Resumo em Inglês:
In the past thirty years, a series of plans have been developed by successive Brazilian governments in a continuing effort to maximize the nation's resources for economic and social growth. This planning history has been quantitatively rich but qualitatively poor. The disjunction has stimulated Professor Mello e Souza to address himself to the problem of national planning and to offer some criticisms of Brazilian planning experience. Though political instability has obviously been a factor promoting discontinuity, his criticisms are aimed at the attitudes and strategic concepts which have sought to link planning to national goals and administration. He criticizes the fascination with techniques and plans to the exclusion of proper diagnosis of the socio-political reality, developing instruments to coordinate and carry out objectives, and creating an administrative structure centralized enough to make national decisions and decentralized enough to perform on the basis of those decisions. Thus, fixed, quantified objectives abound while the problem of functioning mechanisms for the coordinated, rational use of resources has been left unattended. Although his interest and criticism are focused on the process and experience of national planning, he recognized variation in the level and results of Brazilian planning. National plans have failed due to faulty conception of the function of planning. Sectorial plans, save in the sector of the petroleum industry under government responsibility, ha e not succeeded in overcoming the problems of formulation and execution thereby repeating old technical errors. Planning for the private sector has a somewhat brighter history due to the use of Grupos Executivos which has enabled the planning process to transcend the formalism and tradition-bound attitudes of the regular bureaucracy. Regional planning offers two relatively successful experiences, Sudene and the strategy of the regionally oriented autarchy. Thus, planning history in Brazil is not entirely black but a certain shade of grey. The major part of the article, however, is devoted to a descriptive analysis of the national planning experience. The plans included in this analysis are: The Works and Equipment Plan (POE); The Health, Food, Transportation and Energy Plan (Salte); The Program of Goals; The Trienal Plan of Economic and Social Development; and the Plan of Governmental Economic Action (Paeg). Using these five plans for his historical experience the author sets out a series of errors of formulation and execution by which he analyzes that experience. With respect to formulation, he speaks of a lack of elaboration of programs and projects, of coordination among diverse goals, and of provision of qualified staff and techniques. He mentions the absence of the definition of resources necessary to the financing of the plan and the inadequate quantification of sectorial and national goals due to the lack of reliable statistical information. Finally, he notes the failure to coordinate the annual budget with the multi-year plans. He sees the problems of execution as beginning in the absence of coordination between the various sectors of the public administration, the failure to develop an operative system of decentralization, the absence of any system of financial and fiscal control over execution, the difficulties imposed by the system of public accounting, and the absence of an adequate program of allocation for the liberation of resources. He ends by pointing to the failure to develop and use an integrated system of political economic tools in a mode compatible with the objective of the plans. The body of the article analyzes national planning experience in Brazil using these lists of errors as rough model of criticism. Several conclusions emerge from this analysis with regard to planning in Brazil and in developing countries, in general. Plans have generally been of little avail in Brazil because of the lack of a continuous, bureaucratized (in the Weberian sense) planning organization set in an instrumentally suitable administrative structure and based on thorough diagnoses of socio-economic conditions and problems. Plans have become the justification for planning. Planning has come to be conceived as a rational method of orienting the process of decisions through the establishment of a precise and quantified relation between means and ends. But this conception has led to a planning history rimmed with frustration, and failure, because of its rigidity in the face of flexible and changing reality. Rather, he suggests a conception of planning which understands it "as a rational process of formulating decisions about the policy, economy, and society whose only demand is that of managing the instrumentarium in a harmonious and integrated form in order to reach explicit, but not quantified ends". He calls this "planning without plans": the establishment of broad-scale tendencies through diagnosis whose implementation is carried out through an adjustable, coherent instrumentarium of political-economic tools. Administration according to a plan of multiple, integrated goals is a sound procedure if the nation's administrative machinery contains the technical development needed to control the multiple variables linked to any situation of socio-economic change. Brazil does not possess this level of refinement and any strategy of planning relevant to its problems must recognize this. The reforms which have been attempted fail to make this recognition as is true of the conception of planning informing the Brazilian experience. Therefore, unworkable plans, ill-diagnosed with little or no supportive instrumentarium or flexibility have been Brazil's legacy. This legacy seems likely to continue until the conception of planning comes to live in the reality of Brazil.
