Business Governance in Brazil and South Africa: How Much Convergence to The Anglo-Saxon Model?

GOLDSTEIN, ANDREA E.

doi:10.1590/0101-31572001-1247

Acessibilidade / Reportar erro

Brasil

Brazilian Journal of Political Economy

Español English

Brasil

Español English

sumário « anterior atual seguinte »

Sumário

Articles • Brazil. J. Polit. Econ. 21 (2) • Apr-Jun 2001 • https://doi.org/10.1590/0101-31572001-1247 copy

Business Governance in Brazil and South Africa: How Much Convergence to The Anglo-Saxon Model?^* * I thank Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira, Peter Kingstone, Sylvia Maxfield, David O’Connor, and seminar participants at the 2000 meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, panel on “Competitive International Economic Strategies in Latin America”, for most useful comments on earlier drafts. The opinions expressed and arguments employed remain my sole responsibility, and do not reflect those of the OECD Development Centre or its member countries.

Governança comercial no Brasil e na África do Sul: quanta convergência para o modelo anglo-saxão?

Authorship SCIMAGO INSTITUTIONS RANKINGS

ABSTRACT

The effect of globalization on national economic and political strategies is a central theme in policy analysis. At the core of this debate is business governance, interpreted in this paper in a wide sense as the laws, rules, and routines that govern large-scale corporations. Conventional wisdom has it that cross-national patterns of business governance are converging on the so-called Anglo-Saxon, capital-market driven model. In this paper I analyze recent changes in Brazil and South Africa, to conclude that models of business governance should be seen jointly with the institutional underpinnings of the economy. These include legal traditions that are unlikely to undergo rapid changes, other institutional features directly related to the ways in which first compete in the global economy, and the mechanisms through which social actors resist changes adverse to their interests.

KEYWORDS:
Corporate governance; privatization; regulation

	BRAZIL	Owner	Sector	SOUTH AFRICA	Owner	Sector
1	Petrobras	CG	RM	Escom	CG	U
2	CVRD	CG	RM	Sats	CG	U
3	CESP	SG	U	Anglo	PN	RM
4	TELESP	CG	U	Remgro	PN	D
5	Furnas	CG	U	Gencor	PN	RM
6	CHESF	CG	U	Barlows	PN	D
7	RFFSA	CG	U	De Beers	PN	RM
8	Copene	PN	IC	Sasol	CG	IC
9	EMBRATEL	CG	U	lscor	CG	IC
10	CEMIG	SG	U	Amgold	PN	RM
11	Usiminas	CG	IC	GFSA	PF	RM
12	SABESP	SG	U	SAB	PN	CND
13	Eletronorte	CG	U	Ltberty Holdings	PN	D
14	Light	CG	U	CG Smith	PN	CND
15	Petroquímica União	CG	IC	Amic	PN	D
16	Mercedes Benz	PF	CD	JCI	PN	D
17	COPEL	SG	U	IDC	CG	D
18	Camargo Corrêa	PN	C	CGS Food	PN	CND
19	Mendes Junior	PN	C	Vaal Reefs	PN	RM
20	VARIG	PN	U	Premier Group	PN	CND
21	TELERJ	CG	U	AECI	PN	IC
22	Suzano	PN	IC	Sappi	PN	IC
23	Belgo Mineira	PN	IC	Amscor	CG	HT
24	Volkswagen	PF	CD	Tongaat	PN	CND
25	Petrobras Distribuidora	CG	CND	Senchem	PN	IC
26	Mannesmann	PF	IC	Dries	PN	RM
27	Rhodia	PF	IC	Metkor	PN	C
28	Klabin	PN	IC	Federale Volk	PN	D
29	Aracruz	PN	IC	Anglovaal	PN	RM
30	Brasileira Alumínio	PN	IC	Tiger Oats	PN	CND
31	Votorantim	PN	IC	ATI	PN	D
32	Andrade Gutierrez	PN	C	Kisch	PN	CND
33	Dow Química	PF	IC	Alpha	PN	C
34	Eletrosul	CG	U	Nampak	PN	IC
35	Pirelli	PF	CD	M&R	PN	D
36	Nestlé	PF	CND	Plate	PN	D
37	ESSO	PF	RM	Hiveld	PN	IC
38	White Martins	PF	IC	OK	PN	CND
39	Docenave	CG	U	PPC	PN	C
40	Ford	PF	CD	Reunert	PN	HT

	BRAZIL	Owner	Sector	SOUTH AFRICA	Owner	Sector
1	Petrobras	CG	RM	Anglo	PN	RM
2	Furnas	CG	U	Eskom	CG	U
3	TELESP	PM	U	Transnet	CG	U
4	CESP	SG	U	Sappi	PN	IC
5	SABESP	SG	U	De Beers	PN	RM
6	EMBRATEL	PM	U	Remgro	PN	D
7	CVRD	PN	RM	Telkom	CG	U
8	Fiat	PF	CD	SAB	PN	CND
9	Eletropaulo	PM	U	Anglo Gold	PN	RM
10	RFFSA	CG	U	Sasol	PN	IC
11	CEMIG	SG	U	CG Smith	PN	CND
12	CSN	PN	IC	Nail	PN	H
13	Light	PN	U	Barlows	PN	D
14	CBD	PN	CND	Goldfields	PN	RM
15	CHESF	CG	U	Iscor	PN	IC
16	Usiminas	PN	IC	Johnnic	PN	H
17	Brahma	PN	CND	Avmin	PN	RM
18	Petrobras Distribuidora	CG	RM	Tiger Oats	PN	CND
19	Mercedes Benz	PF	CD	GFSA	PN	RM
20	COPEL	SG	U	Pepkor	PN	CND
21	CPFL	PM	U	Minorco	PN	RM
22	TELERJ	PM	U	Billiton	PN	RM
23	TELESP Celular	PF	U	Amplats	PN	RM
24	VARIG	PN	U	M&R Hld	PN	H
25	Eletronorte	CG	U	FIT Hld	PN	H
26	COSIPA	PN	IC	AVI	PN	D
27	Ceval	PN	IC	Imperial	PN	CND
28	Gerdau	PN	IC	Kersaf	PN	CND
29	CST	PN	IC	AECI	PN	IC
30	Shell	PF	RM	Tongaat	PN	DI
31	Bandeirante	PM	U	Amgold	PN	RM
32	Credicard	PN	CND	Dries	PN	RM
33	Ericson	PF	CD	Wooltru	PN	CND
34	Soza Cruz	PF	CND	Implats	PN	RM
35	Copene	PN	IC	Comparex	PN	HT
36	TELEMIG	PM	U	Shoprite	PN	CND
37	VASP	PN	U	Hiveld	PN	IC
38	CEDAE	SG	U	Trencor	PN	CND
39	CRT	PM	U	Richemont	PN	DI
40	Ipiranga	PN	RM	Gencor	PN	RM

	Dispersed Ownership	Shared Control	Family Ownership	Government Ownership	Foreign Ownership	Cooperatives
1990	1	5	27	38	27	2
	(1)	(4)	(23)	(44)	(26)	(2)
1995	3	15	26	23	31	2
	(2)	(11)	(17)	(30)	(38)	(2)
1997	3	19	23	21	33	1
	(2)	(12)	(16)	(32)	(37)	(0)
1998	4	23	26	12	34	1
	(3)	(19)	(17)	(21)	(40)	(0)

1983		1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Anglo	52.5	54.1	53.6	54.1	60.1	49.5	45.3	44.2	42.4	33.7	38.2	43.3	37.1	28.3	22.6
Sanlam	9.4	10.7	12.2	11.3	10.7	10.8	9.5	13.2	13.2	15.6	12.0	10.5	12.4	11.0	10.6
Rembrandt	2.1	2.8	3.8	4.4	4.3	7.6	16.1	13.6	15.2	14.6	15.5	13.0	7.8	10.6	9.9
Old Mutual	0.6	2.7	10.6	10.9	8.0	9.8	9.8	10.2	10.4	14.2	10.7	9.7	11.2	10.2	11.4
Liberty	1.1	2.1	2.0	2.3	2.0	2.6	3.4	2.6	3.7	4.7	6.2	7.2	7.3	11.1	11.9
Anglovaal	1.7	1.7	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.4	2.2	2.2	2.5	2.9	3.4	3.6	2.9	3.0	1.5
Foreign control	5.4	5.7	5.9	6.1	4.1	5.1	3.6	2.1	1.9	2.2	2.4	2.2	4.1	4.1	4.0
Mgm’t control	4.1	5.1	3.0	3.5	3.7	6.9	4.9	5.0	6.2	6.8	7.7	7.0	7.5	6.6	7.4
Black control	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.6	6.3	9.3
Other groups	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.4	4.1	6.1
Joint control	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.4	1.5	1.3
Unallocated	19.9	12.8	4.0	1.2	1.8	2.8	1.3	3.2	3.9	5.0	3.5	3.4	3.9	3.2	4.0
Memorandum Cumulated share by top 5	65.7	72.4	82.2	83.0	85.1	81.2	80.3	83.8	84.9	82.8	82.6	83.7	82.3	78.2	66.4

Centro de Economia Política Rua Araripina, 106, CEP 05603-030 São Paulo - SP, Tel. (55 11) 3816-6053 - São Paulo - SP - Brazil
E-mail: cecilia.heise@bjpe.org.br

Acompanhe os números deste periódico no seu leitor de RSS

[1] *
I thank Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira, Peter Kingstone, Sylvia Maxfield, David O’Connor, and seminar participants at the 2000 meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, panel on “Competitive International Economic Strategies in Latin America”, for most useful comments on earlier drafts. The opinions expressed and arguments employed remain my sole responsibility, and do not reflect those of the OECD Development Centre or its member countries.