Logic in Brazilian colonial corpora

A lógica nos corpora coloniais brasileiros

Abstract

There is a thought, originally by Tobias Barreto and later repeated by Sílvio Romero and Antonio Paim, which, first, states the presence of the Brazilian philosophical acephaly, and secondly, the lack of written materials and hence of philosophy during Brazil’s Colonial period. This view is, on the one hand, based on the assumed non-existence of any writings with a minimum of philosophical content worthy of the name during the first three centuries of the colonial period in Brazil and, on the other hand, on the Brazilian philosophical incapacity. To counterposition ourselves with regard to this, in the first part of this Article we characterise four different colonial corpora - one Jesuit, one Carmelite, one Benedictine, and one Franciscan. Then, in the second part of this paper, we analyse the underlying definition of logic for each corpus. The analysis is based on the following hypothesis: not only does Brazilian Colonial Philosophy exist, but also it shows some characteristics of modern Cartesian philosophy.

Keywords:
Colonial philosophy; Corpora; Manuscripts; Brazilian Philosophy

Resumo

Há uma tese de Tobias Barreto, repetida por Sílvio Romero e Antonio Paim, que afirma, primeiro, a acefalia filosófica brasileira e, segundo, a inexistência de escritos e, consequentemente, de filosofia no período colonial. Essa tese assenta-se, por um lado, na suposição da inexistência de quaisquer escritos minimamente filosóficos e dignos de tal nome durante os três primeiros séculos da colônia e, por outro, na incapacidade filosófica tupiniquim. Para contrapormo-nos à mesma, caracterizamos, na primeira parte deste artigo, quatro corpora coloniais - um jesuítico outro carmelita, um beneditino outro franciscano - e, na segunda parte, analisamos a definição de lógica subjacente aos corpora. A análise parte desta hipótese: não apenas existe a filosofia colonial brasileira quanto ela tem características da filosofia moderna cartesiana.

Palavras-chave:
Filosofia colonial; Corpora; Tobias Barreto; Filosofia brasileira

Resumen

Hay una tesis de Tobias Barreto, repetida por Sílvio Romero y Antonio Paim, que afirma, primero, la acefalía filosófica brasileña y, segundo, la inexistencia de escrituras y, en consecuencia, de filosofía en el período colonial. Esta tesis se basa, por un lado, en el supuesto de la inexistencia de escritos mínimamente filosóficos dignos de tal nombre durante los tres primeros siglos de la colonia y, por otro lado, en la incapacidad filosófica de los tupiniquim. Para oponerlo, en la primera parte de este artículo caracterizamos cuatro corpus coloniales -un jesuita, otro carmelita, un benedictino, otro franciscano- y, en la segunda parte, analizar la definición de lógica que subyace a los corpus. El análisis parte de esta hipótesis: no sólo existe la filosofía colonial brasileña, sino que también tiene características de la filosofía cartesiana moderna.

Palabras clave:
Filosofía colonial; Corpus; Tobias Barreto; Filosofía brasileña

Introduction

According to the title, there are indeed some philosophical works in the colonial period in Brazil (1500 - 1822), even though there are some people who confirm the exact opposite (ROMERO, 1878, p. 1): “we can affirm, due to the historical question, that philosophy has not been totally foreign to us, in the first three centuries of our existence”. If taken as an undisputable truth, this statement ends up paralysing any kind of research; to be contested, there is a need not only for literature of a philosophical ilk, but also an intellectual rigour. The critical fortune of this statement, together with the proverbial repetition of the fact that the Brazilian people are philosophically acephalous, endorsed by the dearth of historical research studies on the issue and on the relative comfort in not needing to worry about bygone days or arid files, has made it convenient to make a thoughtless repetition that there has been no philosophical production in the colonial period.

Formally, Tobias Barreto has been nominated by the culturalists as the Father of Brazilian Philosophy; prior to this, there was no philosophy, were we to believe their diagnosis. From their pens came forth two key statements, set in stone, in the Recordação de Kant (published as part of Questões vigentes de philosophia e de direito in the ninth volume of Barreto’s complete works) which became the classic justification of the denial of Brazilian colonial philosophy (1926, p. 245; we shall henceforth adapt spelling in line with the new spelling rules): “there is no domain of intellectual activities in which the Brazilian spirit shows itself to be so timid, so frivolous and fruitless, as in the philosophical domain”. This assumed sterility is backed by the lack of poets and poesy among us, and on the idea that we are merely literary anthropoids - half humans, half monkeys -, without any dignity for any philosophical classification or citizenship. According to Tobias Barreto, the main consequence is uselessness on proving something obvious (1926, p. 249): “but it is a superfluous task to want to prove that the sun is not cold, or that Brazil does not have a philosophic head. I hereby renounce the pleasure and the glory of a demonstration of this type”. As the author makes this issue seem obvious, the author exempts himself from the task of carrying out the demonstration task, even though the obvious is not always a good counsellor in philosophical terms.

If the view held by Tobias Barreto (1839-1889) does not seem to lack proof, it was not long before Silvio Romero (1851-1914) took it on, brimming with enthusiasm, on the opening of his study on Brazilian Philosophy (1878, p. 1). As this was not enough, this thesis has been largely copied in recent years. It was resumed and then used as an excuse for reducing the need for colonial philosophical research, with denial prevailing once again (PAIM, 1998, p. 3):

In relation to the first three centuries, we must admit that the intellectual life of the country at the time was very thin and largely limited to some circles - religious orders during the period and literary organisations set up in the 18th Century - and currently existing urban centres. These were found to be restricted to some points on the coast - Rio de Janeiro, Salvador, Olinda and a few others - and also to Minas Gerais, during the period known as the Gold Cycle (…). In this situation, philosophical meditation had to be a mere repetition of what was going on in the colonising country. In this historical period being addressed, Portugal rejected Erasmism and, in general, Renaissance humanism, bringing about the Second Portuguese Scholastic that, even though some interest was naturally maintained, resulted in the closure of Portugal to the movement of ideas kindled by the Modern Age.

Sílvio Romero and Antonio Paim therefore provided a disservice bringing about incalculable harm to Colonial philosophical research. In addition, we must not doubt that there could be other followers of the same ilk. However, as a person from Minas Gerais, I accept, without a blush, that “I am myself. I am different from everyone else... I do not know much, but I am suspicious about a lot of things” (GUIMARÃES ROSA, 1958, p. 16). This distrust, together with scepticism with regard to ready answers, make me like disagreeing with ‘established truths’ and show why, behind them, there can be worlds of profound silence yet as grandiose as the arrogance of those who deny it. For this reason, there is an important task: that of showing that the statements made by Tobias Barreto himself, seconded by Sílvio Romero and Antonio Paim, are so empty and lack historical research of sources. For anyone intending to be a historian, this is comparable to suicide, while for us it means accepting the ‘shame of others’.

As we start from the opposite pole, we need to characterise the corpora philosophica of Jesuits, Carmelites, Benedictines, and Franciscans within the Brazilian colonial period, with a view to providing grounds for the opposite view. However, before we try to answer, I need to defuse some misunderstandings. First, if someone still believes that there are no philosophical works, or that all such works were destroyed when the Jesuits were expelled (1759), they are very wrong. Secondly, these are not theology texts with some philosophical coating, but philosophical texts in the true meaning of the term, as understood at the time, the content of which including logic, physics, and metaphysics. Thirdly, the writings are not limited to these three main topics, as they also address the issues of “animastics or philosophy of the mind” and studies of morals and right. In this case, there are texts addressing the issue of slavery, for example. Fourthly, the texts are not reduced to the Jesuit Aristotelianism or Thomism, much to the contrary, they are closer to the Scout movement, to Platonism, and to modern philosophy. Fifthly, with regard to the idea that these could be lesser writings, and, at second order, this is not questioned as there are writings of equal length than those produced at the Universities at Coimbra and Évora in that period. If this means they are lesser papers, this should be accepted as a common matter to those Universities. There is also Cursus Philosophicus with up to 871 folios, and in this case, the assumption of there being lesser works needs to be reviewed. Sixthly, to those who only believe in the hasty stories of philosophy, I suggest calm and patience, to be able to tackle texts containing quotations ranging from Zeno of Elea, Thales of Miletus, Pythagoras, St Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus and John Baconthorpe (c. 1290 - 1347) to the likes of Pierre Gassendi, Francis Bacon and René Descartes. Last but not least, some of these were penned in Latin with significant corrections, and others not so much: among the manuscripts, some were proofread, but not all; among the printed editions (editio princeps), all are revised but still show incorrections. In addition, there are very few written in Portuguese, and even these contain many quotations in Latin, French and other languages.

Once the ‘initial warnings’ have been made, I immediately move to the characterisation of the Jesuit, Carmelite, Benedictine and Franciscan corpora under consideration, and then we shall make an analysis of the concept of logic within these four corpora to illustrate the argument about the modernising philosophic content. Our hypothesis is therefore that not only is there a Brazilian colonial philosophy, as also that this philosophy has a typical inclination towards modern philosophy of the Cartesian ilk.

1. The formats of the colonial corpora

1.1. The Jesuit paper we have used for our analysis is the Mappam Philosophicam in quatuor veluti regiones, rationalem, naturalem, animasticam, et transnaturalem, whose editio princeps dates from 17 March 1730, being printed at the Typography of the Inquisition Court at Coimbra. The text was signed by teacher Bento da Fonseca (being the seventh of twenty academic texts by this author) and defended by a student by the name of Francisco Xavier. It passes through the four main elements of philosophy as taught during the Ignatian philosophical three-year period: logic, or rational philosophy, in the first year; physics or natural philosophy and animastics or ‘philosophy of body and soul’ in the second year, and metaphysics or transnatural philosophy, in the third year.

This is a text about universal examination (de universa) regarding knowledge, as this exposes the triennial distribution of the course content (accuratissime delineatam, graphyceque per triennium distributam). The text is distributed in 8 folios, recto et verso, with only the reverse side of the first folio is left blank, while the last folio has handwritten notes. This is a printed version with some 50 lines per folio and 96 graphemes per line, including blank spaces (see Figure 1: folio 2 recto). The text is divided into four parts, with the first part, dedicated to logic, extends for 9 paragraphs that are numbered using Roman numerals; the second, dedicated to physics, has 7 paragraphs; the third, dedicated to animastics, has 6 paragraphs, and the fourth one, dedicated to metaphysics, has only 3 paragraphs.

Figure 1
Bento da Fonseca, Mappam philosophicam... fol. 2 recto

1.2. The second text that I highlight here is a manuscript from the Carmelite School of Pará, with an approximate date between 1725 and 1735, presented on seven recto et verso folios, with the second and last reverse side being left blank. It has some 32 lines per folio with 55 graphemes per line, including the blank lines. It is the only text coming from Pará with a cover and authorship information. This is a Conclusão teológica sobre o mistério inefável da Encarnação, or ‘Theological conclusion on the ineffable mystery of the Incarnation’, and was defended by Friar Inácio da Conceição, a reader of Holy Theology and defended by Friar Antônio de Araújo, at the Carmelite Convent of¹. Apart from the cover and back cover, the test is printed on four folios, subdivided into four conclusions on the possibility, the causes, the consummation (assumptio) and the hypostatic union in the incarnation of the Word.

Figure 2
Inácio da Conceição, Conclusão teológica... fol. 1

We also see that the texts from Pará do not show any metaphysical writings, even though there is a theology text that addresses De ineffabili Incarnatione Mysterio, in which there is a discussion of the metaphysical logic of the incarnate Word. Among the writings coming from the state of Pará, there is one text that deals with the physical works of Aristotle; another one focuses on ethics, discussing the issue of slavery, and the last text is about Law and addresses issue like libel and slander, and public defamation. All these texts already have a complete editio diplomatica².

1.3. Another corpus I highlight in this paper is the Philosophia Platonica seu Cursus Philosophicus Rationalem, Naturalem et Transnaturalem Philosophiam sive Logicam, Phisicam et Metaphysicam Completens, penned by Friar Gaspar da Madre de Deus, at the Benedictine Monastery of Rio de Janeiro on 7 March 1748. Out of all the texts listed here, this is the most famous and the one with most references, even though it is still largely unknown. This is a manuscript in which the two best articles were written by Carlos Lopes de Matos, one being about the author, and the other containing excerpts of the manuscript, duly transcribed and with a somewhat imprecise translation, in 1970 and 1972 (MARQUES, 2021a). The two articles are transcribed by A. Paim as part of his Etapas iniciais da filosofia brasileira (1998, p. 8-21) without observations or critical analysis. This manuscript is also mentioned by Paulo Margutti (2013, p. 299-300), using the reference markers of Matos (1970 e 1972) and Paim (1998). As this is a manuscript commonly mentioned in books on the history of philosophy, we should have a lot more, which is not the case. This is a manuscript to be studied and edited. Even though this work mentions the three parts of classical philosophy, the manuscript only covers the first two, in a set with some 435 folios on the first part and 354 in the second, giving a total of 789 folios. Each mage has 24 lines, and each line has 60 graphemes, including spaces left blank (see Figure 3: folio 1 verso and 2 recto). The part devoted to logic is divided into seven books. Each book is then divided into chapters that, in turn, are divided into propositions. The second part is structured in chapters and propositions, with these being subdivided into questions. This is one single book, with the content distributed in matter, form and a composite of form and matter, and the respective causes. Regarding to legibility, it is not the best, but at least can be read or edited.

Figure 3
Gaspar da Madre de Deus, Philosophia Platonica, fol. 1

1.4. The last corpus selected is the Compendium Philosophicum et Recompilatum, by Friar Manuel dos Anjos (Fr. Emanuel ab Angelis), dated on 15 November 1756 and coming from the Franciscan Province of Mato Grosso, from a school known as Colégio Serenensi (in Provinciae nostrae in nostro Colegio Serenensi, vulgo do Mato Grosso). I attach him to the Franciscan corpus, both tanks to the dedication message that follows the title Sanctissima Mentem Sublimi Dignissimi Nostri Joanis Duns Scoti as also through the completion of the first part, where there is explicit praise for the Father, St Francis (folio 279³). Turning to a general characterisation, each folio has 32 lines and 52 graphemes per line, on average, including blank spaces (see Figure 4: folio 281, the first folio in the section about physics). Both the handwriting and the condition are much better than the manuscript penned by Friar Gaspar da Madre de Deus. This means that they allow quick and easy reading, with the text now being in its second and revised version, as mentioned in the title (et recompilatum). Regarding state of the art, we have transcribed and revised the first part (279 sheets on logic), currently being translated. For further information, we recommend you read A filosofia e suas formas (MARQUES, 2021b, p. 135-174).

Figure 4
Manuel dos Anjos, Cursus Philosophicum, fol. 4 recto

With the general characterisation of the corpora, and so as not to return to the text A filosofia e suas formas (MARQUES, 2021b) where, as already mentioned, the best course of action is to move on with what we have proposed, which is to analyse the concept of logic in these writings., Before that, however, we shall note that the aforementioned lack of colonial philosophical writings does seem to be an unsustainable point, however. I do not have the illusion of following the length of each written piece, but I seek to highlight the points that classify and initially define the issue of logic in these written pieces. The points under analysis from this moment hence shall be: what definition of logic is present in these corpora; what theoretical affiliation can be identified in this definition, and what is the theoretical scope of the definition as proposed. It would be too pretentions to wish to have a final study of these definitions. However, we shall bring understanding as possible for the time being. In addition, as the texts studied are all written in Latin, we shall not be translating them, but only give a paraphrase that is understandable, with the original being shown in the most complete form that would allow us to put them as footnotes. As this is an in fieri kind of research, considerations and criticism are always welcome, so we can enhance the future editions.

2. The definitions of logic in colonial corpora

As the corpora have already between characterised, we shall organize this second topic in numeric subdivisions, following the prior order of presentation, with regard to the texts when we are dealing with the elements present in these, even when indirectly related in the content, they shall be preserved as a matter of fidelity to the original. In addition, the exposure shall be followed by a brief summary to compare the definitions.

2.1. Bento da Fonseca studied with Rodrigo Homem at the School of Maranhão and was his successor in reading the philosophy course as from 1725, when Rodrigo Homem when he went to Pará, then returning to the metropolis. Even though Serafim Leite has assigned him less than less than ten academic texts, we now know that this is a case of some two dozen, this being the seventh text numbered according to the numbering used in Catalogus Eborensis (MARQUES, 2018, p. 136). We do not yet have an edition of the opera omnia by Bento de Fonseca, but what we have studied here is highly representative, addressing the full content of the course dictated in the philosophical triennium. We must also remember that there are other written texts by the author - letters, prefaces, and statements- that would also deserve to be mentioned in an opera omnia when the work is produced.

The author subdivides the nine paragraphs addressing logic, in 4 parts, with the first aimed at a general introduction to logic (philosophiam rationalem percurrit) with 4 paragraphs on universal materials and formal formats (¶1), the universal species (¶2), gender and predictive and subjective species (subjicibilis ¶3) and the individual, differences, and means of predication (¶4). The second part addresses common and particular signs (signa in communi, et in particular) and is summarised in one single paragraph (¶5) with the core themes: the sign and its components, the formal and instrumental sign, the natural and conventional sign (ex instituto). The third part, about prior analysis, deals with terms, propositions and oppositions (¶6), consecution, conversion and equipolence (¶7) and the syllogism, syllogistic form and the middle term (ars reducendi syllogismus, et inveniendi medium (¶8). Finally, the fourth part (¶9) deals with posterior analysis (ac topici), precisely from those premises in order, for the conclusion and the division of the syllogism, according to the matter.

In the whole text, we highlight two passages: the first, which is the expression of the issue of universals (folio 26 recto ¶1), and the second being the definition of the individual and the predications of being (folio 26 verso ¶4). In both passages, there are references to the authors commented on, and the wording brings definitions in italics, even though they do not seem to entirely refer to the authors mentioned: the texts in italics sound better as a definition explained by the teacher rather than as a quotation, as we understand it in the present day. Let us take a look (folio 26 recto ¶1):

Constructing our truly real understanding of universal matter, we follow the definition of real universal matter as a whole and entirely simple potential. Hence, one can infer the objective distinction between the metaphysical degrees thus created. We answer the questions - there would be a formal distinction between metaphysical degrees created based on the Scotist understanding of natural things and, on the other hand, there would be an admirable extensive and virtual distinction, transferrable to the object as created - by rejecting both possibilities. [For this reason, regarding the real universal point of matter] this means there is a real and intentional distinction, in the manner as proposed by Bacon. There is no intentional and real whole from the standpoint of the object, and neither does this apply to universal matter. As a result, we say that the solution as proposed by Scotus does not please us, according to the terms presented⁴.

It is interesting to observe that the definition of universal real matter is a definition of the realists, being rejected by Bento da Fonseca. This is nothing new, as his teacher Rodrigo Homem had also rejected this same definition in his work A técnica do raciocínio (MARQUES, 2018, p. 205). The Scotist logic would allow one to think of a scientia realis of mundane objects as a mental reality through a correspondence between thought and language. This would be the assumption (FREITAS, 2006, p. 85): “Duns Scotus recognises human intelligence as an unlimited intentionality, both natural and intrinsically open to knowledge of universality or the totality of being”. However, it is because of this unlimited intentionality that Bento da Fonseca criticises this view. In his view, there is no intentional real. Hence, the author moves away from the Scotist heritage.

The development of the following paragraphs just confirms the rejection, by Bento da Fonseca, of the Scotist logic and theory of knowledge. As a critic of Scotism, he moves closer to Thomism, which is what we can read between the lines in his definition of the individual and predications of being (folio 26 verso ¶4):

The individual, according to the first intention, is defined by Thomas Aquinas as something that is indivisible in itself, and divisible by some other last division. [The individual] as considered by the second intention, is something that is able to exist or that can be the predicate of only one. There are five individual predicable species. There is no vague form of individual in the real world, even though someone could ask mainly about the possibility of there being individualising universal differences; however, this person would be wrong. The most significant individual difference is, formally speaking, the very establishment of the different thing. Turning to the way of being and predication, through a complete and determined form, the difference goes well beyond the typology it acquires; however, as a mode of predication, the subsistent element surpasses the typology of the difference. For this reason, the difference can be defined as the third predicate, namely: the one that is able to exist and to be a predicate of many things, as an essential quality. The proper in itself (property) is defined as something that is peculiar to someone. Moreover, to the extent that there is indeed a fourth mode, it will be predicable, and vice-versa. After all, what is the own convenience of the fourth mode [of predication]? This question shall not be left unanswered. The fifth predicate is defined as what can exist or be a predicate of many things as a contingent quality. A positive or negative real accident is not predicable on the real being, as it cannot be brought about before itself or before the existence of the subjects. At the very most, it can be predicable if it is considered in relation to a future being⁵.

This is a symptomatic passage to understand the precision with which the author treats the different issues. The initial indication as made by St Thomas Aquinas deserves to be compared with the definition of the mediaeval master (Summa Theologica I, q. 29, a. 4c and III, q. 77, a. 2 apudSTORCK, 1998, p. 27): “the individual is something that is indistinct in itself, but distinct from others⁶”. The appropriation of the definition is indirect and, in a way, imprecise. In sequence, Bento da Fonseca mentions the definition regarding the second intention - that which is able to exist, or which can be the predicate of only one -, while in St Thomas Aquinas the wording is the following (In I Sent. d. 23, q. 1, a. 3 c apud STORCK, 1998, p. 31): “the individual can be understood in two ways: through a name of the second intention like the monikers of ‘individual’ or ‘singular’, which do not mean something singular, but rather a notion of singularity; or by a name of the first intention, which means the thing for which the notion of particularity is convenient”⁷. With the second quotation, the same thing seems to happen: the use of references is made freely and indirectly; however, it also attempts to give the text an understanding as large as possible, meaning the most lucid that can be obtained, and a mnemonic form. However, one can see that the author has St Thomas Aquinas in mind, meaning that the author does not detach himself entirely. The second part of the definition of the individual echoes the terms of Porphyry’s Isagoge, or putting it better, the terms of the five Aristotelic predictables. Any predication (kategoriôn or praedicamentorum) occurs through typology and species, difference, property and accident⁸. On the one hand, Bento da Fonseca addresses the individual, the difference, the owned and the accident, with some negligence regarding the issue of species, even though all five terms were previously mentioned (folio 26 recto ¶2). On the other hand, the text that seems to make explanatory notes in the preparation thereof, has the following form in Porphyry (PAIVA, s/d, p. 2): “the typology, for example, is the animal; the species, for example Homo sapiens; the difference being, for example, the rational being; a proper characteristic being for example the ability to laugh; the accident being black or white skin, and the ability to sit down”⁹. This does not mean we are saying that the text lacks philosophical value. Much to the contrary. We are just showing the degree of freedom the author uses in making indirect mention of the sources he has in mind, and how the final expression of logic, as explained in these two fragments, can be compared to the classic understanding thereof.

2.2. The second paper to be highlighted is the Conclusões teológicas sobre o inefável mistério da Encarnação (Theological conclusions on the Ineffable Mystery of Incarnation). In this work, we are interested in the logical bases present in the text, as a way of understanding the epistemological assumptions made by professor Inácio da Conceição and by the student who defended the conclusion, Friar Antônio de Araújo. The brief manuscript is on folios 150 and 151 recto and verso. This is, indeed, a well-written and well-preserved version. The handwriting is excellent, and the margins are separated by a simple dash, showing the care taken with the organisation of the text. We shall quote excerpts based on the recently published version (Friar Inácio da Conceição apud MARQUES, 2021c) which is part of the collection of written works from the Carmelite Convent in Pará.

The model used for writing the conclusiones is always the same. It does not include the text with the development of arguments, only bringing conclusions that, in this case, are the results of arguments that have been discussed throughout the research study. These Conclusões teológicas sobre o inefável mistério da Encarnação discuss the possibility of there being natural knowledge of metaphysical reality, meaning that arguments consider a list of logical and epistemological assumptions between natural and transnatural theology, based on the question about the convenience of the moment of incarnation. The answer is presented in four precise conclusions (150v: apud MARQUES, 2021c, p. 20):

It is possible not only to deny the Mystery of Incarnation and believe that this does not exist; in the same way that one does not affirm the existence of light for those people who are not [children of] light. As there is no possibility of a natural proof of this possibility, similarly only through the natural light of reason is it possible to get a positive idea of the Mystery of Incarnation¹⁰.

The epistemological limit on the awareness of incarnation is that of the natural light of reason. The understanding of the mystery assumes, in this regard, something new beyond mere rationality, as it is not possible to understand even the mystery of the Trinity, or divine immutability in incarnation, through the natural light of reason alone. The cause of this phenomenon lies in the limits on investigations that are unable to understand the hidden plans of divine will. All that is known about divine incarnation is nothing but simple opinions of theologists, The real understanding rests with the ‘power of divine tasks’ which opens intelligence for understanding (151 recto: apud Marques, 2021c, p. 21). In this regard, the investigation of the scope of human understanding is only possible when compared to the limits of what is known in the world (151 verso: apud MARQUES, 2021c, p. 22):

The term that is adopted by this ineffable compound Christ the Lord is the Divine Word; while the word is the very nature of personality, and the common logic of three persons; whose difficulty is: if in the Divine Word the logic of hypostatic union, if it is an absolute predication of just a relative predication?¹¹

The possibility of understanding the mystery is opened through the awareness of divine logic, namely: on the one hand, the logic that is private to the three persons, and, on the other hand, through the logic expressed at incarnation. This does not mean that incarnation shall mean a lowering of the incarnate person, because “Divine Nature may not be humanised, not in itself, not through its existence, and not even through absolute subsistence”¹² (151 recto: apud MARQUES, 2021c, p. 21). This means that this logic does not equate to a lowering of the incarnate; much to the contrary, human nature is assumed (assumptam) and is raised by incarnation, even though there is no obstacle stopping incarnation, in the form of human conducting; however, when this does occur, this shall be due to the Divine Plan, which exceeds the limits of human logic, of the natural light of reason.

The fourth conclusion brings over two more arguments on the logical impossibility of an incarnation that is understandable and also limited to the human dimension (151 verso: apud MARQUES, 2021c, p. 23): the first says that incarnation - the hypostatic union between divine nature and the bodily substrate (unio naturae ad suppositum) - does not occur in any body, otherwise the product could be repeated many times; and, in the second, the incarnation assumes the rationality of the union between ‘flesh and word’ regarding the rationality of the gift of being (tam in ratione unionis, quam in ratione doni ita esse). In short, it becomes evident that the mystery of incarnation is, on the one hand, a work of rationality, internal to the three people, and, on the other hand, a result of the rationality of the hypostatic union and rationality of the gift of being (divine freeness) The consequence is the generalisation of logic as the comprehension principle of the Divine Being, even though that does not mean that the natural light of reason is sufficient for that. This means that the human being understands divine logic only insofar as there is an opening to the supernatural light of faith. Within this theoretical limit, this is not a case of limitation of reason, but rather of the generalisation of rationality open to divine understanding. This means the correct logic would be a condition of greatest coverage, for understanding the mystery.

This logic, as expressed in Carmelite writings, is a bit like the patristic understanding when using the term; logic, in the strict sense, as understood as a subdivision of the understanding of the options of the incarnate Logos, and from where we see nothing in the world that is not logical (or diabolic). Much to the contrary, the whole world is seen as a work of the incarnate Logos, meaning that the whole world is logical. In turn, in Jesuit writings, we have a logic that is redesigned based on the heritage of the Aristotelic Categories, explained through the format of Isagogé, by Porphyrius. In this case, if anything can be said about them, the Carmelite logic would be the heir of patristic logic, and also the Jesuit logic, in turn an heir of the Porphyric logic, even though this was also read by St Thomas Aquinas. Hence, the corpora to be analysed are too long for us to traverse the whole path of logical thought, respectively? 435 folios in the Philosophia Platonica, by Friar Gaspar da Madre de Deus, and 280 folios within the Cursus Philosophicus, by Friar Manuel dos Anjos. For this reason, the attention is strongly centred on the definition of the terms in each one of the corpora. So let us start with the Benedictine one.

2.3. We shall analyse three specific points of the logic as proposed by Friar Gaspar, namely: first, “’nature, existence and distinction of logic’; second, the ‘properties of logic’ (respectively chapter 2 and chapter 3 of the first book), and third ‘if the concept of virtue is a Platonian idea’” (book III, chapter 1, proposition 6). Hence, we shall be following this format for all similar quotations: III, 1, prop 6). The third point shall be analysed only to check how platonic the philosophical understanding of the author actually is. Regarding the first point mentioned, the chapter on the nature, existence and distinction of logic takes up just over ten folios (16-26). There is a definition in the first proposition, and each proposition is divided into arguments (I, 2, prop. 1, fol. 16; the terms in italics replace an underlined section in the original text):

Logic, also known as Dialectics, is defined as the ability to teach a certain kind of Science. By definition, well understood, its essence, or its common concept, is an essence of frailness of expression, and shows what is not anything else or does not differ from the defined. We therefore define it as something we know as the essence of logic and not as assigned to what is essential for teaching skills, themselves. On the other hand, Logic, Metaphysics and the different sciences have this characteristic capacity, and there are many different ways of teaching, as many as the different sciences that exist, as well as knowing what the different teaching methods consist of, as stated in our definition regarding typology and specific differences; if this is well understood.

Por outro lado, a Lógica, a Metafísica e as diversas ciências têm essa faculdade, e há diversos modos de ensinar tantas quantas são as ciências que existem, além de se conhecer em que consistem os diversos modos de ensinar como consta em nossa definição em relação ao gênero e às diferenças específicas; se bem entendido¹³.

Logic is the general capacity of scientific understanding: that which qualifies for scientific knowledge as such but does not get confused with the format that teaching acquires. The definition as proposed by Friar Gaspar - what we know as the essence of logic, and not how one assigns something to what is essential for the skill of teaching - places logic in a specific place. I mean, the essence of logic refers to the way in which we can know something. In this sense, it is the human intellective capacity to assimilate a certain object. This does not include what is essential for the skill of teaching; in other words, the essence of logic is distinct from the teaching method, because each specific science (logic, metaphysics, or any other science) has its own method. Hence, logic is not a teaching method, but what qualifies the individual for rational knowledge of any object, while the method of teaching science, whatever it may be, depends on the specificity of this science, and for this reason a range of sciences (aliis scientiis) necessarily involve a multiplicity of teaching methods (pluri docens modum sciendi). The sequence of the proposition also brings an additional two reasons: one reaffirming the specific nature of each science, and the other distinguishing the types of sciences, with a division between practical and theoretical (utentes et docentes), like ethics and philosophy, for example.

The second proposition brings an internal division regarding the way logic is used: artificial, current, and habitual, analytic and metaphysical (I, 2, prop. 2, fols. 18 and 19). Artificial logic refers to the use of logic to establish arguments that are formally correct; the current and habitual is the one that refers to non-contradictory forms of discourse; analytic logic refers to the methods of establishment of scientific discourse and demonstrative reasons; finally, metaphysical logic investigates the conditions of knowledge with regard to metaphysical realities. Next, propositions 3 and 4 (I, 2, prop. 3 and 4, fols. 19-26) establish distinctions between current and habitual logic (utentes et docentes). This is, therefore, a case of the distinctions between the practical and the theoretical use of logic: the use of logic within the space of ethical decision and its function within the establishment of scientific demonstrations.

Moving on, in the next item (I, 3, prop. 1 and 2), there is a discussion of two points: first, if logic is a form of science, and second, if this is a speculative practical form of exercise (habitus). With regard to the first point, the answer is sustained based on four key arguments: first (folios 26 to 28), the object of a Science needs to exist: in the case of the object of logic, it is impossible to know what it is without the habit of logical analysis, hence the object (which, indeed, is logical analysis) must also exist (necessitas existentiae). As it is impossible to conceive the existence of the world without a Creator, it is also impossible for there to be knowledge without a cognoscent form of logic (necessitas hipothetica). The author makes the second argument in a syllogistic manner (fols. 28 and 29), “logic is not a Science, but this cannot even be stated”¹⁴. It is worth stating here that the denial of the possibility of logic being taken as a science is denial of the whole possibility of science in itself. Sequentially, the third argument is also syllogistic (folios 29 and 30): “a necessary proposition is sufficient to indicate the object of Science, and then, in Logic, there are many necessary propositions, hence logic is science”¹⁵. Negatively, the refusal of the object of logic (the necessary propositions) would be equivalent to a denial of any form of science, which is not the case here. The fourth argument (folio 30): a hypothetical proposition is able to identify the object of a science; in this case, there are many hypothetical propositions taken as valid, meaning that soon there will be the need for logical science capable of analysing such a proposition. With this statement, the author staunchly rejects the possibility of scepticism and reaffirms his confidence on the certainty of logical and rational knowledge. This means that logic is not just a form of dialectics, but of all sciences, even though each one follows their own method.

Folios 31 to 36 are reserved for the analysis based on the nature of logic, and whether this is a speculative or a practical exercise (habitus speculativus vel practicus). Friar Gaspar proposes four distinctions with regard to the nature of logic (folio 31): (i) whether it is simply speculative (simpliciter speculativa), (ii) or whether this is as simply speculative as simply practical (practicam simpliciter), (iii) or whether this is simply practical, (iv) or if it is simply practical, and speculative at a second level. The answer has been divided into two parts, with the first bringing up three key arguments: 1) logic is a speculative science, as any form of definition and analysis of knowledge is in itself simply speculative (fol. 31); 2) ‘the habit, whose purpose is the truth, is simply speculative; on the other hand, the purpose of logic is the truth; hence, it is a speculative exercise¹⁶” (fol. 33); 3) the exercising of knowledge is distinct for each branch of science, but the final goal is always the same, that of knowing, and one cannot know anything without practising speculative exercises (folio 33). Once the arguments of the first part have been considered, we shall now consider the others, of the second part: (4) any science is necessarily founded with a demonstration, and establishment of a demonstration requires some arguments of a speculative ilk, as ‘it is demonstration that should produce science’ (demonstratio debet generare scientiam: fol. 35) and (5) this argument is based on the distinction between the distinction of the scientific methods, as there are some that have practical services, and that secondarily have a speculative ilk (productive sciences). There are others that have speculative habits and, secondarily, have a practical ilk (ethics and politics). In this case, logic serves no practical purposes. Its main function is instrumentalisation of science for the speculative analysis of its assumptions; for this reason, it is a merely speculative science (simpliciter speculativam: fol. 36). (simpliciter speculativam: fol. 36).

This having been said, Friar Gaspar not only manages to prove the scientific nature of logic, as also distinguishes it from practical and productive science, for being merely speculative. Reaching this point, all that remains is the issue concerning the Platonic inspiration (idea Platonis). This point would be summed up in the first paragraph of the discussion (III, 1, prop. 6, fol. 153): turning to the position of the nominalists, a position that would not be sustained, as this is not only a question of a discursive order, meaning that it shall not suffice as it is not enough to distinguish what is and what is not communicable by words (non-omnibus, et vocibus); with regard to the peripathetic elements, one must notice that not the whole of reality gets reduced to things (arte in rebus), as there are many things that do not get confused with the real or the material, and they do not make any distinction between what is real and the inferior realities (non distinguitur realiter ab inferioribus); Finally, the Platonics are the only ones to establish an adequate between the inferior realities of the real world and the other dimensions that exist (ab inferioribus realiter distinguitur et existens ante omne <aliorum> illus). The peripathetics have depreciated that which Aristotle himself (in Metaphysics, I, 6, 7 and 8) taught about Plato. In addition, here we see Platonic heritage in authors such as Appuleius, Eustachaeus, Bessalion, Seneca, Augustine of Hippona, Apuleio, Eustáquio, Bessalion, Seneca, Augustine of Hippo, Justin the Martyr, St Thomas, Augustine “Euguvinas”, Durandus, and so on, including John Caramuel. It is important to observe that João Caramuel (1606-1682) was a Spanish member of the Cistercians who had been highly praised and followed by Father Friar Gaspar da Madre de Deus. Caramuel, who had stood out mainly for the assimilation he had made, stands out for the assimilation that he made of Cartesian Physics, and as a forefather of predictive logic and philosophy of language (Marechal, 1951). This Cartesian heritage provides evidence of the ‘modernisation’ of the Benedictine, and the platonic inheritance is recommended. We do not analyse the extension of the argument but seeing that it extends from the first part of folio 153 to the middle of folio 154, after which there is an appendix through to folio 167, dedicated to the defence of the Divine Philosopher (varii proponitur modi explicandi et defendendi Philosophum divinum), there is no doubt regarding the consideration of Friar Gaspar by Plato.

2.4. The fourth and last manuscript of this analysis is the Cursus Philosophicus, penned by Friar Manuel dos Anjos, and the part received to here shall be the Tractatus secundus: Logicae (fols. 67-91). The reason is obvious, as this deals with in natura (unity or doubt), object (material or formal), quality (science of art, practical science, or specularity), of logic, as the nature of other sciences. The manuscript is divided into three books, and each book is divided into treatises. The disputes were split into questions, and these in chapters. These disputes were then distributed in numbered chapters, so the references shall indicate, for example, a reference of Book I, Tract II, t. II, single presentation, cap. 1, par. 3, folio 68 (please read: I, ii, disp. un. q. 1, chap. 1 §3, fol. 68). Analysing what the logic is according to Friar Manoel dos Anjos, formally this is the most systematic essay and is very symptomatic, which is duly caused by the fact that this is a recompilatum (revision) essay, we therefore consider the logic according to Friar Manuel dos Anjos (I, ii, disp. un. q. 1, cap. 1 §1, fol. 68):

The concept of logic comes from the Greek word Logos, which means both reasoning and reason, and can be defined thus: logic is the science of discourse and reasoning. See the first paragraph of the first paper: logic can be divided into artificial and natural, Natural [logic] is an intellectual virtue in itself, through which, even without rules, divisions, definitions, arguments or principles are made. Artificial logic is the set of principles and set rules, through which divisions, definitions and arguments are operated. It is divided into universal and particular. Universal artificial logic deals with the rules as common to all sciences. Particular artificial logic deals with the rules for any one particular science. Logic can also be divided into teaching logic and practical logic. Among the Greeks, teaching is seen as something independent while practice refers to rules for joint things. The logic of teaching is the one that sets rules for exercising instrumental logic, while the logic of use is the rule itself, transmitted by the teacher.¹⁷

The first aspect that impresses in this definition is the conceptual precision and also the rigor with which the author establishes divisions and definitions. In addition, both the resource to etymology of the word and the indication of the internal parallel of the text (vide primum paragraphum primi tractatus) show the clear conscience of a well-written and well-revised work. On returning to the point shown, we find not only the definition of logic, but also of dialectics and operations of the intellect (I, i, introd. §1, fol. 14):

Logic is defined as the intellect’s capacity to prescribe the method of investigation of the truth, which some people also call dialectics. The tern ‘logic’ comes from the Greek Logos, whose Latin meaning can be defined as internal discourse or reasoning, and for this reason logic can be seen as the capacity of reasoning. The term ‘dialectics’ comes from the Greek word Dialegoma, and the corresponding Latin word is dispute (disputatio). Hence, both mean the capacity of dispute, which is why the two terms are used interchangeably, from there we gather that, based on the term ‘logic’, there are three operations of the intellect: simple apprehension, judgement, and discourse¹⁸.

This said, the author remembers that each of these terms needs to be understood in an appropriate way, as their rules and specificities in each aspect. For this reason, as many subdivisions as necessary shall be made, so that the text shall be easily understood. This means that one must highlight not only the awareness of density of content, but also pedagogical concern in the exhibition of the matter. On comparing the texts, we see that the exhibition present on folio 68 is just a retake of a precedent definition that has been explained in much more detail on folio 14. Once again, one can clearly see the author’s rigour and care when preparing the text. Next (I, ii, disp. un. q. 1, cap. 1 §2, fol. 68), he completes the definition of logic:

Both teaching logic and practical logic are divided into current and habitual. Habitual teaching logic is the habit itself, which means an effort by the intellect in assimilation of rules for division, definition, and argumentation., Current [logic] is the intellective act itself, as the exercise of understanding of the rules for division, definition, and argumentation. Habitual practical logic is the logic act itself, the intellectual disposal to which intelligence inclines, and then is willing to use the rules learnt in teaching of the use of logical terms. Current practical logic is an exercise of the intellect through which it produces logical devices, through which knowledge is obtained¹⁹.

This is the way in which the author defines logic and its functions. Apart from terminological rigour, the Latin wording is also worth highlighting due to the quality of the writing. Among the preceding ones, the one that comes closest is the Benedictine, but one must also not forget the length of the texts, which facilitate exposure and argumentative precision. For this reason, we return to the Franciscan’s manuscript and, to somewhat abridge the text, it is worth mentioning the way he answers the question regarding whether logic is science or art (inquirit an logica sit scientia, vel ars). Here is the answer (I, ii, disp. un. q. 3, cap. 1 ¶1, fol. 83):

In this theme there are four positions: two extreme and two intermediates. The first extreme position denies that teaching logic and practical logic are the same; the second says that both are extreme in science; the first intermediate admits that the teaching of logic is not a science, while practical logic would be indistinct in other sciences, as it would be science itself. This means that the second intermediate is in opposition to the first, which seems to be the case, even for Scotus, but there are still some doubts about whether it would be a science in all aspects²⁰.

The base for the debate between the four positions having been placed, Friar Manuel dos Anjos goes straight to the answer to the question that shall take up the 8 following paragraphs, in which he textually quotes the position held by Duns Scotus who follows Thomas Aquinas in the third question of the comment to the Sophistic Refutations and also mentions the books Ethics VI,3 and VII, 3; Metaphysics I and Rhetoric I. The conclusion is predictable from the references mentioned. About the two final chapters of the issue being discussed (I, ii, disp. un. q. 3), he looks into whether logic is a practical form of science or a speculative one, and if its nature distinguishes it, from the composition of other sciences. Once again, one must mention the references on which he bases the construction of his answers: De anima I,3; Duns Scotus, in Metaphysicae VI, q. 1; and Aristotle, Metaphysics VI, 1 and The Prior Analytics I, 1. The references are not only precise but also bring the key points for discussing the issue. Friar Manuel dos Anjos is strict regarding use of sources and the mention of each reference, which is another valuable indicator to think of the meaning and content of the philosophy practised in the long-distant 18th Century in the Brazilian Midwest.

By way of conclusion

We have introduced the text with a precise hypothesis: not only is there a Brazilian colonial philosophy, but also it has characteristics of modern Cartesian philosophy. It is worth adding that this is not an end point, but just a statement of progress made so far in this research. This means that there are other aspects that can and should be considered as the investigation progresses. Now, there is a need to present the answer considering the initial hypothesis.

First, the statements made by Sílvio Romero and Antonio Paim, justifying the imagined lack of a ‘philosophical mind’ among Brazilians assume the expression of Tobias Barreto, so dear to both and resulting in Romero’s general formulation (1878, p.1): “Philosophy in the first three centuries of our existence was not totally strange”. Those manuscripts that we highlighted (1725 to 1756) do not allow a generalisation to the whole colonial period but are sufficient to show the vigour of academic production in only four colonial schools, without demeaning others that existed. Were this the case, we could recommend other writings, of both earlier and later dates, with the same content, but this would not be possible due to the length of this work. With the colonial corpora duly highlighted, it is no longer possible to confirm the absence of a systematic and rigorous philosophical production; Denial of such production is only possible with significant ill will and, consequently, outside the realm of philosophy. Therefore, there is a long philosophical production still to be studied, and in this regard, it is impossible to deny this philosophy.

Secondly, we proposed to analyse the concept of logic in the four colonial corpora. The corpus by Bento da Fonseca does not present an explicit definition of the object. Even so, we can see how logic operates, both in the definition of the being and its predicates, as also in the definition of formal, instrumental, natural, and conventional signs, and in the definition of the clause and the different forms of syllogism. In this regard, it uses a manualistic understanding of logic, but this is enough to know how it was appropriated at the Second Jesuit Scholastic. Turning to the text by Friar Inácio da Conceição, there is no formulation of logic in the strict sense. The Carmelite presents logic as a condition of the world, after the incarnation of the Logos. It does not appear to disregard the function of academic logic, but his argument goes in the direction of a criticism of the limitation of logic based on natural reason and, hence, of the need for the human being to be open to the logic of divine grace. In the third corpus, Friar Gaspar da Madre de Deus shows all the rigour in the definition of logic and dialectics, also distinguishing between logic and teaching method. It is obviously a speculative science, either by its format or its content, and its best expression lies in the works of Plato. Nominalists are not good logicians because they limit rational work to criticism of the world, and the peripathetics are not either, as they limit everything to the real. Fortunately, the Platonics perform much better, keeping open the relationship between the real world and the transcendent world of ideas. Finally, the corpus by Friar Manuel dos Anjos does only not succeed in showing the nature and function of logic as much as they propose definitions of teaching logic and practice logic, the functions of the intellect (apprehension, judgement, and discourse), the method of logic and also its purpose: ‘prescribe the true investigation method’. This is not all, but it readdresses characteristics of the four corpora. The first seems to be the synthesis of a treatise wider in scope and the second just situates a new way of understanding logic, namely the style like tardy Greek philosophy of the Holy Fathers. The other two authors characterise the recognition of a systematic form of logic.

The third aspect refers to the modernising philosophical elements in the writings, Regarding the first two - Jesuit and Carmelite - it is difficult to say much, except that they show evidence of their loyalty to the mediaeval authors. In this case one must not forget that the Ratio Studiorum already shows itself to be staunchly against forms of novelty. In addition, neither of them loses, as genuine writings of a Second Scholastic. As for the last two - Benedictine and Franciscan - there is no doubt that the show good things about modern philosophy. And this is not just because they mention modern philosophers: Durandus and João Caramuel, who were directly involved in modern thought according to the writings of the Benedictine, also quote such modern thinkers as Pierre Gassendi, Francis Bacon and René Descartes who, in the test by the Franciscan, is his main interlocutor. Another factor to bear in mind is that the Benedictine and the Franciscan have an unusual centrality in the distribution of the corpora, on dedicating, respectively, 435 and 279 folios to logic, 354 to physics, respectively, while not a single folio was used for coverage of metaphysics, except a mere 50 folios on the manuscript of the Franciscan. What other reason would there be to attach so much centrality do physics and show disregard for metaphysics, other than some modernising trend in thought?

This means that denial of the existence of colonial philosophical works is only possible for those who show disregard for historical research or who cling to the very negation of science. As we are talking here about Brazilian colonial philosophy, should anyone wish to deny its existence, they shall do this philosophically, which means justifying the arguments.

Primary References

• BENTO DA FONSECA SJ; FRANCISCO XAVIER SJ. Mappam Philosophicam in Quatuor Veluti Regiones, Rationalem, Naturalem, Animasticam, & Transnaturalem. Coimbra: Benedictum Seco Ferreyra / Sancti Officij, 1730.
• FREI GASPAR DA MADRE DE DEUS. Philosophia platonica seu Cursus Philosophicus Rationalem, Naturalem et Transnaturalem Philosophiam sive Logicam, Phisicam et Metaphysicam (1748). São Paulo, Biblioteca do Mosteiro de São Bento.
• FREI INÁCIO DA CONCEIÇÃO; FREI ANTÔNIO DE ARAÚJO. Conclusiones Theologicas de Ineffabili Incarnatione Mysterio. Carmeli Paraensi Conuentu. In: Marques, L. Á. Corpus Paraensis. Educação e Filosofia, Uberlândia, v. 35, n. 74, p. 1-24, maio/ago. 2021c. Disponível em: https://doi.org/10.14393/REVEDFIL.v35n74a2021-63280 Acesso em: 18 mar. 2022.
  » https://doi.org/10.14393/REVEDFIL.v35n74a2021-63280
• FREI MANUEL DOS ANJOS. Cursus philosophicus et recompilatum. Porto: Biblioteca Pública Municipal, Manuscrito 380, 1756.

Secondary literature

• BARRETO, T. Questões vigentes. Obras completas, volume IX. Rio de Janeiro: Gráfica Editora de Paulo Pongetti & C., 1926.
• FREITAS, M. B. C. Teoria do conhecimento. In: MERINO, J. A.; MARTÍNEZ FRESNEDA, F. (orgs.) Manual de filosofía fransciscana. Petrópolis: Vozes, 2006.
• GUIMARÃES ROSA, J. Grande sertão: veredas. Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, 1958.
• MARECHAL, J. Précis d’Histoire de la Philosophie Moderne, tome 1: de la Renaissance a Kant. Bruxelles: Universelle; Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1951.
• MARGUTTI, P. História da filosofia do Brasil (1500-1822), vol. 1. São Paulo: Loyola, 2013.
• MARQUES, L. Á. A filosofia e suas formas: entre a metafísica e a ética. In: MARGUTTI, P. (org.) Vº Colóquio Pensadores Brasileiros. Porto Alegre, RS: Fi, 2021b.
• MARQUES, L. Á. A lógica da necessidade: o ensino de Rodrigo Homem no Colégio do Maranhão (1720-1725). Porto Alegre, RS: Fi, 2018.
• MARQUES, L. Á. Em busca de uma filosofia colonial brasileira. Veritas (Porto Alegre), v. 66, n. 1, e39730, 2021a. Disponível em: https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2021.1.39730 Acesso em: 3 mar. 2022.
  » https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2021.1.39730
• PAIM, A. Etapas iniciais da filosofia brasileira. Londrina: UEL, 1998.
• PORFÍRIO. Introdução de Porfírio. Trad. G. B. V. Paiva (s/d) da edição de A. Busse: Porphyrii Isagoge, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca IV, 1 Berlin, 1887. Disponível em: https://fdocumentos.com/reader/full/porfirio-introducao-isagoge Acesso em: 3 dez. 2021.
  » https://fdocumentos.com/reader/full/porfirio-introducao-isagoge
• ROMERO, S. A philosophia no Brasil. Porto Alegre: Deutsche Zeitung, 1878.
• STORCK, A. C. A noção de indivíduo segundo Santo Tomás de Aquino. Analytica (Rio de Janeiro), vol. 3, n. 2, p. 13-53, 1998. Disponível em <https://revistas.ufrj.br/index.php/analytica/article/view/429/386> Acesso em 17.3.2022.
  » https://revistas.ufrj.br/index.php/analytica/article/view/429/386

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  Conclusiones Theologicas de Ineffabili Incarnatione Mysterio. Praeside Ignatio a Conceptione, Sacrae Theologiae Lectore. Sustentaturus Fr. Antonius de Araujo. In Carmeli Paraensi Conuentu Die 26 hujus Vespere.
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  The manuscript on paper books is in Marques, L. A. A Física de Aristóteles: Os manuscritos inéditos do Anonymous Paraensis e de Bento da Fonseca, SJ. In: César Oswaldo Ibarra; Celina Ana Lértora Mendoza. (Org.). XVIII Congreso Latinoamericano de Filosofía Medieval: Respondiendo a los Retos del Siglo XXI desde la Filosofía Medieval. Buenos Aires: Celina Ana Lértora, 2021c. Available at <http://www.redlafm.org/congreso2021.html> Accessed on 5.3.2022. The text on slavery is part of the book Escritos sobre escravidão, organized by me and by João Paulo R. Pereira (Porto Alegre: Fi, 2020) and two more papers - Conclusiones morales por injuriis circa bonum famae and Conclusiones Theologicas de Ineffabili Incarnatione Mysterio - are in the article Corpus Paraensis (Revista Educação e Filosofia, Uberlândia, v. 35, n. 74, p. 1-24, May/August. 2021d. Available at: <https://seer.ufu.br/index.php/EducacaoFilosofia/article/view/63280/33138> Accessed on: 16.3.2022).
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  ...ad laudem Dei unius, et trini, Purissimae que Virginis Matris Mariae, et Sanctissimi Pater Noster Francisci, Divi que Antonii hujus Colegii titularis Maximi, Divi que Bernardini Serenensis, cujus festi diem 8um hodie 97 May celebramus, et nostri Compendii primae parti finem ponimus.
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  In construenda nostri Universalis materia Reali Realium sententiae adhaeremus, acerrimeque propugnamos Realem Universalis materiam esse Unum totum potentiale objective simplex. Hinc inferes, inter gradus metaphysicos creatos dari distinctionem objectivam. Quaeres 1. Utrum inter gradus metaphysicos creatos intercedere possit Distinctio formalis ex natura rei Scotistica? Quaeres 2. An saltem illa mirabilis Distinctio virtualis intrinseca transferenda sit ad creata? Duplici quaestio unica negatione facimus satis. Implicat Distinction Realis Intentionalis Bacchonica. Unum totum reale intentionale a parte rei existens nec est, nec esse potest apta universalis materia. Consequenter affirmamus, placitum aliquorum Scotistarum nobis non placere; nam terminis judicamus.
• 5
  Individuum primae intentionis juxta S. Thomam definitur: Id, quod est indivisum in se, et divisum a quovis alio ultima divisione. Secundae intentionis sic: Id, quod aptum est esse, vel praedicari de uno tantum. Quinque numeramos Individui species. Individuum vagum in rerum natura nullatenus (nallatenus, in the original) agnoscimus. Dubitabis hic, et principaliter: Utrum differentiae individuantes possint esse Universales? Non possunt. Differentia maxime propria consistit formaliter in ipsa entitate rei differentis. In modo essendi, et praedicandi per modum formae perficientis, et determinantis excedit differentia genus, quod contrahit; in modo autem praedicandi subsistenter excedit genus differentiam. Differentia prout est tertio praedicabile definitur Id, quod aptum est esse, vel praedicari de pluribus in quale essentiale. Proprium ex vi nominis proprie definitur Id, quod alicui peculiare est. Prout vero est quartuor modo est quartum praedicabile, et est contra. Si quaeras: In quo sita sit convenientia proprii quarti modi? Non sine responsione abibis. Quintum praedicabile definitur Id, quod aptum est esse, vel praedicari de pluribus in quale contingenter. Accidens reale positivum, vel negativum non potest esse quintum praedicabile pro esse actuali ante sui, et subjectorum existentiam. Potest tamen esse, si sumatur pro esse de futuro.
• 6
  Individuum autem est quod est in se indistinctum, ab aliis vero distinctum.
• 7
  Sed individuum dupliciter potest significari vel per nomen secundae intentionis, sicut hoc nomen ‘individuum’ vel ‘singulare’, quod non significat rem singularem, sed intentionem singularitatis; vel per nomen primae intentionis, quod significat rem, cui convenit intentio particularitatis...
• 8
  The Greek and Latin concepts respectively are γένος or genus, διαφορὰ or differentia, εἶδος or species, ἴδιον or proprium and συμβεβηκός or accidens.
• 9
  Est autem genus quidem ut animal, species vero ut homo, differentia autem ut rationale, proprium ut risibile, accidens ut album, nigrum, sedere.
• 10
  Incarnationis Mysterium esse possibile negare poterit solus, qui incarnationem de facto esse, et existere non concesserit; nam qui hujus existentiae lucem habet illam possibilitatem affirmare tenetur. Haec tamen possibilitas non est naturaliter demonstrabilis, nec post habitam hujus Mysterii Reuelationem potest creatura aliqua solo lumine naturali judicium positiue probabile de illius possibilitate formare.
• 11
  Terminus assumens in hoc ineffabili composito Christi Domini, est Verbum Diuinum; cum autem in verba sit ratio personalitatis sibi propriae, et ratio communis naturae tribus personis, difficultas est: An Verbum Divinum terminauerit unionem hypostaticam ratione praedicati absoluti, an solum secundum relativum?
• 12
  Natura enim Diuina nec per se ipsam, nec per suam existentiam, nec per subsistentiam absolutam potest veniri humanitati.
• 13
  Logica quae est Dialectica vocis, definitur: facultas docens modum sciendi. Per definitio: illa est bona definitivo, qua dicta et recepta fragilissime conceptu essentia vel definitae, et quae non convenit alteri vel diversae a differentia; atque ita nostra definitione, cognoscimus tam essentiam logicae et propter hanc nihil assignatur quid essentialiter sit facultas docens scire, quo nostra definitio est bona. Contra, per tali facultas convenit Logica et Philosophia Metaphysica et aliis scientiis, quae omnes sit facultatis et pluri docens modum sciendi ab omnibus difert qua omnes aliae scientiae docent, aliud, quam scire ipsum modum sciendi ut sic quo nostra definitio consistat genere, et diferentia communer, seguitur quae est bona.
• 14
  Logica non est scientia, nula datur scientia, sed hoc non est dicendum.
• 15
  Propositio necessaria sufficiet datur objectum scientiae, atque logica dabit plures propositiones necessarias: quo logica est scientia.
• 16
  Ille habitus est speculativus simpliciter, cujus fines est veritas; atque finis logicae est veritas ; quo logica est habitus speculativus.
• 17
  Logica derivatur a verbo greco Logos, quid sermonem seu rationem significat, quare logica sic potest definiri: logica est scientia sermocinalis, suo rationalis: vide primum paragraphum primi tractatus: logica divitur in artificialem, et naturalem. Naturalis est ipsa virtus intellectiva, qua quis absque regulis aliquas divisiones, definitiones, et argumentationes, seu discursus facit. Artificialis est congerus preceptorum, et regularum quibus dividitur, definitur, et argumentatur. Logica artificialis dividitur in universalem, et particularem. Universalis est, quae tradit regulas omnibus scientiis communes. Particularis est, quae tradit regulas ad particularem scientiam. Altera divisio logicae est in docentem et utentem: Inter grecos docens vocatur a rebus avulsa, et utens rebus conjuncta. Logica docens est quae tradit regulas ad conficientum instrumentum logicale. Utens voco est, quae utitur regulis a docente traditis.
• 18
  Logica sic definitur: facultas prescribens intellectus modum indagandi veritatem; ab aliquibus vocatur Dialectica. Logica derivatur a verbo graeco Logos , quod latinae idem sonat, ac sermo internus seu ratiotinatio, et sic idem est Logica, ac facultas ratiotinandi. Dialecticae dicitur a verbo graeco Dialegomae, quod latinae idem est ac disputatio; et sic idem est dialecticae, ac facultas disputandi: unde logica hoc duplici nomine insigniri solet, sed in re idem esse videtur: ex utroque colligitur, quod terminis logicae est dirigere onmes tres operationes intellectus in ordine ad bene disputandum: et cum operationes intellectus sint tres, nempe, simplex apprehensio, judicium, et discursus.
• 19
  Logica tam docens, quam utens dividuntur in actualem, et habitualem. Logica docens habitualis est habitus, suo facilitis in intellectu ad cognoscendas regulas dividendi, definiendi, et argumentandi. Actualis est actus intellectus, quo exercite cognoscuntur regulae dividendi, definiendi, et argumentandi. Logica utens habitualis est habitus, seu facilitas in intellectu, quo intellectus est inclinatus, et dispositus ad utendum regulis a logica docente traditis ad conficiendos in terminos logicos. Utens actualis est actus intellectus, quo actualer conficit artefactos logicos, quo scito.
• 20
  In hac re dantur quattuor sententiae, duas extremae, et duae mediae: prima extrema negat logicam tam docentem, quam utentem esse scientiam; secunda extrema docet utramque esse scientiam; prima media tenet logicam docentem non esse scientiam, utentem voco esse scientiam afirmat non distinctam ab aliis scientiis, sed esse ipsamet scientias; secunda media et contra se habet, haec est scito, et Scotarum, sed adhuc dubitatur an sit scientia quoad omnes suas partes.

Publication Dates

• Publication in this collection
  27 Oct 2023
• Date of issue
  2023

History

• Received
  07 Mar 2023
• Accepted
  21 July 2023