The Meanings of Autonomy: Brazilian and Mexican Reactions to Tensions between China and the United States

Abstract

The article addresses the question of autonomy in Mexico’s and Brazil’s foreign policies in the context of increasing tensions between the United States and China. Although Mexico’s and Brazil’s relations with China —and to a lesser extent the United States— are very different in nature, both Latin American countries face the same challenge of finding a balance in relations with both great powers. The article analyzes Mexico’s and Brazil’s handling of a “triangular relationship” since 2018, illustrating the scope and limits of each country’s autonomy. In the case of Mexico, economic integration with the United States explains the place of China as both an opportunity and a threat; in the case of Brazil, although China is its major trade partner, domestic interests become as important as structural elements, and its government cannot disregard US concerns. In addition to the review of secondary literature, the article uses a series of interviews of Mexican and Brazilian diplomats.

Autonomy; China-US rivalry; Brazil, Mexico

Introduction

In less than three decades, China has become a key player in the economies of Latin America and the Caribbean, disrupting the comfortable position of the United States as the sole hegemon after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Consequently, the tensions between the two powers have repercussions on the foreign policies of all countries in the region, including the biggest ones. The structural nature of economic dependence with either China or the United States (Barrera et al. 2021; Svampa and Slipak 2018) precludes the option of total alignment with either one, as has been well demonstrated by the case of Jair Bolsonaro (2019-2022) in Brazil. This situation has led to the emergence of four main academic debates.

First, there is a consensus that the lack of regional coordination limits Latin America’s capacity to react. For some, regional fragmentation is due to governments’ behaviors (Colombo et al. 2021; Dussel Peters 2020b; Vadell and Rubiolo 2020), while others argue that it reflects the divisive effects of tensions between powers (Silva and Grassi 2022). Second, authors ask whether the countries of the region stand to gain or lose from the increased animosity between China and the United States, especially regarding trade. They seem to agree that, in the long run, more is lost than gained from the destabilization of commodity prices and interest rates, increased uncertainty and subsequent political tensions (Gachúz Maya 2022; Gachúz Maya and Urdinez 2022; Girón-Díaz et al. 2019; Vásquez Galán 2022).¹ In both cases, the evolution of economic ties with the two powers does not solve fundamental problems linked to their development model. Thirdly, some scholars question the veracity of the threats posed by China claiming it might be a discourse developed by the United States to maintain its global hegemony. In the latter case, we would be facing the risk of self-fulfilling perceptions (Ruiz Sandoval 2022). On the contrary, others argue that we are experiencing a rivalry that is going to structure the international system (Kalout and Martins da Costa 2022).

These discussions raise a fourth debate about Latin America’s capacity to react to triangular relations with China and the United States. While there is near unanimity in postulating that the governments of the region should avoid aligning with one of the two powers, disagreements dominate as to the ability of these actors to do so. As has been pointed out, reflecting on the possible autonomy of foreign policy decisions in Latin America requires specific studies (Russell 2021). Indeed, ties with both China and the United States vary in their material and symbolic dimensions depending on the case. Thus, the capacity to decide may also have different expressions and this observation leaves several intuitive questions open: what does autonomy mean? What does it intend to gain in the face of growing tensions between powers? Discussing autonomy requires comparative empirical studies. How do actors perceive tensions between China and the United States? What responses do Latin American countries provide? In this article, we compare Brazil and Mexico, the two main markets and most populated countries in the region (see section I).

Based on the previous reflection, our main research question is the following: What do we learn about autonomy in the context of increasing tensions between China and the United States based on Brazil and Mexico’s experiences by striving for a balance between them? We argue that, although Brazil’s and Mexico’s relations with the two powers are different, they share common difficulties. For Brazil, it is a matter of not having to choose between China and the United States; the balance of domestic interests, notably economic and military regarding the two powers imposes autonomy (Bolsonaro case), or is used to promote Brazil’s room for maneuver (Lula III case). For Mexico, it is a matter of balancing the weight of the United States and not confronting it. Domestic interests are more directly linked to the United States, but the rise of China at the global level gives Mexico a certain degree of autonomy. Paradoxically, Mexico’s strong trade and financial relations with the United States makes China a threat and an opportunity. Autonomy therefore is essential to increase Latin America’s international insertion, but it has different meanings depending on the case. Understanding these meanings allows us to appreciate the diverse logics of dependency in the region and the varying degrees of agency in Latin America.

This article contributes to the debate on Latin American autonomy in two ways. On the one hand, we offer a comparison between Brazil and Mexico that is not yet common, as we will see in section I. On the other hand, we study the capacity to decide of Latin American actors empirically, that is, based on the perceptions of diplomatic representatives. In this way, we aim to join the conversation regarding the foreign policies of Southern powers in a context of great power competition.

Our qualitative study is based on an extensive literature review and 15 interviews in Brazil and Mexico. The fieldwork was conducted between December 2023 and September 2024 (see Annex I), which corresponds to the governments of Lula III (2023- ) in Brazil and Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) (2018-2024) in Mexico. We chose to interview diplomatic representatives because the international context permeates their work continuously and they are officially on the front line to observe and experience the tensions between China and the United States. Moreover, sharing the same profession makes it possible to compare their responses. We conducted semi-directive interviews to leave space for the diplomats to develop their visions. We then compared their responses with what the existing literature informs us and contrasted the reactions between representatives of the two countries. This does not mean that other actors are not key in shaping governmental reactions to China-U.S. rivalry; we will mention them where appropriate. We focus our research not only on the competition between China and the United States, but specifically on the direct pressures that the authorities of these two countries may exert on their Latin American counterparts against each other.

Our study is framed in the context of growing tensions between China and the United States. The triangularization of Latin America’s relations with these two countries dates back to the last 20 years; however, there is agreement in the literature that this rivalry took a new turn as of March 2018 with the first protectionist measures imposed by the United States on Chinese products (Gachúz Maya and Urdinez 2022; Pires and Nascimento 2020; Sevares 2022). That is why we decided to focus on a recent period that coincides with the context of polarization in the United States during the administrations of Donald Trump (2017-2021) and Joseph Biden (2021-2024), and with the consolidation of Xi Jinping’s power (2013- ) in China. The global context is characterized by the rise of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, climate and energetic issues, the Covid-19 pandemic, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and the more assertive U.S. policy against the People’s Republic, especially during the Republican administration. All these elements are important to understand the direction of discussions in Latin America.

To answer our research question, the first section of the article offers a state of the art that allows us to justify our case studies and to identify the terms of the debate regarding Latin American foreign policies capacity to decide. A second section discusses the conditions of autonomy for Brazil and Mexico, in particular their different contexts and shared problems. Finally, we study the challenges of implementing autonomy in each case, shedding light on its diverse meanings that emerge from diplomatic practice.

I – The State of the Art: The Weight of the Conjuncture and the Empirical Mystery of Autonomy

The literature review on Latin American foreign policies in the face of tensions between China and the United States allows us to point out aspects that still need to be studied in order to enrich the reflection on their possible autonomy. The literature on China-U.S. competition and its consequences for Latin American countries is flourishing. This literature is not new; we track publications back to 2005, when the U.S. congressional hearings on the Chinese presence in Latin America began. However, their number increased in the wake of China’s rise and the Trump administration. Thus, we reviewed about 100 references published since 2020 based on the keywords Latin America-China-U.S.; Brazil-China-U.S.; and Mexico-China-U.S., published mostly in Spanish and Portuguese. In the interviews we conducted, a vast majority of the actors also recognized the relevance of the tensions between the United States and China for the functioning of the international system and for their work. When we asked them about the essential aspects of the current global context, they tended to mention the tensions between China and the United States along with the war in Ukraine and the war in Gaza. They usually associated Russia with China in the rivalry with the United States. Only one Brazilian diplomat answered optimistically regarding U.S.-China competition, relativizing its concrete importance and betting on power responsibility and interdependence (Interview B7). The economic interdependence among the two countries was sometimes mentioned, to illustrate the complexity of the international scene and its differences with the Cold War (Interviews B1, B9 and M6). One diplomat affirmed that in multilateral fora, the room for maneuver is reduced because of tensions among these three powers (Interview B9).

One area for improvement in the existing literature is the methodological systematization and collection of empirical data. Most works formulate arguments from descriptive statistics and press reviews, without making explicit the strategy followed. We found an article based on interviews on the effects of external powers for regional cooperation (Luciano and Mesquita 2022). They conclude that the ideology of governments has a more systematic effect on cooperation than the presence of a superpower, and that this presence sometimes helps and sometimes does not.

The existing references, moreover, still leave gaps in the analysis. For example, they propose almost no comparison between Latin American cases. The relative absence of publications comparing Brazil and Mexico in the recent period stands out. González González et al. (2023) examine Brazil and Mexico simultaneous participation as non-permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and argue that there was little cooperation between delegations. Fierro (2020) and Cepik et al. (2021) discuss Brazil and Mexico’s relations with China. In the first work, it can be seen how China represents a palliative to their economic difficulties despite the lack of planned government strategies towards the Asian giant. In the second, the authors study how Brazil and Mexico use the China factor as a lever for their international insertion from the early 2000s until 2012 in Mexico, and 2016 in Brazil. They argue that the opportunities presented by China are not fully exploited by either Brazil or Mexico regardless of the ideological color of their governments; ties with China depend on a multitude of international and domestic factors, such as the position of the United States, the development model, the global macroeconomic situation, and the ideological perspectives of actors on both sides. They conclude that “to Brazil, one of the limitations was the disagreement between the economic and political elites [whether getting closer to China or not], whereas to Mexico it was a sort of ‘group-think consensus’ [promoting moderation regarding China]” (Cepik et al. 2021, 12).

This last argument points to the differences between Brazil and Mexico. Brazil is a much larger country than Mexico in material terms, as shown in Table 1. Mexico is much more dependent on the United States than Brazil, without the latter escaping dependency problems (see section II). However, seen at the regional level, both countries share several characteristics: they are the two largest countries in material terms (see the comparison with the third country regarding GDP, Argentina, in Table 1), and their diplomatic corps are relatively more professionalized (existence of an entrance examination, diplomatic academy, professional career). We can consider that we are dealing with two more similar cases.

Table 1
Material capacities of Brazil and Mexico

	Brazil	Mexico	Argentina
Surface area, by sq. km (2021)	8,515,770	1,964,375	2,780,400
Population (2023)	216,422,446	128,455,567	46,654,581
Gross domestic product (GDP), in trillion USD (2023)	2.17	1.79	0.64

Sources: World Bank Group Open Data, https://data.worldbank.org/, consulted on 10/22/2024.

As we have pointed out in the introduction, one of the main debates about the impact of inter-power tensions on Latin America refers to autonomy. However, we have not found case studies comparing Brazil and Mexico that are linked to this concept. Autonomy has been forged by South American scholars in the 1960s and the 1970s. We understand autonomy in the classical way as defined by Juan Carlos Puig (1980), “the maximum capacity of one’s own decision that one can have, taking into account conditioning factors of the real world” (149). Contrary to the fatality implied by dependency theories, these authors reflected upon the possibility for Latin America to serve its interests in international politics, despite being in a structural restrictive position. Explicitly linked to the Cold War context, autonomy was designed as a tool for analysis and for action to balance the hegemonic presence of the United States in the region.

Interestingly, South American references on autonomy have not circulated largely in Mexico. However, similar thoughts on the capacity to decide also developed in this country, particularly following the “Ojeda formula”. After the name of the internationalist who thought about Mexico’s relative independence in the 1970s, the formula states that “the United States recognizes and accepts Mexico’s need to dissent from US policy in everything that is fundamental to Mexico but, even if it is important to the United States, is not fundamental. In return Mexico cooperates in everything that is fundamental or important to the United States, but not to Mexico” (Ojeda 1976, 93). Ojeda argues, therefore, that Mexican foreign policy faces a dilemma: to keep an anti-interventionist position while not confronting the United States too much. (Ojeda, 1976, 80). Based on these assumptions, and on the analysis of Mexico’s policy in the inter-American system in the 1960s, Ojeda concludes that Mexico was able to act relatively independently from the United States. Mexico’s “relative independence” is Ojeda’s approach to autonomy.

Autonomy has generated a lot of discussion and evolution through time, in order to adapt it to a post-Cold War world in which actors developing international links are more and more diverse (Russell and Tokatlian 2003) and also to understand its variations between governments (for the Brazilian case, see Vigevani and Cepaluni 2009). Simultaneously, other authors have argued for the need to rescue the classical, more realist version of autonomy (Briceño Ruiz and Simonoff 2017; Pinheiro and Lima 2018), which we consider more accurate for our study based on inter-state relations. In this line, according to Míguez’s (2021), increasing one’s own decision space is equivalent to limiting that of the powers, albeit relatively. In a proposal that seems to encourage dialogue South American classical autonomy and Mexican relative independence, Actis and Malacalza (2021) coined the concept of “liquid autonomy” to refer to the need of Latin American governments to select enclaves or niches where they can improve their capacity to decide in a restrictive and vulnerable context, as the current one. In this article, we aim to reflect upon the possibility of such liquid autonomy, based on diplomatic perceptions.

Several works discuss the possibility of autonomy for Latin American diplomacies. Neutrality is the dream goal of both political actors and academics (Kalout and Martins da Costa 2022; Pires and Nascimento 2020). In Brazil, diplomats usually employed the expression “To avoid exclusive choices”, whereas in Mexico they claimed to have no a priori alignment. Some authors adopt a skeptical stance, referring to the double hegemony that restricts Latin American decision-making capacity, taking the example of Brazil (Schenoni and Leiva 2021), while others consider it as a fact to be consolidated through “active non-alignment” (Fortín et al. 2021).

According to Roberto Russell (2021) and Fortín et al. (2021), the answers will depend on each case, but they will seek a point at which no interest is totally satisfied, but neither totally ignored. We find this reflection interesting, but it requires further empirical consolidation. The interviewees of the two countries assume that they seek greater autonomy; however, how can this objective be studied? What are the positions of Brazil and Mexico at the global level? How do they relate to the powers? What is the state of their diplomatic corps in complex contexts? What are the restrictions on their capacity to decide? Analyzing autonomy requires understanding the international place of the countries studied, as well as how their diplomatic actors try to act from a vulnerable position. Brazil and Mexico symbolize this delicate situation in the face of tensions between China and the United States, since they share similar dilemmas, despite experiencing different conditions of autonomy.

II – Different Contexts, Shared Dilemmas: The Constraints on Autonomy

In classical thinking on autonomy, its implementation depends on both internal and external factors, which Hélio Jaguaribe (1969) defined in terms of “national viability and international permissibility” (for an update, see Briceño Ruiz and Simonoff 2017 or Lorenzini 2024). In the case we are interested in, at the internal level, the presidents, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and domestic interest groups are key, due to the economic importance of both the United States and China for Brazil and Mexico. Restrictive action also depends on their bilateral ties with each of these great powers. This comparative conjunctural analysis allows us to argue that, despite their different situations towards China and the United States, the governments of Brazil and Mexico share a certain vulnerability in pursuing their autonomy.

Domestically, Brazil and Mexico portray different profiles, even though the governments in office are part of the Latin American moderate left. In Brazil, the period under study is characterized by great ideological variations between Jair Bolsonaro and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. While the former sought to align himself more with the United States, especially Donald Trump’s government, in his third term, Lula has resumed previous activism and diplomatic diversification, and searches for Brazil’s leadership supported by a more critical view of Western powers. In Mexico, AMLO showed no interest in foreign policy, except on rare occasions linked to the Latin American agenda. He has officially assumed the preponderance of ties with the United States, and has not made explicit a strategy toward China. In fact, the Mexican president declared the need of strengthening “North America” to face China’s competition (Muñoz de Cote 2021). In a nutshell, China is sometimes recognized as a threat, but it continues to be one of Brazil and Mexico’s opportunities to diversify their foreign policies and improve their international position.

Foreign ministries experience a delicate moment in both cases. Their budget is traditionally among the lowest among federal institutions, even though Brazil receives more funds in absolute terms (Schiavon and Figueroa 2019). Above all, both face a relative loss of influence for various reasons. Foreign affairs offices have multiplied in various public entities and foreign ministries have gone through internal crises. In Brazil, the ministry is still traumatized by the Bolsonaro experience (Interviews B1, B2 and B4). The lack of human resources also constitutes a significant problem (Interview B9). Lula chose Celso Amorim, his Foreign Minister during his first two terms, to head the International Relations Advisory Office in the Presidency, which has assembled a solid team that works together with Itamaraty, but also sometimes relegates the ministry to the background. Thus, in many interviews, we were told that requests from non-governmental actors on behalf of the United States or China went directly to the Presidency (Interviews B5 and M5). In Mexico, AMLO appointed Marcelo Ebrard, one of his closest collaborators, as minister, who primarily placed people he trusted in the highest positions of the ministry and weakened the professional service. After his departure in 2023, the arrival of Alicia Bárcena, former Secretary General of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), led to a process of recovery, but with a tight schedule due to the 2024 electoral contest. In general, the ministry has suffered from budgetary austerity. Consequently, as in the case of Brazil, some sensitive issues related to China-U.S. rivalry are directly expressed to the Mexican president. Particularly when foreign ambassadors have direct contact with the Head of the Executive, they tend to bypass the ministry (Interview M5).

As for interest groups, they are mainly those from the economic sector that express themselves in the face of tensions between China and the United States. In Mexico they are more homogeneous than in Brazil (Cepik et al. 2021), mostly from the export sector and supporting ties with the United States. In Brazil they are more diverse, depending on the effects of the Chinese presence on their activities. The industrial sector tends to ask for protection from Chinese competition in Brazil and in foreign markets, while the agribusiness sector owes much of its boom to exports to the Asian giant.

Brazil and Mexico’s relations with China and the United States may seem different at first glance, if we focus on the commercial sphere. However, a comparison with more indicators points to several elements of similarity, as shown in Table 2. If we take data on trade, investment, defense, attracting role models and politics, the answer is not that clear. In the military field, the United States dominates in both cases, as well as in attracting role models for the elites (education, tourism, diaspora), despite also having a long history of trauma. China does not have that, and it is much less well known (Stuenkel 2019). However, recent surveys indicate growing negative views on China, contrary to the United States. The emerging power has thus a huge challenge ahead when it comes to its image in Brazil and, to a lesser extent, Mexico.

Table 2
Brazil and Mexico’s Relations with China and the United States

	China	United States
	Trade (exports vs imports, in % and by ranking)
Brazil (2021)	31.30 (1) vs 22.78 (1)	11.16 (2) vs 17.68 (2)
Mexico (2021)	1.84 (3)* vs 19.94 (2)	78.06 (1) vs 43.69 (1)
	Inward Foreign Direct Investment (in USD millions)**
Brazil (2022)	7,309	127,910
Mexico (2022)	1,878	235,955
	Defense (presence)
Brazil (2022)	Limited	Leading
Mexico (2022)	Limited	Leading
	Elites attraction***
Brazil (2022)	No	Yes
Mexico (2022)	No	Yes
	Public opinion (somewhat/very favorable vs somewhat/very unfavorable, en %)
Brazil (2023)	40.5 vs 48.3	73.1 vs 17.7
Mexico (2023)	53.6 vs 32.6	72.2 vs 21.7

World Integrated Trade Solution (2024)International Monetary Fund (2024)Kalout and Martins da Costa (2022)Pu and Myers (2022)
• * China appears as the third individual country, behind Canada, but the “Unspecified” category comes in second place.
• ** We know that most Chinese investment in Latin America comes through tax havens. However, they do not appear among the main investors in Brazil and Mexico.
• China includes mainland and Hong Kong.
• *** This indicator includes study, tourism or migration destinations (Kalout and Martins da Costa 2022).

The economic sector (trade and investment) deserves specific attention, because this is where competition between China and the United States began, and these are the areas with the greatest Chinese presence in Brazil and Mexico, as well as those with the greatest differences in material terms (see Table 3). In terms of investment, China is on the rise, but the United States and Europe still dominate; in the case of Mexico, China’s investment is also increasing, but the United States continues to be the major partner (Hernández, 2024). China’s presence in both economies has changed radically in less than three decades, as far as trade is concerned. Mexico in 1971 and Brazil in 1974 officially recognized the People’s Republic, but trade flows (exports and imports for Brazil, imports only for Mexico) only increased at the turn of the century, reflecting the rise of the Chinese economy. In the case of Brazil, China has even dominated trade relations since 2009, but the United States is its second most important partner. Brazil mainly exports primary products - soybeans - to China and imports manufactured goods, partly displacing local industry. Trade with China is the main factor behind the primarization of the Brazilian economy.

Table 3
Brazil and Mexico’s Trade Flows with China and the United States, in U$ thousands, in 2021

	Exports to China	% exports to the world	Imports from China	% imports to the world	Exports to the US	% exports to the world	Imports from the US	% imports to the world
Brazil	87,907,887.86	31.3	53,464,016.77	22.8	31,337,515.82	11.6	41,502,926.65	17.7
Mexico	9,078,868.36	1.8	101,020,778.95	19.9	386,086,717.59	78.1	221,311,735.90	43.7

World Integrated Trade Solution (2024)

The Mexican economy is much more open to international trade and much more integrated with the United States, involving China; imports from China to Mexico are mainly components used for the maquilas whose products are resent to the United States. These imports replace goods that previously came from the United States or were produced in Mexico (Baker 2024; Dussel Peters 2020a; Xuedong and Covarrubias 2023). Thanks to cheaper Chinese components and the rivalry between China and the United States, Mexico has managed to increase its presence in the US market, competing, paradoxically, with China. The other source of competition concerns labor wages and offshoring, despite the fact that Chinese capital has accounted for a significant share of nearshoring investment in Mexico (Tzili Apango 2024). Thus, Mexico is entangled in a difficult triangular relationship, and to complicate things more, it has a huge deficit with China (see Table 3), and Chinese illegal products massively reach the Mexican market. Recently, fentanyl has symbolized this aspect of China-Mexico economic flows, with consequences for the United States (see Section III).

In brief, the differences in terms between Brazil and Mexico’s relations with China and the United States should not hide a shared situation of vulnerability (Bernal Meza 2021; Chagas-Bastos and Franzoni 2019; Sevares 2022). The two countries are subject to the logic of the markets and the economic health of the two great powers, whose economic size is out of all proportion of that of their Latin American partners. In 2023, according to the World Bank, the GDP of the United States reached 27.36 trillion current USD, that of China 17.79, that of Brazil 2.17 and that of Mexico’s 1.79. This condition opens the door for the powers to take advantage of and put pressure on Latin American governments in their favor.

For this reason, several authors have wondered about areas where such pressure is implemented. Eight examples stand out in our review of the literature, most of them at the regional level: trade; technology (5G); the Covid-19 pandemic; the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB); the crisis in Venezuela; the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC); the one-China policy; and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The last two do not apply to our study since Brazil and Mexico recognize the People’s Republic of China and do not participate in the BRI.

For other examples, while there are different perspectives and competition between China and the United States, these do not necessarily translate into direct pressures on Latin American governments from one against the other. This does not mean, however, that the rivalry between the United States and China does not make the international and domestic scenarios more difficult. Thus, regarding the donation and sale of medical material and anti-Covid-19 vaccines, both China and the United States developed their own strategies, not always concurrent (Malacalza and Fagaburu 2022; Torres García and Orozco Plascencia 2022; Woodrow Wilson Center 2022). We have no evidence that the reception of products from one country was conditioned to the non-reception of products from the other. Regarding the Venezuelan crisis, the United States clearly supports the opposition, while China maintains its relations with the government of Nicolás Maduro, which has yet to repay part of the debt acquired during the chavismo years (Teixeira Jr. 2020). Donald Trump’s administration supported the Lima Group, a regional initiative akin to the opposition’s views, but this support was not conditioned to the adoption of anti-Chinese positions. A similar situation occurred with Brazil’s withdrawal from CELAC under the Bolsonaro administration (Rodríguez and Rüland 2022). Although this decision confirms the Brazilian government’s preference for relations with the United States, after conducting our research, we cannot conclude that this episode is linked to the rivalry between the United States and China.

Finally, some cases show an explicit connection with tensions between China and the United States. In the case of Mexico, Anguiano (2019, 154) argues that Washington requested Peña Nieto’s government not to associate with the Asian Investment on Infrastructure Bank, promoted by Beijing. In 2020, Donald Trump imposed an American candidate, Mauricio Claver-Stone, as head of the IDB, contrary to the practice of appointing a Latin American person since its creation in 1948. His aim was to reduce Chinese influence in the bank. A year earlier, the US President had succeeded in getting the proposed annual meeting to be hosted in Chengdu cancelled (Trevisan 2021, 196). Brazil and Mexico, in particular, are examples linked to the Fourth Industrial Revolution, a field in which Latin America is lagging behind (Carrasco Muro 2023), which exacerbates vulnerability and the question about the possibility of autonomy.

III – The Quest for Autonomy in Practice: Same Objective, Different Perspectives

Autonomy is, above all, a foreign policy objective. In this article, we take the Brazilian and Mexican perspectives and assume that they must act in a restrictive context due to their conditioning relationship with the two powers. In the literature reviewed, there are more studies on the intentions of the United States and China than from the Latin American point of view. Works focused on the latter offer three consensuses. First, the situation is suboptimal for all Latin American countries in a context of fragmentation and paralysis of regional cooperation (see Introduction). Second, as we saw in section I, it is not convenient to align, and third, there are no strategies to anticipate the effects of this rivalry, which sometimes translates as the absence of a “state policy” (Gachúz Maya 2022; Fierro 2020).

Therefore, when reflecting on the room for maneuver of the Brazilian and Mexican governments in the face of Sino-U.S. rivalry, it is essential to study their practices on a case-by-case basis, as autonomy will be tailor-made, more “liquid” (Actis and Malacalza 2021).

In order to analyze the search for autonomy from the diplomatic practice, it is necessary to decrypt when China or the United States exert pressure on Brazil or Mexico to decide in their favor and against the other. In this sense, it is not only necessary to study the context of rivalry between powers and its effects on Latin America, but also to find situations that reveal a more direct interference by one or both powers. The interviews served both to identify these situations and to appreciate the practice of autonomy on the part of Brazilian and Mexican diplomats. The results can be divided into two axes: the origin of the expansion of tensions between powers to Latin America and the search for the preservation of the capacity to decide and the varied meanings of autonomy that result from this process.

The issue at hand came onto the academic research agenda primarily because of US concerns. This approach assumes a priori a negative perception of the situation that is often described with terms such as “risk”, “tension” and even “war”. What emerged from the interviews is that China is not perceived as a threat from a diplomatic point of view, i.e. to the international system (Interviews M1 and B5).² Thus, Russia is seen as more disruptive due to its invasion of part of Ukraine, and China tends to side by Russia, but not systematically; in this sense, the Chinese position is more flexible (Interviews B1, B6, B9, M1 and M6). On one occasion, a diplomat familiar to Chinese politics expressed worries about the power centralization under Xi Jinping (Interview B2). Regarding the United States, the domestic consensus on the Chinese threat is perceived as problematic for the future (Interviews B2 and B7).

Consequently, it is more the United States that is pressing Brazil and Mexico to position against China than the reverse (Interviews B2 and B5). Chinese authorities appear to be more defensive, reacting through protests, often informal, to US policies (Interview B5). Indeed, previous research has shown that several US criticisms of China, such as its “debt trap diplomacy” have been exaggerated (Pu and Myers 2022, 12) and go as far as to put the United States in an aggressive rather than alternative position (Pires and Nascimento 2020, 14; Stuenkel 2019), as the angry power in decline that adopts counterproductive behaviors (Interviews B1 and B6). China then even appears as a counterweight to the United States (Interview M4), a partner that gives more in cooperation (Interview B6).

Although tensions between China and the United States are expressed in direct pressures on Brazil and Mexico mainly in the economic and technological spheres, during the interviews we were struck by the fact that the United States has also sought to influence in other areas. This reveals the ongoing process of self-fulfilling prophecies detected by Ruiz Sandoval (2022). Thus, the United States, along with various European countries, has sought to have Brazil speak out against China on human rights issues (Interview B3). Mexico seems to share a similar situation that led to informal dialogue with its South American counterpart, facilitated by the fact that the two current governments are labeled as leftists (Interview M6).

However, in Latin America, the strongest expression of great power competition is in technological and trade issues, with security repercussions, most of the time intermingled. Two emblematic cases of US pressure against China are the renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) for Mexico and the 5G technology bidding process in Brazil. Both have been extensively studied because they bring together several challenges of the rivalry between powers: market access, digital technology competition and security issues (access to sensitive data and information). We highlight here the aspects that interest us to study the practice of autonomy and refer to existing works for the analysis of the two examples as a whole.

The election of Trump seemed to put Mexico at risk firstly because of the uncertainty regarding NAFTA, in force since 1994. To the surprise of many, Mexico, the United States and Canada managed to renegotiate the agreement to convert it into the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), in force since 2020. There are areas where the USMCA takes into consideration Chinese competition (although maybe not by name). For instance, Article 32.10 of the treaty, untitled “Non-Market Country FPA” defines such states as those with which any of the parties have signed any free trade agreement. Basically, if Mexico would like to negotiate such a treaty with a non-market economy, it would need to have the approval of the United States and Canada, or it would have to withdraw from the USMCA (Gobierno de México 2024). Mexico does not recognize China as a market economy, contrary to Brazil that did it in 2006. Furthermore, the USMCA reinforces its policy of rules of origin to prevent the imports of products whose process includes Chinese investments (Gachúz Maya 2022). Dussel Peters (2018) even asks whether the USMCA could be considered as the “first anti-China international treaty”.

According to Fierro (2020) and Gachúz Maya (2022), the USMCA demonstrates the priority Mexico gives to its relations with the United States to the detriment of its own interests. The agreement even threatens Mexican sovereignty with clause 32.10. For instance, the USMCA will not help Mexico resolve its deficit with China and could even impede investment in fast-growing sectors related to sustainability (Gachúz Maya 2022). However, Mexico protects its export lobby by guaranteeing access to the U.S. market.

In addition, relations with China have been sought in another delicate area that involves the United States, and has come to define much of the security agenda with Mexico: synthetic drugs, particularly fentanyl. In the past, China was the main provider of fentanyl to the US market through Mexico. Having a huge pharmaceutical industry, the Chinese government started to impose restrictions on it to avoid the supply of illegal drugs. Such supply was further limited by the COVID-19 pandemic so that Mexican cartels have become important producers. As of today, inputs for the production of fentanyl come from China and Mexican cartels distribute it in the US market, urging US authorities to demand both China and Mexico to stop such shipments. The situation came to a point where AMLO sent a letter to Xi Jinping asking for China’s cooperation in stopping fentanyl’s illegal trade. A spokeswoman for China’s Foreign Minister replied denying that there is illegal trafficking of fentanyl (Benítez Manaut 2024; Pérez Ricart, 2024). According to Benítez Manaut (2024, 6-7), China perceived that Mexico had been used by the United States. China’s traditional position has identified demand as the cause of fentanyl supply, but has gradually tried to control production in China, and shipments to Mexico. On this issue, the Mexican government tends to protect its capacity to decide and preserve its relations with China. AMLO and Xi Jinping met during the APEC Summit in San Francisco in 2023, afterwards the Chinese embassy issued a communiqué informing that the meeting had been successful, and that “Mexico and China defend their independence and autonomy, and firmly oppose other powers’ interference in domestic issues”, a clear message to the United States. After the meeting, Mexico and China established the Working Group on Chemical inputs, according to Pérez Ricart (2024, 15), a first step to reinforce bilateral cooperation.

Contrary to Mexico where there was no debate, the 5G auction process in Brazil was highly mediatized, due to the US attempt to block the participation of the Chinese company Huawei. In our interviews, this episode was frequently mentioned as a symbol of how US-China competition impacts Brazil. At the time, Jair Bolsonaro was president and favored alignment with the United States (Antal and Fierro 2022), so the surprising result was that this alignment did not take place. The launching of the auction was delayed in 2020 to culminate in November 2021. Both the United States and China played “carrots and sticks” strategies to defend their interests. Brazil crystallized their differences, partly because it represents one of the main markets for this technology worldwide (Benites 2020). Representatives of Donald Trump’s government made threatening statements in the press while promising investments, while Xi Jinping’s government lobbied with the support of its allies in the Brazilian government and blackmailed Huawei’s participation in the delivery of medical products during the pandemic.

The Bolsonaro government found itself divided between the anti-China, the pro-China and the neutrals (who wanted a quick and open tender) (see Morfín de la Parra 2024). The anti-China group was composed of the president, his sons and foreign minister Ernesto Araújo (2019-2021). Those in favor of China gathered around Vice President General Hamilton Mourão, the Ministry of Science, Technology, Innovation and Communications, and the Minister of Agriculture, Livestock and Food Supply, Tereza Cristina Corrêa da Costa Dias, the main channel of the agribusiness sector. It should be noted that this sector owes its boom to the increase in exports to China in the last two decades. Huawei had technical advantage because of its former presence in Brazil, and offered cheaper costs for implementing 5G in Brazil (Colombo et al. 2021; Gonzalo and Haro Sly 2022). In addition to a knot of Sino-US rivalry, 5G was also a matter of development and Internet access for the Brazilian population.

In the end, the Brazilian government adopted a compromise solution that did not fully comply with US expectations, but did not ignore them either, and that allowed it to preserve its partnership with China. Huawei was authorized to participate in the private network auction in Brazil, but not in the governmental one (Morfín de la Parra 2024). Brazil resisted the securitization process intended by the United States (van der Westhuizen 2024) and avoided siding with either power. During the negotiation of the 5G tender, Jair Bolsonaro vehemently declared, “Who will decide 5G is me, not a third party” (Farrel 2020), but it seems that the complexity of Brazilian economic ties with the United States and China, and their reverberations in domestic politics might have force him to find a balanced position.

Different practices regarding autonomy stand out from these experiences. While Mexico tries to protect its capacity to decide, Brazil seeks to expand it. In the latter case, it is repeated in the interviews that Brazil is autonomous and does not have to choose in the face of tensions between China and the United States. This is President Lula’s perspective. While, for Bolsonaro, the diversity of domestic interests imposed a balanced decision, Lula uses it to justify an expanded capacity to decide, as revealed by current negotiations concerning Brazil’s possible participation in the Belt and Road Initiative (“Lula diz que vai discutir com a China o que Brasil ganharia com Nova Rota da Seda.” 2024).

As for Mexico, one interviewee summarized the country’s dilemma in the following words: “to know when we have to align and when we cannot” (Interview M1), confirming the validity of the Ojeda formula. It is about giving in on some key issues for the United States in order to better be able to decide in other areas, such as, for example, investments in infrastructure —a fundamental element of AMLO’s project— or to vote in international organizations. Concretely, an updated version of the formula means that a U.S. fundamental demand will be placed at the top of the Mexican agenda, whereas it might not be the case for Chinese ones (Interview M5). At the same time, this allows for a greater room for maneuver on other issues that are significant for Mexico. A more discreet strategy with China seems to be working better for Mexico, as strategic Chinese investments have been concluded during the AMLO administration, such as the Maya Train. This contrasts with the former Mexico City-Queretaro train project, which was cancelled due to pressure from the United States (Tzili Apango 2024). Furthermore, in 2020, Mexico, along with 15 other countries, abstained during the election of Mauricio Claver-Carone as head of the IDB (Arciniegas 2020), despite the fact that this candidate symbolized Trump’s offensive against China in Latin America. On this occasion, Jair Bolsonaro’s Brazil aligned itself with the United States.

Conclusions

The question of autonomy has been a long-standing objective for Latin American countries. In this article, we addressed such question focusing on the cases of Brazil and Mexico and adjusting it to contemporary circumstances: the emergence of China and the subsequent tensions with the United States. In line with Fortín et al. (2021), we argue that the US-China rivalry is an opportunity whereby Mexico and Brazil may find margin for maneuver from their traditional dependence on the United States. At the same time, however, they have to find a delicate balance between the two great powers. This is very acute in the case of Mexico given its economic and financial integration with the United States: China is indeed an opportunity for trade and investment, but to a certain point. Opportunity easily turns into risk. Brazil, on the other hand, is free to establish strong trade relations with China, but is not as free to depend on China in other issues, as the 5G case demonstrates. Thus, the possibility of autonomy exists for both Mexico and Brazil, but within limits, and its meaning varies. AMLO’s Mexico intended to protect what autonomy it can have whereas Lula’s Brazil has tried to expand such limits.

Interestingly, and based on Baker’s argument (2024, 10), the Brazilian and Mexican diplomats we interviewed did not seem to understand the US-China rivalry as the possibility of two differently ruled international systems; they did not mention a normative dimension regarding a certain world order. This was not the purpose of our article but it definitely is a key issue for two countries that have experienced US hegemony for at least two centuries, and that long for autonomy. Apparently, the capacity to decide on one’s own terms will continue to be a foreign policy goal for both countries in a relatively well-known international system —that is, in the context of increasing tensions between great powers. The emergence of China is therefore a challenge for both governments and academia in Latin America that needs to be faced with all its implications.

Annex 1
: Interviews

Code	Area of work	Place and date
Brazil
B1	Multilateral	12/8/2023, Brasilia
B2	Climate-related issues	12/12/2023, Brasilia
B3	Human rights	12/12/2023, Brasilia
B4	Human rights	12/13/2023, Brasilia
B5	North America	12/13/2023, Brasilia
B6	Special Advisory to the President	12/14/2023, Brasilia
B7	Office of the Minister	12/20/2023, online
B8	Europe	12/21/2023, online
B9	United Nations	01/04/2024, online
Mexico
M1	Multilateral	04/25/2024, Mexico City
M2	Multilateral	04/25/2024, Mexico City
M3	Office of the Minister	05/13/2024, Mexico City
M4	Europe	05/20/2024, Mexico City
M5	Economic promotion	09/03/2024, Mexico City
M6	United Nations	09/03/2024, Mexico City

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank the two reviewers for their constructive comments, as well as Ana Flávia Barros, Danielly Bécard, Antonio Carlos Lessa and Carlos Milani for their support during Élodie’s stay in Brasilia.

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• 1
  In the short term it is noted that Brazil may gain by displacing the United States in soybean sales to China, and Mexico may benefit from nearshoring to increase its exports to the United States to the detriment of China (Fierro 2020).
• 2
  This does not prevent China from being an economic competitor, particularly in the industrial sector, for both Brazil and Mexico.

Publication Dates

• Publication in this collection
  16 Dec 2024
• Date of issue
  Nov 2024

History

• Received
  17 Sept 2024
• Accepted
  28 Oct 2024