Abstract
In this article, we analyze how the method adopted by STF when ruling on Extraordinary Appeal No. 134,509, which established the inapplicability of vehicle’s tax on aircraft and vessels, in light of the Structuring Theory of Law. In order to criticize the decision, we adopted the case study methodology, by analyzing the decision of the mentioned appeal, with particular emphasis on the opinion of Justice Francisco Rezek, whose position was followed by the majority. Adopting the methodological premises of the Structuring Theory of Law, we point out that the decision hypostasises the constitutional lawmaker, since it accepts the dogma of the legislator’s will, and disregards the linguistic context of the utterance motor vehicles, which led the court to deviate from the question raised – does the Constitution of 1988 authorize the incidence of vehicle’s tax on (aircrafts and) vessels? – to answer a different question: did the constitutional lawmaker of 1987 wish to allow IPVA on (aircrafts and) vessels?
Structuring Theory of Law; constitutional interpretation; legislative intention; context; vehicle’s tax