

ERRATA

In the paper “*Alternate paths to economic development: A comparative analysis of Brazil and India in the era of neoliberalism*”

DOI: 10.1590/0101-31572017v37n02a03, published in the Brazilian Journal of Political Economy 147, vol. 37, n.2, April-June/2017, originally published in this site, some footnotes failed to be published:

Where it read:

[...] This capital intensive nature of structural change, while growth inducing, has been unsuccessful in absorbing the large pool of unskilled labour that exists in the countryside. Thus while the share of services accounted for 53 % of GDP in 2010, its share in total employment was a mere 26%. Agriculture on the other hand employed 55% of the labour force, but accounted for only 16 % of GDP in the same year.

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⁵ Baer and Sirohi (2016) develop this argument in detail for Brazil and India. See Ghani (2010) for a different conclusion.

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⁶ See Drèze and Sen (2013) and Kohli (2012) for a brief discussion.

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⁷ <http://unicef.in/Story/1124/Nutrition>.

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⁸ United Nations Human Development Report (online): <http://hdr.undp.org/en/data> and World Development Indicators (online): <http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators> [Viewed: 30/06/2015].

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[...] Given the inherent problems associated with poverty calculations we may also note other indicators of progress. In the 12 year period spanning 2000 and 2012, mean years of schooling increased by 1.6 years, life expectancy has increased by 3.4 years and the under-5 mortality rate has decreased at an average rate of 6.9% per year.

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¹⁰ In India the corresponding numbers were 0.8 years, 4.1 years, 4% per year respectively. See UNICEF (2014) and UNDP (online): <http://hdr.undp.org/en/data>.

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[...] Of course it is true that the economy had a balance of payment crisis in 1990 but as Patnaik and Chandrasekhar (1995) suggest, the actual dimensions of this crisis never reached threatening proportions and there was actually very little need to resort to liberalization. What all this means is that the neoliberal reforms were not undertaken in response to external shocks as was the case of Brazil; It was a slow and gradual process which by this virtue has succeeded in creating of a strong coalition of support, including not only the big bourgeoisie but also the urban middle class and propertied middle and upper castes of rural India.

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¹¹ See also Vinaik (2001) and Kohli (2006a).

¹² Bardhan (1999) calls this the “dominant proprietary” classes.

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[...] Further, unlike Brazil Where taming inflation created a propensity towards deflationary policies during the 1990s and therefore caused significant losses of jobs for the middle class, in India not only was neoliberal policymaking relatively less conservative but the aforementioned bias towards high-tech services also tipped the scale in favor of skilled labour.

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¹³ In a somewhat exaggerated claim McCartney (2010: 95) states that “Far from providing a constraint on the fiscal maneuverability of the Indian economy and punishing deficits with capital flight, capital market liberalization has in fact allowed a sustained Keynesian-style expansion by the Indian state”. Describing the state’s policies as “Keynesian” can hardly be defensible given the abject failure to effective demand in any broad sense. Yet the statement also has an element of truth in the sense that even the most conservative policy makers have been relatively flexible on issues of fiscal deficit.

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¹⁴ See Sen (1993).

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¹⁵ The Brazilian middle classes formed an important electoral vote base of the PT throughout the 1990’s. Even though this support began to wane after the first term of Lula, PT received 60% of the lower middle class votes during the elections in 2006 (Bohn 2011).

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[...] Disillusioned with orthodox policies, by 2002 it was precisely this “losers’ alliance” consisting of workers, local industrialists and middle classes that began demanding a change from status quo and that propelled PT into the national limelight (Morais and Saad-Filho, 2003)

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¹⁶ Both Boito (2007) and Morais and Saad-Filho (2003) see these new class alliances as a sign of deepening, rather than weakening of neoliberalism.