Recognizing the importance and consequences of the liquidity preference of banks in the creation and granting of credit, the paper analyzes and discusses a particular and important instance of the liquidity preference: the evaluation of the cost of obtaining information by banks. This cost, when analyzed in the light of the credibility of monetary policy, affects the liquidity preference and therefore the availability of resources for lending to non financial companies. The point of discussion, as well as the contribution of the paper, is in the argument that this cost is raised when the monetary policy credibility is low, affecting the amount of wealth and resources of the companies and the liquidity preference of banks. Based on the model developed by Towsend (1979) found in Carlin and Soskyce (2006), the paper addresses the impact of credibility on monetary policy and thus on the process of granting credit.
credibility; information asymmetry; credit rationing; monetary policy
