulletin of Personnel*) (Brazil, 2015).

When analyzing the evolution of DAS positions in the last years, we do not observe an increase of “outsiders” in these positions. Since 1988, they correspond to approximately 25% of DAS appointees. We observe, however, differences within DAS-1 to 3 and DAS-4 to 6 positions. This is due to the different competences needed for these positions, entailing higher job complexity. The percentage of “outsiders” in DAS-1 to 3 positions tends to be lower, and this is because their lower salaries are unattractive for people who do not live in Brasília and/or work in the private sector. DAS-4 to 6 positions, on the other hand, are more occupied by outsiders, not only because wages are higher, but also because these positions are politically relevant and entail more responsibility over public policy. For this reason, career civil servants occupy a lower share of high-level DAS positions, but even so, “outsiders” do not hold most high-level DAS positions.

This sort of empirical analysis is the usual approach used by academics to discuss the issue of bureaucratic politicization. Our data converges with the conclusions of many of the scholars who have been writing about this topic. D’Araújo and Lameirão (2011), Praça, Freitas and Hoepers (2011) and Barberia and Praça (2014) show that factors such as professional experience and qualification are relevant for doling out DAS positions, although their importance varies according to the position’s level. Similar results were identified in a recent survey, focused on the federal government’s mid-level bureaucrats (DAS-1 to 5) (Cavalcante and Lotta, 2015), which indicate technical competence and professional experience as more important factors than partisanship for the appointment of DAS positions.

The Decree 5.497, published in 2005, which established that 75% of DAS-1 to 3 and 50% of DAS-4 positions should be occupied exclusively by career civil servants, reinforced the demystification of the idea of high politicization of DAS positions in the federal public administration. It is important to emphasize that there are no problems in appointing “outsiders” for political appointment positions, especially because they bring different experiences that are welcome in many sectors of the state. But the problem is when “outsiders” dominate most management and direction positions, a common practice in countries that have “parallel bureaucracies” (Stein et al., 2006). On the other hand,

a balance between “outsiders” and civil servants is recommended, mainly because appointing civil servants means giving value to the bureaucracy and tends to generate greater continuity, coherence and ensure greater impartiality and objectivity to public policies.

In this sense, it is essential that DAS appointees are qualified and prepared for their positions. When we analyze the education level of DAS appointees (see table 1 in the Appendix), we observe that a vast majority has college degrees and/or master degrees and PhDs, well above the average for civil servants of the federal public service in general. While in 2014 the average number of appointees with only high school degrees was around 20%, this share in all public servants of the Executive Branch exceeds 40%. On the other hand, the percentage of DAS appointees with at least a college degree is almost 80%, while the average number for federal civil servants in general is less than 50%. Additionally, it is noticeable that higher DAS levels tend to have more qualified occupants. In other words, there is a direct correlation between the greater degree of complexity and responsibility of DAS appointees with more specialized professionals.

Finally, the gender variable is also a relevant factor in the analysis of the professionalization of the federal bureaucracy, insofar as the development of a society presupposes mechanisms of gender equality between the sexes.

Data from the Statistical Staff Bulletin (Brazil, 2015) indicates that 46% of federal civil servants in the Executive Branch are female, a percentage that has changed little over the last few years but which is very close to what is observed in the private sector.

However, the main problem when analyzing the occupation of political appointment positions is a more discreet participation of women. If, on the one hand, the percentage of female DAS occupants increased proportionally from 1996 to the present days, on the other hand, the disparity increases as the level of the DAS position increases. While in 2014 the percentage of women in DAS-1 to 3 was close to 45%, in line with their share of the Executive’s workforce, for DAS-5 and 6 positions it did not reach 30%.

Nonetheless, it should be noted that the scenario has evolved considerably in the last two decades, especially in positions of greater responsibility. Table 1 reinforces this perception, which is also clear in the analysis of high-level positions during Dilma Rousseff’s government. In 2014, 10 women were ministers, while only 18 women held cabinet positions from 1890 to 2011 (SPM, 2013)

Thus, even with a flexible nomination system, the federal bureaucracy has been more valued, which has been reflected in the growing share of effective officials in top management positions, a high degree of qualification and a growing gender balance.


The most critical point of this system does not involve its high degree of discretion (D’Araújo and Lameirão, 2011; OECD, 2010), but mainly, the fact that there are no selection and recruitment processes for DAS appointees based on impersonal and transparent criteria, fostering meritocracy by relying on certain skills and competences which are defined previously.

2.5 EDUCATION AND TRAINING

The fifth dimension we analyze is the importance of education and training of civil servants in the federal public administration.

It is notorious that, the more prepared, the greater the civil servant’s ability to perform highly complex functions, as well as to develop multiple competencies such as leadership. In this sense, the first aspect to be analyzed is the level of education of civil servants in the federal Executive. Graphic 5 displays the aforementioned data.

GRAPHIC 5 QUANTITATIVE EVOLUTION OF ACTIVE CIVIL SERVANTS IN THE EXECUTIVE POWER, ACCORDING TO EDUCATIONAL LEVEL



Sources: Brazil (2015) and IBGE (2016). Specifically developed.

It should be noted that the data in Graphic 5 refers to the level of education required for entry in the federal public service, and does not refer to the actual training of employees. Looking at the data over time, however, allows one to perceive a strong change in the initial educational profile for entry into the federal bureaucracy. There is a clear reversal in the predominance of mid-level and higher-level posts, which recently constitute the majority of federal civil servants. Although it is difficult to measure this now, the expectation is that the predominance of college level graduates tends to generate, in the medium term, a positive influence on the productivity of public administration.

This phenomenon can be interpreted through the point of view of two trends. The first is that between 1997 and 2002, there was a clear reduction in the number of middle-level employees, which can be explained both by the race for pensions in this period and by the decrease in hiring people of this educational profile due to the option of outsourcing certain administrative activities. The second trend is that, as of 2003, there was a growing process of hiring college-level civil servants for more specialized activities. As we have already discussed, the entry of new civil servants since then has been positive for “older” careers, as well as for a wide range of new positions, especially in the infrastructure and social policy areas.

The trend of higher educational level observed in the civil servants’ profile also reflects the changes in higher education policy in Brazil during the period. According to the census of higher education (Inep, 2013), the enrollment rate between 1995 and 2013 had a fourfold increase, with a predominance of private universities and, more recently, more relevance for public universities.

In addition to higher educational level as a prerequisite for admission, it is important to mention that civil service exams for federal government positions are increasingly becoming more competitive. By way of illustration, civil service exams for the careers in the management area, considered the strategic core of the state, have more than 100 candidates for each position. In other words, admission to these positions demands not only a good academic background but also a lot of specific preparation for the exams.

Following the standards of nations considered to be holders of a professional and meritocratic bureaucracy, the federal government has been investing in the continued training of bureaucratic careers since the late 1980s. As in France, Italy and Canada, certain careers incorporate a compulsory training course (Cruz, 2010) in the last stage of their selection process. Within the federal government, the practice began in the diplomatic area many decades ago, but has since expanded to most of the careers considered typical of state, such as government managers, audit and legal policy areas.

Although it does not follow a rigid configuration, training plays a central role in the formation, recognition and identity (greater cohesion and greater homogeneity within the category) of civil servants as part of a state bureaucracy. In this process, it is essential to highlight the role of the schools of government, responsible for the initial training of new civil servants, for activities of continuous development, postgraduate training and research, and the dissemination of knowledge about public management. These are crucial dimensions in professionalization processes and higher valorization of the civil servant.

Despite the growth in demand for qualification in the Brazilian public service was intensified after the process of re-democratization in the 1980s, only in 1998 the government schools were formally included in the Brazilian Federal Constitution. Amendment 19, from 1998, establishes that the federal and state governments must maintain schools of government for the education and improvement of their personnel.

At the national level, the phenomenon of the proliferation government schools has become a commonplace. Their mission is to guarantee permanent training of civil servants in all levels of federal government and in all government branches (Legislative, Executive and Judiciary). Since 2003, the National Network of Government Schools has been set up, coordinated by Enap, with the participation of some 200 institutions (Fonseca et al., 2015).

At the federal level, 17 schools make up the Segu (*Union Government School System*) and are responsible for personnel training. The performance level of such schools has been increasing, and they are not restricted to the initial training of bureaucrats. Most of the schools perform skill development activities.

More recently, schools have also started providing postgraduate training for more relevant servants in specific policy areas. Finally, another line of action, fundamental for the professionalization of bureaucracy and for the improvement of public management, is research development and the spreading of knowhow and good practices.

Decree 5.707, published in 2006, is worth mentioning. It establishes the National Policy for Personnel Development (PNDP) for federal civil servants. The measure institutes training as a permanent activity throughout the entire professional career. The policy emphasizes the essential role of government schools in the professional development of bureaucracy, in order to improve its duties, with quality and efficiency (Fonseca et al., 2015).

3. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

This article analyzed the professionalization process of the Brazilian federal bureaucracy using two complementary strategies: a historical analysis and a discussion of recent changes in the federal civil bureaucracy from 1995 to 2014. Along these lines, the article intended to identify the advancements of the period and dilemmas that persist in the federal public administration.

The historical analysis corroborates with the perception that the current setting of the Brazilian public service is a result of continuous transformation processes and not the result of a single historical moment or a single government decision. The two major reforms prior to the enactment of the 1988 Federal Constitution, the Dasp Reform and Decree 200 of 1967, introduced innovations that intended to establish a merit-based and professional bureaucracy, closer to the Weberian model. However, both initiatives achieved partial results that reinforced the historical dichotomy of the Brazilian public administration: partly professionalized and qualified, and partly unprofessional and clientelist.

Considering the five dimensions that were analyzed, over the last two decades, we observe significant advances. But there are historical dilemmas and challenges to the professionalization of the federal bureaucracy that need to be addressed.

On the one hand, the empirical data show a process of restoration of the staff, especially since 2003, with diversification in admissions in existing careers, as well as the creation of new careers and positions in areas such as infrastructure, social policy, and regulation. Regarding wage policy, there was a true increase in employee remuneration meanwhile personnel expenses at the federal level remained controlled. Regarding performance evaluation, it is possible to assert that the systems went through sophistication and expansion. In the occupation of political appointment positions, the data indicate advances such as the rise of civil servants in appointment positions, higher education levels and more gender balance. Finally, with regards to the education and training of civil servants, there was an increase in the educational level of civil servants and a continuous process of institutionalizing the development of the bureaucrats' competences, especially through the strengthening of the schools of government.

On the other hand, dilemmas and challenges in the federal public administration reinforce the historical gap between a minority of “professionalized” bureaucracy and an “unprofessional” majority. Firstly, despite the hiring of more civil servants in the last decade, the percentage of civil servants relative to the population is still far from that of developed nations, especially from those that provide universal social policies. Secondly, the actual growth in wages has worsened the unevenness between different careers and positions. This problem has also been amplified by subsidizing some careers. Additionally, three other questions are posed as challenges to the professionalization of bureaucracy: the introduction of performance evaluation mechanisms to define part of the wages; the widespread implementation of more transparent and impersonal criteria for the selection and provision of appointment positions, and the increase of female participation in higher-level positions.

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APPENDIX

TABLE 1 DAS OCCUPANCY RATES, ACCORDING TO LABOR BOND, EDUCATIONAL LEVEL AND GENDER

DAS	With labor bond	Without labor bond	Level of Education				Gender	
			Fundamental	Secondary	College	Graduate	Male	Female
1996								
DAS-1	15,2%	84,8%	6,9%	32,6%	50,8%	7,4%	54,8%	45,2%
DAS-2	14,4%	85,6%	4,6%	23,8%	61,8%	6,2%	61,0%	39,0%
DAS-3	16,1%	83,9%	1,9%	15,8%	71,0%	9,4%	64,0%	36,0%
DAS-4	19,7%	80,3%	1%	9,6%	81,3%	6,8%	71,2%	28,8%
DAS-5	24,1%	75,9%	1%	6,2%	86,1%	6,4%	82,7%	17,3%
DAS-6	31,3%	68,7%	0,8%	4,7%	85,9%	7,8%	83,6%	16,4%
TOTAL	15,8%	84,2%	4,8%	24,6%	61,0%	7,2%	60,5%	39,5%
1998								
DAS-1	23,2%	76,8%	7,6%	30,7%	50,9%	10,8%	54,7%	45,3%
DAS-2	25,3%	74,7%	6,8%	23,4%	62,1%	7,7%	60,4%	39,6%
DAS-3	29,3%	70,7%	3,3%	13,9%	71,8%	11,0%	62,5%	37,5%
DAS-4	40,4%	59,6%	1,4%	9,6%	80,4%	8,6%	70,7%	29,3%
DAS-5	40,3%	59,7%	1,6%	3,9%	86,6%	7,9%	83,3%	16,7%
DAS-6	49,2%	50,8%	0,8%	2,3%	87,9%	9,1%	85,6%	14,4%
TOTAL	27,1%	72,9%	5,9%	22,8%	61,8%	9,5%	60,4%	39,6%
2000								
DAS-1	16,40%	83,60%	3,4%	29,0%	54,7%	12,9%	51,0%	49,0%
DAS-2	18,40%	81,60%	4,7%	21,7%	61,2%	12,5%	59,1%	40,9%
DAS-3	16,20%	83,80%	1,5%	14,0%	70,2%	14,3%	60,2%	39,8%
DAS-4	29,30%	70,70%	0,5%	6,6%	78,3%	14,5%	66,9%	33,1%
DAS-5	30,60%	69,40%	0,2%	3,0%	82,5%	14,4%	81,1%	18,9%
DAS-6	41,10%	58,90%	0,7%	1,4%	82,9%	15,0%	84,9%	15,1%
TOTAL	19,10%	80,90%	3,1%	20,8%	62,9%	13,2%	58,1%	41,9%

Continue

DAS	With labor bond	Without labor bond	Level of Education				Gender	
			Fundamental	Secondary	College	Graduate	Male	Female
2002								
DAS-1	21,10%	78,90%	2,8%	31,5%	53,2%	12,5%	49,8%	50,2%
DAS-2	22,50%	77,50%	3,5%	23,9%	60,7%	11,9%	56,7%	43,3%
DAS-3	19,20%	80,80%	1,1%	15,0%	70,7%	13,2%	59,4%	40,6%
DAS-4	29,70%	70,30%	0,4%	6,6%	81,4%	11,6%	64,2%	35,8%
DAS-5	33,80%	66,20%	0,1%	3,0%	84,7%	12,2%	76,9%	23,1%
DAS-6	36,60%	63,40%	0,0%	0,6%	84,8%	14,6%	81,7%	18,3%
TOTAL	22,80%	77,20%	2,3%	22,2%	63,1%	12,3%	56,5%	43,5%
2004								
DAS-1	27,40%	72,60%	4,7%	35,0%	47,8%	12,5%	52,2%	47,8%
DAS-2	24,40%	75,60%	1,3%	24,4%	60,9%	13,4%	53,9%	46,1%
DAS-3	23,40%	76,60%	1,0%	16,9%	70,3%	11,8%	55,6%	44,4%
DAS-4	35,50%	64,50%	0,6%	7,4%	82,3%	9,6%	63,9%	36,1%
DAS-5	40,20%	59,80%	1,0%	5,4%	83,4%	10,1%	77,4%	22,6%
DAS-6	45,50%	54,50%	0,5%	5,3%	81,3%	12,9%	83,4%	16,6%
TOTAL	27,70%	72,30%	2,3%	23,4%	62,1%	12,1%	56,3%	43,7%
2006								
DAS-1	24,7%	75,3%	4,8%	33,6%	49,1%	12,5%	53,2%	46,8%
DAS-2	23,6%	76,4%	1,2%	25,2%	60,7%	12,9%	53,9%	46,1%
DAS-3	21,0%	79,0%	1,0%	16,5%	71,3%	11,2%	53,2%	46,8%
DAS-4	32,1%	67,9%	0,4%	7,6%	83,2%	8,8%	61,7%	38,3%
DAS-5	36,9%	63,1%	0,3%	4,2%	86,2%	9,3%	76,1%	23,9%
DAS-6	42,3%	57,7%	0,0%	5,2%	82,5%	12,4%	82%	18%
TOTAL	25,6%	74,4%	2,2%	22,8%	63,3%	11,7%	56%	44%
2008								
DAS-1	25,6%	74,4%	4,4%	30,8%	51,9%	13,0%	54,5%	45,5%
DAS-2	22,9%	77,1%	1,0%	22,6%	62,8%	13,6%	55,0%	45,0%
DAS-3	24,4%	75,6%	0,9%	15,7%	72,4%	11,0%	54,9%	45,1%
DAS-4	32,2%	67,8%	0,5%	7,5%	83,2%	8,7%	62,9%	37,1%
DAS-5	34,4%	65,6%	0,4%	4,2%	86,3%	9,1%	77,1%	22,9%
DAS-6	41,5%	58,5%	1,5%	6,8%	80,0%	11,7%	80,0%	20,0%
TOTAL	26,2%	73,8%	2,0%	20,8%	65,2%	11,9%	57,3%	42,7%

Continue

DAS	With labor bond	Without labor bond	Level of Education				Gender	
			Fundamental	Secondary	College	Graduate	Male	Female
2010								
DAS-1	26,3%	73,7%	3,2%	31,6%	49,7%	15,5%	54,5%	45,5%
DAS-2	24,9%	75,1%	0,9%	23,0%	62,1%	14,0%	54,4%	45,6%
DAS-3	28,2%	71,8%	0,6%	15,6%	73,9%	9,9%	54,6%	45,4%
DAS-4	31,5%	68,5%	0,4%	7,7%	83,6%	8,2%	61,7%	38,3%
DAS-5	34,0%	66,0%	0,2%	4,4%	86,7%	8,6%	74,8%	25,2%
DAS-6	39,2%	60,8%	1%	6,2%	80,9%	12,0%	77%	23%
TOTAL	27,6%	72,4%	1,5%	21%	65%	12,5%	56,8%	43,2%
2012								
DAS-1	24,7%	75,3%	3,1%	32,1%	47,5%	17,4%	55,1%	44,9%
DAS-2	24,2%	75,8%	0,9%	22,2%	60,9%	15,9%	54,1%	45,9%
DAS-3	28,9%	71,1%	0,4%	14,3%	72,1%	13,2%	54,0%	46,0%
DAS-4	30,3%	69,7%	0,6%	7,3%	78,8%	13,4%	63,3%	36,7%
DAS-5	28,1%	71,9%	0,2%	4,0%	83,1%	12,7%	71,2%	28,8%
DAS-6	35,4%	64,6%	1%	2,7%	79,4%	17,0%	77,0%	23,0%
TOTAL	26,5%	73,5%	1,4%	21%	63%	15,3%	57%	43%
2014								
DAS-1	24,7%	75,4%	3,0%	30,1%	56,1%	9,9%	55,2%	44,8%
DAS-2	24,6%	75,4%	0,8%	21,1%	69,3%	8,3%	54,5%	45,5%
DAS-3	28,6%	71,6%	0,4%	14,4%	76,4%	8,5%	53,5%	46,5%
DAS-4	27,1%	72,9%	0,6%	7,4%	83,4%	8,5%	62,3%	37,7%
DAS-5	25,9%	74,1%	0,1%	3,5%	88,6%	7,9%	70,7%	29,3%
DAS-6	34,1%	65,9%	0,5%	3,3%	89,1%	7,1%	78,2%	21,8%
TOTAL	25,9%	74,1%	1,3%	19,5%	69,8%	8,8%	56,8%	43,2%

Source: Brazil (2015).