

## Change and continuity between *Chile Solidario* and *Ingreso Ético Familiar*

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This article presents and discusses the two conditional cash transfer initiatives implemented in Chile – *Chile Solidario* (2002-2013) and *Ingreso Ético Solidario* (2013-present) – and aim at identifying continuities and change between the two. A comparison of the two programmes, based on Howlett and Cashore's (2009) typology for analysing policy change that distinguished between ends and means, allows the identification of continuities and changes regarding the goals and mechanisms present in the two programmes. The article argues that despite being announced as an innovative measure in regard to the previous programme, *Ingreso Ético Familiar* maintains the core characteristics of *Chile Solidario* and includes some additional elements. This article makes two different contributions: (1) it traces the evolution of conditional cash transfers programmes in Chile over the past two decades and (2) it establishes a dialogue with the literatures on changes to social policy.

**Keywords:** social policy; conditional cash transfers; policy change; *Chile Solidario*; *Ingreso Ético Familiar*.

### Mudanças e continuidades entre o *Chile Solidario* e o *Ingreso Ético Familiar*

Este artigo apresenta e discute os programas de transferência monetária condicionada implementadas no Chile, o *Chile Solidario* (2002-2013) e o *Ingreso Ético Familiar* (2013-presente), procurando identificar continuidades e diferenças entre as duas iniciativas. Tendo por base a literatura sobre mudanças em políticas públicas e, em particular, a tipologia proposta por Howlett e Cashore (2009), que distinguem entre fins e meios, faz-se uma comparação entre os dois programas, de modo a identificar objetivos e mecanismos que se mantêm, quais se alteram, bem como as novidades introduzidas. Argumenta-se que, apesar de ter sido apresentado como um programa inovador em relação ao seu antecessor, o *Ingreso Ético Familiar*, o *Chile Solidario* mantém os atributos daquele, aos quais se adicionam alguns novos elementos. O artigo traz contributos em duas áreas: traça a evolução da política de transferência condicionada no Chile nas duas últimas décadas e dialoga com a literatura sobre mudança em política social.

**Palavras-chave:** política social; transferência monetária condicionada; mudança em políticas sociais; *Chile Solidario*; *Ingreso Ético Familiar*.

### Cambios y continuidades entre el programa Chile Solidario e Ingreso Ético Familiar

El artículo presenta y discute los programas de transferencia condicionada chilenas – el Chile Solidario (2002-2013) y el Ingreso Ético Familiar (2013-presente) – y busca identificar continuidades y diferencias entre las dos iniciativas. Teniendo como base la literatura acerca de cambio en políticas públicas y, en particular, la tipologia propuesta por Howlett y Cashore (2009) que distingue entre fines y medios, se realizar un análisis comparado entre ambos programas, buscando identificar los objetivos y mecanismos que persisten, los que se modifican y si se introducen innovaciones. Como resultado, pese a que haya sido presentado como un programa innovador en relación al anterior, el Ingreso Ético Familiar mantiene los principales atributos de Chile Solidario, a los cuales son añadidos algunos nuevos elementos. El artículo busca hacer contribuciones en dos áreas: (1) mapear la evolución de los programas de transferencia condicionada en las dos últimas décadas y (2) dialogar con la literatura sobre cambios en política social.

**Palabras clave:** política social; programas de transferencias condicionadas; cambio en políticas sociales; Chile Solidario; Ingreso Ético Familiar.

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

The adoption of a new social policies is often heralded as a great novelty. It was the case with of the cash transfer program *Ingreso Ético Familiar* (2012), which replaced the exiting program *Chile Solidario* (2002) and was presented as a ‘new policy’ (Piñera, 2011, p. 15). The emphasis placed on innovation becomes particularly relevant when policies are considered to be the symbol of a government. This is the case of *Chile Solidario* in relation to the center-left *Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia* (Larrañaga & Contreras, 2010), and of *Ingreso Ético Familiar* in relation to the center-right *Coalición por el Cambio*. Usually, new governments highlight the originality of their policies - the innovative components are pointed out, while continuities are ignored. However, it is worth asking how unprecedented this new program is.

The analysis of policy change has received considerable attention and there is already a consolidated literature on the subject, which is presented in the next section. In this article, we make use of Hall’s proposals (1993) and of Howlett and Cashore’s contributions (2009). These frameworks allow us to analyze public policies and the changes they undergo, distinguishing between policy ends and means and taking into account different levels of abstraction. From the comparison of the two programs under this matrix, we conclude that, despite the emphasis given to policy change, the program *Ingreso Ético Familiar* reproduced features that were already present in *Chile Solidario* and added a few novel elements. Thus, the innovative character is lower than advertised.

The two cash transfer programs under analysis were selected because of their importance both in Chile and across Latin America. On the one hand, *Chile Solidario* was a flagship project in the fight against poverty under Ricardo Lagos’ government (Cohen & Franco, 2006; Larrañaga & Contreras, 2010). On the other, its adoption is part of a broader process of dissemination of the conditional cash transfer model in Latin America<sup>1</sup> and in other contexts.

<sup>1</sup> The diffusion process of Conditional Cash Transfer programs has been extensively studied by authors such as Osorio (2018, 2020), Peck and Theodore (2015), Sugiyama (2011), among others, and is not discussed in this paper.

The Chilean program stood out because it contained a new component, that of psychosocial support, which is described below. This component was incorporated by cash transfer programs adopted by other countries, such as Paraguay (*Tekoporâ*, in 2005), Trinidad and Tobago (Step-Up, in 2006), and Colombia (*Red Juntos*, in 2007) (Cechinni & Martínez, 2011; Osorio & Vergara, 2019; Peck & Theodore, 2015; Valencia, 2008). The replacement of *Chile Solidario* by *Ingreso Ético Familiar*, in 2013, makes it possible to examine and discuss change in public policy and, in particular, in social policy of high national and regional relevance.

The next section consists of a literature review on policy change and includes the presentation of the analytical framework. This is followed by a section on methodology. The fourth and fifth parts explore the design, implementation and evaluation of *Chile Solidario* and *Ingreso Ético Familiar*, respectively. Finally, the two initiatives are compared.

## 2. CHANGE IN PUBLIC POLICY: A BRIEF REVIEW

The concept of policy change has been widely discussed. The first studies, known as incrementalism, suggests that minor changes happen successively (Lindblom, 1959). Several authors have sought to explain changes, which may be normal or atypical (Howlett, Ramesh, & Perl, 2013). The former are minimal changes made over time that do not affect the contours of the policy (Howlett et al., 2013). The latter are profound transformations that affect ideas, general orientations, objectives and instruments.

Howlett et al. (2013) refer to the paradoxical fact that atypical changes, despite being occasional and rare, concentrate most of the studies. The proposals that analyze these moments of sharp change (Hall, 1993; Kingdon, 1984; Muller, 2011; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993) highlight the role of new ideas in decision-making and/or the access of actors with different views to decision-making venues. In addition, they give relevance to policy learning processes, which consist of drawing lessons and applying them to the (re)design of policies based on what is in force in other contexts. Decision-makers might also learn from their participation in other initiatives (P. M. Haas & E. B. Haas, 1995; Howlett et al., 2013).

Drastic modifications tend to occur at critical moments, such as the change of government and moments of crisis (Kingdon, 1984), or when new problems that generate uncertainty arise (P. M. Haas, 1992). They can also take place when the existing policy presents failures in responding to the problem (Howlett et al., 2013). In contrast, the theory of punctuated equilibrium (True, Jones, & Baumgartner, 1999) combines the two types of change – normal and atypical – by suggesting that long-lasting policies have extensive periods of great stability, in which slight changes occur, interrupted from time to time by marked alterations.

Seen from another perspective, policy change can assume the following contours: innovation, termination, succession and maintenance (Torrell, 2005). It is considered an innovation when it is possible to observe the emergence of new ideas and the adoption of new practices that translate into a significant change in the protocols generally used (Paz & Fontaine, 2017). As already mentioned, the emergence of an innovation is unusual (Hogwood & Peters, 1983; Howlett et al., 2013; Torrell, 2005). The termination of a policy, in turn, is also rare, which is explained not only by the many interests at stake, but also by the political cost that can lead to the loss of support, for example (Howlett et al., 2013).

Termination tends to be associated with very radical changes of vision and/or the rise of groups with very divergent orientations to decision-making positions (Harguindéguy, 2013). Hogwood and Peters (1983) note that, despite the fact that many theories are devoted to the analysis of the emergence of new policies, ‘*«new» policies are rarely written on a tabula rasa, but rather on a well-occupied or even crowded tablet of existing laws, organizations and clients*’, which leads them to argue that more attention needs to be paid to policy succession phenomena - i.e., the replacement of an existing policy with another.

The authors argue that this change tends to be increasingly present as a result of (a) the strengthening and expansion of public action, which reduces the space for innovation; (b) constraints created by existing policies (response to issues not observed by them or to problems arising from their implementation); and (c) the availability of resources. This approach has similarities with incrementalism, recognized by the authors, who highlight, however, the advantages of distinguishing between different types of small and successive changes, a point absent in the first model.

It is worth mentioning that the succession process can occur in different ways: (a) linearly, when there is a direct replacement of one policy by another, keeping the objectives aligned with the initial proposal; (b) by consolidation, taking the form of merger or integration; (c) by disintegration, which happens when a public policy breaks down, giving rise to two or more policies; or (d) non-linearly, in the case of the emergence of an alternative policy, but similar to the one that existed before (Torrell, 2005).

Finally, there are also cases of policy maintenance, which corresponds to the reinforcement of the existing measures by modifying secondary aspects and do not call into question the goals that guide the policy (Harguindéguy, 2013; Torrell, 2005).

This typology of change processes can be broadened by adding to it an analysis of the components of the programs. In other words, considering that the transformation may involve different elements, resulting in differentiated processes, enriches the framework. According to Hall (1993), two levels must be taken into account: policy ends, which are the general objectives that guide the policy; and techniques, which encompass all the means and instruments that make up the policy and allow the achievement of its objectives.

Hall’s proposal (1993) is taken up and further elaborated by Howlett and Cashore (2009), who propose separating ends from means, in addition to recommending the inclusion of a dimension of abstraction, whose level may be high, operational or basic. In the framework advanced by the authors, when the abstraction is high, the ends correspond to the philosophy that guides the policy, while the means refer to instrumental logic or preferences regarding implementation. When the level of abstraction is operational, the ends represent the explicit objectives of the program and the means are the mechanisms that allow these objectives to be achieved. When the level of abstraction is basic, ends refer to an established organization and means are ways of monitoring policy, that is, elements and mechanisms that enable action (Howlett & Cashore, 2009). If, at the practical level, it is desirable that ends and means are aligned and co-constructed as the policy evolves, this distinction is quite useful from an analytical point of view. Box 1 outlines such a proposal.

**BOX 1 ANALYSIS OF ENDS AND MEANS ON PUBLIC POLICIES**

High Level Abstraction		Level of abstraction		
		Program Level Operationalization	Specific On the Ground Measures	
Ends and Means	Policy Ends or Aims	Ends	Goals	Settings
	Policy Means or Tools	Instrument Logic	Mechanisms	Calibrations

**Source:** Elaborated by the authors based on Harguindéguy, (2013) and Howlett and Cashore (2009).

The separation between ends and means enables the emergence of new modes of analysis of policy change. These are: (a) layer addition, which occurs when new ends and means are added to the previous ones and may bring inconsistencies in the long term; (b) policy drift, when new ends are defined without changing the means to achieve them; (c) conversion, which involves the adaptation of the means to bring them closer to the ends; or (d) redesign/replacement, which occurs when both ends and means are changed (Howlett et al., 2013).

An analytical framework that separates ends from means, based on proposals by Howlett and Cashore (2009) as well as Harguindéguy (2013), is used by Osorio and Vergara (2019) to compare Chilean, Colombian and Paraguayan cash transfer policies. The authors argue that the processes of diffusion of these policies present in the region of Latin America allow for the replication of some components that constitute the core of such initiatives but hide considerable variation regarding the objectives of the programs and other elements that compose them.

**3. METHODOLOGY**

The article starts with a review of the literature on policy change, specifically in social programs. Based on the conceptual discussion in the previous section and the analytical matrix already presented, two Chilean cash transfer programs, implemented one after the other - *Chile Solidario* (2002-2013) and *Ingreso Ético Familiar* (from 2013 onwards) – are compared. The analysis focuses on the period between 2002, when the first program was created, and 2018. The aim is to understand whether there are continuities or discrepancies regarding the objectives of the policies, their guidelines and the set of instruments they mobilize.

In order to compare the programs, information was collected from secondary sources, such as academic articles and books, as well as from reports and other official documents.

The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) has a database of non-contributory social protection programs in Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC, undated), which contains information on conditional cash transfer programs implemented in different countries. In addition to general information about each program, the database also contains quantitative data, such as the number beneficiaries in a historical series, and the program’s annual budget, among other. For each program, ECLAC’s platform indicates a few studies of academic nature or carried out by international organizations. The consultation of this platform provided access to quantitative data about the programs and helped identify some of the studies that serve as a basis for this work. Based

on this information and on additional data recovered from other articles and chapters found in the bibliography and in other bibliographical search platforms, such as SciELO, the design of each of the programs under analysis was reconstituted. Then, the information referring to each of them was systematized and organized in the analytical matrix (Box 2), facilitating the comparison between the programs. With this comparison, the differences observed between the two were identified and, more concretely, it was possible to discuss at what level they occurred, that is, if they were transformations related to ends and/or to means.

The following two sections present *Chile Solidario* and *Ingreso Ético Familiar*. These are followed by a section devoted to the comparison of the programs and to the discussion of the similarities and changes observed in the transition from the former to its substitute.

#### 4. CHILE SOLIDARIO

Chile has a long history of measures to support vulnerable populations. During the governments of Frei (1964-1970) and Allende (1970-1973), there were significant advances in non-contributory protection for vulnerable mothers and children (Garay, 2010). With the military dictatorship (1973-1990), the neoliberal vision became dominant, translating into a decrease in spending and a marginal role for the State, together with incentives for private sector participation (Raczynski, 1994). This period saw the introduction of a private pension system (1981), the adoption of public works programs, and the creation of *Subsidio Único Familiar* (1981), a cash transfer for vulnerable families with children requiring medical check-ups, and of *Pensión Asistencial*, which consists of financial support for the elderly and disabled in poverty (Raczynski, 1994; Graham, 1994). Targeting and selection tools have also been developed, notably *Ficha CAS*<sup>2</sup> (Larrañaga, Falck, Herrera, & Telias, 2014).

From 1990 on, the redemocratization brought advances in areas such as health and housing, with the former regime's social benefits maintained along the same lines (Robles, 2013). Noteworthy was the creation of the *Fondo de Solidaridad e Inversión Social* (Fosis), an independent structure within the Ministry of Development and Social Planning (Mideplan), financed by resources from tax reform and from international donor agencies, and whose main activities were to facilitate access to credit, provide training and support the development of community projects or within the project bank (Graham, 1994).

In democracy and with high levels of economic growth, poverty declined - in 1987 it reached 45% of the population (Tonda, 2013), dropping to 20.1% in 2000 (Ramzic, 2013). However, the sustained fall in extreme poverty was interrupted by the impact of the Asian Crisis in 1998 (Robles, 2013). The following year, a Mideplan study estimated 225,000 families in extreme poverty, about 5% of the population, and denounced the limited access of this group to support measures (Barrientos, 2010).

Faced with this data, Mideplan's Social Division created a working group that was tasked with generating an integrated strategy to combat extreme poverty that prioritized the provision of services and networking and focusing on families (Palma & Urzúa, 2005). Previous local experiences, such as the municipality of La Florida, and initiatives developed by civil society organisations, such as

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<sup>2</sup> Use of socio-economic data to identify the poorest families.

*Fundación Rodelillo* and *Hogar de Cristo*, served as inspiration (M. C. Oliveira, 2018; M. C. Oliveira & Bichir, 2021; Osorio, 2018, 2020).

Its elaboration included the participation of a group of people trained in social work, which influenced the design of the program and explains the importance attributed to psychosocial aspects (M. C. Oliveira, 2018; Reininger, Castro-Serrano, Flotts, Vergara, & Fuentealba, 2016), as well as the incorporation and operationalization of concepts present in academic debates such as social capital (Osorio & Puente, 2017), multidimensional poverty, social networks and work in crisis. The new program<sup>3</sup> was announced by President Lagos in his 2002 message to the country (Lagos, 2002) and implemented in the same year, regulated by Law No. 19,949 of 2004.

Following the tradition of focusing social measures, the program targeted families in extreme poverty who were selected based on their scores in *Ficha CAS* and, later, *Ficha de Protección Social*<sup>4</sup>. Participation in *Chile Solidario* was sealed with the signing of an agreement between the family and the State, lasting a total of five years and divided into two phases.

During the first two years, in addition to receiving a social benefit, the family was included in *Puente*, a psychosocial support program, which consisted in the monitoring of the family by a social worker, in order to jointly outline a particular strategy to overcome poverty, which should focus on 53 indicators - later 71 - grouped into seven dimensions: documentation, health, education, housing, work, income and intra-family dynamics. It was an innovation in this area and resulted from the observation of practices developed by civil society organisations (M. C. Oliveira, 2018).

This element differentiated the Chilean initiative from other conditional cash transfer programs implemented in the region<sup>5</sup> and attracted the attention of the international community, and was subsequently replicated in other contexts<sup>6</sup> (Osorio, 2018, 2020; Osorio, M. C. Oliveira, & Vergara, 2020; Osorio & Vergara, 2019). While *Puente* was the central axis of *Chile Solidario*, the monetary transfer was a secondary concern (Larrañaga & Contreras, 2010). Transferred preferentially to women, the value decreased over time and ceased immediately if the family was no longer part of the *Puente*.

At the end of the first stage, families were disconnected from *Puente* and stopped receiving the transfer, which was replaced by another one, called *Bono de Egreso*, lasting three years. In addition to receiving a subsidy for drinking water consumption and sanitation services (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2017), families enrolled in *Chile Solidario* had priority access to other existing benefits and services, such as *Subsidio Único Familiar*.

Under the first Bachelet government (*Concertación*, 2006-2010), changes were made to existing social benefits, such as the elimination of annual quotas for access to the *Subsidio Único Familiar* (Garay, 2010), resulting in an increase in the number of beneficiaries. *Chile Solidario* also started to integrate additional measures designed for the homeless population, the elderly living alone and children with incarcerated parents.

<sup>3</sup> For more information regarding the formulation of the program, see, for example, Oliveira (2018), Oliveira and Bichir (2021) or Osorio (2018, 2020).

<sup>4</sup> *Ficha de Protección Social* replaced *Ficha CAS* and uses vulnerability indicators (Larrañaga et al., 2014).

<sup>5</sup> Due to the introduction of this component, Barrientos (2013) considers it a different initiative from Conditional Cash Transfer programs, calling it an integrated strategy to combat poverty.

<sup>6</sup> Paraguay, Colombia and Caribbean countries.

Furthermore, to lessen the impact of the global financial crisis that began in 2008, and as part of the Chilean stimulus package, extraordinary cash transfer measures that targeted the poorest, in particular *Chile Solidario* beneficiaries, were implemented (Robles, 2013b). Another change worth mentioning occurred in 2009, with the creation of the Comprehensive Social Protection System, following the approval of Law No. 20,379, with *Chile Solidario* now being considered a subsystem<sup>7</sup>.

The coordinated response to the multidimensional problem of extreme poverty implied the mobilization and articulation of various agencies and ministries at different levels of government. *Chile Solidario*'s funding came from a tax adjustment<sup>8</sup> and depended on the Ministry of Finance (Garay, 2010). While Mideplan was responsible for managing the funding, selecting beneficiaries and coordinating the institutions involved, monitoring and evaluating (Larrañaga & Contreras, 2010), Fosis was in charge of managing *Puente*. Linking the program with other areas, such as education and health, required the participation of and coordination with the respective ministries (Franzoni & Voorend, 2011).

*Chile Solidario* was implemented in partnership with the municipalities, which were invited to join the program by signing an agreement with Mideplan (Raczynski, 2008). A *Unidad de Intervención Familiar* (Family Intervention Unit) was then created to coordinate local action and was staffed by local officials and by workers appointed by Fosis (Larrañaga & Contreras, 2010; Raczynski, 2008). The program was operationalized in almost all the municipalities (Raczynski, 2008). Agreements were also signed with various state agencies to guarantee priority access to services for *Chile Solidario* beneficiaries (Raczynski, 2008).

*Chile Solidario* aimed to assist 225,000 families in extreme poverty, as indicated in the Mideplan study of 1999. In the first year of operation (2002), 40,700 families benefited from the program, or 1.15 per cent of the population (Cepal, 2021a). Then it was gradually expanded in the years that followed. In 2006, it reached almost 250,000 families, exceeding the initial target, and in 2012 it touched the maximum number of 546,000 beneficiary families. With the creation of *Ingreso Ético Familiar* in 2013, new beneficiaries ceased to be incorporated into the program and numbers decreased dramatically, to around 80,000 families, still in the same year, and to 12,500 in 2017, the year the program ended (Cepal, 2021a).

Several studies have assessed the impact of *Chile Solidario*, with Larrañaga and Contreras (2010) warning about the difficulty of assessing subjective goals, such as intra-family relations. Barrientos (2010) stated that about 70 per cent of families were able to achieve the goals. A study by Galasso (2006) indicated renewed confidence of families in themselves, increased enrolment of children in school and greater demand for training and health care, particularly in urban areas. The same study found no evidence of improved family income or greater capacity to enter the labor market. This latter information was relevant because it leveraged a discussion on poverty-labor, an important topic for the *Coalición*. It also exemplifies the role of incentives for change played by evaluations (Howlett et al., 2013).

<sup>7</sup> The approval of this law also created *Chile Crece Contigo*, which brings together a set of measures from various sectors, such as education and health, aimed at early childhood.

<sup>8</sup> It is also worth mentioning a World Bank loan aimed at conducting studies on the program and promoting the strengthening of institutions and human resources (Raczynski, 2008).



### 3.2. Ingreso Ético Familiar

In 2007, a debate on poverty and equity began, which led to the convening of an advisory council to examine the issue. Difficult access to the formal labor market was identified as a factor explaining the perpetuation of poverty (Arellano, 2013; Kast, 2013), both in the council and in discussions in other arenas in which experts associated to the *Coalición* participated (Miorelli, 2017). These debates guided the creation of new measures, such as the *Subsidio al Empleo Joven* (2009), aimed at supporting young people aged 18-24 belonging to the most vulnerable 40% who managed to integrate into the formal labor market (Huneus & Repetto, 2013).

The election of Sebastián Piñera (2010-2014) at the head of the *Coalición por el Cambio* corresponded to the first right-wing moment in the presidency after redemocratization. Addressing poverty through economic growth and labor market insertion was taken up in Piñera's program, which envisaged the review of existing instruments and their replacement with programs that reflected the new orientation, so as to enable the elimination of extreme poverty by 2014 and of poverty by 2018 (Piñera, 2009, 2011).

Thus, as early as 2011, a group was constituted within Mideplan with the mission of rethinking *Chile Solidario* and transforming it into *Ingreso Ético Familiar*, an idea that was already present during the presidential campaign (Piñera, 2009). In addition, the transition of Mideplan to the Ministry of Social Development (MDS) and a review of the selection mechanisms for social programs was also initiated (Larrañaga et al., 2014). Approved in Congress in May 2012, *Ingreso Ético Familiar* was first implemented in 2013 and is still in force. Miorelli (2017) attributes the delay to setbacks - the Minister of Social Development left the government and there it was difficult to articulate the different agencies and ministries involved.

*Ingreso Ético Familiar*, the substitute of *Chile Solidario*, is also known by the name *Subsistema de Seguridades y Oportunidades*. On the Chilean government's data page (Gobierno de Chile, 2021), it is described as follows:

The Chilean Subsystem *Seguridades y Oportunidades* is a benefit that cannot be claimed and that offers integrated and continuous support to the most vulnerable people and families, so that through their own effort and commitment they can overcome the condition of extreme poverty.

It consists of two blocks: one of intervention and the other of cash transfer, which assumes a more important role than in the previous model. The intervention part is called *Eje* and consists in the monitoring of families by a social worker in order to identify appropriate strategies for each situation, referring them to *Apoyo Social* (social support) and, in some cases, to *Apoyo Laboral* (labor support). The former consists of 19 sessions over 24 months, in which the social worker and the family establish a plan to achieve the goals linked to the development of capacities (Arellano, 2013). All families are compulsorily part of this program (Centro de Políticas Públicas, 2012).

*Apoyo Laboral*, on the other hand, varies according to family needs and also lasts 24 months, crystallizing the vision that links employment to overcoming poverty, insofar as it aims to assist working-age individuals in overcoming barriers that hinder their insertion into the formal labor

market. A specialized professional accompanies the working-age members of the family and together they design the *Plan de Inserción Laboral* (Labor Insertion Plan), which reflects their particular needs. *Apoyo Laboral* also provides for the development of activities such as technical training and the promotion of micro-entrepreneurship, among others (Arellano, 2013).

The second element of the program is cash transfers, divided into three groups: dignity, duties and achievements. The dignity pillar translates the idea that the State offers families the means to overcome poverty. Thus, *Bono Base* is a transfer that corresponds to 85% of the difference between family income<sup>9</sup> and the extreme poverty line, adjusted annually (Arellano, 2013; Cecchini, Robles, & Vargas, 2012; Hernando, 2013). The duty pillar is understood as an incentive to build human capital (M. C. Oliveira, 2018). Thus, and following a logic present in Latin America, the transfer requires as a counterpart the fulfilment of conditionalities in the areas of education<sup>10</sup> and health<sup>11</sup>.

The third pillar follows a logic of rewarding families that achieve good results (Arellano, 2013) and contemplates three distinct areas. First, those who manage to meet the defined goals before the deadline receive an additional transfer (Kast, 2013). In addition, a new transfer was created. It is called *Bono al Trabajo de la Mujer* (Women's Work Bonus) and rewards women's entry into the formal labor market in two ways: when they get a job, they receive an additional benefit, worth part of their salary, for four years; the employer also receives an incentive for two years (Huneus & Repetto, 2013). It aims to increase the hiring of women and reduce the pay gap (Kast, 2013). The third award is *Bono por Logro Escolar* and is intended for students with good performance. It comprises two categories: 50,000 pesos for students who rank in the top 15% of their class and 30,000 pesos for those who rank between the top 15% and 30%.

The management and implementation structure of the program is very similar to that of *Chile Solidario*, described above, with the MDS coordinating various agencies and levels of government, Fosis in charge of *Apoyo Social* and *Apoyo Laboral*, and the municipalities as local partners in implementation. Families are selected through the use of *Ficha de Protección Social*, followed by the signing of a commitment with a representative of the State, which means joint effort to overcome poverty (Larraín, 2013), an idea already present in *Chile Solidario* and also found in other Latin American contexts. The duration of the program is 24 months and can be extended to 36 if the family does not participate simultaneously in both the *Apoyo Social* and *Apoyo Laboral*.

In 2013, *Ingreso Ético Familiar* had 100,200 families participating. The following year, the number of beneficiaries reduced to 66,000, increasing again in 2016 and reaching a maximum of 202,300 beneficiary families in 2016 (Cepal, 2021b). In September 2021, official government data pointed to 94.7 thousand families receiving a cash transfer and 75.1 thousand families receiving at least on the transfers (Gobierno de Chile, 2021).

A number of studies have assessed the impacts of *Ingreso Ético Familiar*. Fernández and Calcagni (2015) point to reduced knowledge about the rules and the amounts to be received, which undermines

<sup>9</sup> It includes salary and other income, plus subsidies and support received.

<sup>10</sup> Minimum attendance of 90% in primary school and 85% in secondary school.

<sup>11</sup> Compliance with the vaccination calendar for children up to six years old.

family organization. With regard to labor market insertion, the effects of *Apoyo Laboral* and *Bono al Trabajo de la Mujer* vary from region to region - strengthening labor supply does not necessarily lead to an increase in demand (Centro de Políticas Públicas, 2012; Fernández & Calcagni, 2015). In addition, Huneus and Repetto (2013) point to another barrier to the functioning of the incentive for women. The Chilean labor market has high turnover, so the requirement to keep the job for four years may limit the reach of the measure.

*Bono por Logro Escolar* is harshly criticized as it does not contribute to poverty reduction. Moreover, the fact that being among the top 15% or 30% does not depend exclusively on the effort of the students (Hardy, 2012). It also increases pressure on children, including intra-family pressure (M. C. Oliveira, 2018). Furthermore, despite the association of the duty pillar with compliance with health and education conditionalities, there is no evidence of significant impacts (Henocho & Troncoso, 2013). In general, the program contributes to raising the available income and, consequently, enables higher levels of consumption (Fernández & Calcagni, 2015).

#### 4. CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMS IN CHILE

The above-mentioned changes can be discussed in the light of the matrix presented in the first section and serve as a basis for the elaboration of Box 2, containing information from *Chile Solidario* and *Ingreso Ético Familiar* concerning the ends and means.

#### BOX 2 ANALYSIS OF CHILE SOLIDARIO AND INGRESO ÉTICO FAMILIAR

Components	Level of Abstraction	Aspects of the Public Policy	Chile Solidario	Ingreso Ético Familiar
Ends	High Level Abstraction	Ends	Addressing and integrating the extremely poor in the social protection system.	Addressing and integrating the extremely poor in the social protection system.
	Program Level Operationalization	Goals	Offer comprehensive support to families living in extreme poverty, integrating them into the State's social networks.	Offering comprehensive support to families in extreme poverty, developing their autonomy and promoting their insertion in the labor market.
	Specific On the Ground Measures	Settings	Mideplan, Fosis and Intersectorial Coordination.	MDS, Fosis and Intersectorial Coordination.

*Continue*

Components	Level of Abstraction	Aspects of the Public Policy	Chile Solidario	Ingreso Ético Familiar
			Means	High Level Abstraction
	Program Level Operationalization	Mechanisms	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Transfer for families enrolled in the program.</li> <li>- Bonus transfer after meeting minimum requirements.</li> <li>- <i>Subsidio Único Familiar</i>.</li> <li>- Drinking Water Allowance.</li> <li>- School Attendance Allowance and Solidarity Pension (65 and over).</li> <li>- Subsidy for obtaining the National Identity Card.</li> <li>- Psychological support (<i>Puente</i>).</li> <li>- Preferential access to other social programs for which they are eligible.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Basic cash transfer (dignity pillar).</li> <li>- Conditional cash transfer (duties pillar).</li> <li>- Bonus transfer for minimum requirements met earlier than expected (achievements pillar).</li> <li>- <i>Bono por Logro Escolar</i> (achievements pillar).</li> <li>- <i>Bono al Trabajo de la Mujer</i> (achievements pillar).</li> <li>- <i>Subsidio Único Familiar</i>.</li> <li>- Drinking Water Allowance.</li> <li>- Subsidy for Permanence in School and Pension Solidarity (65 years and over).</li> <li>- Subsidy for obtaining the National Identity Card.</li> <li>- Psychological support (<i>Apoyo Social</i>).</li> <li>- Professional accompaniment for insertion in the labor market - <i>Apoyo Laboral</i>.</li> <li>- Preferential access to other social programs for which they are eligible.</li> </ul>
	Specific On the Ground Measures	Calibrations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Duration: two years (24 months) in the first stage of <i>Chile Solidario</i>, corresponding to the duration of <i>Puente</i>.</li> <li>- Duration: three years (36 months) in the second phase of <i>Chile Solidario</i>.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Duration: two years (24 months) – <i>Apoyo Social</i>.</li> <li>- Duration: two years (24 months) – <i>Apoyo Laboral</i>.</li> <li>- Total duration of the program varies from 24 to 36 months - possible gap between <i>Apoyo Social</i> and <i>Apoyo Laboral</i>.</li> </ul>

**Source:** Elaborated by the authors based on the analysis of *Chile Solidario* presented in Osorio and Vergara (2019), replicated for the analysis of *Ingreso Ético Familiar*.

There is an overlapping of information from the two programs in almost all categories, except in the objectives and mechanisms. In other words, this is not a situation of atypical change, involving a drastic break with existing ideas and practices and their replacement by new ones. The purpose of the policy is to integrate those living in extreme poverty, but the guidelines are not exactly the same. In *Chile Solidario*, the aim was to support families and bring them closer to the programs and benefits offered by the State, which was in line with social service practices, a vision that was well represented in Mideplan at the time. *Ingreso Ético Familiar*, on the other hand, aims to support families and promote their autonomy and insertion in the labor market, a translation of the vision that links work to poverty, advocated by economists who make up the group responsible for designing the new program (Reininger et al., 2016).

As for the mechanisms, *Ingreso Ético Familiar* not only maintained all those already present in the previous program, but also incorporated new elements, such as *Apoyo Laboral* and *Bono al Trabajo de la Mujer*, among others. These two additions can be seen as mechanisms to achieve the program's new labor market goals. The growing number of cash transfers and the creation of labor support programs is explained by the centrality of transfers and by the effort connecting beneficiaries to the formal labor market.

What is new about the *Ingreso Ético Familiar*? According to Miorelli (2017), Piñera's government was concerned with creating its own initiative quickly, since *Chile Solidario* had *Concertación*'s signature. Changing the program's name and voting a new law marked a new beginning and linked the novel program to Piñera's government. Announced during the presidential campaign, *Ingreso Ético Familiar* was presented as a 'new policy' (Piñera, 2009, 2011). However, the idea of profound change is contested. Some consider the new program 'less innovative and revolutionary than it declares itself to be' (Centro de Políticas Públicas, 2012, p. 3), while others claim that 'it is *Chile Solidario* 2.0' (as cited in M. C. Oliveira, 2018, p. 159) and that 'the structure and operationalization of IEF inherited the general features of its predecessor, *Chile Solidario*' (E. Oliveira, 2015, p. 140).

There are a number of components of *Ingreso Ético Familiar* that were already present in *Chile Solidario*. Both programs aim to tackle down extreme poverty. Families in this situation are the unit of intervention, an essential feature of conditional transfer programs. Potential beneficiaries are identified by using *Ficha de Protección Social* - families with the lowest scores are invited to take part in the program. There is a logic of exit doors, that is, families can benefit from the program for a limited period of time, which in *Chile Solidario* totaled five years - two years of intensive monitoring and three years of additional support - and in *Ingreso Ético Familiar* corresponds to only two years but can reach three years if the enrollment in *Apoyo Social* and in *Apoyo Laboral* does not happen simultaneously.

Aside from transferring cash, the program aims to link families to the network of services and program. This is achieved with the support of a social worker, who identifies the difficulties and potentialities of each family and in partnership with the family designs a plan to overcome the situation of extreme poverty. Both programs have a psychosocial support component, which was associated with cash transfer programs for the first time with *Chile Solidario*. In the former, it corresponds to *Puente*, the program's most emblematic feature and one that has been positively evaluated both by social workers and beneficiary families. In *Ingreso Ético Familiar*, it goes by the name *Eje*. This is the

first contact with the family and implies intense monitoring and the design of a specific strategy for each family that is put in place within the framework of *Apoyo Social*. Moreover, and still according to the logic of linking families to the State's social network, both programs guarantee preferential access to other benefits and services.

Management occurs in a similar way: both are allocated to Mideplan – later transformed into MDS - with Fosis taking responsibility for the psychosocial support component. The implementation is done in partnership with the municipalities, with whom agreements are signed. Units for the coordination and management of the program are established at the local level.

Part of *Chile Solidario*'s structure is replicated by *Ingreso Ético Familiar*. Thus, rather than the creation of an innovative parallel program, *Ingreso Ético Familiar* can be understood as an advanced version of *Chile Solidario* to which new components are added. This refers to the metaphor of the Christmas tree on which extra decorations are hung, used by Cecchini and Martínez (2011) to describe recent changes to conditional cash transfer programs. The practice of adding new components to an existing cash transfer is not unique to Chile and can also be found in countries such as Mexico or Brazil.

To say that the *Ingreso Ético Familiar* is an absolutely innovative program is to disregard a whole previously existing structure that is described in the sections above. However, there are new elements. The first change concerns cash transfers, which were secondary in *Chile Solidario*, since the focus was on psychosocial support, and acquire a place of greater importance in *Ingreso Ético Familiar*, being broken down into several measures with distinct objectives.

Another modification is that some of the transfers follow a rewarding logic - *Bono por Logro Escolar* and *Bono al Trabajo de la Mujer*, in which the individual is rewarded for (good) behavior or performance. The application of an award logic to children, through the *Bono por Logro Escolar* attributed to students with excellent performance, had been previously ventured in Brazil, but was not adopted (M. C. Oliveira, 2018). The underlying idea is that of rewarding individual effort, which is in line with a neoliberal conception of poverty as a problem of the individual, who should be the main responsible for overcoming the situation in which he/she find him/herself in<sup>12</sup>.

Also noteworthy is the change in language. The second pillar, which frames the health and education conditionalities, is called 'duties. The use of such language is associated with the idea of the 'deserving poor' and stands in opposition to other terms, such as 'co-responsibility' (Cohen & Rolando, 2006), which aimed to convey the idea of an agreement between the state and citizens.

A further step in the analysis is to fit it into the categories mentioned by Howlett et al. (2013). An innovation corresponds to changes in the principles. In this case, changes occurred at the level of operational abstraction, thus affecting the objectives and mechanisms. Having said this, one may affirm that, despite containing original elements, *Ingreso Ético Familiar* is not an innovation. In spite of the identified continuities, new ends have been added, which entails the inclusion of new mechanisms. Thus, one may classify the change from *Chile Solidario* to *Ingreso Ético Familiar* as a case in which new layers were added the existing program.

Perhaps the biggest alteration is the centrality of the idea of insertion in the labor market as a way to overcome poverty, essential to understanding the place attributed by this program to work and

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<sup>12</sup> For a further discussion of the application of the neoliberal vision to social policies, see, for example, Mahon et al. (2015).

the introduction of *Apoyo Laboral*, as well as of the incentives for women to enter the formal market through the *Bono al Trabajo de la Mujer*. As there is no evidence that *Chile Solidario* has contributed to greater access to the labor market by beneficiary families, *Ingreso Ético Familiar* responded to the problem by adding a new element (Larrañaga & Contreras, 2015). Furthermore, the introduction of these components reflects a reorientation of the program, resulting from an alteration of the ideas espoused by decision-makers, who advocate the use of labor market incentives over other mechanisms to combat poverty (Piñera, 2009).

Although linking cash transfers to work requirements is unusual in the region, it is present in the minimum income schemes put in place from the 1990s in Europe – i.e., France and Portugal. Alternatively, other countries tried to create synergies between support and training programs, such as Brazil – i.e., Bolsa Família was associated to the National Program for Access to Technical Education and Employment (Pronatec).

The aim of this article is to assess the degree of change in the transition from *Chile Solidario* to *Ingreso Ético Familiar*. Once the magnitude of the change has been addressed, other questions arise and allow us to continue to advance our understanding of the topic. Thus, we can ask ourselves, for example, what factors explain the variation between *Chile Solidario* and *Ingreso Ético Familiar*. Despite the name change and the modifications discussed in this article, the program was maintained in the transition from the center-left government to the first right-wing government elected after the return to democracy.

Regarding the adoption of conditional transfer programs, several explanations have been advanced: policy diffusion processes (Osorio, 2020; Sugiyama, 2011), political-electoral competition (De La O, 2015; Garay, 2016) or legacies of previous policies (Fenwick, 2013; Pribble, 2013). In this debate, the weight of ideology as an explanatory variable has been the subject of controversy – Sugiyama (2011) and Brooks (2015) claim it is not relevant, while Borges (2018) highlights its importance.

The possible political-electoral use of these programs has also been addressed in several studies, generating diverse opinions (Osorio, 2018). In a survey that sought to indicate the factors that lead to the adoption of conditional transfer programs, Sugiyama (2013) did not identify the perception of political gains as one of the motivations. There is a broad discussion about the effects of implementing such programs on the results of subsequent elections, with studies suggesting the existence of direct connections – i.e., Lula's election in 2006 (Hall, 2008, 2012) - while others argue that cash transfers do not influence the vote (Corrêa, 2013).

To our knowledge, there are no studies on the electoral effects resulting from the replacement of a conditional transfer program with a similar one, as happened in Chile and in other countries, so this is a possible new avenue of investigation. Moreover, while acknowledging the existence of partial modifications introduced under Piñera, future work can explore possible explanatory factors for continuities between the two programs.

## 5. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

Changes in social policy - and public policies in general - are common and there is a large body of literature that addresses the subject both from a theoretical point of view and through the analysis of various cases. The present article is in dialogue with these studies insofar as it looks at Chile's policy to reduce extreme poverty in recent decades and, in particular, at *Chile Solidario* and *Ingreso Ético Familiar*, in order to identify changes and continuities.

From the comparative analysis of the two programs and using the distinction between ends and means proposed by Howlett and Cashore (2009), we conclude that, in the transition from *Chile Solidario* to *Ingreso Ético Familiar*, most of the principles and mechanisms were maintained. This means that both programs are designed to tackle down extreme poverty and combine cash transfers with psychosocial support. In addition, *Ingreso Ético Familiar* added new elements to the existing ones, such as contributing to the insertion of working-age people in the formal labor market (end), and *Apoyo Laboral* and *Bono al Trabajo de la Mujer* (means). Thus, while recognizing the originality of these elements, the replacement of *Chile Solidario* by *Ingreso Ético Familiar* corresponds to the addition of layers and is not a complete innovation.

These results contribute to clarifying the characteristics of Chilean conditional transfer programs, which are central in the country's social policy strategy. The article also contributes to discussions regarding the use of such programs in the region, since other countries have incorporated components that build on Chile's experiences. Given the relevance of cash transfers in the fight against poverty, it is necessary to deepen the analysis of their characteristics and how they evolve over time, identifying continuities and changes. Thus, Howlett and Cashore's (2009) proposal enables us to consider possible levels of change in programs that were rapidly disseminated across the region and have proved to be long-lasting measures. Once installed, with rare exceptions in which termination occurred - i.e., Nicaragua (Franzoni, 2013) -, programs have been maintained (Cecchini & Martínez, 2011; Osorio, 2020), so the analysis of change becomes relevant.

In addition to understanding to what degree change takes place, it is important to make progress in identifying the explanatory factors for continuity or disruption, both in the Chile and in other cases - i.e., possible change in the transition from *Progresá* to *Oportunidades* and then *Prospera* in Mexico. It is also relevant to analyze the implications of these programs for Chile's range of social policies. Can *Ingreso Ético Familiar* be considered an expansion of the system or is it a more limited program? The program was maintained by the following governments - center-left and right-wing (Piñera's second term) -, which can also be discussed. Are the characteristics of *Ingreso Ético Familiar* still the same? Or was there any alteration? If so, what changed?

Finally, it is necessary to bear in mind the disruptions experienced in Chile from October 2019 onwards. On the one hand, *estallido social* gave visibility to a series of social demands. On the other, the pandemic crisis had negative impacts on the labor market, and on poverty and inequality, resulting in increasing pressure on the social protection system. The emergency response involved the adoption of temporary benefits targeting the most vulnerable and the middle class, the possibility of withdrawing money from individual capitalization funds, and other measures (Fariás & Trebilcock, 2021). Future research could address how these crises might affect *Ingreso Ético Familiar* and how the program relates to the measures adopted in an emergency context and/or is affected by them. Such questions allow us to continue the study of change in social policies in Latin America, the central theme of this article.



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