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Articles • Rev. Bras. Econ. 70 (4) • Oct-Dec 2016 • https://doi.org/10.5935/0034-7140.20160025   copy

A Note on Auctions with Compulsory Partnership* * We thank the comments of Flávio Menezes, Sérgio Parreiras and seminar participants at SAET 2016 and IWGTS 2014. The financial support of CNPq-Brazil is gratefully acknowledged.

Authorship SCIMAGO INSTITUTIONS RANKINGS

We study a symmetric, profit share, common value auction with a twist: One (fixed) Bidder, if not winning the auction, has to enter a partnership with the winner, sharing both expenses and revenue at rate (say) 0 < λ < 1. We show that it doesn't have an equilibrium in pure-strategies.

Keywords:
Pre-Salt Auction; Production Share; Equilibrium Existence

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