Abstract
This article will examine the relationship between Hans Kelsen’s theory of law and theory of democracy. In the first part, it will be demonstrated how moral relativism consists in a philosophical presupposition of the whole work of Kelsen. Then it will be detailed the relation of moral relativism to Kelsen’s conceptions of law and political science, arguing that it is possible to see these two aspects of the kelsenian work as parts of a single theoretical project. It will be explained how the concept of democracy defended by Kelsen, based on axiological emptying, fits both its relativistic assumption and its scientific aspirations. At the end, the conclusion is that, for Kelsen, methodological purity represents itself a democratic value. As a result, democracy is seen through an exclusively procedural theoretical point of view that conceives the values of freedom and equality not as ends, but as gears of the democratic machine.
Keywords
Hans Kelsen; legal positivism; political science; democracy; moral relativism