Abstract
In this paper, I analyse the discussion about perceptual conceptualism and non-conceptualism transferred to the phenomena of aspect perceptions presented by Ludwig Wittgenstein in the Part titled “Philosophy of Psychology” ofPhilosophical Investigations. In doing so, I will reconstruct these positions by collecting some of the main theses of those who have taken a position in the contest. I will focus on the contributions of Sonia Sedivy and Charles Travis on behalf of conceptualism and the non-conceptualist defence of Avner Baz about aspects of these phenomena. As a result, the examination calls into question the terms of the debate between conceptualism and non-conceptualism. In this sense, the primary purpose of this research is negative since I will limit myself to sustain that neither of the presented positions is an adequate characterisation of the content of Wittgensteinian aspect perception.
Keywords:
Wittgenstein; Aspect Perception; Conceptualism; Non-conceptualism