The mischaracterization of the ST&I funding policy: an analysis of the Brazilian Fund for the Development of Science and Technology

Abstract

This study aims to critically analyze the mechanisms that depletethe Brazilian fund for the development of science and technology (FNDCT), jeopardizing its ability to promote economic and social development. Data were extracted from the integrated budget and planning system (SIOP) bases and the budget execution report between 2012 and 2021, made available by the Brazilian funding agency FINEP. The quantitative results indicate a process of “dehydration” due to changes such as the regulation that allows the executive to redirect resources previously earmarked for the fund (called DRU), the formulation of the legislation on the annual budget (PLOA) and the contingency reserves. The qualitative analysis shows a mismatch between the promise of a bold and innovative science and technology policy and a centralized and bureaucratic governance structure. Sectoral funds do not face, on average, problems in raising resources. However, the centralized management subservient to fiscal austerity policies leads to quantitative insufficient budget execution and qualitatively poor diversification. As outcomes, this situation mischaracterizes the ST&I funding policy, failing to comply with the promise of development through innovation.

Keywords:
ST&I funding policy; FNDCT; budget execution

Resumo

Este estudo tem como objetivo analisar criticamente os mecanismos que desidratam o Fundo Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (FNDCT), debilitando-o na sua função de promover o desenvolvimento econômico e social. Os dados foram extraídos das bases do sistema integrado de orçamento e planejamento (SIOP) e do relatório de execução orçamentária, entre 2012 e 2021, disponibilizados pela financiadora de estudos e projetos (FINEP). Os resultados da investigação apontam que, do ponto de vista quantitativo, há um processo de desidratação, por mecanismos como a desvinculação de receitas da união (DRU), a formulação do projeto de lei orçamentária anual (PLOA) e as reservas de contingência. Do lado qualitativo, há descompasso entre a promessa de uma política arrojada e inovadora e uma estrutura de governança centralizada e burocrática. Os fundos setoriais não enfrentam problemas de arrecadação, mas a gestão centralizada e subserviente a políticas fiscais de austeridade leva a uma execução orçamentária quantitativamente insuficiente e qualitativamente pobre em diversificação, quadro que descaracteriza a política de financiamento de ciência, tecnologia e inovação (CT&I), deixando de cumprir a promessa de desenvolvimento via inovação.

Palavras-chave:
política de financiamento de CT&I; FNDCT; execução orçamentária

Resumen

Este estudio tiene como objetivo analizar críticamente los mecanismos que deshidratan el fondo nacional de desarrollo científico y tecnológico (FNDCT), debilitándolo en su función de promover el desarrollo económico y social. Los datos fueron extraídos de las bases del sistema integrado de planificación y presupuesto y del informe de ejecución presupuestaria entre 2012 y 2021, puestos a disposición por la financiadora de estudios y proyectos. Los resultados de la investigación indican que, desde el punto de vista cuantitativo, existe un proceso de deshidratación, a través de mecanismos como la Desvinculación de Ingresos de la Unión Federal, la formulación del proyecto de ley presupuestaria anual y las reservas de contingencia. En el aspecto cualitativo, existe un desajuste entre la promesa de una política audaz e innovadora y una estructura de gobierno centralizada y burocrática. Los fondos sectoriales no enfrentan, en promedio, problemas de recaudación, pero la gestión centralizada supeditada a políticas fiscales de austeridad conduce a una ejecución presupuestaria cuantitativamente insuficiente y cualitativamente pobre en términos de diversificación, situación que descaracteriza la política de financiamiento para la ciencia, tecnología e innovación (CT&I), incumpliendo con la promesa de desarrollo a través de la innovación.

Palabras clave:
política de financiamiento para CT&I; FNDCT; e jecución presupuestaria

1. INTRODUCTION

The Brazilian government has developed funding mechanisms for science, technology, and innovation (ST&I), which were expected to foster endogenous forms of economic development driven by innovation. One of the main funding mechanisms for the national ST&I system is the National Fund for Scientific and Technological Development (FNDCT), created in 1969 and operated by the Financing Agency for Studies and Projects (Finep). FNDCT’s goal is to provide financial support to national priority projects and programs for scientific and technological development. It is made up of sectoral funds, fueled by tax and parafiscal revenues from specific economic sectors, to finance specific innovation actions. It is also made up of transversal funds, designed to stimulate university-company interaction (CT-Verde Amarelo) and the innovation infrastructure of Science and Technology Institutions (CT-Infra).

The resources raised for ST&I, especially by sectoral funds, as they are directed to key sectors in the national ST&I strategy, should be fully applied in the research activities they are intended for. However, Moraes (2008), Queiroz and Cavalcante (2012), and Leal, Teixeira, and Moreira (2020) argue that the resources applied by sectoral and transversal funds, since their inception, do not correspond to the amounts collected. Therefore, this study’s objective is to present and describe the mechanisms that dehydrate sectoral funds, weakening their function of fostering ST&I development. We chose these funds as the empirical focus of the research because they indicate an innovative policy, created to secure financing for innovation.

The assessment had two dimensions. The first was quantitative and focused on FNDCT’s budget execution. Data were extracted from the federal government’s Integrated Budget and Planning System (SIOP) and from budget execution reports of sectoral funds, between 2015 and 2021, made available by Finep and updated by the Broad National Consumer Price Index (IPCA). The second dimension was qualitative and examined FNDCT’s management mechanisms, whose sources were the corresponding regulations and other studies, which were important for showing how and why decisions were made on the use of resources. The article begins with a brief history of FNDCT, and next presents and discusses the dehydration mechanisms, regarding the two dimensions.

2. LEGAL FRAMEWORKS AND SOURCES OF REVENUE FOR SECTORAL AND TRANSVERSAL FUNDS

The legal instruments that support the allocation of specific resources to sectoral and transversal funds that comprise FNDCT were approved between 1998 and 2012, as shown in Chart 1.1 The first sectoral fund, CT-Petro, was created to ensure investments in innovation projects exclusively for the oil and natural gas production chain in Brazil.

Between 2000 and 2004, several of these funds were created to secure research resources for sectors such as energy, land transportation, water resources, mineral extraction, aerospace, IT, aeronautics, biotechnology, agribusiness, health, and water transportation, as well as for the development of the Amazon. In 2012, the CT-Inovar-Auto was set up, oriented to companies of the automotive sector, such as automakers and distributors. However, as it was a counterpart to the tax waiver policy, it was terminated in 2019. In addition to sectoral funds, two transversal funds were created: CT-Verde Amarelo, in 2000 (for university-company cooperation), and CT-Infra (for infrastructure), in 2001.

Chart 1
List of sectoral funds, in order of creation

Chart 1
continuation

Taking stock of the results of these sectoral funds’ creation processes, we highlight that the drive for some of them was indirect, based on legal changes that made markets such as oil, electricity generation, and information technology more flexible. The financial compensations paid by private companies that take over these flexible or privatized spaces, or even royalties from private agents’ exploitation of public resources are the income sources for innovation development funds, in these same sectors or at the Manaus Free Trade Zone (Amazon Fund). Sectoral funds collect and apply resources in the same economic sector, while the resources for transversal funds come from FNDCT.

3. THE ANATOMY OF FNDCT DEHYDRATION

This section shows that, between the generation of expected revenue by the different legal frameworks and the effective application of resources, there are significant cuts of different kinds that dehydrate the ST&I policy. It is divided into a quantitative dimension, where we analyzed FNDCT collection and budget execution, and a qualitative dimension, which examines aspects of FNDCT management.

The collection comprises financial resources transferred by the National Treasury and FNDCT own funds, obtained from return on loans. Their sum increased FNDCT annual availability for investment from R$ 7.44 billion, in 2012, to R$ 10.3 billion, in 2021. During the analyzed period, the fund extended its source of own resources from R$ 222 million, in 2012, to R$ 2.56 billion, in 2020, a 1,057% increase, totaling a R$ 9.47 billion own collection. A detailed analysis by type of fund shows that three of them (CT-Infra, CT-Verde Amarelo, and CT-Petro) accounted for 63% of FNDCT revenue, from 2012 to 2021. The transversal funds increased their share from 36%, in 2012, to 48% in 2021, while sectoral funds decreased from 63%, in 2012, to 52% in 2021, of FNDCT total revenue. Therefore, with regard to collection, there was a shift towards transversal funds.

In the historical series analyzed, the years 2015, 2016, and 2017 showed a decrease in money collection, with an average of R$ 5.4 billion collected by funds. In 2018, FNDCT recovered its capacity of raising funds, considering the total resources collected, reaching the highest annual amount (R$ 10.3 billion) available for ST&I projects in 2021. Hence, resource availability, regarding revenue, has not been an obstacle for FNDCT financing ST&I policies.

These resources could be even greater, considering that the first moment of FNDCT dehydration occurs in the collection phase, due to the incidence of the Decoupling of Union Revenues (DRU). According to Leal et al. (2020), Constitutional Amendment No. 42/2003 introduced the decoupling of 20% of the resources allocated to the fund by the legislation of ST&I sectoral programs, while Constitutional Amendment No. 93/2016 raised the percentage to 30%. Between 2012 and 2021, the incidence of DRU removed R$ 16.1 billion in revenue for ST&I funding, which meant loss of revenue, money that was not transferred to the fund for further investment.

The analysis of budget execution considered the total resources managed by FNDCT, divided in two budget units (BU): BU 74,910 - resources under FNDCT supervision (reimbursable) - and BU 24,901 - FNDCT (non-reimbursable). The non-reimbursable funds are oriented to projects from scientific and technological institutions (ICTs) and to cooperation between ICTs and companies, to economic subsidies for firms, to equalize financial charges on credit operations, and to programs developed by social organizations. Reimbursable resources are oriented to companies’ technological development projects, as a loan to Finep, with capital injection as an alternative incentive for impact projects (Lei nº 11.540, 2007).

The second moment of FNDCT dehydration was identified at the stage of preparing the Annual Budget Bill (PLOA). Graph 1 shows that only at the beginning of the historical series, in 2012, 2013, and 2015, PLOA values were similar to those collected. The Federal Accounting Court (TCU), in Appellate Decision No. 500, of 2015, pointed out that collected revenues were not considered in PLOA, and recommended that the Ministries of Science, Technology and Innovation, of Finance, and of Planning, Budget, and Management should use “the estimated revenue collection from sectoral funds and their respective sources of funds exclusively and entirely for the preparation of FNDCT future budget proposals, contained in BU 24,901” (Acórdão TCU nº 500, 2015). This recommendation is still ignored, and cuts have increased since 2016, especially in non-reimbursable resources. In 2021, PLOA estimated only 22% of the total amount of FNDCT revenues for application in the two BUs.

Graph 1
Comparison between collected values by resource type and the expenditure projection of FNDCT on PLOA

Resource contingency was the third moment of fund dehydration and considered one of the major barriers to FNDCT financing of ST&I policies, under Complementary Law No. 177/2021(Koeller & Rauen, 2021; Leal et al., 2020; Negri & Koeller, 2019). The financial contingency reserve amounted to R$ 17.9 billion, from 2012 to 2021. The approval prevented the allocation of FNDCT resources to contingency reserves of primary and financial nature. However, when the 2021 LOA (Annual Budget Law) was passed, the Bolsonaro administration blocked more than R$ 5 billion from FNDCT.

The suspension was denounced to TCU and only a partial release of R$ 2.2 billion was achieved in that year. Therefore, even with the legal prohibition, the blocking occurred without any kind of legal or administrative penalty to the government, which highlights the vulnerability of ST&I funding. The suspension data show that it is in the implementation stage that budget cuts are most evident (Negri & Koeller, 2019). In 2021, budget forecast for reimbursable resources was twice that of the previous year, when R$ 3.67 billion were expected. However, only 22% of that total was actually spent, through Finep loans for companies’ investment in innovation projects.

Another problem identified at implementation is the way non-reimbursable funds are distributed, shown in Graph 2, since the resources are not directed to sectoral funds. There has been a stronger reduction in the execution of vertical sector funds. In 2021, only R$ 3.5 million were spent, distributed among seven funds, representing 0.46% of the total paid by BU 2,4901, and 0.09% of the total collected by vertical sector funds in that year. Investment spreading was already the subject of two TCU appellate decisions (Acórdão TCU nº 3.440, 2013; Acórdão TCU nº 1.237, 2019), where rapporteurs pointed out that “the lack of FNDCT specific guidelines enables financing many projects with different goals, at the expense of projects more aligned with the fund’s purposes and, therefore, with the national ST&I strategy” (Acórdão TCU nº 1.237, 2019).

Graph 2
Analysis of the distribution of FNDCT’s non-reimbursable resources, by type of action

Graph 2also shows that transversal actions, such as Fostering Research and Development in Basic and Strategic Areas, and other actions, like promoting scientific and technological projects and supporting scientific events, among others, also faced significant cuts in budget execution in 2021, when compared to the beginning of the historical series in 2012, which totaled 87% and 54% of paid resources, respectively. The increase observed in other actions in 2020 corresponds to R$ 339 million assigned for financing projects to handle the public health emergency resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic. These systematic cuts, especially from 2015 onwards, combined with the cuts in resources for investments in ICTs, represent a setback in keeping and improving the national ST&I infrastructure.

The quantitative dimension showed that FNDCT dehydration has increased in the last 10 years, and that the resources collected are not sufficient to fund ST&I projects. Table 1 summarizes the stages and forms of dehydration, shows the anatomy of cuts, and the budget stages in which ST&I policies lost most funding.

Table 1
Anatomy of budget cuts in FNDCT funding (R$)

	Implementation Stages	2012	2021	Accumulated variation from 2012 to 2021	Accumulated value from 2012 to 2021	% of grand total collected by FNDCT
	DRU	1.4 billion	2.3 billion	62.3%	16.1 billion	-
Collection	Sectoral Funds Collection	7.2 billion	7.7 billion	7.09%	64.7 billion	-
	Return from FINEP	222 thousand	2.56 billion	156%	9.48 billion	-
	Total effectively collected	7.44 billion	10.3 billion	38.4%	74.18 billion	-
Budget Execution	PLOA	6.64 billion	2.29 billion	-181%	40.73 billion	55%
	Contingency Reserve	0	4.8 billion	-	17.9 billion	24%
	Paid execution	4.28 billion	1.55 billion	-63.7%	28.9 billion	38.96%

• Source: Based on SIOP data and corrected by IPCA of December 2021.

Table 1 shows that the process of dehydration began at the collection stage, when the Fund lost R$ 16.1 billion because of DRU, which could represent a total budget of R$ 90.28 billion. However, only R$ 74.18 billion came to the fund, and of this total R$ 28.9 billion were actually spent; that is, only 38.96% of the total resources available between 2012 and 2021. Contingency reserves withdrew R$ 17.9 billion from FNDCT in the analyzed period. These data strengthen Koeller and Rauen’s (2021) argument, that the mismatch between FNDCT collection and execution indicates that the fund’s initial intention of securing resources for ST&I policies did not materialize.

Regarding the qualitative dimension, documentary analysis showed that the assessment of FNDCT investments needs improving. TCU Appellate Decision 1,237/2019 (Acórdão TCU 1.237, 2019), the result of an operational audit by MCT&I, suggests that Finep needs to implement a method for evaluating the Fund’s results and impacts, even though the agency establishes product and process indicators in its programs.

For Corder (2008), Moraes (2008), and Queiroz and Cavalcante (2012), the sectoral funds policy created a new institutional framework for the Science and Technology field and was itself an innovation compared to previous funding mechanisms. On the other hand, this new institutional framework did not increase the amount of resources invested (Moraes, 2008), nor diversified existing funds into new lines and agents different from the previous model, which had a linear-supplier nature (Queiroz & Cavalcante, 2012). In that model, innovation is the result of linear stages, where knowledge production follows a sequence, from basic to applied science and then to development and production. Although some innovations in lines and programs have been introduced, from the perspective of budget execution they remained in a marginal position, compared to reimbursable loans for companies and non-reimbursable programs for research projects, which are mostly academic.

When analyzing FNDCT governance system, Leal et al. (2020) found an increased discretion in the execution of Fund’s resources, through transversal actions. One of the reasons is the centralization of decisions in committees and commissions dominated by the federal government, with no representation from sub-national entities and a low presence of the scientific and business sectors, thus disqualifying the mixed management system planned at Sectoral Funds’ origin (Corder, 2008; Leal et al., 2020).

The innovative political-institutional arrangement designed as sectoral funds were created was disfigured, in addition to the reorganization of FNCDT in 2007, through Law No. 11,540 (Lei nº 11.540, 2007), losing society’s representation for the benefit of the government, and, in this particular case, without sub-national representation. The consequence was the bureaucratization of decision-making bodies, which have become hostages to fiscal policies of continuous blockings in different governments; the inability to meet federal equalization guidelines; and subject to misuse in applications, as mentioned by control bodies themselves.

Finep’s publication of the 2019 FNDCT Report is an indication of the low innovative pattern of S&T funding, since only 60% of the amount contracted was actually disbursed; three-quarters of the amounts paid were reimbursable, in the form of credit; 85% of the non-reimbursable amount paid was for ICTs and scholarships; and 7.5% of the amount contracted was for interactions between ICTs and companies.

Few credit lines are disruptive in terms of innovation, such as the so-called pioneering innovation - 15 active projects in the portfolio in 2022 - and only one invests consistently in companies’ permanent R&D structure, called ‘innovation for competitiveness’ - with 10 active projects in the portfolio in 2022. Even regarding the private sector, there is a regional concentration and by companies’ size, classified by Finep itself as large or medium-large. Among the projects finished in 2019, 77% of the number of operations and 79% of the value went to companies of these sizes. As for regional concentration, 91% of the operations were in the Southeast and South regions, which accounted for 83% of the total amount disbursed.

4. FINAL REMARKS

There is a process of dehydration whose complete anatomy this article sought to describe and analyze critically, in the light of its own data collection. The privileged and almost mythical position of innovation as the engine of development, which has marked not only the political speech of the last few decades, but also the legal frameworks and policy guidelines in S&T, has not unfolded into an effective and sufficient budget execution to manage a delayed and dependent economic matrix.

The presented data show that, on average, sectoral funds are not facing collection problems, but are suffering from a process of dehydration dictated by a fiscal policy of austerity that has held the national economy hostage to financialization. Although the general S&T budget has increased in relation to Gross Domestic Product (Koeller & Rauen, 2021), the percentage of budget’s non-execution has also risen, showing the same levels of application as before sectoral funds’ creation.

Complementary Law No. 177/2021 (Lei Complementar nº 177,2021) led to an increase in reimbursable and non-reimbursable resources settled in the 2022 FNDCT budget execution, but the amount paid still represents a portion of LOA’s projected resources. Hence, there is a total mischaracterization of the ST&I financing policy designed after FNDCT creation, so that the organization based on specific funds with their own revenue and application is deconstructed in budget execution, which blocks most of the resources and spreads the leftovers among transversal actions, at the discretion of a centralized management system, without planning and an effective assessment.

REFERÊNCIAS

• Acórdão TCU nº 3.440, de 04 de dezembro de 2013 (2013). Auditoria de natureza operacional destinada a identificar como são realizadas a avaliação de resultado e a avaliação periódica de impacto e efetividade do FNDCT, previstas na Lei 11.540/2007. Identificação de lacunas quanto às avaliações determinadas pela lei, assim como das possíveis principais causas de tal quadro. Tribunal de Contas da União.
• Acórdão TCU nº 500, de 11 de fevereiro de 2015 (2015). Auditoria de Conformidade-MCTI. Utilização inadequada do FNDCT no custeio de outros órgãos e programas. Tribunal de Contas da União.
• Acórdão TCU nº 1.237, de 29 de maio de 2019 (2019). Auditoria Operacional. Ministério Da Ciência, Tecnologia, Inovações e Comunicações (MCTIC). Tribunal de Contas da União.
• Decreto nº 2.851, de 30 de novembro de 1998. (1998). Dispõe sobre programas de amparo à pesquisa científica e tecnológica aplicados à indústria do petróleo. https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto/d2851.htm
  » https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto/d2851.htm
• Decreto nº 3.867, de 16 de julho de 2001. (2001). Regulamenta a Lei no 9.991, de 24 de julho 2000, que dispõe sobre realização de investimentos em pesquisa e desenvolvimento e em eficiência energética por parte das empresas concessionárias, permissionárias e autorizadas do setor de energia elétrica, e dá outras providências. https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto/2001/d3867.htm
  » https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto/2001/d3867.htm
• Decreto nº 3.874, de 19 de julho de 2001 (2001). Regulamenta o inciso V do art. 1o da Lei no 8.001, de 13 de março de 1990, e a Lei no 9.993, de 24 de julho 2000, no que destinam ao setor de ciência e tecnologia recursos da compensação financeira pela utilização de recursos hídricos para fins de geração de energia elétrica. https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto/2001/d3874.htm
  » https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto/2001/d3874.htm
• Decreto nº 3.877, de 24 de julho de 2001 (2001). Institui o Cadastramento Único para Programas Sociais do Governo Federal. https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto/2001/d3877.htm
  » https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto/2001/d3877.htm
• Decreto nº 3.915, de 12 de setembro de 2001 (2001). Regulamenta a Lei no 9.994, de 24 de julho de 2000, que institui o Programa de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico do setor espacial, e dá outras providências. https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto/2001/d3915.htm
  » https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto/2001/d3915.htm
• Decreto nº 4.195, de 11 de abril de 2002 (2002). Regulamenta a Lei no 10.168, de 29 de dezembro de 2000, que institui contribuição de intervenção no domínio econômico destinada a financiar o Programa de Estímulo à Interação Universidade-Empresa para Apoio à Inovação, e a Lei no 10.332, de 19 de dezembro de 2001, que institui mecanismos de financiamento para programas de ciência e tecnologia, e dá outras providências. https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto/2002/d4195.htm
  » https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto/2002/d4195.htm
• Decreto nº 4.344, de 26 de agosto de 2002 (2002). Regulamenta a Lei no 8.394, de 30 de dezembro de 1991, que dispõe sobre a preservação, organização e proteção dos acervos documentais privados dos presidentes da República, e dá outras providências. https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto/2002/d4344.htm
  » https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto/2002/d4344.htm
• Decreto nº 7.819, de 3 de outubro de 2012 (2012). Regulamenta os arts. 40 a 44 da Lei nº 12.715, de 17 de setembro de 2012, que dispõe sobre o Programa de Incentivo à Inovação Tecnológica e Adensamento da Cadeia Produtiva de Veículos Automotores - INOVAR-AUTO, e os arts. 5º e 6º da Lei nº 12.546, de 14 de dezembro de 2011, que dispõe sobre redução do Imposto sobre Produtos Industrializados, na hipótese que especifica. https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2011-2014/2012/decreto/d7819.htm
  » https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2011-2014/2012/decreto/d7819.htm
• Fundo Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico. (2019). Relatório de resultados do FNDCT 2019 http://www.finep.gov.br/images/a-finep/FNDCT/08_06_2020_Relatorio_de_Resultados_FNDCT_2019.pdf
  » http://www.finep.gov.br/images/a-finep/FNDCT/08_06_2020_Relatorio_de_Resultados_FNDCT_2019.pdf
• Koeller, P., & Rauen, A. T. (2021). Previsão de arrecadação de recursos do Fundo Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (FNDCT) para o período 2021-2024, segundo novas determinações legais(Nota Técnica, 82). Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada.
• Leal, J. C., Teixeira, A. C., & Moreira, G. E. (2020). Governança, federalismo e crise do Fundo Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (FNDCT). Economia e Sociedade, 29(1), 297-325. https://doi.org/10.1590/1982-3533.2020v29n1art11
• Lei Complementar nº 177, de 12 de janeiro de 2021 (2021). Altera a Lei Complementar nº 101, de 4 de maio de 2000, para vedar a limitação de empenho e movimentação financeira das despesas relativas à inovação e ao desenvolvimento científico e tecnológico custeadas por fundo criado para tal finalidade, e a Lei nº 11.540, de 12 de novembro de 2007, para modificar a natureza e as fontes de receitas do Fundo Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (FNDCT), e incluir programas desenvolvidos por organizações sociais entre as instituições que podem acessar os recursos do FNDCT. https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/lcp/lcp177.htm
  » https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/lcp/lcp177.htm
• Lei nº 9.991, de 24 de julho de 2000 (2000). Dispõe sobre realização de investimentos em pesquisa e desenvolvimento e em eficiência energética por parte das empresas concessionárias, permissionárias e autorizadas do setor de energia elétrica, e dá outras providências. https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/l9991.htm
  » https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/l9991.htm
• Lei nº 9.992, de 24 de julho de 2000 (2000). Altera a destinação de receitas próprias decorrentes de contratos firmados pelo Departamento Nacional de Estradas de Rodagem, visando o financiamento de programas e projetos de pesquisa científica e desenvolvimento tecnológico do setor produtivo na área de transportes terrestres, e dá outras providências. https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/l9992.htm
  » https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/l9992.htm
• Lei nº 9.993, de 24 de julho de 2000 (2000). Destina recursos da compensação financeira pela utilização de recursos hídricos para fins de geração de energia elétrica e pela exploração de recursos minerais para o setor de ciência e tecnologia. https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/LEIS/L9993.htm
  » https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/LEIS/L9993.htm
• Lei nº 9.994, de 24 de julho de 2000 (2000). Institui o Programa de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico do Setor Espacial, e dá outras providências. https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/l9994.htm
  » https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/l9994.htm
• Lei nº 10.168, de 29 de dezembro de 2000 (2000). Institui contribuição de intervenção de domínio econômico destinada a financiar o Programa de Estímulo à Interação Universidade-Empresa para o Apoio à Inovação e dá outras providências. https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/L10168.htm
  » https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/L10168.htm
• Lei nº 10.176, de 11 de janeiro de 2001 (2001). Altera a Lei no 8.248, de 23 de outubro de 1991, a Lei no 8.387, de 30 de dezembro de 1991, e o Decreto-Lei no 288, de 28 de fevereiro de 1967, dispondo sobre a capacitação e competitividade do setor de tecnologia da informação. https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/LEIS_2001/L10176.htm
  » https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/LEIS_2001/L10176.htm
• Lei nº 10.197, de 14 de fevereiro de 2001 (2001). Acresce dispositivos ao Decreto-Lei no 719, de 31 de julho de 1969, para dispor sobre o financiamento a projetos de implantação e recuperação de infra-estrutura de pesquisa nas instituições públicas de ensino superior e de pesquisa, e dá outras providências. https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/leis_2001/l10197.htm
  » https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/leis_2001/l10197.htm
• Lei nº 10.332, de 19 de dezembro de 2001 (2001). Institui mecanismo de financiamento para o Programa de Ciência e Tecnologia para o Agronegócio, para o Programa de Fomento à Pesquisa em Saúde, para o Programa Biotecnologia e Recursos Genéticos - Genoma, para o Programa de Ciência e Tecnologia para o Setor Aeronáutico e para o Programa de Inovação para Competitividade, e dá outras providências. https://planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/leis_2001/l10332.htm
  » https://planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/leis_2001/l10332.htm
• Lei nº 10.893, de 13 de julho de 2004 (2004). Dispõe sobre o Adicional ao Frete para a Renovação da Marinha Mercante - AFRMM e o Fundo da Marinha Mercante - FMM, e dá outras providências. https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2004-2006/2004/lei/l10.893.htm
  » https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2004-2006/2004/lei/l10.893.htm
• Lei nº 11.540, de 12 novembro de 2007. (2007). Dispõe sobre o Fundo Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico - FNDCT; altera o Decreto-Lei no 719, de 31 de julho de 1969, e a Lei no 9.478, de 6 de agosto de 1997; e dá outras providências. https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2007-2010/2007/lei/l11540.htm
  » https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2007-2010/2007/lei/l11540.htm
• Lei nº 12.715, de 17 de setembro de 2012. (2012). Altera a alíquota das contribuições previdenciárias sobre a folha de salários devidas pelas empresas que especifica; institui o Programa de Incentivo à Inovação Tecnológica e Adensamento da Cadeia Produtiva de Veículos Automotores, o Regime Especial de Tributação do Programa Nacional de Banda Larga para Implantação de Redes de Telecomunicações, o Regime Especial de Incentivo a Computadores para Uso Educacional, o Programa Nacional de Apoio à Atenção Oncológica e o Programa Nacional de Apoio à Atenção da Saúde da Pessoa com Deficiência; restabelece o Programa Um Computador por Aluno; altera o Programa de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento Tecnológico da Indústria de Semicondutores, instituído pela Lei nº 11.484, de 31 de maio de 2007; altera as Leis nº s 9.250, de 26 de dezembro de 1995, 11.033, de 21 de dezembro de 2004, 9.430, de 27 de dezembro de 1996, 10.865, de 30 de abril de 2004, 11.774, de 17 de setembro de 2008, 12.546, de 14 de dezembro de 2011, 11.484, de 31 de maio de 2007, 10.637, de 30 de dezembro de 2002, 11.196, de 21 de novembro de 2005, 10.406, de 10 de janeiro de 2002, 9.532, de 10 de dezembro de 1997, 12.431, de 24 de junho de 2011, 12.414, de 9 de junho de 2011, 8.666, de 21 de junho de 1993, 10.925, de 23 de julho de 2004, os Decretos-Leis nº s 1.455, de 7 de abril de 1976, 1.593, de 21 de dezembro de 1977, e a Medida Provisória nº 2.199-14, de 24 de agosto de 2001; e dá outras providências. https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2011-2014/2012/lei/l12715.htm
  » https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2011-2014/2012/lei/l12715.htm
• Moraes, J. M. In J. A. de Negro, & L. C. Kubota (2008). Políticas de incentivo à inovação tecnológica(pp. 67-106). Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada.
• Negri, F., & Koeller, P. (2019). O declínio do investimento público em ciência e tecnologia: uma análise do orçamento do Ministério da Ciência, Tecnologia, Inovações e Comunicações até o primeiro semestre de 2019(Nota Técnica, 48). Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada.
• Queiroz, G. P., & Cavalcante, L. R. (2012). Evolução da execução orçamentária do Ministério de Ciência e tecnologia entre 2001 e 2010 (Texto para discussão, 1751). Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada.

• DATA AVAILABILITY

  The entire dataset supporting the results of this study is available upon request to the corresponding author (Camila Furlan da Costa). The dataset is not publicly available as it is a compilation made by the authors from public data indicated in the legends of graphs and tables.

Reviewers

• 12
  Lidia Boaventura Pimenta (Universidade do Estado da Bahia, Salvador / BA - Brazil) https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0936-9202
• 13
  Robson Zuccolotto (Universidade Federal do Espírito Santo, Vitória / ES - Brazil) https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2629-5586
• 14
  One of the reviewers did not authorize the disclosure of their identities.

• 15
  Peer review report: the peer review report is available at this URL. https://periodicos.fgv.br/rap/article/view/90967/85482

Edited by

Alketa Peci (Fundação Getulio Vargas, Rio de Janeiro / RJ - Brazil) https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0488-1744

Gabriela Spanghero Lotta (Fundação Getulio Vargas, São Paulo / SP - Brazil) https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2801-1628

Data availability

The entire dataset supporting the results of this study is available upon request to the corresponding author (Camila Furlan da Costa). The dataset is not publicly available as it is a compilation made by the authors from public data indicated in the legends of graphs and tables.

Publication Dates

• Publication in this collection
  20 May 2024
• Date of issue
  2024

History

• Received
  16 Mar 2023
• Accepted
  21 Sept 2023