RS3 Size of resource system |
7,200 hectares of forest reserve (most of which had been harvested selectively for 'noble' hardwoods prior to settlement, but fundamentally intact and contiguous) |
4,000 hectares of pasture and ~11,000 hectares of remaining forest within collective reserve boundaries: (assuming 15,000 hectares total for collective LR i.e. roughly half the size of the settlement) |
RS4 Human-constructed facilities |
Brazil nut processing plant consisting of several buildings and facilities involving several distinct operations (oil, flour, food processing); Roads in relatively good condition; avoiding permanent protected areas outside of the collective reserve |
Roads in precarious condition, in some cases crossing permanent protected areas in lots outside of the collective reserve |
RS9 Location |
One continuous area along southern and eastern sides of settlement |
Reserve separated in 3 distinct areas; complex geography |
Resource units (RU) |
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RU4 Economic value |
Brazil nuts processed for flour and oil: US $71/ha * 103 hectares per user (7,200 ha/70 user families) = estimated US$ 6,573 per year per user (assuming 10% costs); US$580,000 in advance credit provided by the Federal Supply Company (CONAB) in 2013 |
Mixed beef and dairy: US $212/ha * 20 hectares per user = US $2,332 per year per user (assuming 45% costs) |
Governance systems (GS) |
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GS1 Government organizations |
settlements created with strong presence by INCRA; aim to be a model in terms of forest management and conservation in the Amazon region; SEMA-MT and IBAMA (gold mining fiasco in 2004 and its repetition in 2012) also involved; difficult relationships with local government |
settlements created with low presence of INCRA, minimal presence of SEMA-MT or IBAMA; good relationships with local government |
GS2 Nongovernment organizations |
Support from an NGO and GEF project on INCRA's design and planning of the settlements; series of overlapping integrated projects provide long term support for activities inside the settlement: Instituto Pró-Natura (1992-2005); GEF/UNDP (2001-2010); Poço de Carbono Juruena (2010-2014); Sentinels of the Forest (2014 to present) |
Short term support from the French Office Nationale de Forêts (ONF) for local conservation projects at the ONF Fazenda São Nicolão, located north of the settlement along the Juruena river: |
GS4 Property-rights systems |
Brazil nut trees and collective forest are common property in usufruct under authority of INCRA |
Unauthorized land tenure with informal boundaries between users, enforced by local fiat; Individually owned cattle demarcated by branding |
GS5 Operational rules |
800 Brazil nut trees are geo-referenced; Prices for Brazil nut products secured through contracts; Risk distributed across value chain; Tax relief on cooperatives' reported production |
Black market land sales and land accumulation; Volatile prices; Producer risk; Taxable invoices for cattle sales difficult to obtain |
GS6 Collective-choice rules |
1 association representing common interests within the settlement |
6 associations representing fragmented interests within the settlement |
GS7 Constitutional rules |
Collective Environmental License tied to the collective LR, which provides environmental legality to the entire settlement, regardless of the land tenure status of individual beneficiaries outside of the reserve or their participation in Brazil nut processing |
From the administrative standpoint of a settlement-wide environmental registry (CAR), 150-200 families within the collective reserve may be 'invisible', as these users are not tied to demarcated lots; CAR rules are not matched with the existing resource system based on the historical occupation of the collective reserve |
GS8 Monitoring and sanctioning processes |
State agencies provide some limited support in monitoring of reserve; Certification of non-timber forest products based on Brazil Nuts harvested on the collective LR, based on sustainable management certification criteria; Outside of the collective reserve, 170 of 250 (68%) of demarcated lots have INCRA recognized beneficiaries (as of 2012) |
A settlement wide CAR will likely be unable to attribute deforestation to particular users inside the illegally occupied collective LR areas; No legal government mechanism exists to expel unauthorized users from collective reserve; No products involving the collective reserve are certified; Outside of the collective reserve, 461 of 524 (88%) demarcated lots have INCRA recognized beneficiaries |
Users (U) |
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U1 Number of users |
Roughly 70 families participate in Brazil nut cooperatives |
~200 families occupying collective forest reserve, each occupying 20 hectares mostly in pasture |
U3 History of use |
Settlers arrived in ~1999/2000, after lots and collective reserve demarcated by INCRA |
Settlers arrive in 1997/8 before INCRA demarcated lots and collective LR areas in 2003 |
U5 Leadership/ entrepreneurship |
PPG-7, GEF projects link settlement with development of cooperative enterprise based on extractivism and added-value processing |
Initial efforts to create a cooperative disintegrated and led to more informal association for Brazil nut harvesting on properties external to the settlement |
U6 Norms/Social capital |
Social recognition and legitimacy of reserve, linked to state policies; Norms function independent of municipal politics and alliances (municipal authorities in cahoots with gold miners in 2004-5); Boundaries of the forest reserve are known; Settlers have informal system for monitoring the LR |
Social norm is the occupation of the collective reserve through productive use to secure tenure, which is linked to municipal politics; No social recognition or legitimacy of collective reserve |
U7 Mental models |
Recognition of the collective LR as a viable commonly-managed asset |
No appreciation of the collective LR areas as a commons |
Interactions (I) |
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I5 Investment activities |
US $300,000 supplied by international and state agencies (GEF/UNDP, SEMA, INCRA) for Brazil nut processing infrastructure, and additional CONAB working capital finance ($580,000) |
Local municipal government provides resources for road maintenance, including unpaved roads within collective LR |
I8 Networking |
Settler association and cooperatives are linked with Mato Grosso state and Federal agencies via pilot projects |
Networking with municipal governments for road maintenance and in obtaining taxable sales invoices for cattle and other product sales (even though land tenure is unrecognized) |
I9 Monitoring activities |
Collective LR monitored against invasion through community-based arrangements |
n/a |
Outcomes (O) |
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O1 Social performance measures |
Sustainable commons; Social and material infrastructure favoring sustained, long term economic returns; System functions regardless of land tenure on individual lots outside of the collective reserve |
Social concentration on economic returns to minimal investment; Unsustainable, lack of property rights encourages ongoing 'frontier' dynamic; Private land accumulation and increasing socio-economic inequality are occurring, regardless of the informal character of land rights |
O2 Ecological performance measures |
Deforestation rates reduced to a minimum by 2010; 57% forest cover retained for the settlement as a whole (as of 2012) |
Significant uptick in deforestation rate from 2% to 5% in 2012; 37% forest cover retained for the settlement as a whole (as of 2012) |